Causality, realism and the two strands of Boltzmann's legacy (1896 - 1936) by Stöltzner, Michael
Causality, Realism and the Two Strands 
of Boltzmann’s Legacy (1896-1936) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Michael Stöltzner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades  
im Fach Philosophie 
an der Universität Bielefeld 
 
 
 
 
Bielefeld, Mai 2003 
 2
 3
Preface 
 
The ideas presented here have a relatively long history. It reaches back to the 
year 1995 when I had finished my master thesis in mathematical physics and 
became interested in the philosophy of science. In those days, the Vienna Circle 
had become a great opportunity for me to simultaneously learn philosophy of 
science and start genuine research work. Here was a philosophy that started with 
the criticism of the philosophy I knew reasonably well from my earlier studies, 
by referring to the physics I knew or could quickly understand after working 
through old textbooks. Quite at the beginning of my reading and writing I 
bought Karl von Meyenn’s nice collection about the Forman debate. I was 
stunned. Frank’s book on causality from which I learned quite a lot, to Forman’s 
mind, contained “largely blather”. There was Hans Reichenbach who despite all 
scientific world-view (not: weltanschauung) rapidly “confessed” to irrationalism 
and camouflaged existentialism as Logical Empiricism. 
 I decided to write an essay review which listed all the misunderstandings 
of Logical Empiricists I had found. For various reasons the review never made it 
into print until I understood that this was a fortunate outcome. Criticizing 
Forman by spotting misunderstandings of still widely unknown figures, among 
them Frank and von Mises, would have been an original contribution, but not an 
interesting one. The debates about Forman had already been fought in the 1980s. 
Everyone knew that one could do better now! Since 1971 history of science has 
undergone a rapid development not the least as regards it methodological 
abilities. Among them is the perspective of local traditions which has shown its 
relevance for the Vienna Circle. I mainly owe it to my partner Veronika Hofer 
that my interest for and insight into the history of science proper has developed 
over the years. 
 The most important discovery for the present book was the personality of 
Franz Serafin Exner and his unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Gegenwart 
(1923). Exner provides the missing historical link between the older generation 
of Mach and Boltzmann and the younger generation of Schrödinger, Frank and 
von Mises. It was through his synthesis of Mach’s empiricism, Boltzmann’s 
indeterminism, and Fechner’s relative frequency interpretation of probability, 
that Vienna Indeterminism becomes at all a coherent tradition.  
The first outline of the project was presented in June 1997 in a talk at the 
University of Trieste. It became more pointed in a paper I contributed to a 
Synthese volume on Boltzmann and in a talk given at Florence in 1999. But it 
only reached it final phase when I went to the University of Bielefeld in 2001. 
That the already existing bits and pieces finally came together in this book owes 
much to Martin Carrier’s effective insistence to complete it as my belated Ph.D. 
thesis. His very detailed criticism of earlier drafts has significantly contributed 
to focusing the book’s main thrust. 
I am also greatly indebted to Maria Carla Galavotti, Michael 
Heidelberger, Eckehart Köhler, Friedrich Stadler, and Thomas Uebel, for so 
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many hints and encouragement over the years. Their influence is looming at 
large in the discussions on probability and the history of the Vienna Circle. 
In connection with those papers on which chapters of the present book are 
based, I owe many thanks to John Blackmore, Erwin Hiebert, Paolo Parrini, 
Merrilee and the late Wes Salmon, and Roger Stuewer for their criticism and 
suggestions. 
In the final phase of the project, Don Howard, David Rowe, and Erhard 
Scholz have made very helpful comments on single chapters. 
Among the others whom I owe thanks for constructive comments during 
various presentations are Mitchell Ash, Herta and the late Kurt Blaukopf, Jeremy 
Butterfield, Nadine DeCourtenay, Henk deRegt, Gregor Schiemann, Matthias 
Schramm, Peter Weingart, and Paul Weingartner. 
All my long educational zigzag paths would have been impossible without 
the almost unconditional support of my parents and grandparents all of whom 
were still alive when I turned from physics back into philosophy. Sadly, three of 
them did not live to see the book completed. 
 
Bibliographical Notes 
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 8 partly draw on material already published before. 
(Stöltzner, 1999, 2000a, 2002b, 2003a) I also owe thanks to various archives. 
The Institute Vienna Circle has allowed me to study the papers of Schlick and 
Neurath. For the permission to quote I thank Anne Kox and the Wiener Kreis 
Stichting. The Österreichische Zentralbibliothek für Physik has most effectively 
supplied copies from the Schrödinger letters and other material. I thank them for 
the permission to quote from letters of Schrödinger. 
 
On translations 
 
As the book is historically oriented, I put the German texts first. Different 
translations of different authors often destroy terminological continuities, 
possible allusions, implicit assent or dissent. Thus I have often intervened into 
translations, occasionally even into those published during an author’s life time. 
Several translations have reduced the italics present in the German original. 
Even though at places this yielded more italics than corresponds to 
contemporary style, I have reintroduced italics everywhere except for the proper 
names. If not indicated otherwise, translations are mine. 
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Introduction 
 
Contemporary debates about the relationship between causality and quantum 
mechanics, both on the historical and on the philosophical level, have been largely 
shaped by the conviction that causality is a concept germane to classical physics and 
becomes problematic or even obsolete on the atomic scale. Philosophers mostly 
reacted, on the one side, by developing concepts of stochastic causality and by 
relinquishing the demand for causality as a precondition of scientific explanation, or, 
on the other side, by developing interpretations of quantum mechanics that restored 
causality at the price of introducing unobservable entities, if not by altering the theory 
in a certain regime presently inaccessible to experiment.1 In philosophical debates 
surrounding quantum mechanics, causality is often paralleled to determinism and 
realism while its failure is seen as a sign of indeterminism and an argument in favor of 
empiricist accounts of explanation. 
 Historians of science, on their part, have mostly been intrigued by the idea that 
the relation between acausality and quantum mechanics was a contingent historical 
fact embedded into the general historical context of the early Weimar republic. That 
even highly formalized scientific theories were thus susceptible to cultural and social 
influences, stood in the trend of overcoming the limitations of an exclusively 
internalist history of ideas and embedding scientific activity into society and culture 
broadly conceived.  
 During the last decade these two strands came into close contact – in contrast to 
the general trend of philosophy of science and history of science moving apart from 
one another. Philosophers found the historical contingency of the Copenhagen 
interpretation not only a convincing case of Duhemian underdetermination of theory 
but also a promising argument in favor of alternative interpretations. Copenhagen, so 
the standard gospel reads, simply won ugly, by sociological rather than by rational 
factors, against deBroglie’s pilot-wave in 1927. And in 1952, Bohm’s new 
interpretation – originally called ‘causal’ – was unfairly neglected because hidden 
variable theories were deemed impossible in a dogmatic fashion. Already in 1982, 
John S. Bell whose famous inequalities of 1965 had turned the tide in favor of a 
revitalized interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics, cited2 Paul Forman’s 
(1971) famous thesis according to which the fathers of quantum mechanics had been 
so strongly affected by the anti-scientific post-war milieu that they prematurely 
abandoned the requirement that a theory of atomic phenomena be causal. In 1994 
James T. Cushing provided a rather detailed alternative history leading straight into a 
causal picture without being deviated to Copenhagen, and without any prospect of ever 
coming there. To a somewhat lesser extent, historians of science have crossed the 
disciplinary borders via the bridge so erected. Mara Beller (1996, 1999), for instance, 
supplies vast historical material to bolster the causal picture. All these authors reject 
any significant influence of well-entrenched philosophical convictions, or the 
                                                          
1 Take (Salmon, 1984 and 1994) and (van Fraassen, 1980) as examples for the first two reactions. Salmon has 
always been very careful about quantum mechanics; cf. his reaction to my attempt to connect his view with one 
particular interpretation (Stöltzner, 1999b, 1999c). Both aspects of the other attitude are most drastically realized 
by the advocates of Bohmian mechanics (Cushing/Fine/Goldstein, 1996), but in principle all current hidden-
variable interpretations in some way or another stress that they are after a causal picture. 
2 (Bell, 1987, p. 166). 
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protagonists’ earlier involvement into philosophical debates, on the debates 
surrounding the development of quantum mechanics during the 1920s. Quantum 
philosophy, so Beller holds, was only erected afterwards as a rhetorical tool against the 
opposition. 
 These recent developments provide the context of the present book. By 
combining historical analysis and philosophical interpretation, it intends to alter the 
above picture in an important respect. The debates about causality in fundamental 
physics in the Weimar epoch – or so I shall argue – were much more subtle than the 
dichotomies presently in use suggest. They had begun long before 1918 and they 
would continue long after 1927. More precisely, in the disputes about Boltzmann’s 
philosophical legacy the prospect of a genuinely indeterministic world-view already 
emerged in the first decade of the century; it found its outspoken opponents shortly 
thereafter. Neither in 1918 nor in 1927 the leading physicists were, accordingly, bare 
of well-developed philosophical convictions on the subject of causality. Although 
these convictions did not have a decisive influence on the course of the theory’s formal 
development, in some cases, they had a stabilizing effect on the individual scientist’s 
research programs. 
It is true, these convictions and even more the terminology they were phrased 
in, developed under scientific and cultural influences. Their philosophizing was not of 
that kind of system philosophy which prevailing in the universities of the day. Rather 
did they follow the well-established model of scientist-philosopher which had emerged 
with Hermann von Helmholtz, for the German tradition indebted to Kant, and Ernst 
Mach, for the Austrian empiricist tradition.3 In the 1920s and 1930s this type of 
philosophizing was an important element for the formation of precisely that style of 
scientific philosophy as exercised by Logical Empiricists which would shape modern 
philosophy of science. No wonder that some Logical Empiricists and some of their 
masters will figure prominently in the story I am going to tell.  
As regards their embedding into academic life, the philosophical debates among 
German physicists followed a typical scheme. Addresses delivered to the whole 
university or another learned institution subsequently went through various journals of 
broader scope and were later assembled into separate books. The appearance of such a 
book typically testified the author’s becoming a scientist-philosopher. After 1913, the 
debate would mainly take place in one particular scientific weekly, Die 
Naturwissenschaften. This autonomy of the philosophical discourse among the 
scientist-philosophers frees the present investigation from the notoriously futile 
problem whether equations are motivated by philosophical concepts or vice versa.  
 I shall not provide a detailed map of the whole terrain of the German debates on 
causality in physics between the year 1896 when the first volume of Boltzmann’s 
Lectures on Gas Theory appeared and the year 1936, when Logical Empiricists gave 
their respective views a definitive form, at a time when most of its remaining 
advocates had already emigrated. But the majority of Forman’s witnesses will appear 
on the scene, and they will appear in two camps, one advocating a break with classical 
causality and the other developing a more liberal view of causality. Instead of trying to 
classify a large heterogeneous community, I shall identify a rather well-entrenched 
dispute about the prospects of genuine indeterminism in physics that waged between 
                                                          
3 While I shall discuss the role of Mach in great detail, for Helmholtz I refer to (Krüger, 1994) and (Schiemann, 
1997). 
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Vienna and Berlin, from Boltzmann’s death in 1906 until deep into the 1930s. 
Membership in either of the two camps was based upon a certain philosophical stance 
concerning the relation between causality and physical ontology. Either one followed, 
together with the Berlinese, Kant by claiming that to stand in a causal relation was a 
condition of the possibility of being real as a physical object (Kant called this 
empirical realism), or one agreed with Mach and the Viennese that causality consisted 
in functional dependences between the determining elements and that physical 
ontology dealt with facts which were stable complexes of such relations. To those 
standing in the Kantian tradition, the second stance was too weak and fell short of the 
aims of scientific inquiry.  
This fundamental distinction paved the way for two interpretations of 
Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics. The debate between Vienna and Berlin basically 
concerned the following aspects. (i) The starting point were the highly improbable 
events that were admitted by Boltzmann’s statistical derivation of the second law of 
thermodynamics. (ii) In a radically empiricist perspective, the intimate relationship 
between Machian causality and a theory-specific ontology could be used to argue that 
the burden of proof was with the determinist who must provide a sufficiently specific 
theory of microphenomena before claiming superiority over a merely statistical theory. 
(iii) There existed two theories of probability which accommodated the strange events 
admitted by the second law. In von Kries’s Spielraumtheorie they were integrated into 
a deterministic Kantian universe. In Fechner’s Kollektivmaßlehre there existed 
collective objects (Kollektivgegenstände) and genuinely statistical laws for them which 
were of no other type than the familiar – apparently deterministic laws.  
Vienna Indeterminism is characterized by the full acceptance of the improbable 
events, a radically empiricist conception of natural law and ontology, and the 
frequentist interpretation of probability. In this full-blown version, it only began with 
Franz Exner and was later advocated, with important internal divergences, by Erwin 
Schrödinger, on the one hand, and Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises, on the other 
hand. Max Planck set out from rejecting all three tenets of Vienna Indeterminism, but 
later reconciled himself with (i). His former student Moritz Schlick approached Vienna 
Indeterminism as far as (ii) is concerned, but never accepted the relative frequency 
interpretation in its strict Viennese reading. 
 These three points and the, more fundamental, disagreement regarding the 
relationship between causality and ontology also provided the background for how 
both camps reacted to the conceptual crises in atomic physics in the early 1920s and to 
the advent of quantum mechanics in 1926. While the Berlinese (Max Planck and the 
early Moritz Schlick) had to substantially modify their notion of causality, the Vienna 
Indeterminists (Franz Exner, Erwin Schrödinger, Philipp Frank, and Richard von 
Mises) could just feel themselves constantly confirmed.  
Finally, in the mid 1930s, at the end of the European phase of Logical 
Empiricism, one can see a twist in the front lines that resulted from a change of focus. 
There was no longer any doubt that the basic theory of nature was statistical, but the 
problem of quantum mechanical ontology received different answers. Schrödinger was 
among those who constantly challenged the generally accepted Göttingen-Copenhagen 
view according to which quantum mechanics was the final word in atomic physics. In 
the 1930s, his philosophical thinking was conceived against this background so that, to 
most readers, he appeared to approach the positions of Planck and Einstein. Yet 
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Schrödinger never abandoned indeterminism and he continued to defend Boltzmann’s 
Bild-realism of scientific theory. It was rather Logical Empiricists who changed their 
views in an important respect when developing to a growing extent the logical analysis 
of science. By developing a verificationist theory of meaning Schlick departed from 
Planck’s realism and approached the Viennese empiricists. In this way he could get 
along with quantum mechanical indeterminism yet without granting statistical 
regularities the status of law. Frank not only approached Schlick’s identification of 
causality and prediction, but he also took a more language-oriented stand based on 
Neurath’s physicalism. These developments permitted Frank and Schlick to find in 
Bohr’s notion of complementarity – as opaque as this declared generalization of 
causality was – a territory to search for rapprochement. An important motivation to 
establish, in this way, a strategic alliance with the Göttingen-Copenhagen group was 
Logical Empiricists’ intention to combat an increasing number of misinterpretations of 
quantum mechanics in which they conceived a return of outdated metaphysics. 
 Before providing a more detailed overview of the book and how it is organized 
into chapters, I shall make some methodological reflections as to how this project sits 
between philosophy and history of science. I will use both philosophical analyses to 
sort out the basic convictions of the two historical strands, and historical methods to 
contextualize the causality debate as a historical phenomenon of its own. And my 
conclusions will be both historical insofar as I claim the factual integrity of a certain 
philosophical tradition supported by a historical context and philosophical insofar as 
Vienna Indeterminism teaches a lesson about the relation between causality and reality 
criteria that might prove helpful in avoiding certain conceptual confusions and the use 
of ill-founded pragmatic criteria of theory choice within present-day philosophical 
debates around quantum mechanics. 
 
 
* 
 
Contacts between historians of science and philosophers of science are not without 
problems. A recent paper by two philosophers of science – to my mind, representing 
the majority view – even diagnoses a “troubling interaction” (Pinnick/Gale, 2000). 
According to standard disciplinary gospel, historians are after narratives, while 
philosophers’ aspirations are normative, even for those who want to ground their 
normative claims in detailed historical analyses. Hence, the truth of a theory is of little 
relevance to historians, while philosophers investigate the context of justification of a 
successful or unsuccessful. 
The Forman debate is a case in point, in particular because it served as an 
influential model for externalist analyses in the history of science. Already its title was 
quite explicit: “Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: 
Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual 
Environment”. Forman (1971) listed a great number of physicists and mathematical 
physicists who, to his mind, sacrificed the demand for a causal explanation of atomic 
phenomena long before quantum mechanics would force them to do so, simply 
because they wanted to conform to the requirements of the post-war Weimar zeitgeist. 
Scientists, in this perspective, were understood as personalities embedded in a 
particular socio-cultural milieu that could even influence the rational content of their 
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theories. Thus not even physics, the most formalized and most precisely measuring 
discipline, proved immune against the prevailing ideologems.  
 The dismissal of internalist history of ideas drastically widened the gap between 
history of science externalistically conceived and philosophy of science, which in the 
1970s stood in the middle of the classical struggles between Karl Popper, Imre 
Lakatos, Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. In Lakatosian terms, Forman’s 
externalist picture was decidedly elitist; it were the leading scientists who set the day’s 
standard of what be considered scientific and they succumbed to the zeitgeist in their 
societal role as Bildungsbürger. Accordingly, all demarcation criteria intended to 
normatively guarantee the rationality of the scientific approach, dissolved into the 
broad socio-cultural context. Consequently, the sociological approach sided with Kuhn 
and Feyerabend’s ‘new epistemology’. Although normal science, so Kuhn continued 
to hold against Popper and Lakatos, was indeed guided by a well-entrenched paradigm 
and had fixed normative standards accepted by the elite, across scientific revolutions 
there was little common ground for the interactions or competitions which Lakatos’ 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programs needed to fully thrive. Albeit not 
incomparable, the old and the new paradigm were incommensurable, and the 
revolutionaries could basically only await the old guard ultimately passing the scepter.  
 There are still many philosophical debates as to whether there are scientific 
revolutions, whether the incommensurability thesis is at all adequate, whether the 
scientific enterprise is rational, etc.4 The present book is not intended as a case study 
for them. But if the concept is at all meaningful, quantum mechanics undoubtedly 
represented a scientific revolution containing at least two discontinuities: the first was 
the emergence of the quantum of action in Planck’s law of radiation – here Kuhn 
(1978) himself contributed a seminal study –, and the second consisted in the almost 
simultaneous introduction of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, which openly displayed 
the limits of the applicability of the concepts of classical physics, and Schrödinger’s 
wave equation, which for a short time promised an return to classical physics.  
 The present book is dedicated – as has been the Forman debate – to the 
discussions about one basic philosophical concept, causality, that was strongly 
influenced by and in turn shaped the interpretative underpinnings of the quantum 
revolution. To Planck and the early Schlick, the demand for causality was tantamount 
to the scientific method and implied ontological commitments as to what scientific 
laws were about. Thus the Berlin tradition experienced quantum mechanics as a 
revolution while the Vienna Indeterminists largely did not. Due to this central role of 
causality, the present investigation does not deal with the development or 
abandonment of one philosophical concept among others. Still, it concerns a single 
philosophical concept rather than the scientific weltanschauung of atomic physicists in 
general. This will require a certain level of philosophical sophistication and to this end 
I shall avail myself of the standard methods of the historiography of philosophy – 
“Begriffsgeschichte”, so to speak – but without tracing philosophical schools gathering 
around the interpretation a few master texts or stressing their constant adherence to a 
particular philosophical ancestry. The causality debate was led by leading scientists 
with philosophical aspirations and by scientist-philosophers rather than by professional 
philosophers. Together with the more famous debate on the concept of space-time 
                                                          
4 See, for instance, (Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey, 2001) and the papers in the first section of (Kampis/Kvasz/ 
Stöltzner, 2002).  
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prompted by relativity theory, this debate contributed to the formation of scientific 
philosophy, or philosophy of science as we know of today. The existence of such an 
autonomous philosophical discourse and its internal dynamic must not be neglected by 
historians of science. It represents a characteristic element of German physics, of no 
less importance than other academic traditions or institutions. 
 The present investigation is not after a full-blown hard core of Boltzmann’s 
statistical mechanics and how this legacy developed – continuously or discontinuously 
– into the hard core of a quantum mechanical research program. Rather does it 
reconstruct the arguments in a particular philosophical debate that explicitly declared 
itself as such. It extended over almost four decades and involved three fundamental 
theories of modern physics: statistical mechanics, relativity theory, and quantum 
physics. These manifold influences and the long period considered make it impossible 
to treat both camps respectively as a set of precise philosophical assertions. The above-
mentioned three aspects are thus rather a framework to be filled with specific 
arguments than a fixed set of dogmas. What remained constant, the relation between 
causality and ontology, had to be adjusted to the respective theories. The divergent 
tendencies resulting from these adjustments are counterbalanced by cohesive historical 
factors: formal and informal institutions, among them the Vienna Institute of Physics 
and the Exner Circle, documented self-identifications with the local tradition by 
members of the second generation, explicit and implicit criticisms of the other side, the 
existence of a renowned forum in which large part of the second half the debate took 
place, and the formation of strategic alliances.  
 Such a combination of philosophical and historical methods for the study of a 
philosophical topic emerging from within science proper is characteristic for a budding 
research field, the history of philosophy of science. This is, to my mind, the most 
suitable classification of the present book’s general approach. 
 
 
* 
 
What stage can the history of philosophy provide for Vienna Indeterminism? There 
exist national traditions in philosophy in a rather general sense. For a dispute over 
causality between Vienna and Berlin the paradigm of ‘Austrian philosophy’ suggests 
itself. With this term Rudolf Haller (1986a) has baptized an intellectual tradition 
prevailing in the Habsburg monarchy since the days of Bernard Bolzano that was 
continued by Franz Brentano and his school, on the one side, and Ernst Mach and the 
Vienna Circle, on the other side. Its core characteristics include a scientific attitude, 
anti-idealism, and the rejection of Kant’s transcendental philosophy in favor of 
Hume’s empiricism – self-identifications that appear in the 1929 manifesto of the 
Vienna Circle and in Neurath’s later chronicles of the movement. Whatever stand one 
takes with respect to the Haller thesis in general,5 one aspect severely limits the value 
of the Austrian philosophy paradigm for a historical contextualization of Vienna 
Indeterminism. Together with modern logic and the positivist tradition, general 
relativity became crucial to the philosophical identity of the Vienna Circle and Logical 
Empiricism. At about 1920, also the Germans Schlick and Reichenbach, who were by 
then general relativity’s most prominent philosophical defenders and who had received 
                                                          
5 See among others (Uebel, 2000), (Stadler, 2001), and (Stöltzner, 1998). 
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their philosophical formation largely by neo-Kantianism, arrived at the rejection of any 
aprioristic conceptions of space and time however relativized, thus establishing the 
future front line against neo-Kantian philosophy of space and time.  
 The present study demonstrates that the front lines on causality were 
significantly different because Schlick’s break with the neo-Kantian tradition would 
take much longer. Moreover, the main defender of deterministic causality in physics, 
Max Planck, was at the same time chiefly responsible for getting relativity theory 
accepted by the German physics community. In contrast, some of the staunchest 
followers of Mach and Brentano opposed relativity theory or advocated an 
interpretation that was starkly different from the one that became seminal for Logical 
Empiricists’ epistemology.6 Still in the mid 1920s, the front line on matters of 
causality, as we shall see, went right through the Vienna Circle roughly separating the 
Austrians Frank and Mises from the German Schlick. But the reason of this division 
reached back to a particular philosophical position shared by both Mach and 
Boltzmann that was much more specific than just being the general empiricist 
tendency in Austrian philosophy.  
 Thus the national philosophical tradition has to be specialized down to the level 
of the local context which the single scientist belonged to. Research programs and 
research traditions are typically not only kept together by a hard core and auxiliary 
hypothesis, but also by scientific communities or other organizational structures. For 
philosophical concepts such a real-world contextualization is less common. As we 
shall see, Vienna Indeterminism emerged in a specific philosophical context within the 
Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna (Sect. 4.7.). There the late Boltzmann 
developed a more radical form of indeterminism than Planck could read in the earlier 
Lectures on Gas Theory (1896, 1898a). It was passed on to the younger generation, 
among them Schrödinger and Frank, by the experimental physicist Exner who enjoyed 
an unprecedented influence on a large circle of pupils (Sect. 4.3.). There are manifold 
references by Vienna Indeterminists emphasizing Exner’s priority for the idea of 
irreducible indeterminism, most prominently by his former assistant Schrödinger. 
Being exceptionally cohesive in spirit and more prone to philosophical reflections than 
comparable institutions, the Institute of Physics also influenced a more informal circle 
at its periphery, the First Vienna Circle comprised of Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto 
Neurath, and occasionally Richard von Mises.  
 During the 1920s the philosophical causality debate mainly took place in the 
scientific weekly Die Naturwissenschaften which, in the struggles about relativity 
theory, had become the principal medium for the discussions among the scientist-
philosophers, among them Logical Empiricists. (Sect. 5.1-5.4) Restricting the textual 
basis mainly to papers published there, one loses only very few of the texts studied by 
Forman. In compensation one can identify a progressive sub-milieu of scientists 
persisting within the anti-scientific general cultural Weimar milieu. The outer 
boundary of this submilieu excludes large part of German university philosophy – the 
‘school philosophy’ in Logical Empiricists’ wording – and those criticizing modern 
physics as a whole, among them Philipp Lenard. 
 Among the texts thus individuated we find a network of affirmative and critical 
references, in particular when alluding to the Mach-Planck polemics. While the 
Viennese repeatedly stressed Exner’s priority for genuine indeterminism, their 
                                                          
6 (See Hentschel, 1990). 
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opponents hardly took notice of him. Apart from such self-identifications, the most 
important element of cohesion is a long series of dialogues between the Vienna 
Indeterminists, on the one side, and their opponents Planck, von Laue, and Schlick, on 
the other side. They either take the form of implicit or explicit criticism in print or are 
stated only in private correspondence. In my understanding, these dialogues served to 
elaborate a philosophical position against criticism and in view of a constantly 
evolving theory of atomic phenomena. Responses and rejoinders were not ad hoc but 
rather involved a well-entrenched stance on the relation between causality and 
ontology that ultimately went back to the years of the Mach-Planck debate and a 
diverging understanding of the role of probability in physics.  
 Although the motive of dialogue will figure prominently in the present study, I 
am far from Beller’s (1999) concept of dialogism (Sect. 2.2.) because the latter 
excludes deep-seated philosophical commitments in exchange for rhetorical ad-hoc 
maneuvers. I am far from denying that scientists often decide to form strategic 
alliances in order to defend a certain stance against opposition; take the Göttingen-
Copenhagen interpretation or Logical Empiricism. But forming such an alliance is a 
historical fact that does not exclude that in retrospect – or rational reconstruction – the 
internal divergences appear as strong as the cohesive traits. It just happened that in the 
concrete historical situation, scientists believed that a certain aspect was more 
important than others. This distinction will prove important for an adequate assessment 
of Schrödinger’s position. 
 
 
* 
 
Chapter 1 is dedicated to a critical analysis of the Forman thesis. By failing to 
recognize the aspirations of the scientist-philosophers, it oscillates uneasily between 
philosophical naiveté and strong conclusions about a philosophical concept, as if this 
were an ordinary ideologem like the ones figuring in Forman’s – to my mind, much 
more convincing – studies on the ideology of internationalism, science policy, etc. 
Ironically, these studies prove convincingly that the economical crisis was less severe 
in German physics than in other disciplines.7 Section 1.1. provides a critical outline of 
Forman’s arguments. Section 1.2 summarizes relevant aspects of the scholarly debates 
that have ensued the Forman thesis. Section 1.3. discusses Forman’s extension of his 
original thesis beyond 1927 and with respect to the concepts of Anschaulichkeit and 
individuality. Although Anschaulichkeit is philosophically a fuzzy concept and, 
accordingly, more susceptible to milieu influences, Forman’s new case is weaker 
because, in the historical context of the 1920 Anschaulichkeit was tightly connected to 
the struggles about relativity theory.  
  Rejecting the original strong Forman thesis of an adaptation of the scientists to 
the anti-causal Weimar milieu and accepting the weaker form of a strong influence, 
Cushing (1994) outlines an alternative history of a causal quantum mechanics that he 
basically identifies with the deBroglie-Bohm tradition. Section 2.1. demonstrates that 
Cushing has indeed made a convincing case for Duhemian underdetermination. 
Unfortunately, he has also filed an equal rights claim according to which the 
deBroglie-Bohm picture should be investigated with priority for the sake of historical 
                                                          
7 (Forman, 1974), (Forman, Heilbron, Weart, 1975). 
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justice. This new candidate on the list of pragmatic criteria of theory choice leads into 
many of the above-mentioned methodological problems between history and 
philosophy because pragmatic criteria of theory choice are not invariant under 
historical translation. That, to my mind, Cushing’s alternative history ultimately fails, 
shows that scientists’ discussion of philosophical concepts is embedded into the 
history of science, both internally and externally, to a much stronger degree than he 
has assumed. If one wants to understand physicists’ reaction to deBroglie’s pilot-wave 
theory in 1927, one has to take into account that some of them had been deeply 
involved into statistical mechanics, relativity theory, and early quantum theory. And – 
with notable exceptions, it is true – they checked their philosophical world views for 
consistency with these scientific achievements. Other than in the case of rational 
reconstruction, to think up an alternative history one has to modify a whole history, not 
just a single concept, however basic it may be. 
 At surface, Beller (1999) rejects both counterfactual reasoning and the Forman 
thesis. On her account studied in Section 2.2., prior to 1927 indeterminism was not 
pivotal altogether. Neither were the members of the quantum generation driven by 
other deep-seated philosophical motives. They were just immersed in local and 
creative dialogues which in 1927 suddenly turned into the creation of the orthodox 
Copenhagen narrative. This change of attitude was mainly driven by Bohr’s and 
Heisenberg’s ambitions to win the clumsy matrix mechanics superiority over 
Schrödinger’s elegant formalism. To this end, they invoked rhetorically-casted 
philosophical arguments as ex-post justifications. Copenhagen positivism used the 
verificationist ax to chop down the prospect of a genuine quantum reality emerging 
from the theory’s formalism shared by both sides. As with Cushing’s counterfactual, 
Beller’s intention is to prove that Göttingen-Copenhagen interpretation won ugly, that 
is, by historical contingency rather than by rational arguments.  
 Beller’s method of dialogism, emphasizes the ad hoc character of argument 
building and is thus directed explicitly against the idea that the leading quantum 
physicists advocated genuine philosophical positions. In both parts of her book this 
conclusion emerges simply from the perspective taken, because the dialogist grid 
either is too fine, in the local dialogues prior to 1927, or too coarse, when the orthodox 
narrative is directly compared to the Bohm tradition of the 1950s and 1990s. 
 The seminal dialogue for the present book was the polemics between Planck 
and Mach that sparked the German physics community in the years from 1908 to 
1910. It is commonly believed that Planck’s (1908a) Leiden speech expressed the 
farewell to his early sympathies for Mach’s positivism and was motivated by his 
insight that Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics was inevitable for the quantum theory of 
radiation. But this picture needs qualification because it overemphasizes the role of the 
notorious struggle about atomism for the protagonists’ philosophical convictions. A 
more detailed analysis reveals a striking continuity between Mach and Boltzmann, on 
the Viennese side, while one discerns core elements of Planck’s epistemology already 
in his early book on the principle of energy conservation. Chapter 3 deals with the first 
phase of the debate in its entirety. 
 Vienna Indeterminism was made possible by Mach’s redefinition of causality in 
terms of functional dependences between sensory elements. (Section 3.1) Mach’s 
ontology was based on facts which were constituted by relatively stable complexes of 
such functional dependences. Going beyond Hume, Mach expressed them in terms of 
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concrete physical equations. He called these laws direct descriptions and opposed 
them to indirect descriptions, such as atomistic theories, which involved hypotheses. 
But in order to guarantee the integrity of functionally constituted facts, Mach had to 
posit an ontological principle of unique determination of the actual fact in comparison 
to all variations of its functional dependences. (Section 3.2) 
 As would the Vienna Indeterminists, Mach held that for the empiricist it was 
impossible to finally decide between determinism and indeterminism. Nevertheless, he 
still favored determinism as a regulative principle because only thus could 
probabilities make sense. While Mach consequently agreed with his opponent Planck 
that all probabilities required a determinist foundation, Boltzmann was surprisingly 
vague with respect to this most fundamental concept of his statistical mechanics. 
(Section 3.3) He simultaneously clung to the old concept of equiprobability – which 
was either based on causal relations or on their absence due to our ignorance – and 
emphasized against Planck that the highly improbable entropy-decreasing events could 
really occur. Only once did Boltzmann endorse in passing the Spielraum (range) 
interpretation of Johannes von Kries (1886). Accepting – at least since the mid 1880s – 
core tenets of Mach’s epistemology, Boltzmann sought to give a proper ontology to 
the atoms of kinetic theory by means of a twofold reality criterion. On the one hand, he 
conceived of atomism as property reduction to theoretically defined universal entities 
and their interactions. Theories, in this perspective, were regarded as pictures (Bilder). 
(Section 3.4) On the other hand, atomism was already implied by humans’ finitary 
reasoning powers that made it impossible to actually assess the continuum. At this 
point, Boltzmann surprisingly endorsed Mach’s empiricist understanding of 
mathematics.  
 Boltzmann died two years before the polemics between Mach and Planck took 
off. Through them Planck became widely regarded as a philosopher. Compared to the 
profound analyses of his contributions to black-body radiation (Kuhn, 1987) and his 
eminent role in German science (Heilbron, 1988), Planck’s involvement into 
contemporary debates with other scientist-philosophers has hardly been investigated. 
Section 3.6. prepares for the Mach-Planck polemics by reading Planck’s 1887 book on 
the principle of energy conservation against the backdrop of Mach’s historico-critical 
methodology. I argue that Planck’s insistence on thermodynamics’ being based on two 
independent law-like principles and his views on principles in general and causality 
already by then ran against Mach’s approach. Undoubtedly, Planck’s later 
interpretation of scientific progress was plainly anti-Machian, since he believed that 
outdated absolute concepts are relativized just in order to find deeper absolute 
concepts. In the controversy with Mach (Section 3.7.), Planck devised a convergentist 
argument in favor of metaphysical realism. Granting the Kantian proviso against 
knowing the thing-in-themselves, we could nonetheless approach them stepwise and, 
at the horizon of the right path, we envisage some relativized a prioris that direct our 
further step, among them causality. Section 3.8. shows that Planck also advocated a 
structural realism that was based on the idea of formal invariance as provided by the 
Principle of Least Action. The final Section 3.9. is dedicated to the consequences of 
the three protagonists’ understanding of culture inasmuch as it was influenced by their 
epistemology.  
 Chapter 4 deals with Exner’s amalgamation of Mach’s radical empiricism and 
Boltzmann’s late indeterminism. Exner’s synthesis involved a substantial shift in the 
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understanding of probability. Viewing Boltzmann’s difficulties with the ontological 
status of probabilities, it is surprising that he never cited Fechner’s (1897) 
posthumously published frequency interpretation of probability. Shortly after 
Boltzmann’s death this move was made in Exner’s (1908) inaugural speech as Rector 
of the University. Frequentism henceforth became a characteristic trait of Vienna 
Indeterminism that distinguished the tradition against Planck and Schlick who 
remained committed to von Kries’s interpretation of probability. 
 As Exner built physical ontology upon collectives, he had to defend a rather 
firm empiricism in Machian footsteps because only in this way could he jettison all 
worries as to whether there had to be some unobservable deterministic laws at the 
deepest level. In his polemics with Planck in the late 1910s, Exner emphasized that all 
apparently deterministic laws could well be the macroscopic limit of indeterministic 
basic laws valid for the single particles or events. Planck instead remained committed 
to a deterministic foundation for the definition of physical probabilities. (Section 4.5.) 
More than anything else, Exner’s synthesis paved the way to accept genuine 
indeterminism in physics without any reference to quantum mechanics.  
 Exner’s indeterminism did not halt at the borders of physics or natural science. 
Prompted by Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes, by the end of his 
life, Exner (1923) wrote a comprehensive physicalist theory of culture that embraced 
all history from the formation of the solar system until the present state of Western 
civilization. A major driving force of progress and decline was the second law of 
thermodynamics. The resulting distinction between indeterminism at the microscopic 
level of the individual and determinism on the very very large scale permitted Exner to 
simultaneously accept and reject the pessimism about cultural decline prevailing in the 
Weimar epoch. Science was robust enough to escape Spengler’s morphological cycles. 
Section 4.6 amounts to a digression from the causality debate, but its import on the 
validity of Forman’s thesis is pivotal because Exner, to my mind, represented a typical 
example of a Ringerian Mandarin in physics, a concept which stood at the back of the 
Forman’s milieu analyses.  
 Chapter 5 is dedicated to Die Naturwissenschaften that became the forum and 
cultural sub-milieu for the causality debate after 1913. Modeled after the British 
Nature, this scientific weekly strove to follow the major developments within the 
whole of natural science and present them in a generally comprehensible and 
captivating form. Philosophical debates in this journal did not simply happen, but were 
carefully planned by the founding editor Arnold Berliner. Section 5.1. thus documents 
Berliner’s editorial activity until he was ousted under Nazi pressure in 1935, his 
unique personality, and his views about the unity of science and culture. Some of the 
recollections testify the enormous influence of Berliner on the cultural identity of the 
younger generation of German physicists. Section 5.2. shows how Die 
Naturwissenschaften became an important stronghold in the ‘defense belt’ around 
Einstein and relativity theory. Standing in for the ideals of science also meant to take a 
firm stand against the Spenglerian challenge (Section 5.3.). Together with the views of 
Berliner himself, I take this attitude as indicating that Die Naturwissenschaften 
represented – at least for a large group of younger physicists – a well-entrenched 
socio-cultural sub-milieu based on some general convictions about the positive role of 
science in society that made its members resistant to the influences of the general 
milieu. This did not exclude that the same physicists, in their private role as 
 19
Bildungsbürger, reacted very differently to the feeling of a cultural decline. To my 
mind, the undifferentiated concept of milieu is one of the weakest points of the 
Forman thesis.  
 In Section 5.4., I provide an overview of the philosophical topics discussed in 
Berliner’s journal and conclude that apart from a rather generally oriented education 
program, Berliner gave ample space to authors from the emerging tradition of Logical 
Empiricism. Simple counting of papers shows that Die Naturwissenschaften 
represented the principal public medium for the scientist-philosophers in the Vienna 
Circle, that is, for Frank, Schlick, and von Mises, until Erkenntnis was founded in 
1930. Section 5.5. depicts an early debate about causality in atomic theory between 
Walter Schottky, Boltzmann’s former collaborator Walter Nernst, and Mach’s former 
ally Joseph Petzoldt. We find Nernst strongly indebted to Boltzmann’s statistical 
mechanics yet without taking the late Boltzmann’s Machian tack. Schottky redefined 
the concept of causality in such a way as to meaningfully speak about stochastic 
causality. Petzoldt saw no need of action because, to his mind, the Machian notion of 
causality was wide enough to accommodate all problems of quantum theory.  
 The reception of Exner’s synthesis was typically limited to those who had 
closer contacts to Vienna physics. As Chapter 6 shows, Erwin Schrödinger persistently 
stressed Exner’s priority in contemplating genuinely indeterministic laws of nature. 
(Section 6.1) Schrödinger followed Mach’s neutral monism and developed a 
pronounced unease against the Göttingen-Copenhagen emphasis upon observers 
distinct from objective reality. Quite in line with the early phase of Vienna 
Indeterminism, he was searching an ontology for his wave equation in the sense of 
Boltzmann’s universal and coherent pictures; yet neither the wave function nor – in 
later years – unified field theory brought him success. But he continuously rejected 
Copenhagen’s commitment to macroscopic concepts, such as particle trajectory, the 
applicability of which to the atomic domain was limited in principle by the theory 
itself. Having been elected Planck’s successor at the University of Berlin in 1927, he 
continued Exner’s debate with Planck. Yet whereas in his 1922 Zurich inaugural 
speech he had considered the alternative between determinism and indeterminism as 
an empirical question – as had Exner – in 1929 he took a conventionalist tack and 
called the choice a matter of practicability. In 1931, Schrödinger dedicated two papers 
to his former teacher Exner. While the first represents his most mature plea for Vienna 
Indeterminism, the second searches for general characteristics of the cultural and 
scientific milieu of a certain epoch. Put against the backdrop of Exner’s inaugural 
address, it reveals that Schrödinger rejected one element in his teacher’s indeterminist 
theory of culture conformed to Spengler’s idea of cultural cycles. All this will be 
discussed in Section 6.3. Before, I briefly discuss those aspects of the comparatively 
broad literature on Schrödinger which have resulted from projecting back his matured 
post-war views about quantum mechanics into his stance of the 1920s and 1930s. 
(Section 6.2.). 
 Chapter 7 accompanies Schlick from Berlin to Vienna in the transition from a 
rather Planckian view of causality to one that enabled him to fully accept the main 
tenets of the Copenhagen interpretation without subscribing to Vienna Indeterminism. 
Schlick’s ultimate breach with Kantian roots went parallel to the final dismissal of 
Planck’s convergent realism, the sharpening of the verificationist criterion of meaning, 
and the rising influence of Wittgenstein on his thinking. What Schlick, however, never 
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accepted was the frequency interpretation of probability. Moreover, he remained 
committed to von Kries’s Spielraum interpretation. 
Schlick’s first paper on causality was almost exclusively oriented at relativity 
theory. In order to rescue the principle of causality from triviality, he required that in 
causal laws space-time coordinates should not have any absolute significance. (Section 
7.1) Still in the mid 1920s he openly took Planck’s side in the polemics with Mach. On 
Schlick’s account, the statistical character of the second law was not situated in the 
laws themselves, but in the initial conditions. “It is clear…that only in utmost 
extremity will the scientist or philosopher resolve to postulate purely statistical micro-
laws” (Schlick, 1925, p. 461/61). By 1925, Schlick became increasingly aware of the 
problems of deterministic causality in the atomic domain; but his respective statements 
rather resembled a hybrid of continuing his 1920 position and admitting, as a good 
empiricist, that the principle of causality might have to be abandoned. (Section 7.2.). 
When in 1926 the emergency case had actually happened Schlick, after five 
years of remaining practically silent about causality, made a complete turnaround and 
in 1931 he renounced all attempts to explicitly characterize the causal character of 
laws (Section 7.3.). “Verification as such, the fulfillment of prediction, confirmation in 
experience, is therefore the criterion of causality per se” (Schlick, 1931, p. 151/188). 
And commending Wittgenstein he emphasized that “at bottom a law of nature does not 
even have the logical status of an ‘assertion’, but represents, rather, a ‘prescription for 
the making of assertions’” (Ibid., p. 151/188). Schlick’s new theory permitted him to 
appraise Copenhagen’s insight that the Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations represented 
an in principle limit on prediction set by the laws of nature themselves, and 
simultaneously cling to the idea that all statistical regularity could be separated into 
strict laws and pure randomness – a remnant of the old distinction between 
nomological and ontological regularity on which the Kriesian theory was based. 
Schlick received many reactions from leading physicists of the day (Section 7.4.). 
They show that in contrast to his verificationist reading of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relations, core parts of his new theory of causality were quite orthogonal to the already 
entrenched front lines on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. That Schlick 
refused to consider statistical ‘laws’ as genuine laws found almost unanimous 
objection, most pointedly, of course, by Schrödinger. In correspondence with 
Sommerfeld, Schlick explicitly rejected Mach’s ‘principle of the sloppy laws of 
nature’ and together with other reactions one can conclude that Schlick was still much 
closer to the German philosophical background than to Vienna Indeterminism. 
 At that time, however, Schlick had long joined forces with the two Vienna 
Indeterminists in the Vienna Circle. Chapter 8 discusses the positions of Frank and von 
Mises together not only because of their common intellectual origin, but particularly 
because of the many affirmative cross-references in their works. In his first 
philosophical paper in 1907, Frank had considered the general law of causality as a 
mere convention. This position was motivated by the First Vienna Circle’s reading of 
French conventionalism and did not quite conform to Frank’s subsequent adherence to 
Mach’s philosophy of science. (Section 8.1.) In his 1932 book The Law of Causality 
and its Limits, Frank largely revoked his earlier conclusion as too rash and investigated 
in greater detail the conditions under which the general law of causality attains an 
empirical content. (Section 8.5.) But he came up with a negative conclusion. There 
existed neither a proof of the validity nor any empirical consequences of the general 
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law of causality. Nevertheless, we constantly presuppose the existence of special 
causal laws in daily life. In the introduction, Frank emphasized that his change of mind 
was caused by quantum theory and by von Mises’s “conception of statistical laws and 
their relation to dynamic laws” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 24/12). According to this view 
discussed in Section 8.2., both types of law did not compete with one another; they 
simply concerned different observational facts. Just as the Newtonian dynamical laws 
govern the motions of point particles, statistical laws deal with mass phenomena which 
are represented by statistical collectives. Von Mises explicitly criticized Boltzmann’s 
formulation of the second law as a blend of microdeterminism and macroprobabilism, 
and advocated a purely probabilistic approach instead. Von Mises and Frank gained 
the freedom to choose collectives as a proper ontology by supplementing Mach’s 
concept of causality with the idea that all concepts in physical theories are coordinated 
to specific experiences or measurements. (Section 8.3.) Thus, in 1932, Frank could 
simply argue that the only modification in quantum mechanics was the statistical 
character of this coordination. To his mind, Anschaulichkeit had little space within the 
scientific world conception so described. If not interpreted as actual sensation, 
Anschaulichkeit typically gave preference to an outdated mechanistic world view. In 
both relativity theory and atomic physics physicists had seen more clearly than ever 
before that the realistic interpretation of auxiliary concepts was problematic. Frank’s 
1928 paper amounted to a vigorous protest against what Forman takes to be a wide-
spread demand of the milieu. (Section 8.4.)  
 The final three sections of the book are dedicated to the rapprochement between 
both strands of the causality debate. Large part of this development, so I shall argue, 
was the sharpening Viennese focus on linguistic analysis of scientific theory. 
Schrödinger who remained committed to Boltzmann’s conception of theories as 
picture thus, in one of the final dialogues in Berliner’s Naturwissenschaften, found 
himself on von Laue’s side and against von Mises (Section 8.6.). On the 1936 
Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science, Bohr’s concept of complementarity 
and the idea of a physicalist language provided the basis for a far-reaching agreement 
of Frank and Schlick (Section 8.7.). During the days of the congress, Schlick, who 
could not attend due to university regulations, was killed by a former student. And two 
years later, all major protagonists of the present book had emigrated. Here not only the 
causality debate, but also the European phase of Logical Empiricism terminated. 
(Section 8.8.) 
 
 
* 
 
Let me add some words about four philosophical border lines drawn by the present 
investigation. I have characterized the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism by a specific 
relationship between the concept of causality and theory-specific reality criteria, by 
three specific thematic aspects, by a continued dialogue with Planck, and by other 
historical contextualizations. There are a few other scientist-philosophers and 
philosophers proper who thus have been excluded despite their partial interaction with 
Vienna Indeterminism. 
The first border line emerges from the distinction between the physical 
probability – be it based on relative frequencies or ranges– and, thus, the issue of 
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indeterminism from the probability of judgment. All scientist-philosophers discussed 
in the present study strictly maintained this distinction while Reichenbach, who 
himself advocated the statistical character of natural laws, did not. He openly rejected 
such a distinction and thus claimed to arrive at a probabilistic solution to the problem 
of induction. Apart from his open polemics with von Mises, this issue ultimately 
estranged him from the movement of Logical Empiricism in the 1930s. I have 
excluded a more detailed discussion of Reichenbach’s position with a heavy heart, 
even his dialogue with Schlick.8 But this would have inevitably led into much deeper 
investigations of the views on probability within Logical Empiricism including Rudolf 
Carnap’s intermediate position. 
 Second, I have excluded a separate discussion of von Kries’s theory although it 
was outlined on the pages of Die Naturwissenschaften and von Kries there (1919) 
commented upon an earlier paper of the deceased Marian von Smoluchowski (1918), a 
former assistant of Exner. But von Kries was not only a contemporary of the 1920s 
advanced in years. His theory of probability (Kries, 1886) had been written at about 
the same time as Fechner’s (1897), and he never made significant modifications to it. 
This has conduced me to consider von Kries’s works as part of the philosophical 
background and treat his interpretation thus on a par with the rivaling relative 
frequency interpretation of Fechner. 
Third, it is true, there are other scientist-philosophers who repeatedly 
contributed to the foundations of quantum mechanics in Die Naturwissenschaften, 
among them Niels Bohr, Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, and Hermann Weyl. But they 
did not embark onto a debate with the Vienna Indeterminists, apart from the 
correspondence with Schlick (Section 7.4.) and the Vienna Circle’s joint appearance 
with Bohr in Copenhagen 1936. Moreover, all four were strongly influenced by 
philosophical views which Logical Empiricists branded as “school philosophy”, rather 
than by a neo-Kantian or Machian background. Accordingly, the Mach-Planck debate 
did not play such a significant role for their views. 
 Fourth, the rapprochement between Schlick and Vienna Indeterminism is 
followed by the convergence between Logical Empiricists and Ernst Cassirer, the heir 
of Marburg neo-Kantianism. Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern 
Physics (1937) made ample reference to the material discussed in the present book and 
at the end, the author emphasized that the gist of the matter was lying in the distinction 
between causality and the object figuring in the laws. Cassirer traced this thesis back 
to his 1910 book Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff which had focused on the 
dissolution of substantialism in modern philosophy, a tendency which also provided 
the common background of Mach’s reinterpretation of causality and Schlick’s first 
theory of causality. Although in the end, Cassirer, as Planck, opted for maintaining a 
strongly relativized a priori notion of causality, Frank’s review of the book was 
laudatory and spotted there the core thesis of Vienna Indeterminism. 
 
A further principal feature of Cassirer’s account is that the form of the law of causality and the 
concepts of what one calls an object mutually presuppose each other. Also this is a basic thesis 
defended by logical empiricism which has been taken over from positivism. Today’s positivism just 
gives this thesis a more formal turn. (Frank, 1938, p. 73) 
 
                                                          
8 (Schlick, 1931) contained a criticism of Reichenbach’s views; the response was (Reichenbach, 1931). 
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I have refrained from a discussion of Cassirer’s work and Frank’s reaction to it 
because treating Cassirer’s book just as a chronicle of the debates investigated here, 
would not do justice to his the depth of his philosophical views. It remains, however, a 
supportive evidence for the present investigation that right at the end of the period at 
issue here, two philosophers so different as Cassirer and Frank agreed that the core 
problem as regards the alternative between determinism and indeterminism was the 
relationship between the law of causality and a suitable reality criterion and that both 
of them ultimately referred to Mach’s criticism of the concept of causality.  
 
 
* 
 
The present book teaches three lessons. The first is directed at the historiography of 
Logical Empiricism. While there has been much research concerning the departure 
from the Kantian categories of space and time – a move that was one of the 
cornerstones of Logical Empiricism side by side with modern logic – Vienna 
Indeterminism and its dialogues with opponents show that the respective change for 
the category of causality took considerably longer and happened only piecemeal. In 
some respects, the rapprochement between Schlick, Frank, and von Mises left 
substantial disagreements unsettled. This diagnosis joins in with many other recent 
results about the very subtle fine-structure of the movement of Logical Empiricism.  
The second lesson concerns recent contacts between the Forman thesis and 
quantum philosophy. The picture drawn here differs enough from both the thesis’ 
weak or strong version of the Forman thesis to prevent Cushing’s and Beller’s 
argument to obtain. Of course, theory is underdetermined by the empirical facts – 
Logical Empiricists would have been the last to deny this. Of course, the Bohm 
interpretation is worth pursuing as a viable alternative – the Copenhagen finality thesis 
had no adherence among Logical Empiricists in those days. But the pragmatic criteria 
which decide between empirically equivalent alternative formulations – and this is a 
lesson transcending the narrower context of the debate followed here – cannot be 
shifted at will back and forth in history; fertility and simplicity cannot be held 
responsible ex post, they can only be applied anew perhaps leading to a different 
result. I am afraid that there are no equal rights cases in the history of science. 
Although pragmatic criteria of theory choice are typically rational, not historically 
contingent, their application is fundamentally embedded into a concrete historical 
environment.  
The third lesson is that the physicists of Weimar Germany are, to my mind, a 
bad object of study for the historiographical methods of Beller and Forman. More than 
in other countries, German theoretical physicists of the first half of the 20th century had 
philosophical aspirations. This not only brought the scientist-philosophers in contact 
with the emerging scientific philosophy, but it also determined their view of 
foundational matters. Even more, nearly all protagonists of the story to tell involved 
themselves into general cultural or political questions. The problem of causality even 
motivated a parallel exchange on questions of culture, morality and society. That I 
decided to cover this aspect is not merely to oppose the picture drawn by Forman, but 
it is also motivated by Logical Empiricists firm belief that the logic of science and the 
general scientific world conception were inseparable. 
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Although these lessons are dealt with in different parts of the book, they require 
mutual support to be fully convincing. There is no point in refuting the Forman thesis; 
one can only try to draw a more accurate picture which contained the debate 
investigated here as its core. Since the final demise of the received view of Logical 
Empiricism, historiography of this movement occasionally unearths ideas promising 
for today.. What the present book might offer in this respect is to demonstrate how a 
fertile interaction between scientist-philosophers took place around one of the key 
notions of physical science.  
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1. The Forman Theses: A Critical Assessment 
 
The aim of the following two chapters is to critically discuss three prominent accounts 
of the early causality debates among the Weimar physicists that deny any significant 
influence of philosophical convictions on the turn of the events in physics proper and 
on the interpretation of the new quantum mechanics. Although the books of Forman 
(1971), Cushing (1994), and Beller (1999) amply discuss the philosophical convictions 
of key physicists, they are treated as part of ideologems rather than within the context 
of a genuine philosophical debate among scientist-philosophers. Although all three 
books have attracted considerable criticism, their shared neglect of philosophy as a 
determinative element of the early days of quantum mechanics still represents a view 
shared by many people working in the foundations of quantum mechanics. 
The present book will outline a philosophical debate on the role of causality in 
modern physics whose roots go back to the heyday of statistical mechanics and whose 
branches extend to the days when the major concepts of quantum philosophy, among 
them complementarity, began to stabilize. The existence and development of this 
debate, its historical and systematic embedding, are what I have to offer. I shall not 
claim – thus inverting the Forman thesis – a causal influence of philosophy on the 
development of quantum physics; there remains a genuine element of historical 
contingency or theory underdetermination. Nor will my story involve all protagonists 
of quantum mechanics and its interpretation; there are other figures and factors beyond 
those treated in the present book that influenced the adoption of a statistical 
understanding of the theory. But what I do claim is that for a series of major players, 
and within the context of a single scientific journal that harbored the philosophical 
debates among scientist-philosophers during the Weimar days, these philosophical 
debates acted as a factor stabilizing their views, and not as a justification ex post of 
some astounding features of a physical theory that miraculously emerged. It is true, the 
outcome of the debate outlined in the present book had a stronger impact on the 
development of modern philosophy of science than on the interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, at least when interest into the foundations of this theory returned in the 
early 1950s.  
 
* 
 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to provide an overview of the Forman thesis and the debates it 
aroused. Section 1.1 reconstructs the different steps in Forman’s line of arguments. In 
documenting the evidence put forward, particular emphasis is given to such 
personalities who figured in the causality debate between Vienna and Berlin. In 
Section 1.3 I shall also cover the extension of Forman’s original thesis to the concepts 
of “Anschaulichkeit” and “Individualität”. My synopsis will already mention some 
historical details where, to my mind, Forman’s account is inaccurate. To stress it 
again, the main objective of this book is not a refutation of Forman. 
 Section 1.2 highlights some of the criticism and assent the Forman thesis has 
hitherto received. Surprisingly, it took almost a decade until – after reviews and 
occasional citations – Forman’s paper became both a model for case studies and the 
target of basic methodological disapproval. My coverage of these reactions is 
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somewhat selective insofar as it is oriented at the discussions to come in subsequent 
chapters. In particular, I refrain from general discussions about externalism and 
internalism in the history of science. The tradition of Vienna Indeterminism and the 
debates with its Berlin counterpart have both a philosophical and an institutional 
embedding, and thus the externalist and internalist analysis will be, I believe, mutually 
supportive.  
 
1.1. Forman’s Thesis and Its Extension 
 
Forman’s paper “Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: 
Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual 
Environment” proceeds in three steps: (a) a description of the hostile intellectual 
milieu; (b) a general adaptation of German physicists and mathematicians to the 
ideological requirements of this milieu; (c) the thesis that this adaptation also modified 
the content of scientific work. 
 At the beginning, the author provides some insight into his methodology. 
Forman intends “a causal analysis, showing the circumstances under which, and the 
interactions through which, scientific men are swept up by intellectual currents.” 
(Forman, 1971, p. 3) These strong pretensions, problematic as they are (see below), are 
at odds with the feeble ending of the book: “it seems difficult to deny that the shifts in 
scientific doctrine exposed in this paper were in effect adaptations to the Weimar 
intellectual environment.” (Ibid., p. 115) Forman’s textual evidence for diagnosing an 
adaptive response is primarily found “in addresses by exact scientists to academically 
educated general audiences, and especially in their addresses to their assembled 
universities.” (Ibid., p. 6) Although Forman calls it a fortunate circumstance that these 
addresses were published afterwards, he does not undertake an analysis of the 
respective media. This will be done in Chapter 5 below. 
 Again in the Conclusion, one finds another methodological bias of Forman’s 
investigation that presumably influenced the sometimes rather pathetic rhetoric. The 
“most characteristic difference between those physicists who hastened to renounce 
causality and those who clung to it even after the discovery of quantum mechanics” 
was to diagnose “a failure of the human intellect” or to express “an existentialist 
revulsion against intellectuality”, on the part of the “progressives”, and the “faith in 
the capacity of the human intellect to comprehend the natural world”, on the part of the 
conservatives. “And for this reason, also I have not been able to, nor indeed wished to, 
maintain a perfectly neutral stance in my exposé. … My sympathies have 
consequently been with the conservatives in the defense of reason, rather than with the 
“progressives” in their denigration of it.” (All ibid., p. 112f.) As the “progressives” 
stamped “irrational” include personalities of an avowedly rational orientation, such as 
many Logical Empiricists, one wonders what Forman’s notion of rationality is like. 
The Introduction echoes this bias by a reference to  
 
the valuations of physical science in contemporary American society, on the one hand, and the present 
ideological tendencies in these sciences, on the other hand … [A]s sentiments of resentment and 
antagonism toward the scientific enterprise – coupled with a revival of existentialist 
Lebensphilosophie – have become prominent in the last few years, so have the concessions of and 
concessions to the same sentiments within the sciences themselves. We are indeed witnessing in 
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America today a widespread and far-reaching accommodation of scientific ideology to a hostile 
intellectual milieu. (Ibid., p. 5) 
 
But is it really the only option to fortify rationality by conservative standards of causal 
explanation, as Forman suggests? In discussing the anti-science phenomenon of the 
1990s, Gerald Holton proposes a more pragmatic strategy. Spotting, as Forman, 
Spengler as “the ancestor of the end-of-science movements” (Holton, 1993, p. 134), he 
rather relies upon a certain robustness of the scientific method and the internal 
incoherence of the anti-science ideologems: “No world picture is truly anti-scientific, 
insofar as it always has a core component containing a functional proto-theory of the 
physical and biological universe” (Ibid., p. 159) which consists of “the observation, 
identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of 
natural phenomena” (Ibid., p. 152). Needless to say, “the use of probability and of 
quantum causality is not an abandonment of all causality as such.” (Ibid., p. 134) 
 
1.1.1. Milieu’s Traits 
 
Forman’s sociological analysis commences from another, to his mind, characteristic 
trait of contemporary science. The socio-cultural milieu becomes the more influential 
on the scientists the more their overall prestige is questioned. During epochs in which 
science and technology enjoy a high social status, scientists can by and large follow 
their disciplines’ internal logic and ignore antipathy from outside. Thus was, so 
Forman holds, the situation of German physics in the Wilhelmine Empire. Still in 1913 
the Emperor gave a large donation to the newly founded Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft 
which would quickly become Germany’s most important scientific organization.  
 All that radically changed after the defeat of the German army and the 
democratic revolution in November 1918. Occultism and spiritism prospered, 
mysticism and irrationalism spread like kudzu throughout the constantly endangered 
early Weimar republic; Lebensphilosophie, existentialism, the philosophy of Henri 
Bergson dominated the intellectual scene. A science which paradigmatically 
conformed to the requirements of this milieu was Hans Driesch’s vitalism because it 
rejected any reduction of the individuality of life to physico-chemical laws.9 The 
“freedom from positivist causalism and determinism, the overcoming of neo-Kantian 
formalism” represented core elements of the “wissenschaftlichen revolution.” (Ibid., p. 
17, quoting Troeltsch, 1921, p. 1005) Among the educated Germans a far-reaching 
sentiment of crises spread, which had its roots in the devaluation of the intellectual 
capital. Although Forman, at this point, cites Ringer’s seminal study The Decline of 
the German Mandarins (1969), he does not discuss how the Mandarin concept could 
be applied to natural scientists who were beyond Ringer’s scope. Yet, there are some 
cases where scientists were quite explicit about culture, such that the concept can be 
used to partition the extremely heterogeneous group of ‘converts to acausality’. 
(Sections 4.6.5 & 5.3.) 
                                                          
9 Nonetheless, Driesch – a renowned experimental biologist turned scientist-philosopher – himself felt the anti-
scientific pressure of the milieu (Cf. Forman, 1971, p. 19 fn. 38). This classification is, of course, too simple. But 
accepting it here with a grain of salt gives me the opportunity to argue below in Section 5.4. that in Die 
Naturwissenschaften the causality debate in biology substantially differed from the one in physics. Also Frank 
([1932] 1988) took on Driesch at considerable length; see Section 8.5. 
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 In 1918, the first volume of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West appeared 
and it quickly spellbound an intellectual milieu that was just longing for it. “The crisis 
of culture, the revolution in Wissenschaft, radical Lebensphilosophie, all proclaimed 
and epitomized by a sweeping theory of world history in which … physics and 
mathematics are treated alongside art, music, and religion as wholly culturally 
conditioned.” (Forman, 1971, p. 30) Science, to Spengler’s lights, was part of the all-
embracing decline of occidental Faustian rationality leading eventually back to an 
epoch of belief. In this way modern science repeated the course of the Apollonian 
science of antiquity that “faded out between the battle of Cannae [216 BC] and that of 
Actium [32 BC]. And from this it is possible to predict the end of Western natural 
science.” (Spengler, 1918, p. 555)10 There exists no bridge of common empirical facts 
between both cultural cycles that would permit us to understand Greek mathematics or 
mechanics. They are simply part of two different organisms. Nevertheless, those 
organisms live similar lives. “The final terminus to which Faustian wisdom tends, even 
if only in its highest moments, is the dissolution of all knowledge in a colossal system 
of morphological-historical relationships.” (Ibid., p. 639) These homologies which 
were displayed in long tables, were to justify Spengler’s predictions about the future 
course of Western civilization.  
 Modern physics, in particular, exhibits clear symptoms of the exhaustion and 
self-destruction of Faustian science: excessive emphasis on theory and abstract 
symbolism, the abandonment of absolute space and time, and above all the crisis of the 
principle of strict causality which, to Spengler’s lights, “is identical to the concept of 
law. There only exist causal laws.” (Ibid., p. 168) Through probabilistic methods 
science turns back to the individual. “Statistics belongs to the sphere of the organic, to 
fluctuating life, to destiny and chance, and not to the world of exact laws and timeless 
mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 627) “Within a number of radioactive atoms, only single ones 
meet their destiny while the neighboring ones are entirely unaffected.” (Ibid., p. 630) 
More generally, Spengler’s history of the world is based on the “opposition between 
the idea of destiny and the principle of causality [Schicksalsidee und 
Kausalitätsprinzip] which has not been recognized hitherto as such and in its deep 
world-forming necessity.”(Ibid., p. 167) Mechanical causality – so he continues – 
reveals the “fear of the world [Weltangst],” while – as statistical physics ultimately has 
acknowledged – destiny strikes individual atoms like single human beings. 
 Within a milieu dominated by or even committed to crisis and decline, Forman 
just spots two islands of modernism: the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus.11 “Far from 
dominating German philosophy in the 1920s, the Vienna Circle and the corresponding 
group in Berlin – the Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie around Hans 
Reichenbach and Richard von Mises 12[sic!] – with their high positive valuation of 
mathematical natural science represented a rather late and distinctly marginal group.” 
                                                          
10 There is a certain ambiguity with the first editions of Spengler’s opus. The page numbers of the version 
published by Braumüller, Vienna-Leipzig, which I have used, do not coincide with the Munich edition used by 
Forman. For the 33rd edition, the author revised the first volume and deleted some of the passages quoted here. 
This edition became the basis of the English translation. I have checked all quotations myself and added some 
not used by Forman. Focusing on this first edition is crucial because it was the one read by most of the scientists 
to appear in this study. 
11 There have been many links between both groups; see (Galison, 1993) and with many historical details 
(Dahms, 2002). 
12 Although von Mises delivered a lecture to the society and had various contacts with its members, he did not 
get along with Reichenbach. 
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(Forman, 1971, p. 21) “In Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, the 
brochure with which the circle first came before the public, ‘their tone,’ as Ringer 
[1969, p. 308] rightly points out, ‘was that of exasperated outsiders’” (Forman, 1971, 
p. 20) Forman here neglects that Ringer so classified also the various schools of neo-
Kantianism. Is thus the causality debate to be scrutinized in the present book almost 
exclusively led among outsiders?  
 Yet Forman’s account is flawed. He was unaware of the various links that had 
existed between Philipp Frank, Moritz Schlick, Richard von Mises, and Hans 
Reichenbach already in the early 1920s and before. While this might be excused by the 
poor state of the historiography of Logical Empiricism in 1971, another point should 
not have escaped a sociologist’s attention. All four Logical Empiricists figuring so 
prominently in Forman’s study were either examples of the classical type of scientist-
philosopher or of the emerging type of scientific philosopher to be branded by the 
Vienna Circle. While Frank and von Mises remained well-respected scientists who 
extensively published on philosophical subjects, the trained physicists Schlick and 
Reichenbach owed their professorships in philosophy to the intervention of Einstein 
and Planck (and calling Schlick to Vienna was largely arranged by the mathematician-
philosopher Hans Hahn). This demonstrates that within the narrower circle of German 
physicists, the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group were not marginal. Nor were they 
for the readers of Die Naturwissenschaften (See Section 5.3.).  
 
1.1.2. Ideological Adaptations 
 
1.1.2.1. Ideology and Rationality 
 
After the description of the milieu, Forman turns to the first type of adaptation to the 
intellectual environment. It concerns the effects upon scientist’s ideology, that is, 
“upon the professed justifications of scientific activity, upon the epistemological 
stance of the exact scientists, and upon their elan, their esprit, their confidence in the 
future of their discipline.” (Forman, 1971, p. 38) Relegating some declarations against 
the anti-scientific milieu, among them David Hilbert’s criticism of the du Bois-
Reymond’s Ignorabimus (publicly reiterated on almost any occasion from 1900 until 
1930), and against Spengler, among them Exner (1922) and Riebesell (1920), into a 
footnote, Forman moves on to the first leg of his argument. After 1918 the positive 
references to Mach’s positivism significantly decreased. Forman compares two public 
lectures of Wilhelm Wien in 1918 and in 1919, the first of which largely approved 
Mach while the second contained “not the faintest whiff of positivism; no mention of 
Mach at all.” (Ibid., p. 41) Forman concludes that the renowned experimentalist 
“implicitly concedes the series of equations made repeatedly by the antagonists of 
modern science – empiricism = positivism = narrow specialization = utilitarianism= 
materialism” (Ibid., p. 41).  
 
I know of only one instance during the entire Weimar period of a German physicist venturing, in a 
general academic address, to mention Mach’s name with clear approbation and to associate himself 
with Mach’s epistemological doctrines. Nor was it a coincidence that in taking the courageous stand at 
the end of the Weimar period Richard von Mises refused to associate himself with the demand for 
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synthesis, “counting it” – as did Mach – “the highest philosophy to tolerate an incomplete world 
view.” (Ibid., p. 42) 
 
Let me give the complete passage from the Mechanics and its context. According to 
Mach, the evolution of knowledge culminates in “the ideal of a unified world 
conception, which is alone compatible with the economy of a healthy mind.” (Mach, 
1988, p. 480/560) But this ideal is still to be reached. At present “the highest 
philosophy of the scientist [Naturforscher] is to tolerate an incomplete world view and 
to prefer it to an ostensibly complete, but insufficient one.”(Ibid., p. 479/559) Rather 
than the influence of the milieu, von Mises’s stand thus faithfully rehearsed Mach’s 
radical empiricism and epistemological holism. (See Section 3.1.) 
 There are various reasons why he is an unsuitable indicator for the changing 
attitude towards causality. First of all, the polemics with Planck in 1908-1910 (Cf. 
Section 3.7.) estranged many German physicists from Mach’s epistemology albeit 
manifold appreciations on Einstein’s part. Moreover, most physicists followed 
Planck’s lead in taking Mach’s qualms with Boltzmann’s atomism as a case in point 
against positivism and neutral monism tout court. Mach’s posthumously published 
Principles of Physical Optics the Preface of which contained the infamous criticism of 
“the more and more dogmatic theory of relativity theory,” (1921, p. viiif.) led to a 
further loss of credibility among those defending modern physics, because 1921 was 
one of the most critical years for the public acceptance of general relativity.13 In the 
end, Forman himself wavers whether the name Mach is a reliable litmus paper for the 
attitude towards the milieu and observes “that the positivist tradition itself contained a 
substantial element of Lebensphilosophie and that, moreover, there was a solid 
Machian precedent for regarding natural science as the outgrowth of a basic human 
drive.” (Forman, 1971, p. 46) To my mind however, such a position amounts to the 
low-brow empiricism which Holton counts on rather than to existentialist 
enchantment. 
 The most important point is, to be sure, Mach’s theory of causality itself (See 
Section 3.1). When outlining the concepts of causality in use between 1918 and 1927, 
Forman apparently realizes that on the basis of Mach’s causality as functional 
dependences one could contemplate “the denial of any exact laws for atomic 
processes” (Forman, 1971, p. 66), a view which he attributes to Charles S. Peirce and, 
in a footnote, to Franz Exner and Marian von Smoluchowski who were part of an 
persistent “subterranean anticausality current” (Ibid., p. 67).14 In this way one could 
renounce the “essentially Kantian notion of causality as conformity to law” (Ibid., p. 
65) which Forman rightly locates in Moritz Schlick (1920) and Hans Reichenbach 
(1920b). But Forman wrongly identifies Schlick’s position with Spengler’s above-
mentioned claim that there exist only causal laws because Spengler’s, at bottom, 
                                                          
13 The Preface is dated 1913, however parts of the book go back to lectures of the 1870s. Due to the war and 
Mach’s death, the book appeared only in 1921. Wolters (1987) doubts the authenticity of the Preface and 
provides circumstantial evidence for a forgery by Mach’s son Ludwig. Max von Laue’s review in Die 
Naturwissenschaften, interestingly, did not use the “sensational” Preface as an argument to finally dismiss 
Mach’s philosophy. Planck’s closest collaborator judged the book as a late work that lacked the great originality 
of the Principles of Mechanics. “Does it not characterize the scepticist at all costs that he repudiates his ownest 
thoughts in that very moment when a greater mind has developed them into something positive?” (Laue, 1921, p. 
966) To the realist Planck, Mach was indeed a scepticist. (See Sect. 3.7.) 
14 In passing, Forman even suggests that Planck’s (1914) criticism of this attitude is directed against Exner’s 
1908 inaugural address. This is indeed the case (see Section 4.5.). 
 31
mechanistic concept of law does not coincide with a simple, abstract mathematical 
function that uniquely determines the dynamics. Schlick’s concept was modeled after 
relativity theory which, to Spengler’s lights, was as much a sign of decline as 
statistical physics because both departed from the Laplacian world view. (Cf. Section 
7.1.) 
 
It must, of course, be acknowledged that in precisely this period Mach himself, the positivist 
movement in general, and even neo-Kantians like Cassirer were waging a campaign against quite a 
different concept of causality, … the “metaphysical”, “animistic”, “fetishistic” doctrine of cause and 
effect (Ursache und Wirkung) as an ontological assumption, which Mach and his allies wished to 
replace by the mathematical conception of function. … And by 1918 this point of view had become 
almost a matter of course among physicists and the philosophers closely associated with them … so 
that “causality” stripped of all ontological overtones, was taken as equivalent to functional 
determination. (Forman, 1971, p. 68)  
 
But in the end all differences are brushed away in favor of a rather superficial 
criterion. 
 
The possibility of satisfying a (weaker) postulate of lawfulness without demanding that every detail of 
every natural process be unambiguously determined did not entirely escape physicists in the years 
before the discovery of a quantum mechanics having this general character. Nonetheless, the essential 
point is that in the period treated in this paper every such suggestion of a relaxation of complete 
determinism was advanced as, and regarded as, a failure or abandonment of causality. In fact, as we 
proceed we will occasionally find the word “causality” being used in several senses narrower than, not 
wider than, “determinism” … And again, in many instances these special definitions of causality were 
advanced in conjunction with, and as a justification for, an assertion of the invalidity of the law of 
causality. In every instance, however, such special definitions of causality, and a fortiori the general 
requirement of unambiguous determination, were held to be equivalent to the assumption of the 
comprehensibility of nature, and repudiated or defended as such. (Ibid., p. 69-70) 
 
All just a matter of words, so one might ask in the end, words which either met or 
opposed the demands of the milieu? But Forman is not after rhetoric in first place. 
Rather does the adaptation thesis concern a causal influence of the ideology required 
by the milieu on scientific methodology. 
 In this perspective, it is rather surprising that Forman plays down the role of 
philosophy at best. The reason is that, to his mind, philosophy equals classical school 
philosophy; accordingly there remain only few candidates such as Hermann Weyl who 
was deeply impressed by Fichte and phenomenology at various instances of his 
intellectual career.15 
 
And here, saving perhaps the case of Hermann Weyl, it was not a question of “philosophical” 
influences in any serious intellectual sense. By far the single most influential “thinker” was Spengler, 
and that only because the Untergang des Abendlandes, the concentrated expression of the existentialist 
Lebensphilosophie that was diffused through the intellectual atmosphere … Thus, excepting the role of 
Franz Exner, the philosophical theses of the latter nineteenth century to which Jammer has drawn 
attention, while they may perfectly well have some responsibility for the ideational content of the 
Lebensphilosophie of the Weimar period, played, per se, an sich, a negligible role in the sudden rise of 
anticausal sentiment among German physicists after the First World War. (Forman, 1971, p. 110) 
 
                                                          
15 See the papers of Sigurdsson and Scholz in (Scholz, 2001). 
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1.1.2.2. Spenglerism 
 
Spengler is, expectedly, Forman’s second catchword of ideological adaptation. The 
typical reaction of the Weimar scientists was as such: “Of my discipline Spengler 
understands, of course, not the first thing, but aside from that the book is brilliant.” 
(Forman, 1971, p. 30) Scientists typically defended the “most basic tenet of the 
scientific ideology, the autonomy, objectivity, and universality of scientific 
knowledge.” (Forman, 1971, p. 56f.) This was done, to Forman’s mind, by Exner 
(1922) and Riebesell (1920); see Sections 4.6. and 5.3. “Yet for every opponent of 
Spengler’s thesis” to have exploded this ideology by demonstrating that there are no 
immanent, invariant criteria of knowledge, that science depends upon the Lebensgefühl 
of an epoch, “one can cite another exact scientist who … identified himself with this 
doctrinal touchstone of Spenglerism.” (Ibid., p. 57) Among those cited by Forman at 
this point is Schrödinger’s 1932 speech “Ist die Naturwissenschaft milieubedingt?” In 
Section 6.3.7. we will, in effect, see to what extent Schrödinger took Exner’s stand. 
 But the first witness for a “Capitulation to Spenglerism” is Richard von Mises. 
In his 1920 Dresden inaugural address, von Mises argued that since the turn of the 
century mankind has been standing at the end of the ‘age of technology’ that had 
begun in the 1840s or 1850s; “and we have gradually entered into a period which is, 
similarly as the times of Copernicus, Galilei, and Kepler, characterized by a particular 
intellectual trend [geistige Bewegung], a period in which speculative natural science 
blooms [Blüte spekulativer Naturwissenschaft].” (Mises, 1922b, p. 2) Von Mises also 
takes up the poetic title of a paper of Arnold Sommerfeld (1920) which had appeared 
in Die Naturwissenschaften shortly before. Where Sommerfeld titled “A Number 
Mystery in the Theory of the Zeeman Effect”, von Mises added a dash of Spenglerian 
cyclism. “It is a remarkable cycle of affairs [Kreislauf der Dinge] when one considers 
that in present-day atomistic numerical harmonies, even number mysteries play a role 
reminding one no less of the ideas of the Pythagoreans than of some of the cabbalists.” 
(Mises, 1922b, p. 16) But Forman neglects that despite terminological coincidence 
both authors have rather opposite views about atomic physics. For the staunch 
Machian von Mises atoms are still hypothetical, while Sommerfeld constantly 
rehearsed Planck’s (1908a) oft-repeated allegation that positivism leads to infertility.16 
Hence, causality was not at issue in von Mises’ capitulation to Spengler; just the old 
concept of causality had to go in the case of mass phenomena (Ibid., p. 30), but the 
Machian functional dependences could still be maintained. (See Section 8.2.) 
 Forman diagnoses a substantial shift in von Mises’ attitude in late 1921 when he 
republished his speech with an appendix. “What is perhaps most striking and appalling 
about the von Mises of September 1921 is the failure of nerve, the complete loss – just 
as Spengler predicted – of the esprit, the self-confidence which we expect from the 
mathematical physicist.” (Forman, 1971, p. 51) Did von Mises, who had just founded 
the Zeitschrift für Angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik in order to support 
“theoretical foundations of technology” (Mises, 1921b, p. 269) really go “so far in 
assimilating the values and mood of [the] … intellectual milieu as to effectively 
repudiate [his] … own discipline …?” (Forman, 1971, p. 55) It suffices to read the 
                                                          
16 In a letter to Schlick of 17 October 1932, Sommerfeld applied directly this to Philipp Frank, “who despite all 
acumen never tackled a physical problem.” In the same letter, Sommerfeld also rejected Mach’s empiricist 
notion of causality which he termed “principle of sloppy laws of nature.” (See Sect. 7.4.) 
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appendix which mainly explained new findings in relativity theory and atomic physics. 
Von Mises took back part of the skepticism of the original address. He felt 
misunderstood to have rejected the possibility of any further development or 
elaboration of present-day technology. The results of the present speculative science, 
he continued, might well “become the basis of new hitherto undreamed-of technical 
achievements, in the same vein as one considers the foundation of natural science in 
the 17th century as the ‘preliminary stage’ of 19th century technology.” (Mises, 
1922b, p. 31) Still, this observation promised no final cure; and in the end the author 
poured out his troubled heart. 
 
History on the large scale is no unidirectional progress superposed, perhaps, by small oscillations; it 
exhibits birth, growth, and decay as the life of the individual, the family, and the peoples. Gigantic 
intellectual worlds have emerged, risen to great heights, and went to ruins: Where are the gods of 
Greece today and what persists from the spirit of the old Romans among the inhabitants of today’s 
Rome? … 
There is at least a high probability that the edifice of an occidental culture based upon knowledge and 
achievement, which has towered up since five centuries, comes to demolition within the next 
centuries. From this point of view one would have to count relativity theory and atomistic among the 
last building stones which are destined to crown the edifice. This does also not contradict the fact that 
we look at a widely open and fertile field of work, in particular with respect to the second area of 
research; even though evening is gradually drawing near, there remains room for the work of 
generations. 
 Strangely enough, Spengler’s expositions were conceived as an expression of pessimism. As if 
man who ages and acts in the conscience that death will occur some day would be a pessimist! …Are 
then today the works of Greek art and worldly wisdom [Lebensweisheit] completely lost? Thus, to my 
mind, we can content ourselves with the prospect that posterity, once a further development of our 
present occidental culture and a continuation of the exact sciences in our sense have become 
impossible, will think of our times with similar feelings of gratitude and reverence as we show today 
for classical antiquity. Nothing is lost what is done pure in heart and for the sake of the cause! (Ibid., 
p. 32)Surprisingly, von Mises read Spengler not as a pessimist; the last sentence rather 
took a Nietzschean tack to courageously face the inevitable.17 This conclusion was 
supported by the anti-Spenglerian insight that the achievements of earlier cultures 
were not lost. Thus there are clear signs of a retrenchment – as Forman had initially 
assumed on the whole (Cf. Forman, 1971, p. 5) – of the scientist von Mises rather than 
adaptation. But clearly he does not pay mere lip service to the milieu. Rather does it 
seem that the scientist-philosopher von Mises and the Bildungsbürger von Mises 
followed diverging orientations. This is still discernible in his textbook Positivism 
where one can find a rather cautious footnote on Spengler. Cf. Mises, 1939, p. 
325/223) 
 
1.1.2.3. Craving for Crisis 
 
The third ideological adaptation to the milieu concerned the ‘craving for crisis’. “By 
applying the word ‘crisis’ to his own discipline the scientist has not only made contact 
with his audience, but has ipso facto shown that his field – and he himself – is ‘with 
it’, sharing the spirit of the time.” (Forman, 1971, p. 58f.) Once again, we encounter 
Hermann Weyl in first line. The crisis in the foundations of mathematics proclaimed 
by him “was precipitated virtually out of thin air in the two or three years following 
                                                          
17 Recall the end of the Zarathustra! Schiemann (1996, p. 358) reads von Mises’s creative impulse at dusk as 
somewhat ironical. 
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Germany’s defeat. With extraordinary suddenness the German mathematical 
community began to feel how insecure the foundations upon which the entire structure 
of mathematical analysis rested.” (Ibid., p. 60) Unfortunately, the crisis was stirred up 
by the Dutchman Luitzen E.J. Brouwer. The Vienna Circle, on the other hand, took the 
crisis more seriously than most working mathematicians. Thus, in the case of the 
foundational crisis in mathematics Forman faces the paradox to classify the modernist 
fringe movement Vienna Circle as converts to the milieu. Let me turn to three other 
crises. 
 Once again, Forman calls von Mises to the witness stand; this time he testifies 
“On the Present Crisis of Mechanics” (Mises, 1922a). As we shall see in Section 8.2., 
Mises advocated the application of statistical methods because, e.g., in fluid dynamics 
the reduction to an allegedly deterministic micro-level could not produce any 
applicable result at all. However, the crisis of mechanics as a reductionist program 
already dates back to the failures to incorporate electrodynamics that had led to the 
special theory of relativity in 1905. Finally, the “possibility of the crisis of the old 
quantum theory was, I think, dependent upon the physicists’ own craving for crises, 
arising from participation in, and adaptation to, the Weimar intellectual milieu.” 
(Forman, 1971, p. 62) But, to my mind, there were clear physical indications of a 
failure of the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory.18 There were internal inconsistencies, 
problems with the interaction between electrons, and in 1922 and 1923 the theory 
produced empirically wrong results about the Helium atom. When in July 1923 Die 
Naturwissenschaften published a special issue dedicated to “The first ten years of 
Niels Bohr’s theory of the constitution of atoms”, Planck’s keynote paper mentioned 
the helium atom and many electron problems in general as a prominent example for 
the need of a “deep intervention into the system of ideas of the classical theory.” 
(Planck, 1923b, p. 536) Moreover, “[a]t present an, at least to some extent, satisfactory 
solution of the problems raised by the introduction of quantum mechanics into 
atomistic is out of the question by far. Not even the question about the domain of 
validity of the classical theory can today be finally decided.” (Ibid., p. 536) 
Nevertheless, Planck warned against a global indeterminism. 
 
There are eminent physicists who at bottom want to allow the principles of the classical theory only a 
statistical significance … Such a conception seems to me, however, to overshoot the mark by far, if 
only because with the abandonment of classical dynamics they simultaneously pull out the foundations 
of every rational statistics. (Ibid., p. 536) 
 
According to Forman, those meant by Planck’s criticism were “Exner, Nernst, 
Schrödinger, and, yes, Bohr, himself.” (Forman, 1971, p. 93) But Exner had to stand 
the same criticism already a decade before. The fact that Planck basically repeated his 
earlier criticism (Cf. Planck, 1914, p. 63-64; see Section 4.5.) makes this passage 
practically worthless for Forman’s adaptation thesis. Towards the end of the paper, 
Planck, interestingly, was less rigid about the validity of the principle of energy 
conservation, which would be indeed abandoned in the following year by the Bohr-
Kramers-Slater (BKS) theory. Thus we see that, in Planck’s case, the diagnosis of 
crisis did not entail abrogating deterministic causality.  
                                                          
18 An interesting reading in this respect is (Hund, 1984, pp. 127-129) because the author of this history of 
quantum mechanics had himself been an active participant of these developments. 
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 More generally, I doubt that more than a few of the protagonists had taken the 
old theory that was based on the correspondence principle and a calculatory 
machinery, as anything close to the final word. Of course, one can grant Forman that 
on the rhetorical level physicists adapted to the catchwords of the milieu. And they 
had not yet the slightest idea about the way out of the crisis. Sommerfeld’s much-
debated “Zahlenmysterium” is a case in point. The table of spectral series for the 
anomalous Zeeman effect was so mysteriously regular that for every physicist it was 
clear that it indicated an important fundamental law still to be discovered and not just 
an unexplainable fact. Thus was the thrust of the two final paragraphs of Sommerfeld’s 
paper. 
 
The musical beauty of our table of numbers is not impaired by the fact that for the time being it 
represents a number mystery. … In the case of the spectral series it has turned out that the arithmetic 
relations prevailing here have their reason in quantum theory. It is beyond doubt that our still 
mysterious table of numbers indicates the workings of hidden quantum numbers and quantum 
relations. (Sommerfeld, 1920, p. 64) 
 
Sommerfeld was fully right: the theories of Schrödinger and Heisenberg introduced 
the new magnetic quantum number m and modified the algebraic relations for the 
orbital momentum l in such a way that the anomalous Zeeman effect became the 
standard case while the normal Zeeman effect represented a degeneracy of the 
quantum numbers. Thus John Hendry is fully right to consider the heading of the 
article as a “linguistic accommodation to the milieu” (1980, p. 159) – perhaps for the 
sake of popularization. To the German translation of Hendry’s paper, Karl von 
Meyenn (1994, p. 209) adds that the term “Zahlenmystik” had been used in the same 
context as early as in 1917 by the Polish physicist A. Rubinowicz who was working 
with Sommerfeld in Munich. At bottom, Sommerfeld was quite convinced that one 
had already isolated the empirical evidence to be condensed in a law. To be sure, in 
later years he would at first skeptical about the radical epistemological changes 
required by his student Heisenberg.  
 The pronouncements of “crisis” by scientists investigated by the present study, 
and within the community represented by Die Naturwisssenschaften, typically 
combined the diagnosis of a foundational crisis with the conviction, or already the first 
indications, that it would be overcome by developing new foundations. This rhetorical 
figure can be found in at least two places appertaining to both sides of the aisle in the 
causality debate. 
 The first location is even mentioned in a footnote of Forman (1971, p. 59, fn. 
135). In 1933, Karl Menger organized a much-frequented lecture series Krise und 
Neuaufbau in den exakten Wissenschaften (Crisis and Reconstruction in the Exact 
Sciences) the Preface of which declared: “The growing interest of ever wider circles 
for the exact sciences is surely above all a seeking after one of the regions which are 
far removed from the world of crisis. … In truth the exact sciences are by no means 
secure from crises and precisely in recent decades, from theoretical physics on out into 
logic, they have been shaken by severe crises.” (From Forman, 1971, p. 59, fn.)19 But 
this lecture series is no convincing evidence for Forman’s case. If there was a feeling 
of crisis in 1933 and among these lecturers invited by Menger, it was Hitler’s seizure 
of power. And taking Hahn’s contribution “The Crisis of Intuition” (1933) as a 
                                                          
19 See (Stadler, 2001, p. 420) for the further context of these lecture series. 
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paradigmatic example, the span of the crisis extended back to the rejection of intuition 
as a criterion of justifying mathematical axioms that had become the basis of modern 
mathematics as brought about by Weierstraß and Hilbert. Hahn rejected Kant’s pure 
intuition and its contemporary heirs because they hampered mathematical progress. 
Die Naturwissenschaften published a review of these lectures by von Mises who 
concluded that they fortunately disappointed the skepticism aroused by the oft-misused 
word ‘crisis’ in the most pleasant way. “One would wish that each one of the 
assiduous poets of world views [Weltanschauungsdichter] take notice of the fact that 
also physics does not do anything else than what it did at each instance of its 
development, to wit, to adapt the intellectual images of theory to new observational 
results.” (Mises, 1933c, p. 867) 
 The same rhetorical figure is constantly present in the writings of Planck who is 
Forman’s upright fighter under the banner of causality. In an address to the 1910 
Naturforscherversammlung entitled “The Position of Modern Physics With Respect to 
the Mechanical World View”, Planck initially surveyed the impressive achievements 
in experimental techniques. “Also the theoreticians have been imparted a large part of 
the boldness that has emerged among the practitioners, … no physical theorem at 
present is secure against being called into question, every physical truth is open to 
debate. It appears as if in theoretical physics chaos is drawing near.” (Planck, 1910, p. 
25) After a sketch of the long-lasting dispute about the ideal of mechanical 
reductionism, Planck suggested a resolution through relativity theory. “What has led to 
this revolution and how the crisis [Krisis] caused by it will perhaps be overcome shall 
be outlined in the following.” (Ibid., p. 26) Twenty years later, his famous article 
“Positivism and the Real World” also commenced with the motive of crisis.  
 
We are living in a very singular moment of history. Wherever we turn our attention, in every branch of 
our spiritual and material culture, we have got into a moment of severe crises. … Some people view 
this as the beginning of a great improvement, others interpret it as the herald of the inevitable decline. 
As has long been common in religion and in the arts, nowadays in science there is scarcely any axiom 
[Grundsatz] that is not denied by somebody, no nonsense that does not find believers and disciples 
somewhere or other. In the midst of this confusion it is natural to ask whether there is any truth left 
which is unassailable. … The moment this question is asked the mind turns, no doubt, to the most 
exact of our natural sciences, namely, physics. But even physical science has not been spared this 
universal crisis. Even on this field a certain insecurity has emerged and at places the opinions in 
epistemological matters differ considerably. Physics’ hitherto generally accepted axioms, in some 
places even causality itself, are thrown overboard. After all, that such could happen just in physics is 
sometimes counted as a symptom for the unreliability of all human knowledge. (Planck, 1930, p. 
201)20 
 
Has Planck here belatedly adapted to the milieu? The body of the paper which reveals 
a Planck who still – though less certain than before – is breaking a lance for 
causality21. As ever he criticized the infertility of positivism and held with Kant that 
deterministic causality was fully reconcilable with the freedom of the will. While in 
1910 relativity theory had ended the crisis, this time there was no physical remedy in 
                                                          
20 Unfortunately, the differences between the German original and the English translation (Planck, 1981, pp. 65-
106) are substantial and entire passages are missing. As moreover the translator Murphy had his own views 
about the subject (Cf. Forman, 1971, p. 108f.), I shall not use this text and all translations from Planck are mine. 
21 Cf. his dialogue with Schrödinger in the year before which will be the content of Section 6.3.5. 
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sight. Planck retained his optimism and called upon the united forces of science and 
ethics. 
 
I hope that even those of you who have little connection with physics have gained the impression that 
even a single science, if performed thoroughly and conscientiously, is able to unearth valuable 
treasures of aesthetical and ethical nature, and moreover, that precisely the deep crises in spiritual 
culture which we have initially mentioned as our starting point, at the end of the day only serve to 
prepare the federation into an new and higher union. (Ibid., p. 218) 
 
Also Johannes Stark, who together with Philipp Lenard would become a leader of the 
Deutsche Physik under the nationalsocialist regime, contributed a booklet on The 
Present Crisis in German Physics (1922). To him, the crisis consisted in the ‘dogmatic 
nature’ of all modern physics, be it relativity or quantum theory. Stark found a resolute 
response in Die Naturwissenschaften penned by von Laue (1923). After rejecting 
Stark’s dislike of the bulk of modern physics and insisting that there exists no 
difference in value between pure and applied physics, von Laue concluded. 
 
There is not doubt about the existence of a crisis in physics, and there is no doubt as well that it must 
be above all accredited to quantum theory. But the crisis is not limited to German science. It manifests 
itself in the same way in all countries participating in physical research, and it can be overcome only 
once science succeeds in solving the quantum riddle [Quantenrätsel]. There exists no other remedy. … 
All in all we wished that the book had remained unwritten, namely, in the interest of science in 
general, German science in particular, and not the least in the interest of the author. (Laue, 1923, p. 
29f.)  
 
As in Planck’s writings, Laue clearly posed the task to end the crisis by finding an 
appropriate quantum theory. It was Stark who felt an all-embracing sense of crisis, not 
the quantum physicists. For the quantum generation, Stark and Lenard were hardly a 
part of the milieu to seek rhetorical and ideological company with. 
 
1.1.3. Dispensing with Causality 
 
Let me now turn to the third and pivotal step of Forman’s thesis: “Dispensing with 
causality”. In the years 1920/1 suddenly a series of quasi-religious confessions to 
acausality began. While Wien held the fortress against Spengler, the first converts 
were Exner and Weyl. It is true, in those days Weyl was strongly influenced by a 
phenomenology “of quite a different sort from his Machian ex-brothers” (Forman, 
1971, p. 76). In Exner’s case, the “conversion” in 1919 was a walkaway because the 
bulk of his ideas about acausality had already appeared in print a decade ago (1909). 
From a rather superficial summary of the philosophical arguments in the fourth chapter 
of Exner’s Lectures (1919, 1922) Forman concludes: “What is novel is the leap from 
that supposition [that all natural laws are statistical] to the conclusion that causality 
fails. For this leap no justification is offered, and the problem of how perfectly acausal 
microscopic motions result in statistical regularities is not even raised by Exner.” 
(Forman, 1971, p. 75) In Section 4.4., I shall argue that the frequency interpretation of 
probability, which is discussed at length in the Lectures, does the job together with the 
radical empiricist stance. To Forman’s lights, this does not make up a coherent world 
view.  
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[Exner] therefore does the best to convince his (lay) readers of the implausibility of the existence of 
such a causal substratum, switching back and forth between, and largely confounding, the question of 
the validity of the laws of classical mechanics in the atomic domain and the validity of the principle of 
causality in the same domain. (Ibid., p. 75)  
 
Yet, on pain of tautology the empiricist has to be specific about the character of causal 
laws, and entirely unknown causal micro-laws would be just empty gibberish. 
Historically, Exner’s Lectures emerged to a substantial part from the courses he had 
taught at the Philosophical Faculty.22 Forman’s (lay) man on the street, at bottom, 
seems to be a rigid determinist who rejects to fill out questionnaires from the bureau of 
statistics.  
 
Influential as Exner’s lectures indeed were, they have in many respects an archaic air. Exner is a 
curious mixture of the philosophical currents of the two preceding generations, a self-confessed 
mechanist-materialist yet clearly also a positivist in his view of scientific constructs. (Ibid., p. 75)  
 
I wonder where Exner ever confessed to materialism. To be sure, he was a physicalist 
of Boltzmann’s breed. Forman’s talk of an ‘archaic air’ might be justified with respect 
to the poor coverage of Bohr’s theory of the atom despite a lot of spectroscopy; but on 
the other hand, the Lectures contain an ample discussion of nuclear physics, and in the 
second edition (1922) there are several pages about relativity theory, a topic not quite 
popular among German experimentalists. 
 
The quasi-religious conversions to acausality … became a common phenomenon in the German 
physical community during the summer and fall of 1921. As it swept up in a great awakening, one 
physicist after the other strode before a general academic audience to renounce the satanic doctrine of 
causality. (Forman, 1971, p. 80) 
 
There fell Richard von Mises (1922a and 1922b), “the loyal scion of Austrian 
positivism” (Forman, 1971, p. 80), Walter Schottky (1921), and Walter Nernst (1922). 
Forman laments about von Mises’ “‘me too’ tone” (Forman, 1971, p. 82) and Nernst’s 
“resolve to sink the law of causality by hook or by crook.” (Ibid., p. 84) I shall analyze 
the relevant evidence in Section 5.5. Suffice it to note that, strangely enough, Forman 
hears in all of them the “common theme of ignorabimus.” (Ibid., p. 86) But all three 
alleged renunciations of causality were motivated by the desire to get around DuBois-
Reymond’s ignorabimus and to reject the idea of principal borders of human 
knowledge which had been a consequence of an untenable mechanist notion of 
causality, be in a Kantian or in a materialist setting. 
 The next prey of the milieu was Schrödinger whose 1922 Zurich inaugural 
address explicitly rehearsed the Exnerian viewpoint, but “by the fall of 1925 
Schrödinger had converted back to causality for what were most probably personal-
political reasons. He now conceived and developed the wave mechanics as a causal 
space-time description of atomic processes in opposition to the Copenhagen-Göttingen 
matrix mechanics.” (Forman, 1971, p. 104) But at least in 1929, Schrödinger, in an 
exchange with Planck on the occasion of his election as a member of the Prussian 
Academy of Sciences (Schrödinger, 1929), entertained the same views as in the Zurich 
speech, which he now sent to Die Naturwissenschaften without modifications (1922a).  
                                                          
22 (Benndorf, 1927, p. 407) relates that Exner had to give the regular lecture course for students of pharmacy. 
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 Reichenbach fell only in 1925. Once again, the empiricist criterion of meaning 
allegedly leads straight to the Decline of the West. While in a earlier paper 
Reichenbach had left the decision about causality to physics, now he held that “even 
without the hypothesis of rigorous causality it is possible to give a quantitative 
description of the course of nature which does everything that physics can possibly 
do.” (Reichenbach, 1925, quoted according to Forman, 1971, p. 89) Thus probability 
became the most fundamental concept because in this way we need the minimal 
number of presuppositions. “Which is to say that existentialist philosophy, disguised 
as logical empiricism, has preempted the decision.” (Ibid., p. 90) Reichenbach was 
quite active in the Jugendbewegung;23 maybe he even wore a beard to disguise his 
existentialism? But suddenly in 1925 he decided to have it shaved off in Occam’s 
barber shop for a better adaptation to the milieu. More interesting is Forman’s 
conclusion of all such “quasi-religious experience” because it already opens up the 
possibility of alternative histories discussed in Section 2.1. 
 
When our converts attempted to demonstrate the necessity for this renunciation of causality, their 
arguments, as often as not, ought logically to have led to the opposite conclusion. From this I think 
one must infer that they fully anticipated that any argument advanced by a physicist as a 
demonstration of the failure of causality would be received by their audience with uncritical approval. 
(Forman, 1971, p. 90f.) 
 
While Forman does not offer a glimpse of how these logical conclusions run, he 
narrative now calls upon the “Unrenegates against the Tide” who stood up to protect 
the banner of causality. “Among the first … was Mach’s old bulldog, Joseph 
Petzoldt.” (Ibid., p. 91) Closer scrutiny (Section 5.5.3.) will teach that Petzoldt 
defended precisely the Machian concept of causality which he, rightly, considered to 
be reconcilable with quantum mechanics.  
 Planck himself repeatedly raised his voice in favor of the transcendental 
character of the law of causality (Planck, 1923, 1929 & 1930) and hoped that quantum 
mechanics would ultimately return to a causal description. While Forman’s description 
of Planck’s stand is fairly accurate, I have serious doubts whether “Planck and Einstein 
were in complete agreement.” (Forman, 1971, p. 94) Einstein’s position in causal 
matters was rather sophisticated. Independently of Smoluchowski, he had obtained a 
solution of the problem of Brownian motion, and even before, he openly availed 
himself of statistical methods for black-body radiation while Planck did do so only 
stepwise (See Kuhn, 1987, Ch. VII). Moreover, Einstein was seeking, without success 
though, a unified field theory rather than hoping for a simple return of causality. 
Similar motivations might also have guided Weyl24; after all, the issue whether the 
basic description of nature be continuous (as in field theory) or discrete (as in quantum 
mechanics) was not just an internal physical question but a philosophical classic of the 
same rank as causality. 
 Forman now turns his attention to the situation circa 1924. Without resorting to 
the milieu as the reason how such a heresy could have been possible, he states that 
now “the atomic physicists were becoming convinced of the fundamental inadequacy 
of the extant theory of the atom.” (Ibid., p. 97) It seems that Forman now detects a 
second adaptation to the milieu, the failure of mechanics, such that “the 
                                                          
23 See the paper of Hans-Ulrich Wipf in (Danneberg/Kamlah/Schäfer, 1994). 
24 In private communication, Erhard Scholz has expressed serious doubts about Forman’s account of Weyl. 
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antimechanical and anticausal movements coalesced, reinforcing one another.” (Ibid., 
p. 98) Whatever “mechanics” is to mean here – perhaps the strict validity of energy 
conservation –, the most important result in 1924 was the Bohr-Kramers-Slater (BKS) 
theory in which energy conservation held only statistically. Of course, it was once 
again the milieu which guaranteed the theory a “widespread assent” until it was 
experimentally refuted by the experiments of Geiger and Bothe who already in 1925 
showed that energy was conserved in each individual process. And again, 
Schrödinger’s (1924a) “moral feelings” made him “clutching at it with both hands.” 
(Ibid. p. 100) Two years later, he allegedly changed his mind when writing to Wien on 
25 August, 1926: “Today I no longer like to assume with Born that an individual event 
of this kind is “absolutely random”, i.e., completely undetermined. I no longer believe 
today that there is much to be gained from this conception (which I championed so 
enthusiastically four years ago).”25 Yet this passage needs more profound 
interpretation; it will be analyzed in Section 6.3.4.  
 “Causality’s last stand” was tenaciously defended by Wien who maintained 
“that, even when the laws are statistical, causality must reign at the level of the 
elementary process” and that “physicists will not rest until they have subjected atomic 
processes to the law of causality.” (All ibid., p. 102f.) “The confidence and 
corresponding aggressiveness which Wien manifested on the issue of causality in the 
spring of 1926 derived chiefly from Erwin Schrödinger’s papers on wave mechanics 
which Wien was then publishing in his journal, the Annalen der Physik.” (Ibid., p 
103f.) Unfortunately, the next issue of the Annalen would contain Schrödinger’s 
(1926b) proof that wave mechanics was equivalent to matrix mechanics. After Born’s 
statistical interpretation and with the equivalence of wave mechanics and matrix 
mechanics established, Heisenberg in the spring of 1927 could proclaim victory: 
“quantum mechanics definitively establishes the fact that the law of causality is not 
valid.” (according to Forman, 1971, p. 105)  
 Here Forman’s story ends. Now there were rational reasons for the dismissal of 
causality on the basis “of a fundamentally acausal quantum mechanics” (Ibid., p. 110). 
Many philosophers subsequently would jump on the band wagon of the new theory, 
however, they based their “nonsense announced with great fanfare … wholly and 
solely upon the manifestos against causality issued by physicists before that date.” 
(Ibid., p. 111) But whatever stand scientist-philosophers had taken in the causality 
debate, all of them vigorously criticized these misinterpretations. (See Sections 8.5. & 
8.7.). 
 In the end, Forman devotes himself to the really big picture. 
 
[P]aralleling Ringer’s observation that early in the Weimar period the ‘modernist academics’ tended to 
be ‘methodologically adventurous’, one finds that, by and large, those physicists who were readiest to 
repudiate causality had either distinctly ‘progressive’ views by the standards of their social class and 
the German academic world, and/or had an unusually close interest in, or contact with, modern 
literature. [The second condition is probably to save the case von Mises.]… On the other hand, with 
the notable exception of Einstein, those who defended causality tended to be highly principle political 
conservatives and/or interested in classical literature. … And finally to the causalist camp one may add 
the outright reactionaries: Ernst Gehrcke, Erwin Lohr, Philipp Lenard, and Johannes Stark. (Ibid., p. 
113)  
 
                                                          
25 This passage is quoted in (Forman, 1971, p. 104, fn. 235). 
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The book’s rather feeble ending, which I have already cited at the beginning of this 
section, might have been conditioned by the insight that the last series of names poses 
a substantial danger for the stability of Forman’s whole edifice because they evidence 
a continuity with the struggles about relativity theory which Forman has to avoid at 
best to convincingly make his case. Gehrcke, Lenard, and Stark were the main 
opponents of Einstein’s relativity theory, and of modern ‘abstract’ physics altogether. 
Although the clashes around Einstein had already begun before the war (e.g., Gehrcke 
vs. Born, 1913), they reached the peak right in the years 1920-1922, and were thus in 
perfect synchrony with the alleged adaptations to acausality. If it were true that the 
German physicists were more prone to sacrifice the concept of causality familiar from 
classical physics after they had realized that the familiar concepts of Euclidean space 
and absolute time were untenable, the adaptation diagnosed by Forman was by far less 
scandalous. This intimate connection between relativity and atomic theory becomes 
even closer if one takes into account Forman’s later extension of the adaptation thesis 
to the notion of Anschaulichkeit because the later stood in the center of the battles 
between Einstein and Lenard.  
Before turning to Anschaulichkeit in Section 1.3 I shall provide some highlights 
of the debates ensuing from Forman’s original paper. My reading will be somewhat 
selective in order not to lose sight of this book’s main thread.  
 
1.2. Reactions on the Forman Thesis 
 
The most recent opinion about the Forman thesis which I have found is as decided as 
most comments in the three decades before. It teaches that the matter is still 
controversial. Let me quote a passage which ends the relevant chapter in Helge 
Kragh’s Quantum Generation, a book dedicated to 20th century physics. 
 
However, there are good reasons to reject the suggestion of a strong connection between the socio-
ideological circumstances of the young Weimar republic and the introduction of an acausal quantum 
mechanics. Suffice to mention a few of these reasons: 
1. Whereas the physicists often discussed the (a)causality question and other Zeitgeist-related 
problems in talks and articles addressed to general audiences, these topics were almost never 
mentioned in either scientific papers or addresses before scientific audiences. 
2. To the extent that physicists adapted to the Zeitgeist, the adaptation was concerned with the values 
of science, not with its content. 
3. Many of the physicists had good scientific reasons to reject detailed causality and did not need to 
be “converted”. At any rate, only a very small proportion of the German physicists seem to have 
rejected causality before 1925-26. 
4. Sommerfeld, Einstein, Born, Planck, and other leading physicists did not bow to the Zeitgeist, but 
criticized it explicitly. 
5. The recognition of some kind of crisis was widespread around 1924, primarily because of 
anomalies that the existing atomic theory could not explain. Bohr and a few other physicists 
suggested vaguely that energy conservation and space-time description might have to be abandoned 
… 
6. The first acausal theory in atomic physics, the 1924 Bohr-Kramers-Slater radiation theory, was not 
received uniformly positively among German physicists, contrary to what one would expect 
according to the Zeitgeist thesis. And those who did accept the theory were more impressed by its 
scientific promises than by its ideological correctness. The theory’s element of acausality was not 
seen as its most important feature. Moreover, the theory had its origin in Copenhagen, with a 
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cultural climate very different from the Weimar Germany, and was proposed by a Dane, a 
Dutchman, and an American. 
7. Among the pioneers of acausal quantum mechanics were Bohr, Pauli, and Dirac, none of whom 
was influenced by the Weimar Zeitgeist. The young German physicists who created quantum 
mechanics were more interested in their scientific careers than in cultural trends and sought 
deliberately to isolate themselves from what went on in society. 
 
In conclusion, there were good reasons – internal as well as external – for why quantum mechanics 
originated in Germany. As far as I can judge, adaptation to the Weimar Zeitgeist was of no particular 
importance. (Kragh, 1999, p. 153f.) 
 
Counts 3., 5., and 6. concern the obviously weak evidence of Forman’s case seen from 
an internalist standpoint. Count 6. specifically illustrates the crucial role of the BKS 
theory for the question of causality before 1926. Here I largely agree. Counts 2. and 7. 
suggest a far-reaching separation between Forman’s protagonists in their roles as 
physicists and as Bildungsbürger as was the case with von Mises. (Cf. Sect. 1.1.2.2.) 
For one group (Einstein, Planck, Bohr, Exner, Schrödinger) this tension led to active 
participation in the cultural discourse, while others (Dirac, von Neumann) reacted by 
retrenchment, as Forman had initially contemplated. Count 1 is the externalist 
complement to count 2. Analyzing the philosophical debate about causality I have to 
reject them in the strong form as they appear here, because philosophical convictions 
mediated between the values of science and the theory’s content. Moreover, the 
philosophical debate took place in Die Naturwissenschaften that were a medium 
having both a scientific and a general audience. Count 4. is absolutely right, but I have 
some doubts whether Bohr and the later Pauli are correctly classified under Count 7. 
which rather seems to suit the present-day professional theoretical physicist. 
 Apart from an unpublished address by Jon Dorling, the first comprehensive 
reaction to Forman’s thesis was equally outspoken. In “Weimar Culture and Quantum 
Causality”, John Hendry concludes: 
 
Forman’s work has clearly demonstrated the poverty of a wholly internal treatment of issues such as 
that of causality. Physicists were influenced by the crisis-consciousness of post-war Europe and by the 
attitudes characteristic of the Weimar milieu. On the other hand, Forman has also demonstrated the 
dangers of a purely external treatment and the poverty of any naive social reductionism. (1980, p. 171) 
 
In the bulk of his paper, Hendry provides sketches of an internal or rational 
counterpart for most conversion documents. Among them is an interesting observation 
concerning the declaration of victory, to wit, Born’s statistical interpretation (1926 & 
1927). 
 
Born’s rejection of causality, equivalent as it was to the rejection of any relevant microscopic 
coordinates, was also closely tied to his insistence that his theory was final and complete, whether 
microscopic coordinates existed and were measurable or not, and this was the most remarkable feature 
of his presentation. Heisenberg had built his theory upon quantities that were in principle observable, 
but Born restricted himself to those that were in practice, at the time of writing, and asserted that no 
future experiments could change the theory that he had evolved. This somewhat dangerous attitude 
appears to have directly stemmed from his assertion that the physical interpretation must follow 
uniquely from the mathematical formulation of the theory and the assertion itself from a battle waged 
in Göttingen the previous winter between the advocates of a mathematical approach to the new 
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quantum mechanics (Born, Hilbert, Weyl) and the advocates of a physical approach (Heisenberg, 
Fran[c]k). (Hendry, 1980, p. 168)26 
 
In the historical context of 1927, this difference was perhaps of minor importance. 
Seen in retrospect, however, with many hidden-variable theories on the market and 
this present situation being projected back into 1927 by philosophers, such as Cushing 
(1994), the finality claim becomes crucial. More generally, Born’s point concerns the 
fact how physical ontology and empiricist meaning criteria are mutually related, and 
what we expect from the axiomatic approach to quantum mechanics. (Neumann, 1932) 
These problems will come to the fore in the differences between Schlick and Frank in 
1936 (Section 8.7). Here are Hendry’s conclusions. 
 
We may, then, dismiss Forman’s thesis in his own terms, but only if we are prepared to accept the 
naive level of his own arguments; and this, it seems to me, we cannot do. For overwhelming the 
detailed evidence given above and by Forman are many serious problems relating to the causality 
issue in general, to the overall structure of Forman’s demonstration, and to the whole question as to 
what is meant by an “influence of the milieu”, how this relates to the wider concept of sociological 
causation, and how this concept may be meaningfully applied to the history of science. 
 
Hendry rightly criticizes Forman’s “consequent handling of the causality debate in 
simple black-and-white terms. To important contributors such as Weyl and 
Reichenbach, both of whom were well trained in the subtleties of philosophy of 
science, the issue was complex and the classical position naive.” (Ibid., p. 169) To 
Heisenberg and Bohr, the issue of causality was closely related to the applicability of 
the traditional space-time concepts. Moreover, one also has to take into account that 
regarding causality “we are dealing with a contentious and, in part at least, emotive 
issue.” (Ibid., p. 169) 
 
With the information available, Forman has succeeded in demonstrating the influence of the milieu 
upon physicists’ attitudes to causality, and were he to adopt a suitable concept of historical causation 
he could even assert quite reasonably that the attitudes were in some (weak) sense “caused” by the 
milieu. But it is clear from the importance he attaches to the absence of internal motivations and from 
his insistence on the milieu as “the primary” cause that his concept of historical causation is in fact a 
very strong one, and as such it must be supported by much more than the emotive, value-laden, 
discussion of examples that he offers. (Ibid., p. 170) 
 
In Hendry’s final conclusion we already implicitly find the distinction between a weak 
and a strong version of Forman’s thesis. The first merely claims a discernible influence 
of the milieu on some enunciations – be it on their rational content or rhetorical outfit 
– of major quantum physicists. The latter involves a problematic notion of strict 
causation by the socio-cultural milieu; or as the highly critical study of Kraft and 
Kroes puts it, a ‘quasi-behavioristic’ stimulus-response scheme of social interactions. 
 
According to Forman, the Weimar scientists focused exclusively on these academically educated 
general audiences, and their relationship with these audiences bears a lot of resemblance to the 
marketplace, where prices are set by such audiences-without-any-profile. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that Forman’s physicists and mathematicians, craving for recognition and prestige, reacted 
like Pavlovian dogs to the academic milieu. (Kraft and Kroes, 1984, p. 94) 
 
                                                          
26 See also Ch. 8 of (Hendry, 1984). 
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Moreover, a reasonable concept of causation should support a counterfactual: “without 
the influence of these [external] factors, physics in Germany would have taken a 
different course.” (Ibid., p. 96) As no such counterfactual obtains, Kraft and Kroes 
conclude “that Forman has created his own problem and sought for a ‘chameleonlike’ 
mechanism of adaptation as a solution of his problem.” (Ibid., p. 96) As we shall see in 
Section 2.1. Cushing (1994) indeed supplies such a counterfactual on the basis of – or 
rather in support of – a weak version of Forman’s thesis.  
 Kraft and Kroes’s paper also mentions some important characteristics of 
German physics. First, “German physicists had become acquainted with problems of 
an epistemological nature: the controversy between Mach and Boltzmann concerning 
the existence of the atom was part of their scientific heritage.” (Ibid., p. 97) A 
comparable tradition did not exist in other countries. To my mind, this argument can 
be made even stronger: the type of scientist-philosopher was nowhere so widespread 
as in Germany. Second, the authors propose to ‘turn Forman against Forman’ by citing 
later studies of the same author (Forman, 1974; Forman, Heilbron and Weart, 1975) 
according to which Germany had a disproportionately large and well-funded number 
of physicists in comparison to other countries.  
 Taking a closer look at the power structure in the Notgemeinschaft der 
deutschen Wissenschaft, we find the former Prussian minister of education Schmidt-
Ott as its president; Planck and Fritz Haber were in control of the 
Elektrophysikausschuß the great importance of which for the early 1920s resulted from 
the fact that the endowments coming from the General Electric company and the 
Japanese industrial Hajime Hoshi were awarded in hard currency. Although the money 
was advertised for “experimental investigations in the entire field of chemistry and 
atomic physics,”27 the ground-breaking studies of Heisenberg and Born received 
generous support from this source (Cf. Hermann, 1973, p. 90). And thus Planck, the 
arch-defender of causal physics, gave money to overthrow it – too perverse an 
adaptation, it seems. And so did Einstein in his capacity as a director of the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Institut für Physik (Cf. Meyenn, 1994, p. 45-49). 
 Kraft and Kroes also investigate the academically educated general audiences 
which mediated between the Weimar milieu and the German physicists. Forman 
“nowhere specifies the nature and the composition of these audiences.” (Kraft and 
Kroes, 1983, p. 86) There is indeed a dilemma here between these audiences’ 
incompetence in physical matters – which is necessary for any influence to qualify as 
external, –and their competence – which seems to be necessary to be able to influence 
physicists’ theorizing. Kraft and Kroes doubt whether the lack of, or the desire for, 
recognition and prestige produces enough leverage to escape this dilemma. To my 
mind, this dilemma still smells too much of the external-internal distinction. The more 
promising strategy seems to be to be more specific about the connecting links, at least 
after a certain restriction of the focus of investigation. This is the reason why Chapter 
5 attempts to provide such a connecting link for the causality debate between Vienna 
and Berlin.  
 Forman’s paper also led to several case studies that took it as a sort of 
measuring rod. Quite interesting in the present context is Hans Radder’s investigation 
about the Copenhagen-based Dutchman Hendrik A. Kramers who was one of the 
driving forces of the BKS-theory. Radder rightly argues that almost all the material 
                                                          
27 See the guidelines “Die Richtlinien des Japanausschusses”, Die Naturwissenschaften 11, 31-33. 
 45
piled up by Forman in favor of his third claim, which asserted an influence of the 
milieu on the content of physical theory, only supports, if it does at all, his second 
claim and witnesses an ideological adaptation of the single physicists. The only 
example which could win the case for the third claim is the BKS-theory, because it 
represents the only well-developed theory that explicitly breaks away from the 
principle of causality. Interestingly, “Kramers strongly contrasts the possible claims of 
science with a lebensphilosophische, anti-rationalistic and, in his personal case, 
religious viewpoint.” (Radder, 1983, p. 170) However, “in the case of Kramers we 
cannot speak of a ‘conversion’…: his ‘romantic attitude is already apparent … from 
1916 onwards.” (Ibid., p. 171) Yet in a paper of 1925 written in Dutch this 
romanticism combines with a clear-cut positivism.  
 
To be sure, we have to reckon with the possibility that principles like that of the conservation of 
energy or that of the causal course of phenomena in nature will get their feathers singed. However, in 
judging issues like this, one should always bear in mind that such principles are inferred, by the route 
of experience, from phenomena in which a great number of atoms play a part, and that, consequently, 
one can never with certainty conclude from such experiences anything about the elementary processes 
which lie at the root of such phenomena, namely, the processes that take place in individual atoms. 
(quoted according to Radder, 1983, p. 171f.) 
 
We will encounter a similar stand in Exner’s writings (See Sect. 4.4.). On Kramers’ 
account, even foundational matters admit considerable leeway: “For the moment it 
seems to me rather a matter of taste, and perhaps remain so forever, which alternative 
one prefers, unique causality or probability laws.” (from ibid. p. 172) Radder 
characterizes Kramers’ positivism as epistemological, which amounts to a combination 
of empiricist and instrumentalist ideas. Epistemological positivism starkly differs from 
its metaphysical counterpart, Auguste Comte’s claim that science will replace all 
metaphysics and obscure thinking. While the Weimar milieu is antipositivistic in the 
latter sense, Kramer’s epistemological positivism is reconcilable with the demands of 
the milieu because it leaves a free space which is not covered by scientific claims, or 
in Kramers’ words: “We can never get to the bottom of things. … We cannot claim 
more than a mere description of the relative positions and motions of the fundamental 
particles and of the laws governing their mutual action and their interplay with the 
ether.” (Kramers and Holst, 1923, p. 133) As epistemological positivism thus 
professes du Bois-Reymond’s ignorabimus, it is, to my mind, well reconcilable with 
the milieu but fundamentally at odds with Mach’s positivism and Logical Empiricism 
both of which are decidedly anti-metaphysical. On their account, epistemological 
positivism would be still a rather metaphysical doctrine because it reserves a special 
realm for religious truths unassailable by science. Unfortunately, some confusions 
about positivism will be with us throughout this book. 
 Forman’s thesis motivated also case studies in other disciplines. Mitchell G. 
Ash investigates the birth of Gestalt psychology in the Weimar context. 
 
Both Forman’s [1971] and Hendry’s [1980] account rest on two interlocking dualisms – an assumed 
opposition between modern and anti-modern, or rational and irrational; and the related notion that 
culture and society are external to science. This article queries both dualisms by considering a 
prominent case from psychology, a discipline generally thought to be more prone to ideological 
influences than physics. … [However,] Gestalt psychology does not conform easily to such 
conceptions. (Ash, 1991, p. 395) 
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Although I do not fully agree with Ash’s assessment of physics, the comparison is 
interesting, in particular because psychology went through a deep methodological 
crisis of its own. 
 
The difficulties for relativity and quantum mechanics were at least partly due to the fact that their 
procedures for theory-generation were not universally accepted even among physicists. This left them 
fair game for scapegoating in the popular and intellectual press as part of the general discourse of 
‘crisis’. Gestalt theory, too, was only partly accepted in its own community – not, however, because its 
methods were thought too unorthodox … but because its holism did not go far enough. … [Moreover,] 
the implications of that research did not, and could not, satisfy the ideological demands of the public 
from which the researchers came. … Yet in spite of all their holistic talk and their reaffirmation of 
Bildungsbürger values, the Gestalt theorists’ competitors realized full well that combining such 
discourse in some way with that of instrumental reason was the key to psychology’s applicability, and 
hence to official standing and state support. (Ibid., p. 409) 
 
This comparison teaches, I think, four points about the particular situation of physics. 
First, in the Weimar period there already existed a generally visible sense of the 
direction of modern physics. The needle had been adjusted by the experts’ general 
acceptance of special relativity and the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantum theory before the 
war. Second, Die Naturwissenschaften became the public forum for this modern 
physics in the post-war polemics, while the journal did not take a comparatively clear 
stand with respect to foundational debates in other disciplines. Thus, as I shall argue in 
Chapter 5, the causality debate took place within a well-entrenched submilieu 
represented by this journal. It was, accordingly, not as directly connected to the 
general public as relativity theory and thus less in danger of scapegoating. Third, such 
submilieu tampers or mediates the conflict between science and culture. Also the 
Gestalt concept was embedded into a context emphasizing holism and empirical 
advancement. Forth, in both cases the opponents’ behavior enabled mutual profit. 
Planck, Wien, and Einstein did not at all question the scientific merits of the wild ones 
around Heisenberg and supported their research.28  
 The introduction to a useful German collection of the Forman debate by Karl 
von Meyenn (1994) and a later study of Gregor Schiemann (1996) recognize the 
significance of Exner and the Boltzmann school for Forman’s case. Meyenn cites 
Boltzmann’s idea of an atomic constitution of time (See Section 3.5) and his late 
conviction that determinism could well fail on the atomic scale as long as the average 
of all random atomic events reproduces the well-known macroscopic laws. He rightly 
considers already Exner’s 1908 inaugural address as a generalization of these thoughts. 
“Thus already from a physical point of view there had been created a range to 
postulate acausal phenomena.” (Meyenn, 1994, p. 57) The discovery of radioactive 
decay further widened this range, such that Meyenn proposes to relativize Forman’s 
third claim to the extent that “only the various positions admitted from an internal 
scientific point of view could subsequently be elaborated in the direction of one or 
another account under the influence of personal or milieu arguments.” (Ibid., p. 58) 
                                                          
28 Interestingly, Gestalt psychologist discussed the motive of crisis in Die Naturwissenschaften. Koffka (1926) 
published a critical review of Hans Driesch (1926) who attempted to integrate a psychology allegedly in crisis 
into his vitalist outlook. When Kurt Riezler (1929) diagnosed a crisis of the traditional concepts of reality 
triggered by the newest developments in physical science, this provoked a criticism from Ludwik (Ludwig) 
Fleck (1929). And also Wolfgang Köhler (1929) had his turn. 
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Schiemann fully approves of Exner’s criticism of a dogmatic preference of the 
principle of causality “which only approximately does justice to the fallible character 
of natural laws.” (Ibid., p. 361) On Exner’s empiricist account, the causal and the 
statistical view of nature enjoy equal rights. It is very much in the spirit of the present 
book when Schiemann concludes that Exner thus “names the decisive point in the 
physical criticism of causality of the early 1920s which was also the most important 
one from the perspective of cultural history.” (Ibid., p. 361) Interestingly, Schiemann 
identifies Forman’s reluctance to admit that there were sufficient physical reasons to 
criticize the principle of causality before 1926 with the posture of some quantum 
physicists after 1926, such as Heisenberg, that only the statistical character of atomic 
physics necessarily entails the failure of causality. How strong this link becomes in 
present debates will be seen in Chapter 2. Suffice it to say at this point that Exner and 
the Vienna Indeterminists constantly maintained a more flexible empiricist position. 
 
1.3. Further Forman Theses: Anschaulichkeit and Individualität 
 
In 1984, Forman extended his study on the concept of causality in time beyond 1927 
and thematically to the concepts Anschaulichkeit (intuitive evidentiality or 
visualizability) and Individualität (individuality). Given the milieu as described in 
(Forman, 1971), it is of course no surprise “that once a nondeterministic theory of 
atomic processes was at hand, German physicists were disposed to view it and 
represent it in public as providing that liberation from causality so generally desired.” 
(1984, p. 338) But the milieu was also longing for Anschaulichkeit and Indivdualität 
both of which quantum mechanics in point of principle was unable to deliver.  
 With quantum mechanics already established after 1927 and in view of the fact 
that except for acausality the theory contradicted the key demands of the milieu, 
Forman had to use another method than claiming causal influence. 
 
Each [of the three probes] opens with a statement of the true bearing of the theory relative to one of 
the three concepts or characteristics. … This is followed by a brief exposition of the alleged character 
of the theory regarding that concept – alleged first of all by the creators of the theory. These 
allegations are found to diverge markedly from what, a moment before, had been posited as warranted 
regarding these concepts. (Ibid., p. 333f) 
 
In recent years the discussions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics have 
increased rather than arrived at a consensus regarding the “true bearing” of the theory. 
This will prove to be a substantial impediment for Forman’s argument to obtain 
without a strong implicit assumption. Fortunately, this time Forman’s analytic bias is 
not some foggy conservative concept of causality as in (1971), but he takes a stand 
clear enough to count him among the proponents of an alternative interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. At least, such papers typically open with the following words. 
(Cf. Bohm and Hiley, 1993) 
 
Quantum mechanics is merely a statistical theory. As Einstein repeatedly but vainly recognized, it 
cannot be regarded as a complete description of an independently subsisting microscopic world. Nor 
can it be regarded as an appropriate conceptual basis for describing our macroscopic world, where, 
unquestionably, we deal with individual objects and events, not statistical ensembles. Thus even 
categoric statements about the invalidity of the law of causality in the physical world go much too far, 
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not least because they slur over the fact that quantum mechanics is a deterministic theory of 
probabilities. As for the still farther-reaching world-view implications ascribed to quantum mechanics 
– that it ensure free will, or the impossibility of a physicochemical explanation of life – one must say 
that these are completely unwarranted. (Forman, 1984, p. 336f.) 
 
There are many philosophical problems on this list. Some of them, however, were 
altogether not controversial among the protagonists on both sides of the aisle in the 
causality debate. Practically all of them rejected Pascual Jordan’s (1934, 1935) views 
alluded to in the above passage (Cf. Frank, 1935, or Planck, 1936). But once again we 
read 
 
that there was little connection between quantum mechanics and the philosophic constructions placed 
on it, or the world-view implications drawn from it. The physicists allowed themselves, and they were 
allowed by others, to make the theory out to be whatever they wanted it to be – better, whatever their 
cultural milieu obliged them to want it to be. (Forman, 1984, p. 344) 
 
In Forman’s new drama, no scientist-philosophers appear and defend their views but 
reckless academics perpetrate repeated “misuse of quantum mechanics for sweeping 
epistemic renunciations.” (Ibid., p. 337)  
 A core shibboleth of Weimar Lebensphilosophie was individuality. 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle blocks the possibility to follow the trajectory of a 
single particle to arbitrary precision, and the statistics for atomic particles (bosons and 
fermions) lead to an indistinguishability of the single particles. Forman complains that 
after 1926 Heisenberg never again mentioned this simple truth. Bohr, on the other 
hand, advanced “the perverse thesis that the main bearing of quantum theory was to 
demonstrate not only the individuality of atomic processes, but indeed the 
‘indestructible individuality’ of material particles. Then and later Bohr went farther to 
draw explicit analogies with the individuality of living organisms and human 
personalities.” (Ibid., p. 342) I cannot enter into the depths of Bohr’s philosophy29 
here, but let me just make two remarks which are important for later considerations.  
 First, if individuality was indeed such a pressing demand of the milieu and if 
there are causal influences exerted by the milieu onto physical theory of the type 
Forman claims to have established for the concept of causality, one wonders why 
Louis de Broglie’s pilot wave theory, which restored the individual particle trajectories 
in 1927, did not at all profit from this circumstance. To be sure, de Broglie was a 
Frenchman, but those dismissing his views were Germans and many of them, among 
them Pauli, Heisenberg, and Reichenbach, had bowed their head and converted to 
acausality years ago. Interestingly, Bohm (1952) would face the same opponents when 
he presented de Broglie’s pilot-wave idea within a new setting and 25 years later to the 
U.S. of the McCarthy period.  
 Second, what Bohr conceived as a new individuality analogous to organisms 
has today become quite popular among proponents of alternative interpretations. Many 
advocates of the Bohm program, for instance, credit him for the insights that 
measurement apparatus and object system represent an indissoluble unity, and that 
every particular experimental set-up represents a single entity. This was also the 
                                                          
29 There is an enormous literature about Bohr. A recent collection of essays on his philosophical views is (Faye 
and Folse, 1994). 
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background for Bell’s (1986, p. 1f.) early criticism of von Neumann’s No-hidden-
variable theorem. One wonders why de Broglie did not win Bohr’s assent in 1927.  
 Turning to the second milieu shibboleth, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics 
represented a calculatory scheme far cry off any Anschaulichkeit. Although 
Schrödinger’s equivalent description initially appeared closer to physicists’ common 
sense, the ψ waves propagate in configuration space rather than in ordinary space. 
Thus “Heisenberg sought to remove the stigma of Unanschaulichkeit by redefining the 
‘intuitive’ quality so as to make it predictable of his irremediably unpictorial quantum 
mechanics. This redefinition equated ‘intuitive’ to ‘satisfactory’ in a strictly positivist 
sense.” (Forman, 1984, p. 340) And thus Heisenberg once again obtained the applause 
of the milieu. So did Sommerfeld who was a principal opponent of positivism. Citing 
Heisenberg’s redefinition, Sommerfeld held that “the Anschaulichkeit does not consist 
in theoretical ideas [Vorstellungen] which are extrapolated from the rough sensuality 
[grobe Sinnlichkeit] to microscopic processes, but in the narrow and critical 
comparison with possible or imagined experiments.” (Sommerfeld, 1930, p. 165)30 
This position was, however, not far from Planck who already in 1923 wrote that “if it 
is the most noble task of theory to adapt the intuitions [Anschauungen] to the facts and 
not vice versa, then the physicist cannot have doubts about his position towards Bohr’s 
theory.” (Planck, 1923b, p. 535) 
 Thus there is an important difference here. While philosophically 
Anschaulichkeit is a concept considerably more hazy than causality, in the physics of 
the 1920s it had a historical connotation much sharper than causality. Anschaulichkeit 
had been the core of the infamous “cockfight” – or so it was later termed in the press – 
between Einstein and Lenard at the 1920 Naturforscherversammlung. The relevant 
passage from the newspaper record reads as such. 
 
Einstein: The phenomena in the [slowing down] train are the effects of a gravitational field which is 
induced by all closer and more distant masses. 
Lenard: But such a gravitational field should also otherwise cause physical processes, if I want to 
make its existence anschaulich to myself. 
Einstein: What man considers as anschaulich, is subject to great changes, it is a function of time. A 
contemporary of Galilei would have declared his mechanics as very unanschaulich. The 
“anschaulichen” pictures have their intricacies [Tücken], as the often-cited “healthy common sense”. 
(quoted from Hermann, 1995, p. SF 83) 
 
Einstein won the audience’s laughter. This marked an important step in winning public 
recognition for relativity theory among the German scientists. In the general public the 
struggle was anything but over, but after two difficult years the next 
Naturforscherversammlung in 1922 testified the final victory for the theory within a 
community which Lenard, Stark, and their followers had already left. If the milieu’s 
demand for Anschaulichkeit agreed with Lenard’s quest, there was little to gain for the 
quantum generation had they taken it seriously. Even more so as Lenard already in the 
1920s became the pied piper for the Nazi regime among German physicists. 
 It is important to bear in mind that this bridge between the both allegations of 
Unanschaulichkeit was already built in those days. Thus the “positivist redefinition” 
criticized by Forman stood on a broader and firmer basis than just to sweeten the 
transition from Bohr’s planetary model, that was intuitive but ad hoc to Heisenberg’s 
                                                          
30 The paper is cited by (Forman, 1984), p. 340. 
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unituitive matrix formalism. Only by including relativity theory can one safely link the 
Anschaulichkeit around 1920 with the earlier debates between Mach, Boltzmann and 
Planck about the intuitive character of the atomic hypothesis. A person to walk over 
this bridge from the positivist side was the Vienna Indeterminist Philipp Frank. (See 
Section 8.4.) 
The rigid end points of Forman’s story remain problematic despite his later 
extension beyond 1927. His contention that suddenly there were internal reasons for an 
acausal quantum mechanics seems to repeat a widespread tendency of autobiographies 
written by notable scientists. Once the final version of the theory is found, full insight 
suddenly appears like the flash of a genius and makes all earlier failed attempts 
worthless in the split of a second. The same is, of course, true for the final insight that 
a certain program is unfeasible. However, historical reconstruction has to embrace all 
steps from the initial proposals, the heuristic debates, the first attempts, the further 
specification of the problem, the first proto-theory, possible alternatives, the form 
which became final in retrospect, the application of this theory to concrete models, and 
the development of a technical machinery and a mathematical framework (this list is, 
of course, not complete). In the case of quantum mechanics this process probably 
began with Bohr’s seminal papers (1913) which brought first successes, but ran into 
crisis in 1923/24. After a period of theoretical experimentation, there emerged two 
equivalent formulations which until 1928/9 led to a flood of concrete calculations. And 
when in 1932 von Neumann provided a mathematical framework of the theory and its 
interpretation, theoretical physicists had already moved on to quantum field theory and 
nuclear physics. Both books discussed in the following chapter take a wider temporal 
horizon. 
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2. Quantum Counterfactuals and Quantum Dialogues: 
On the Cleft between Rational Reconstruction and 
Historical Contingency 
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to two recent historico-philosophical analyses of the early 
history of quantum mechanics both of which are – more overtly than not – committed 
to a realist or causal interpretation of quantum mechanics. Albeit important differences 
in their methodology, both James T. Cushing (1994) and Mara Beller (1999) hold 
some positivist Copenhagen creed, that after 1926 quickly developed into a powerful 
metaphysical ideology, responsible for the resistance against Louis deBroglie’s 1927 
pilot wave theory and David Bohm’s 1952 causal interpretation which, at bottom, 
refreshed the former. While Cushing sketches an alternative history, Beller studies 
how a complex net of personal relationships and thematical dialogues developed into 
an ideology of the winners.  
Cushing develops an alternative causal history that continues the line of those who by 
1927 had not bowed to the milieu. His objective is twofold. First (Section 2.1.1.), 
Cushing argues that quantum mechanics was underdetermined by the factual evidence. 
This can hardly be doubted, and thus Cushing has provided a convincing case study 
for Duhem-Quine underdetermination. The only problematic aspect is his way of 
rigidly distinguishing between the historically contingent Copenhagen interpretation 
and unchangeable, empirically corroborated quantum mechanical formalism, in 
particular when one takes into account the philosophical aspirations of many leading 
quantum physicists. Their philosophical motives, taken as pragmatic criteria of theory 
choice are driven apart between rational reconstruction in the narrow sense and 
historical contingency. This misses an important historical peculiarity of the scientific 
cosmos of Germany before World War II, the scientist-philosopher.  
Secondly (Section 2.1.2.), Cushing uses theory underdetermination, or historical 
contingency, to legitimate a particular class of empirically equivalent alternative 
theories as respectable partners, or rivals, of the prevailing standard quantum theory. 
Theory underdetermination is, of course, necessary for this specific claim, but not 
sufficient. I shall argue that Cushing’s book falls short of this second objective on the 
factual and philosophical level because historical contingency cannot be used to 
compensate for a deficiency in pragmatic criteria, such as simplicity or fertility. To put 
my point more bluntly, there is no enforceable claim for historical justice in science. 
Alternative theories have to stand the pragmatic criteria in vigor at the time when a 
theory choice is made. Or conversely, pragmatic criteria are not invariant under a shift 
on the historical axis. This was a lesson that already Logical Empiricists knew well 
(Cf. Frank, 1954). Cushing instead uses strong regulative principles about realism and 
causal explanation, or understanding, as a counterweight to deficiencies of the Bohm 
interpretation with respect to other pragmatic criteria, and to do so he has to shift them 
back and forth on the time axis. Within the narrower context of Forman’s thesis the 
alternative history once again shows the philosophical dangers of the Forman’s 
strategy.  
 Mara Beller (1999) rejects both counterfactual reasoning and the Forman thesis. 
On her account, prior to 1927 indeterminism was not pivotal altogether. Neither were 
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the members of the quantum generation driven by other deep-seated philosophical 
motives. They were just immersed in local and creative dialogues which in 1927 
suddenly turned into the creation of the orthodox Copenhagen narrative. This change 
of attitude was mainly driven by Bohr and Heisenberg’s ambitions to win the clumsy 
matrix mechanics a superiority over Schrödinger’s elegant formalism. To this end they 
invoked rhetorically-casted philosophical arguments as ex-post justification. 
Copenhagen positivism thus used the verificationist axe to chop down the prospect of 
a genuine quantum reality emerging from the theory’s formalism – which was shared 
by both sides. In Section 2.2.1., I argue that Beller has basically written two books 
corresponding to the two parts of her Quantum Dialogue. In these books the absence 
of philosophical motives emerges simply from the perspective taken, because the 
dialogist grid either is too fine, in the local dialogues prior to 1927, or too coarse, 
when the orthodox narrative is directly compared to the Bohm tradition of the 1950s 
and 1990s.  
Cushing and Beller underestimate the depth and specific character of the 
philosophical convictions of the scientist-philosophers involved in the creation of 
quantum mechanics and simultaneously overestimate the import of one single trait of 
these philosophies, to wit, positivism. Moreover, they employ a notion of positivism 
which in those days was no longer on the market and contradicts core tenets of those 
thinkers within the German physics community who conceived themselves in 
positivist footsteps. In particular, the Logical Empiricists Frank and Schlick are 
entirely neglected in both books although they entertained closer contacts with the 
German physicists than did any other philosophical school.  
Section 2.2.2. discusses Beller’s method of dialogism and why it fails to 
appraise the philosophical discussions about causality and quantum theory conducted 
in the 1920s. This is a pity because rather than being committed to philosophical 
schools and master texts, German physicists and physicist-philosophers discussed their 
positions in close connection to physical results and in a series of dialogues featuring 
divergent positions. Analysis along dialogues, not dialogism, proves of great value for 
the present book because it permits one to see how philosophical identities and the 
adherence to local traditions are established, communicated, and bequeathed, and how 
scientific results led to a modification of these traditions and new alliances.  
Vienna Indeterminism became a coherent tradition chiefly through a series of 
dialogues with its Berlin counterparts. Apart from the classical Mach-Planck debate, 
there exists no master text. Vienna Indeterminism was not a movement like the 
Copenhagen interpretation or Logical Empiricism, but it harbored one of the major 
strands of the latter. This permits me, finally, to suggest a parallel between these 
movements as to the relationship between inward differences and outward unity. The 
demise of the received view of Logical Empiricism has revealed a movement that 
harbored fundamental internal differences and simultaneously decided to appear in 
public as a united front against the anti-scientific and anti-rationalistic tendencies of 
the Weimar and post-Weimar milieu. Might not the Copenhagen interpretation the 
explicit identification of which dates much later (Howard, 2002) be of the same 
structure as Logical Empiricism? At least this would make it understandable why the 
mid 1930s witnessed the formation of a strategic alliance among them at the 
Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science. (See Section 8.7.) 
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2.1 Cushing’s Alternative History and the Issue of 
Underdetermination 
 
Cushing’s Quantum Mechanics. Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen 
Hegemony begins with a philosophical announcement. “The central theme of this book 
is that historical contingency plays an essential and ineliminable role in the 
construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from among its 
observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors.” (1994, p. xi) That scientific 
theory is in point of principle underdetermined by the empirical facts is a classic in the 
philosophy of science, typically called the Duhem-Quine thesis. It poses a problem for 
the realist and attributes an irreducible role to pragmatic criteria of theory selection. As 
regards the historical dramatis personae in the causality debate, this thesis was 
supported by Mach and all Vienna Indeterminists while convergent realists, such as 
Planck, emphatically opposed it. On the part of the Austrian wing of the Vienna 
Circle, Neurath very early took up Duhem’s holism in its strong (Quinean) form and 
later developed it both with respect to language (protocol sentences and verbal 
clusters) and with respect to the social structure of science, the later encyclopedism 
which was to replace the scientific ‘system’.31 Duhem (1908) instead had balanced 
conventionalism both by common sense and by the ontological claim that although 
there exist no objectively real substances, science approached a natural order of a 
formal kind. This tradition of structural realism can be prolonged to Poincaré, the early 
Schlick and Cassirer (Gower 2000), and also Planck defended it (Section 3.8.).  
 Historical contingency can be understood in many ways ranging from the fact 
that the acceptance of a theory is strongly influenced by historical circumstances – 
even Planck (1990) assented to this version – to a sort of strong historicist program 
which consequently rejects any notion of scientific progress or the rationality of the 
scientific enterprise, as Paul Feyerabend did at places. The latter is, to be sure, not 
Cushing’s intention, and Beller (1999) presents her dialogist methodology explicitly as 
a counter-strategy against Feyerabend and social constructivism. Typically, historical 
contingency of theory is a considerably stronger claim than Duhem-Neurath-Quine 
underdetermination, and contingency holds strictly only if all pragmatic criteria fail to 
give rationally justifiable support to one theory over its competitors. More generally, 
one might say that the distance between both claims is measured by the weight 
attributed to pragmatic criteria of theory preference and regulative principles of theory 
formation.  
More specifically, Cushing claims that both the real history and his alternative 
history of quantum mechanics provide equally rational reconstructions. He explicitly 
sketches an argument for the fertility of Bohm’s theory (Cushing, 1994, § 11.2.2). In 
virtue of Bell’s theorem, the “choice between [locality and causality is ours] to make 
on purely pragmatic grounds.” (Ibid., p. 22) On the other hand, the rational import of 
pragmatic criteria is limited and they tend to be apologetic. “Criteria such as fertility, 
beauty, and coherence, while often important, can have a Whiggish aspect to them if 
they are defined in terms of the successful, victorious, of accepted theory and then 
                                                          
31 More than this brief allusion would lead too far afield. There is today a rich literature on Neurath, see (Uebel, 
2000) and (Haller, 1993). 
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applied to a competing theory.” (Ibid., p. 96) In some cases, two alternative theories 
might have an approximately equal score in their pragmatic virtues and due to limited 
resources scientists are better off to pursue only one strategy first. Already Neurath 
(1913) argued that in such cases it is rational to draw lots or vote. The ineliminability 
of decisions and other contingent elements in the course of science, accordingly, does 
not indicate an irrationality of the overall process of theory choice. Cushing alludes to 
this fact in the Preface. “I do not charge that scientists acted irrationally in selecting 
one theory over another. Nor do I believe that an alternative choice would have left us 
without foundational problems to resolve.” (Cushing, 1994, p. xiii) But now, so 
Cushing continues, it is high time to devote ourselves to the study of the alternative 
theory whose elaboration was blocked by the historically contingent decision of 
quantum physicists. 
 
2.1.1. Copenhagen and Contingency 
 
[I]f certain equally plausible conditions, rather than the actually occurring and highly contingent 
historical ones, had prevailed and the interpretation of quantum mechanics had initially taken a very 
different route from the Copenhagen one around 1925-1927, would our worldview of fundamental 
microprocesses necessarily have been brought back, by the “internal” logic of science, to our currently 
accepted picture of an inherently and irreducibly indeterministic nature? Could our present 
understanding of the behavior of the fundamental laws of nature in terms of an inherently 
indeterministic nature have been replaced by the apparently diametrically opposed view of absolute 
determinism? This book argues that the answer to the first question is no and to the second question an 
emphatic yes. This is not to deny that there were already serious conceptual problems for classical 
physics. (Cushing, 1994, p. xiif.) 
 
Cushing’s story presupposes some conceptual distinctions. The first looks rather 
innocent. A scientific theory is composed of a formalism and an interpretation; 
“formalism means a set of equations and a set of calculational rules for making 
predictions that can be compared with experiment. … The physical interpretation 
refers to what the theory tells us about the underlying structure of these phenomena 
(i.e., the corresponding story about the furniture of the world – an ontology.” (Ibid., p. 
9) One might, however, wonder whether this distinction is really adequate because the 
Bohm theory after all contains a second equation, the pilot-wave equation or the 
guidance condition, and additional concepts, the quantum potential and the particle 
positions, at such places where standard quantum theory has just certain intepretatory 
rules. Admittedly, one does not have to solve the pilot-wave equation and – apart from 
some more recent proposals (Valentini, 1996, Albert, 2000) – the particle positions are 
unobservable in principle, such that the second equation and the Bohmian positions 
might be counted under the interpretation. But this spoils, it seems, the whole 
philosophical advantage of the Bohm theory to be simply a theory about particles in 
motion, and one obtains a theory that is interpretable as if particles were in motion. 
Cushing’s concept of formalism, to my mind, is so construed that empirically 
equivalent theories share the same formalism. This does not seem to meet what the 
underdetermination thesis was all about because it implicitly exempts the formalism 
from criticism, or at least it automatically directs all doubts and struggles to the 
interpretation only. 
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 The second distinction already paves the way towards a philosophical 
predilection for the Bohm interpretation. “Empirical adequacy consists essentially in 
getting the numbers right. … An explanation is provided by a successful formalism 
with a set of equations and rules for its application.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 10) While the 
deductive-nomological or the covering law model yield successful explanations by 
unification or reduction, they cannot produce understanding.  
 
[Understanding] is possible once we have an interpretation of the formalism that allows us to grasp the 
character of an the relations among the phenomena. This is typically associated with an interpretation 
that can plausibly be defended as a realistic one. … My argument here really begins from the intuition 
… that understanding of physical processes involves a story that can, in principle, be told on an event-
by-event basis. This exercise often makes use of picturable physical mechanisms and processes. (Ibid., 
p. 11) 
 
To pick two of Cushing’s examples, Boyle’s law and the EPRB-correlations are 
empirically adequate descriptions which are explained by the formalisms of statistical 
mechanics and quantum mechanics respectively; but an explanation is only given by 
the kinetic theory of gases and the Bohm interpretation respectively. There are also 
two contingently necessary conditions for understanding. 
 
‘Causality’ and ‘locality’ are logically distinct concepts, with causality being the more central in my 
scheme of understanding. The actual nonlocality demanded by nature turns out to be of a fairly benign 
variety: we cannot signal with it … We are able to construct a less incomprehensible, more nearly 
picturable, representation of the physical universe with Bohm than with Copenhagen. We do have the 
option of giving up locality while maintaining a visualizable causality. The choice is our to make on 
purely pragmatic grounds. The origins of the uneasiness about nonlocality may be more psychological 
than logical. … “If the price of avoiding non-locality is to make an intuitive explanation impossible, 
one has to ask whether the cost is not too great.”32 My evident sympathy with views such as those on 
contact action expressed by Maxwell earlier clearly put me into the camp of what has been termed the 
mechanistic view of physical processes. (Ibid., p. 21f.) 
 
Those readers who dislike the Bohm theory might be tempted to quickly subsume it 
under the mechanicist world-view of 19th century physics. Against these allegations 
advocates of the Bohm theory could reasonably emphasize that it is anything but a 
mechanical theory in the Newtonian sense and that is contains, in virtue of its 
empirical equivalence with standard quantum mechanics, strongly non-deterministic 
traits which might be interpreted as a form of quantum chaos.33  
Cushing does not give a priori grounds for preferring the Bohmian ontology of 
particles in motion rather than Copenhagen talk about measurement results, but he 
leaves the choice up to pragmatic criteria of theory preference. Although accordingly 
the ontology of physical theory is conditioned by pragmatic criteria and factual choice, 
Cushing with Quine rejects a Carnapian conception of ontology as linguistic 
framework (1950). While the latter approach might provide ‘explanations’ it cannot 
confer ‘understanding’ – as the concept is defined by Cushing.  
 We have reached one of the crossroads of post-positivist philosophy and thus 
the philosophical discussion has to slow down and check the right of way. The first to 
start is the relation of pragmatic criteria and historical contingency. Investigating 
                                                          
32 Quoted from (Bohm, Hiley, and Kaloyerou, 1987, p. 331); italics by Cushing. 
33 See (Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghí, 1992b). 
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Cushing’s case study will remind us of the holistic character of history and teach us 
how pragmatic criteria transform in time and between theories. The second to follow is 
holism philosophically conceived. Reasonable criteria for a proper ontology of a single 
scientific theory should – on pain of relapsing into Carnap’s frameworks (too) 
narrowly understood – be able to accommodate other fundamental theories as well. 
Otherwise intertheoretical inconsistencies across theories might become conflicts 
between different metaphysical views even before Kuhnian anomalies abound. Third, 
let me just stress that Cushing’s conception of mechanism is intimately linked to the 
Bohmian particle picture, and thus favors a very particular type of ontology. There are 
other mechanist and realist accounts, according to which particle paths in the Bohmian 
theory do not qualify as causal processes. Most interesting is Wesley Salmon’s (1984) 
avowedly mechanistic account of the causal structure of the world, although its author 
has been quite reluctant to take a stand on quantum mechanics (Cf. Stöltzner, 1999b 
and Salmon’s comment). To Salmon, a realist explanation is reached by successful 
reduction to causal processes at a lower level, but these processes are not necessarily 
deterministic. This shows that the far-reaching identification of realism and 
determinism typically advocated by Bohmians – but not only by them – is quite 
problematic. Might thus historical contingency not be a surprisingly effective hideout 
for metaphysical convictions? And might not large part of the equal rights case depend 
on accepting this identification?  
 As Cushing is skeptical about pragmatic criteria, he investigates the influence of 
contingent historical events on the development of quantum mechanics and finds, 
expectedly, the Forman thesis along the way. The stage for it is set after dropping 
some names as “philosophical precedents for the concept of indeterminism in nature.” 
(Ibid., p. 96) The list, which contains Charles-Bernard Renouvier, Émile Boutroux, 
Henri Poincaré, and Harald Høffding, but not Exner, is even less compelling than 
Forman’s “subterranean anticausality current.” (Forman, 1971, p. 67). No wonder that 
“philosophical trends alone did not determine the course of quantum mechanics in the 
early part of the century.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 97) Cushing modifies Forman’s outlook 
by two distinctions.  
 
[P]sychological factors play a larger … role in the specific formulation of a theory while sociological 
ones can be crucial for the acceptance and propagation of an already-formulated theory. Such 
“external” psychological or social factors are not solely responsible for the content of science. Science 
has also its own “internal” demands and constraints that must also be accommodated. I argue that the 
“internal” factors were most important for the emergence of the formalism of quantum mechanics, 
“external” ones for the nature of the interpretation that was accepted. (Ibid., p. 100) 
 
The approximate identification of internal factors and formalism is necessary to tame 
historical contingencies to the interpretation and prevent bad effects on the quantum 
mechanical formalism which standard quantum mechanics and the Bohm theory have 
in common. From Forman’s standpoint it is surprising why the influence of the milieu 
should halt at the border between formalism and interpretation. And accordingly 
Cushing distinguishes  
 
a strong Forman thesis, which would claim a major causal role of the cultural milieu in determining 
the very form and content of a scientific theory, as opposed to a weak Forman thesis, which would see 
the cultural milieu as sometimes playing an important part in the acceptance and propagation of an 
already-formulated scientific theory. This weak Forman thesis can remain agnostic on the internal or 
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external nature of the factors that are responsible for creating and shaping the theory itself. (Ibid., p. 
100) 
 
While Forman advocates the strong thesis, Cushing limits himself to the weak version. 
Consequently the quantum formalism was largely unaffected by the milieu and 
rationally justified, even before 1927.  
But initially two formalisms emerged the equivalence of which was proven only 
afterwards, though quickly afterwards. There was the wave mechanics route favored 
by the heterogeneous continuity group (Einstein, deBroglie, Schrödinger) and the 
matrix mechanics route elaborated by the quite uniform Göttingen and Copenhagen 
groups (Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Jordan, and Born). Not being part of the German 
milieu, deBroglie “did believe that one theory should best conform to nature. He felt 
that classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory provided an embryonic theory of the union of 
waves and particles, all in a manner consistent with a realist (continuous) theory of 
matter.” (Ibid., p. 104) After some early interest for Bergson and Poincaré, deBroglie 
derived support from the philosophy of Émile Meyerson. In was the Austrian 
Schrödinger who developed deBroglie’s ideas into wave mechanics. At first sight 
Schrödinger’s theory seemed to support the visualizability requirement of classical 
theory and “one might expect that the scientific community would have been inclined 
to take the more conservative of the alternatives on offer.” (Ibid., 107) But matters 
turned out in favor of matrix mechanics.  
 I read in Cushing’s account basically three internal factors. First, wave 
mechanics and matrix mechanics quickly proved to be equivalent formulations quite in 
line with Heisenberg’s and de Broglie’s joint conviction that there could be only one 
true theory of quantum phenomena. Second, Born’s stochastic interpretation of the 
wave function showed that the Schrödinger theory was not so classical as it initially 
appeared. Third, on the matrix mechanics route “[d]iscontinuities, not causality as 
such, were initially the key issue.” (Ibid., p. 108) The failed application of the old 
quantum theory to molecules had already convinced experts that the old picturable 
electron orbitals were meaningless. This was the “crisis” of the Bohr-Sommerfeld 
scheme. “The failure of the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory [moreover] … in 1925 
indicated to Bohr that a complete renunciation of the usual space-time methods of 
visualization of the phenomena would be necessary for further progress.” (Ibid., p. 
109) As Beller (1999) convincingly argues, Born’s peculiar consequence was to strive 
for a theory of particles almost at any cost. But, so Cushing and Beller hold likewise, 
all these physical arguments were not conclusive to win the case for matrix mechanics 
not least because it was initially formulated without any interpretative commentary at 
all. “Heisenberg [merely] believed that a successful mathematical formalism of a 
physical theory … was of a piece or whole and that it could not be modified in any 
essential way without destroying the entire structure.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 114) 
 But the challenge from wave mechanics increased; matrix mechanics was in 
severe “danger of losing the war on the calculational front.” (Ibid., p. 117) 
Schrödinger’s equation quickly became the most powerful tool in atomic physics, 
while Heisenberg’s algebraical methods were – and still are – so clumsy that certain 
calculations are hardly doable. This lasting difference seems to me further evidence to 
doubt Cushing’s claim that Schrödinger and Heisenberg were using the same 
formalism just because the theories were rapidly proven to give the same predictions. 
Physicists would continue to prefer Schrödinger’s formalism even if equivalence held 
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only with a grain of salt; in quantum field theory calculations with inconsistent and 
thus uninterpretable formalisms abound for merely practical purposes. The more 
mathematically-minded would cite von Neumann’s (1932) uniqueness theorem as the 
deeper reason for the equivalence proof and relate that it is a nontrivial feature of 
finite-dimensional quantum mechanics that all representations are equivalent up to 
isomorphism. In the quantum field theoretical perspective it appears fruitful to 
distinguish both formalisms. Moreover, the date when this proof was actually given is 
an important, but historically contingent fact that influences the distinction between 
formalism and interpretation in quantum mechanics. Frederik Muller (1997) has 
recently argued that the equivalence proof taken literally did not concern the theories 
actually proposed in 1926 but the modified versions current as of 1932. Conversely, 
one could counterfactually imagine that equivalence would have been established only 
much later. In the absence of a general proof, Cushing’s concept of formalism would 
crucially depend upon the equivalence of the predictions actually made to date. 
 At any rate, the Copenhagen group had to organize an interpretative defense 
against wave mechanics. It was based on combining two philosophical principles, 
positivism and finality, with organizational strength. To Göttingen-Copenhagen – so 
Beller’s more appropriate geography – positivism became the major regulative 
principle of theory construction. When exhibiting an operationalist attitude and 
rigorously eliminating all unobservables, matrix mechanicians conceived themselves 
widely as executing the very program which Einstein had once pursued in relativity 
theory. But the alleged prototype refused Heisenberg’s positivist company and 
retorted, according to Heisenberg’s (1971, p. 63) report, that “on principle, it is quite 
wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. It is the theory which 
decides what we can observe. … Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, 
enables us to deduce the underlying phenomena from our sense impressions.” (quoted 
from Cushing, 1994, p. 110) And also Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick had to see 
Einstein moving towards metaphysics.34 Yet, Einstein’s philosophical convictions are 
quite intricate and they hardly acquiesce in the two-camp picture suggested by 
Cushing. 
 The second philosophical element of Göttingen-Copenhagen was the notorious 
finality claim.  
 
Through his analysis of scattering processes with Schrödinger’s formalism, Born came to the opinion 
that even perfect initial information still led to uncertainty in the result and this implied, for him, a lack 
of causality. Why was the complementarity principle taken as being complete and the final word in 
forbidding even the in-principle possibility of a description of microphenomena that is both causal and 
pictured in a continuous space time? One response is that (thus far) experience has shown the validity 
of complementary pairs of descriptions and that belief in the ultimate necessity of complementarity 
rests on the subjective epistemological criterion of the need for classical concepts and on the 
indivisibility of atomic phenomena (i.e. Bohr’s act of faith). … For Bohr ‘causality’ meant the 
applicability of the exact laws of energy and momentum conservation. (Cushing, 1994, p. 112) 
 
Bohr’s later theory of complementary pictures provided “a consistent story, but it does 
not eliminate, in principle, a causal account.” (Ibid., p. 108) By a mere declaration of 
faith Bohr ultimately claimed that these consistency arguments ruled out even the 
possibility of an alternative point of view. “These were not logical or in-principle 
                                                          
34 See (Feuer, 1974, p. 83f.) and (Howard, 1994). 
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refutations, but strong, practical beliefs that became dogma.” (Ibid., p. 108) Now we 
have assembled all those commitments which, to Cushing’s mind, form the 
intersection of the interpretations of Heisenberg, Born, and others and can thus be 
considered as the Copenhagen interpretation: “complementarity, completeness of the 
description (in terms of the state vector or probability amplitude), a prohibition against 
any possible alternative causal description in a space-time background, and a 
positivistic attitude.”(Ibid., p. 31) 
 I doubt whether these three creeds are able to keep the Copenhagen 
interpretation together. One might even wonder to what extent the Copenhagen 
interpretation still historically existed as an independent position after John von 
Neumann’s Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics was published in 
1932.35 There the formalism was axiomatized, and the finality claim accordingly 
obtained a precise meaning and was based on explicit presuppositions in the form of a 
No-hidden variable theorem. Moreover, the brand name “Copenhagen Interpretation” 
did not come up until the 1950s (Howard, 2002). 
At any rate, Cushing’s thesis does not really depend upon the exact 
philosophical content of the finality claim because he also advances an argument about 
the contingent course of history. Referring to works of Beller (reaffirmed in Beller, 
1999), Cushing holds that the conflict between Copenhagen and wave mechanics “can 
be characterized as one over superiority and professional dominance.” (Cushing, 1994, 
p. 117)  
 
The Copenhagen group had the talent, organization, and drive to carry the day in establishing the 
hegemony of its view. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation paper was a major step in accomplishing this. 
The Copenhagen group worked in concert, while its opponents (Einstein, Schrödinger, deBroglie) 
pulled each in his own direction. … The Bohr Institute in Copenhagen had an enormous influence on 
an entire generation of leading theoretical physicists who passed through it. … As Ralph Kronig 
recalled, Bohr and his close colleagues were authority figures and a young person did not go against 
them. (Ibid., p. 117) 
 
On the 1927 Solvay Congress, the united Göttingen-Copenhagen team won a great 
victory against deBroglie’s first pilot-wave theory which promised a resurgence of a 
causal and realist world view. Pauli brushed it aside by an example which de Broglie 
could rebut no other than by ad hoc arguments; a definitive answer to Pauli’s 
objections was obtained only by Bohm (1952). On the congress, “neither Einstein nor 
Schrödinger gave positive support to de Broglie’s ideas. De Broglie presented a 
conceptual mixture of waves and particles, which did not incline Schrödinger kindly 
toward it since, at this time, he wanted an interpretation based wholly upon the wave 
concept.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 118) In his speech to the congress, Einstein emphasized 
“that any truly fundamental theory … should be a complete theory of individual 
processes (as opposed to yielding information about the statistics of ensembles only). 
… Still, Einstein remained distrustful of this particular model of de Broglie. This was 
likely related to his own abortive attempt at a hidden-variables theory” (Ibid., p. 118f.) 
In May 1927, that is, just five months before the congress, Einstein had written a paper 
entitled “Bestimmt Schrödingers Wellenmechanik die Bewegung des Systems 
vollständig oder nur im Sinne der Statistik?” (Does Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics 
Determine the Motion of a System Completely or Only in the Sense of Statistics?), but 
                                                          
35 This is, for instance, Peter Mittelstaedt’s opinion; private communication. 
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quickly withdrew it; the piece never appeared in print. The reason was most probably 
the “peculiar sort of ‘entanglement’ between independent systems that appears when 
they are described as a composite system in multidimensional configuration space.” 
(Belousek, 1996, p. 443) According to Belousek’s detailed analysis,36 Einstein’s 
manuscript bears some striking similarities with Bohm’s theory, a fact which, 
however, did not prevent Einstein from rejecting the latter as “too cheap.”37 Belousek 
concludes quite in line with Cushing that “the failure of the ‘Bestimmt’ scheme 
engendered in Einstein’s thinking an overall skepticism toward the very possibility of 
a wave-particle synthetic completion of quantum mechanics that conditioned both his 
less than enthusiastic support for de Broglie’s theory and his outright rejection of 
Bohm’s theory.” (Ibid., p. 453) 
 Cushing is reluctant to apply a weak Forman strategy also to the fate of Bohm’s 
interpretation; let me briefly sketch how he story continues. In 1952, Bohm’s 
intellectual opponents were still the same deBroglie had faced in 1927, and they once 
again reacted in a decidedly negative way – von Neumann being a notable exception 
(Cf. Stöltzner, 1999d). Einstein still had concerns about locality, but he “had even 
deeper reasons for rejecting such hidden-variables approaches to a completion of 
quantum mechanics. Quite simply, they were not radical enough.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 
147) The late Einstein counted on a unified field theory that represented a radical 
break with all remnants of classical mechanics. Similarly as in 1927 the internal 
reasons were not compelling, and so Cushing turns to historical contingency. Rejecting 
– reasonably – any influence of Marxist materialist ideology on Bohm’s interpretation, 
he cites Heisenberg’s contention that all opponents of the Copenhagen view wanted to 
return to the ontology of materialism, to a completely objective description of nature, 
rather than accepting Copenhagen’s subjective element in the description of atomic 
events.  
 
At this point we realize the simple fact that natural science is not Nature itself but a part of the relation 
between Man and Nature, and therefore dependent on Man. The idealistic argument that certain ideas 
are a priori ideas, i.e., in particular come before all natural science, is here correct. (Heisenberg, 1955, 
p. 28, quoted from Cushing, 1994, p. 153)  
 
This was the basis on which Heisenberg took the positivist tack that observationally 
equivalent theories, such as Bohm’s, just signify a difference of language. True, this 
sounds like a positivist meaning criterion. But as Cushing himself notices, already in 
the 1920s Heisenberg had rejected any underdetermination of theory, in stark contrast 
to the Viennese positivists. Moreover, if we compare Heisenberg’s charge against 
Bohm of relapsing into materialism with Frank’s (Section 8.4.), we see that 
Heisenberg just replaces one metaphysical world view with another. His emphasis on 
idealism and a priori ideas elevated, as it were, two anathemas of Logical Empiricists 
to lessons to be drawn from quantum mechanics and, finally, his insistence on the 
subjective-objective distinction was precisely that sort of dualist metaphysics which 
Mach’s neutral monism wanted to overcome (See Ch. 3). On such metaphysical a 
foundation, Heisenberg’s meaning criterion was anything but a genuine positivist 
argument.  
                                                          
36 See also (Howard, 1990). 
37 In a letter to Born, 12 May 1952. In the Festschrift for Born, he even published a technical refutation of 
Bohm’s theory which, however, could be successfully countered by Bohm in the same volume. 
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2.1.2. A Counterfactual History and Its Extrapolation 
 
Cushing leaves no doubt that, in his view, Bohm’s alternative “is arguably more 
coherent and understandable than the commonly accepted dogma.” (Cushing, 1994, p. 
174) But, “I have no final word to offer on Bohm’s program, since many aspects of it 
remain to be developed.” (Ibid., p. xi) This is a state of affairs, so Cushing believes, 
quantum mechanics could have arrived at much earlier. To support this claim, he 
develops a whole alternative history which begins around 1925-1927 and condenses 
into a couple of years historical developments which in real time took roughly four 
decades until the proof of Bell’s theorem (1965). The whole counterfactual history 
counts almost exclusively on Einstein, on his titanic scientific abilities to quickly 
prove results which advocates of the Bohmian program obtained only much later, on 
Einstein’s interpreting these results in a particular realist fashion, and on his great 
public prestige to change the thrust of the whole quantum mechanical research into an 
investigation of the Einstein-de Broglie theory. Here is Cushing’s summary of the 
alternative scenario which, to my mind, proceeds in five steps. 
 
 
[1.]Study of a classical particle subject to Brownian motion (about which Einstein surely knew 
something) leads to a “classical” understanding of the already discovered “Schrödinger” equation, 
which is then given a realistic interpretation. A “Nelson” stochastic mechanics underpins this 
interpretation with a visualizable model of microphenomena. This would have made evident the 
possibility of a largely classical foundation for that key equation. A realistic ontology would still 
remain a live option. …  
[2.]Since stochastic mechanics [à la Nelson] is quite difficult to handle mathematically, people would 
likely have tackled the less formidable task of exploring the implications of the (equivalent) linear 
Schrödinger equation. The Dirac transformation theory and an operator formalism would still have 
been available as a convenience for further development of the formalism …  
[3.]The entanglement or nonlocality of that formalism would soon become apparent. Einstein did not 
like such nonlocality and would have rejected any model with this property. Yet the conceptual 
background existed, I shall argue, even in 1927 to prove a Bell-type theorem. If that had happened 
at that time, then Einstein and the rest of the quantum physicists would have perceived in sharp 
relief the choice between determinism and locality in any theory. A causal formulation of quantum 
theory might then have appeared less unpalatable than the Copenhagen version actually chosen by 
the scientific community. 
[4.]Einstein might have next made the transition from stochastic mechanics to “Bohmian” mechanics 
[that is the version of Bohm’s interpretation due to Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì] since … stochastic 
mechanics turns out to be both indeterministic and nonlocal.  
[5.]It is well-known that Einstein was deeply committed to a realistic worldview in which 
microentities have a continuous, objective, observer-independent existence. (Cushing, 1994, p. 
174f.) 
 
At first sight, Cushing’s alternative history has a smack of Hegelian ‘cunning of 
reason’. Foundationalist and operationalist motivations enter the scene just in due 
succession; step 2, for instance, claims that the whole quantum mechanical formalism 
was developed out of calculatory convenience while in step 3 it became the object of 
foundational studies. ‘Cunning of reason’ is no stranger in the rational reconstructions 
of science. According to Lakatos’ mind, it characterizes an elitist conception of 
science. “It is only this then, ad hoc authoritarian/historicist doctrine which separates 
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élitists of this kind from the [Feyerabendian] sceptic.” (Lakatos, 1978b, p. 117) Thus 
in a Lakatosian perspective and in the absence of explicit demarcationist criteria, 
Cushing just attempts to ponder what would have happened if Einstein had scored out 
the Göttingen-Copenhagen elite. Indeed, Cushing’s alternative history is not after a 
full-blown rational reconstruction. 
 
[I]t does not seem worth demanding that my counterfactual scenario had to go along some highly 
specific path. What is important is that there were precedents for such moves and that the necessary 
pieces were already there. … We could today have arrived at a very different worldview of 
microphenomena. If someone were then to present the (merely) empirically adequate Copenhagen 
version, with all its own counterintuitive and mind-boggling aspects, who would listen? (Cushing, 
1994, p. 175) 
 
There are other plausible historical scenarios. “Schrödinger’s original program for the 
interpretation of the quantum theory need not have been abandoned so hastily. 
Theoretical tastes have much to do with this. But for a largely sociological accident, 
Schrödinger’s essentially classical field theory for quantum phenomena could have 
been successfully pursued.” (Ibid., p. 175f.) As we shall see in Chapter 6, Schrödinger 
would be a bad candidate for an alternative history of the type Cushing has in mind.
 Of course, one might continue in this vein. Yet my ambition is not to tell the 
most compelling quantum tale. Rather do I intend to show that the philosophical 
convictions of some key scientists made them quite reluctant, or even resistant to, 
conversions enforced from outside or to begin a new theoretical life. There is, so to 
speak, a broader kind of rationality at work in the scientific process than the rational 
reconstruction of a theory’s argumentative structure reveals. It includes criteria and 
methods of theory choice as well as philosophical convictions of a general nature. This 
is an important lesson of Mach’s above-quoted holism in the history of science: 
scientists do not start with empty hands and eyes open, immersed into and on the basis 
of a provisional world view. The rationality of the scientific process as a whole does 
not require that all steps qualify as fully rational with the benefit of hindsight. Thus 
Cushing’s counterfactual problem is not just a standard case of rational reconstruction 
within one research program, but requires a detailed comparative historical analysis. 
 Interestingly, Cushing’s book failed in the eyes of Forman to whom it is deeply 
indebted. Expressing general sympathy for “a philosopher who rejects his discipline’s 
canonical distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification” 
Forman criticizes that Cushing’s “argument is divided over two, only very loosely 
connected historical fronts”, one located in the 1920s and one concerned with 
explaining the marginal status of the Bohm interpretation after 1952. And more 
generally, “to make this case [for quantum mechanical historicism] – indeed any 
counter-factual case – is considerably more difficult than Cushing appears to 
recognize.” (all Forman, 1995, p. 1844) To this end the historical material which only 
goes little beyond Jammer’s seminal book (1974), does not suffice. Strangely, Forman 
does not address the relation between the alternative history and his own 
investigations, (Forman, 1984) in particular.  
It is true, if there exists a genuinely causal influence, there is no space for 
alternative histories however composed which are to establish a causal quantum theory 
in a milieu longing for acausality. The alternative history would have to falsely tag 
itself as anticausal as Heisenberg had done, on Forman’s account, with respect to the 
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Anschaulichkeit of quantum mechanics. So if Cushing’s alternative history is credible, 
the strong Forman thesis has to go. Forman’s skepticism about Cushing’s 
counterfactual is, to my mind, basically right although the charge of historicism misses 
the point because historical contingency is confined to a very small domain, the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics given an accepted formalism. Still, Cushing’s 
argument bears serious dangers for the Forman thesis, or at least, it elucidates 
Forman’s strong philosophical motivations.  
 The pivotal question of Cushing’s counterfactual history is “what impact a 
‘Bell’ theorem might have had around 1927.” (Ibid., p. 176) Although Bell’s theorem 
in the 1960s was received more positively than Bohm’s interpretation,38 it never 
spellbound the physics community as Cushing counterfactually assumes to be the case 
in 1927. Back then quantum physicists “could have seen the conflict between 
determinism and locality in any theory.” (Ibid., p. 179) Faced with this choice and 
having learned of or performed himself the necessary steps 1. and 2., “finally Einstein 
would not have seen locality as a truly a priori [sic!] concept necessary to do physics” 
(Ibid., p. 265), and he would consequently have developed steps 4. and 5. of the 
alternative program. “The crucial issue is how, in an observer-independent reality, 
Einstein would have evaluated or weighted causality (or determinism) versus 
nonlocality, given that one of these had to go.” (Ibid., p. 179) To ease his pain at this 
point, the alternative history quickly made the non-localities benign by a no-signaling 
theorem. “Although Einstein might still have found Bohm’s theory unacceptable (‘too 
cheap’) as a final theory (and Bohm himself never suggested that is was final theory), 
he might also not have rejected it out of hand because of the (now benign) 
nonlocality.” (Ibid., p. 182)  
 I do not doubt that formally Cushing’s counterfactual argument is correct. 
However, the linch pin of the alternative history are Einstein’s philosophical 
preferences. Here interpreters disagree even with respect to what the horns of the 
dilemma are. While Cushing builds largely upon Arthur Fine’s (1986) interpretation of 
Einstein’s realism, Don Howard (1985, 1990) disagrees and detects a difference 
between locality and the more basic concept of separability, which was responsible for 
withdrawing the “Bestimmt” manuscript. Although I have certain preferences for 
Howard’s description of Einstein’s philosophical views, in particular because 
meanwhile Howard (1994) has convincingly linked them to the encounters on realism 
and causality analyzed in the present book, I cannot enter into these intricate matters 
here. So I must simply accept Cushing’s position that Einstein could have reached the 
philosophical conclusion to prefer causality over locality. But that won’t suffice, as the 
remainder of this section intends to demonstrate.  
 However Einstein decided, the historical problem remains that in one way or 
another all quantum physicists accepting this view would have faced “the possibility 
that nonlocality may well turn out to be a feature of the world” (Cushing, 1994, p. 179) 
and that “[r]elativistic invariance could turn out to hold only at the observational level, 
not necessarily at the level of abstract space-time as usually envisioned in special 
relativity.” (Ibid., p. 183) How would the scientific community and the general cultural 
milieu have reacted to such declarations from Einstein’s side? Even if one accepts 
Cushing’s contention that philosophically Einstein might have made his peace with 
benign non-locality, we have already seen that historically the causality debate was 
                                                          
38 For the reasons, see (Pinch, 1977) and my Lakatosian criticism in Section 4 of (Stöltzner, 2002c).  
 64
indissolubly linked with the acceptance of relativity theory. Cushing argues that the 
real history was contingent in an important respect; so he must accept that also the 
alternative history would have been contingent too. Let us thus pick up the thread of 
the alternative history at step 5 and imagine a comprehensive paper of Einstein’s 
appearing in Die Naturwissenschaften at about 1929. Certainly, Göttingen-
Copenhagen would not be pleased. Others, Born and von Laue, would have seen the 
acceptance of non-locality as Einstein sacrificing his brainchild relativity theory. The 
fact that special relativity was rescued at the observational level could perhaps have 
been accommodated by Logical Empiricists after a detailed analysis of the no-
signaling theorems. But Planck would have fiercely contradicted to abandoning the 
principle of invariance, which he held to be more basic even than causality. (See Sect. 
3.8.) To be sure, Logical Empiricists would have emphasized that the Einstein-de 
Broglie theory – as contemporaries might have called the resultant of step 5 – did not 
amount to a return of the world view of classical mechanics and materialist 
metaphysics because the particle paths guided by the pilot wave were empirically 
inaccessible. Pondering whether particle paths and quantum potential, accordingly, 
were altogether meaningful concepts, at the example of an EPR gedanken experiment 
– which had been established for merely didactic purposes in step 3. –, Logical 
Empiricists might have investigated the relation between really existing quantum 
entanglement and Mach’s principle. All these are quite difficult philosophical 
arguments would have been most suitable for publication in Die Naturwissenschaften 
but unsuitable for the popular press that would certainly have titled a “new revolution 
of Einstein”. 
 Who would be most fascinated by the publicity of the Einstein-de Broglie 
theory? I am afraid but my guess is Philipp Lenard, Johannes Stark, and all those who 
rejected modern theoretical physics altogether. One of the main virtues of the Bohm 
interpretation is, according to Cushing, its greater intuitive appeal to people educated 
in classical physics. There are anschauliche particle paths and the statistical features of 
the theory are as anschaulich as Brownian motion. As shown in Section 1.3., the 
Anschaulichkeit debates in quantum mechanics and relativity theory were intimately 
linked. Still in 1930, Sommerfeld criticized in detail several misunderstandings of 
Stark who had objected to the rotational symmetries inherent in quantum mechanics by 
arguing that the electron is always on one side of an axis through the center of the 
nucleus. Moreover Einstein-deBroglie stochastic mechanics would not have required 
entering into talk about measurability familiar from special relativity and tainted with 
positivist philosophy. Operationalistically flavored no-signaling theorems which could 
hardly be assessed in any anschaulich manner would have convinced the conservatives 
that the alternative between causality (or realism or Anschaulichkeit) and locality was 
tantamount to a choice between atomic physics and relativity theory. As observational 
evidence decisively favoring general relativity over its competitors was still poor – 
because difficult to obtain – in comparison with loads of spectroscopic data indicating 
the superiority of Einstein-deBroglie stochastic mechanics – and the observationally 
equivalent matrix mechanics of Heisenberg – over Bohr-Sommerfeld, Lenard and 
Stark would have understood Cushing’s alternative history as the desired rejection of 
relativity theory. 
 Ideological and milieu factors support this conclusion. As the Golden Twenties 
were drawing to their end, the great depression in 1929 caused anew the general 
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feeling of crisis on which the Forman thesis was built. National Socialism and 
antisemitism were quickly rising in this milieu, and after 1928 Lenard sought Nazi 
company in public. For him, the Einstein-deBroglie theory would have been a great 
opportunity to once and for all eradicate Jüdische Physik – based on the work of a 
Frenchman – as inconsistent and self-destructive, and replace it by Deutsche Physik. 
Admittedly, all this sounds weird, but thus was Deutsche Physik. And thus the 
extrapolated counterfactual would end in a flood of polemics in daily and weekly 
newspapers of the kind familiar from the clashes about Einstein’s relativity theory 
which had sparked the early 1920s.  
 What does this little reductio ad absurdum teach? Quite generally, 
counterfactuals are construed by varying the actual scenario in some respect leaving all 
other conditions fixed. This variation is motivated by what the counterfactual 
argument purports to prove. Cushing varies the interpretation of quantum mechanics 
but leaves unmodified the formalism, all other scientific theories, his protagonists’ 
philosophical views, and the general milieu. Thus his conclusion obtains only ceteris 
paribus. Philosophically ceteris paribus arguments exhibit a number of notorious 
problems, in particular, one has to actually control the ceteris paribus conditions. My 
reductio argument – as strange as it is – shows that Cushing has failed to do so. The 
key problem was the intimate coupling of the interpretation of quantum mechanics to 
be varied under the ceteris paribus condition relativity theory. Cushing’s argument 
only goes through if one claims, in contrast, that quantum mechanics could be treated 
in isolation from other physical theories.39 But doing so leaves little space for genuine 
historical contingency.  
 Moreover, even though at surface value the strong Forman thesis is unaffected 
by this reductio, it becomes clear how strongly both Forman and Cushing are – more 
overtly than not – indebted to those concepts of causality, realism, and Anschaulichkeit 
which characterize classical physics. While Forman leaves matters here, Cushing is at 
pains to accommodate the manifest indeterministic features which the formalism 
simply produces and which are experimentally verified. There are basically two 
strategies used by Bohmians unless they modify the formalism. Either they invoke the 
initial wave function of the universe and the initial configurations of the Bohmian 
particles – whatever that means at the initial singularity of a big bang cosmology – to 
reintroduce uncertainty as a feature typical – in the sense of statistical mechanics – of 
the real world (Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì, 1992a). Or quantum mechanical 
indeterminism is considered as a case of chaotic behavior. This is the key to the 
philosophical morals Cushing himself draws from his counterfactual.  
 Could, at the end of the day, determinism and indeterminism be ultimately 
equivalent. “Can so fundamental a property of the external world be undecidable by 
empirical test and can the choice be observationally irrelevant? ” (Ibid., p. 208) The 
stark contrast between the ideal of Laplace’s demon and the manifest chaotic behavior 
of mechanical systems much simpler than our solar system reminds us that “classical 
mechanics ought not naively to be equated with a determinism that necessarily allows 
complete and meaningful predictability.”(Ibid., p. 210) Newton himself  
 
                                                          
39 As a matter of fact, this is a characteristic trait of some present-day foundational discourse in quantum 
mechanics. 
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did not believe that the mathematical laws as represented in his Principia were in themselves 
sufficient to explain or to predict the long-term stability and future evolution of the physical universe. 
It was only after Newton that the determinism and complete predictive accuracy of his laws of 
mechanics became accepted. A general cultural background had been conducive to a deterministic 
gloss on the laws of mechanics. (Ibid., p. 210)  
 
Underdetermination again. This insight that “[d]eterministic chaotic systems can be as 
irregular (and unpredictable) as a truly random system” (Ibid., p. 213) leads Cushing to 
an argument that figured prominently in Schlick’s (1920) first theory of causality (See 
Section 7.1.). There is no warrant for believing that despite the chaotic nature even of 
simple mechanical systems, still “at the most fundamental level, the universe is 
governed by deterministic laws. … Who would be impressed by such an argument or 
theory, since its effective ‘predictions’ would be empirically indistinguishable from 
those that would obtain in a universe that was at base completely indeterministic?” 
(Cushing, 1994, p. 212) For this reason, Schlick put forward some characteristic 
regulative principles for causal laws, most important among them simplicity. He later 
(1931) revoked this position in favor of the sole criterion of successful prediction; but 
the pragmatic criteria remained important.  
Cushing, in the end, distinguishes the pragmatic criteria of causal explanation 
from the causal structure of the real world. 
 
[A]s a pragmatic matter, we can simply choose, from among the consistent, empirically adequate 
theories on offer at any time, that one which allows us best to “understand” the phenomena of nature, 
while not confusing this practical virtue with any argument for the “truth” or faithfulness of the 
representation of the story thus chosen. Successful theories can prove to be poor guides in providing 
deep ontological lessons about the nature of physical reality. (Ibid. p. 215) 
 
As science has such feeble a bearing on ontology, 
 
belief in determinism as being more fundamental than probabilities in the actual physical world is an 
act of faith, rather than a position demanded, or even particularly well warranted, by the laws of (even 
classical) physics and by the observed behavior of physical systems. Usable determinism reigns almost 
nowhere and chaos nearly everywhere. Newtonian (Laplacian) determinism may remain only a 
theorist’s unattainable dream. (Ibid., p. 214) 
 
Indeed, the kingdom of Laplace’s demon has become small these days. But I wonder 
whether the set of alternatives to be decided by act of faith is complete. Focusing on 
predictability only, Cushing puts deterministic chaos and indeterminism on a par. Here 
I disagree. Modern theories of complexity conceive of a substantial difference between 
deterministic chaos and genuine indeterminism where statistical laws can take hold. It 
seems that Cushing’s identification follows from the identification of a theory’s 
formalism with the formal expression of its empirical content. It is very easy to 
formulate simple systems exhibiting deterministic chaos, but on Cushing’s account the 
poor predictive value of these formulae utterly evaporates such a formalism. On the 
other hand, for phenomena such as turbulence a genuinely indeterministic approach is 
more suitable and predictively more fruitful than an analysis of the system’s chaotic 
behavior. For Richard von Mises (1922a) precisely this became an argument in favor 
of a genuinely statistical approach. 
 Although, to Cushing’s mind, determinism in general remains an act of faith, it 
still is a valid criterion of theory choice that (could have) had a strong Whiggish 
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appeal also within the counterfactual history. So are consistency with the ontology of 
classical physics and the possibility of an interpretation in terms of particles in motion 
as a pragmatic criterion of theory choice. “Who would have listened to Copenhagen 
after the Einstein-de Broglie theory in place?” might be considered as a non-formal 
type of simplicity of the overall discourse, to wit, whether a theory simply merges with 
the prevailing philosophy or with the common sense of a period. (Cf. Frank, 1954) 
 
Either of the two theories passes a test of fertility, in the sense of possessing the internal resources to 
cope with anomaly and new empirical developments that actually occurred, as well as for suggesting 
new avenues for research and generalization. My historical counterfactual scenario … has indicated 
that Bohm’s theory was not an ad hoc, stillborn creation that could have matched Copenhagen only for 
the simplest cases … I do not claim that Bohm’s theory and extensions thereof have yet been 
generated that matched all the successes of the standard approach or that there are no internal 
inconsistencies yet to be discovered. Few people, after all, have worked on this alternative program. 
Nor am I claiming that more people should work on it. (Cushing, 1994, p. 206f) 
 
Granted that the pragmatic criteria do not play a strictly normative role, one 
nevertheless might wonder how they really act in counterfactual histories. Let me pick 
up again the general issue of historical counterfactuals over and beyond the issue of 
ceteris paribus conditions. Even if restricted to a certain place or time frame, or to a 
particular thematic context, any history must be a complete history. Einstein was the 
most prominent pioneer of modern theoretical physics and he can hardly be reduced to 
a bunch of philosophical and physical convictions about quantum mechanics. This 
point holds both internally and externally; also the milieu cannot be switched off at 
will. Integrity of history proves a hobble for counterfactuals because one cannot 
arbitrarily shift back and forth, or stretch and condense, scientific developments on the 
historical scale. In contrast, this is possible in rational reconstruction. Take, for 
instance, conformity to classical physics. Today most scientists got used to the 
paradoxical features of quantum mechanics and to the even more paradoxical features 
of quantum field theory; the vast majority hardly would consider unobservable particle 
trajectories as a great pragmatic virtue. Cushing is surely right that in 1927 the score 
would have been just the opposite. As this pragmatic criterion is clearly not invariant 
under time translation, the counterfactual history does not make the Bohm 
interpretation an equal competitor in virtue of conformity to classical ontology. The 
same for fertility. Other than a few toy models, to date there has been little progress 
with relativistic versions of Bohmian mechanics and Bohmian field theory. Maybe 
higher funding could have yielded an equal score, maybe not because the theory is so 
overtly non-local. Despite serious mathematical difficulties, sixty years of progress in 
quantum field theory cannot be annihilated by just comparing the quality of the seeds 
in 1927, rather than the matured trees in 2002. Even a criterion that presently supports 
the de Broglie-Bohm theory, to wit, the interest it has recently attracted among 
quantum cosmologists, cannot be shifted back to 1927 into a support of the Einstein-de 
Broglie theory because the boom in cosmology did not start before the 1960s. Of 
course, there exist criteria which are (still) time-invariant. The ontological status of the 
quantum potential is today unclear as ever because it has no interaction with anything 
other than just guiding a single quantum particle and ether-like mediating their 
interactions. In Salmon’s terminology, it just participates in pseudo-processes. (Cf. 
Stöltzner, 1999b). If one considers the quantum potential only as a secondary entity 
parasitic on the wave function (from whose derivative it emerges) and asserts that the 
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pilot-wave equation needs not be solved, problems with ontological parsimony 
emerge. In 1927, to be sure, they might have been counterbalanced by ontological 
conformity, but today this strategy is not viable. 
Cushing’s counterfactual is thus no sufficient reason to investigate the Bohm 
theory. But to my mind, it is not necessary as well. The pragmatic score sketched 
above was not hopeless. Moreover, the Bohm theory provides a very interesting model 
that the quantum mechanical formalism – now denoting all basic concepts and 
equations – can be modified in certain non-trivial ways without changing the empirical 
content. Against the backdrop of the philosophical analysis of scientific theory as 
developed since the 1920s, this seems already a sufficient motivation to study this 
alternative.  
 
2.2. Beller: On Dialogues and Revolutions 
 
In many respects Mara Beller’s Quantum Dialogue, The Making of a Revolution can 
be read as the historian’s counterpart to Cushing’s Quantum Mechanics. Not only does 
Cushing repeatedly draw upon historical material from earlier works of Beller, they 
also agree in their aim to win the Bohm theory the status of an equal among equals. 
Thus I will not repeat historical details mentioned in the previous section, but focus on 
interpretative lessons of relevance for the philosophical discourse on causality. 
 While Cushing argues by historical counterfactual, Beller attacks “the 
philosophical legitimation of the Copenhagen ideology” (Beller, 1999, p. 272, fn. 5) 
head-on. 
 
It is not the historian’s task to offer a specific alternative to the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. I 
take no stand on the existing alternatives to orthodox philosophy. This book does not deal with the 
extensive and lively contemporary research of the philosophical problems of quantum physics. Rather, 
my historical, philosophical, and sociological analysis of the Copenhagen philosophy demonstrates the 
possibility and the need of a viable alternative to the orthodox interpretation. (Ibid., p. xiii) 
 
2.2.1. Dialogical Emergence Versus Rhetorical Consolidation 
 
Beller’s book consists of two parts separated by the year 1927 and by methodological 
orientation. The first one is dedicated to the “Dialogical Emergence” of quantum 
mechanics up to 1927. The second titled “Rhetorical Consolidation” investigates how 
the orthodox narrative of the inevitability of the Copenhagen interpretation was 
established after 1927. Rather than being embedded into two distinct and pre-existing 
theoretical frameworks, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s wave 
mechanics “crystallized as the end result of a conceptually fascinating and emotionally 
intense confrontation among quantum physicists. In the fruitful ambiguity of the newly 
created knowledge, there was no place for strong ‘beliefs’ in indeterminism or 
‘commitments’ to positivism.” (Ibid., p. 3f.) Eventual “pronouncements on these 
issues were uncommitted, fluid, and opportunistic.” (Ibid., p. 17) There existed a very 
fruitful dialogue between the various quantum physicists. Conceptual strategies and 
formal tools were mutually exchanged, so that a multitude of positions developed just 
to be modified quickly afterwards when the colleagues had announced new findings. 
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In this perspective basic papers – or rather: master texts – exhibit an irreducible 
polyphony. 
 First, Heisenberg’s uncertainty paper (1927) was full of challenges, doubts, and 
contradictions on all levels above and beyond the mere formulas.  
 
[Philosophically] contradictory voices of positivism (operationalism), model theoretic realism (the 
invariant features of a successful scientific theory refer to genuine aspects of reality), and 
conventionalism (physicists can freely choose the basic axioms of a theory, worrying only about its 
consistency and empirical adequacy) are all present in Heisenberg’s paper. (Beller, 1999, p. 104) 
 
Already two years earlier, Heisenberg’s efforts were not guided by a “coherent 
philosophical choice between positivism and realism” (Ibid., p. 52), but there prevailed 
a peculiar mixture of “the positivist, identifying the meaning of a concept with the 
procedure for its verification (in real or imagined physical interactions [like the 
microscope thought experiment]), and the realist, deducing the genuine features of the 
quantum world from characteristics of the mathematical formalism.” (Ibid., p. 113f.) 
Yet for Logical Empiricists, these two voices in Heisenberg were not inconsistent; in 
his “Positivism and Realism” Schlick (1932) argued that who accepts the 
verificationist criterion of meaning has not problem with realistically interpreting 
certain terms in the formalism.  
 Second, Bohr’s Como lecture (1927) “was not the resolution of wave-particle 
duality by the complementarity principle but rather an extensive defense of his concept 
of stationary state and discontinuous energy changes.” (Beller, 1999, p. 118) What 
appears as “one of the most incomprehensible texts in twentieth-century physics” 
(Ibid., p. 8) is in fact “filled with implicit arguments with the leading physicists of the 
time – Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Compton, Born, Dirac, Pauli, and the lesser 
known Campbell.” (Ibid., p. 120) In this way the “deep conceptual gap fundamental 
between Bohr’s wave-theoretical and Heisenberg’s particle-kinematic interpretation of 
atomic systems” (Ibid., p. 122) becomes evident. This gap “is one of the historical 
roots of the inconsistencies that plague the Copenhagen interpretation of physics” 
(Ibid., p. 122) to date. Yet the united front had to be established very quickly to meet 
the challenge of Schrödinger’s intuitively appealing and technically superior 
formalism. “In his Como lecture Bohr [also] set the historical record straight … [and] 
presented matrix mechanics as the culmination of his own research program, based on 
the correspondence principle.” (Ibid., p. 141) Heisenberg complied with Bohr’s 
leadership and thus the orthodox narrative was instituted.  
 The strongest challenge to the Copenhagen dogma was the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paper (1935) which struck the already consolidated Copenhagen hegemony by 
surprise. Repeating the successful rhetorical move of 1927, in Bohr’s reply “sincere 
and open-minded, though interest-laden, interpretative attempts hardened into an 
ideological stand intended to protect quantum theory from challenge and criticism.” 
(Beller, 1999, p. 9) The paper marked the “transition from legitimate, though often 
confused arguments for the consistency of quantum theory, to argumentative strategies 
promoting the inevitability of the orthodox stand.” (Ibid., p. 9) The year 1935 
separates two voices: reference to Heisenberg’s idea of physical disturbance fades 
away because EPR had made it untenable, while the “emerging operational voice will 
culminate in unreserved verificationism.” (Ibid., p. 151) Bohr’s account of the EPR 
paper introduced philosophical weaknesses not existing in the original. While in the 
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EPR paper “the elements of physical reality are the physical variables that can be 
predicted with certainty, … Bohr reformulated the passage from EPR into a 
metaphysical discussion of what physicist mean when the say ‘reality’. This 
reformulation … had a strong rhetorical effect.” (Ibid., p. 154) Einstein appears as the 
outmoded naive realist, which – of course – he is not. Eight years further down the 
historical road, we find again the conundrum of Einstein’s realism which as of 1927 
was the linch pin of Cushing’s counterfactual. 
 Thus the “Copenhagen interpretation was erected, not as a consistent 
philosophical framework, but as a collection of local responses to challenges from the 
opposition.” (Ibid., p. 167) Copenhagen’s formal consistency was elevated to its 
inevitability and to the finality of quantum mechanics. In the subsequent years, “the 
opposition’s stand is delegitimized and trivialized” and “the past is manipulated to 
make the winners look naturally right.” (both ibid., p. 10) Beller classifies this shift by 
adopting terminology from the influential lecture course of Nobel laureate Richard P. 
Feynman (Feynman/Leighton/Sands, 1969) 
 
In the two-slit experiment, one “need not” assume that the particle traverses a well-defined path 
between the two-slit diaphragm and the detector. … “Need not” is an integral part of scientific 
practice, without which such breakthroughs as the rejection of absolute simultaneity in relativity 
theory and the rejection of a strict determinist framework in quantum theory would not have been 
possible. “Must not” is a positivist excess, at odds with the practice of science, which relies on realistic 
models as a heuristic guide to discovery. (Beller, 1999, p. 174) 
 
The allegation that positivism hampers scientific progress is not new. Planck threw it 
against Mach (Section 3.7.), Sommerfeld against Frank (in a letter to Schlick), and it 
notoriously suffered from a restricted view on the target. But the dichotomy is well-
suited for the “scientific pugnacity” so heavily criticized by Neurath (1915).  
While the microanalysis in the first part of Beller’s book – though on a different 
methodological basis – complies with Neurath’s advice that historians of science 
should investigate all intermediate positions, the second part itself lives such pugnacity 
and rides a rhetorical counterattack against the Copenhagen dogma. Instead of the 
dialogical microperspective, now the orthodox narrative is put against the backdrop of 
its few critics, above all David Bohm and John S. Bell. Historical succession is 
dissolved; pronouncements of Bohr and Heisenberg are contrasted with criticism made 
much later.40 The rhetoric appeal of antirealism as a strategy to protect science and to 
appease internal conflicts are discussed against the backdrop of P.W. Bridgman’s 
operationalism (Beller, 1999, pp. 176-180) instead of mentioning any realism debate 
concurrent with the emergence of the Copenhagen interpretation in Europe. In the end, 
Beller consequently does not arrive all too far from Cushing’s counterfactual outlook, 
and her plea for an alternative interpretation faces the same methodological problems 
as shifting criteria of theory preference back and forth in history.  
 The most disturbing feature of Beller’s presentation is the harsh and sometime 
derogatory rhetoric – somewhat reminiscent of Forman (1971). Among the bad guys is 
Heisenberg whose “hostility to Schrödinger’s theory seems more likely to be 
connected with his instinctive reluctance to admit anybody else into territory that the 
ambitious Heisenberg considered his own.” (Beller, 1999, p. 32) In his recollections 
                                                          
40 Above all in Chapter 9 of the book, e.g. on p. 193 and p. 201, but also the comparison between Bohr and 
Bohm concerning quantum wholeness on p. 256. 
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Heisenberg transgressed the subtle line between “manipulation of history and 
deliberate deception.” (Ibid., p. 213) But the really bad guy is Bohr. “As is suitable for 
a prophet, Bohr talked in fables and parables.” (Ibid., p. 244) Being “an avid 
storyteller” (Ibid., p. 243) but – other than Bohm and Bell – “[l]acking advanced 
mathematical skills, Bohr could not build a new quantum ontology but instead had to 
use ‘common language’ and simple analogies. This personal trait, if not weakness, was 
canonized into the universal doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts and 
the impossibility of a quantum ontology.” (Ibid., p. 259) Disabled in his computational 
capacities, overloaded with administrative duties, depending upon his authority to 
make his assistants carry out his vague intuitions, despite all “hero worship” (Ibid., p. 
153), “Bohr was a tragic figure.” (Ibid., p. 271) “The legend that Bohr had some sort 
of access to nature’s secrets, qualitatively different from that of other mortals, directly 
discouraged critical dialogue.” (Ibid., p. 271) In actual fact, this legend was older than 
the Como lecture or the philosophy of complementarity (See Sect. 4.7.2). 
 Within her black and white set-up,41 Beller did not undertake any further 
investigation why communication was inhibited, although an interesting sociological 
model is available at least for the case of Bohm and von Neumann which, to my mind, 
might be suitably adapted. Trevor J. Pinch commences from the following distinction.  
 
The research-area mode of articulation occurs when the disputed object forms part of the particular 
area of concern of scientists involved in the controversy. … The official-history mode of articulation, 
by contrast, occurs when the cognitive object is referred to in some other context than the immediate 
area of concern. … I regard this context as being mainly the production of cumulative history of 
rationalisation of how a particular field developed. (Pinch, 1977, p. 175)  
 
Bohm’s (1952) proposal challenged the interpretation of quantum mechanics in the 
research-area mode by producing a counterexample and publishing it in the 
discipline’s leading journal. On the contrary, “much of the response of the [quantum 
mechanics] elite has been articulated in the official-history mode,” (Ibid., p. 187) 
mainly by restating von Neumann’s theorem. Bell’s (1966) counterexample found 
better acceptance than Bohm’s because he could precisely spot the defect in von 
Neumann’s theorem and, accordingly, dragged the opponent back into the research-
area mode. In the discussions ensuing the EPR-paper, this did not happen – although 
the paper represented the germ of Bell’s later analysis. At bottom, it appears to me that 
large part of Beller’s distinction between “dialogical emergence” and “rhetorical 
consolidation” boils down to the two modes distinguished by Pinch. 
 
2.2.2. On Dialogues and Dialogism 
 
Beller’s undisputed good guy is David Bohm and he wisely provided a view of science 
according to which his interpretation can be judged equal among equals. 
 
How fitting for Bohm, a victim of this approach [quantum orthodoxy], to develop a diametrically 
opposed view of science – pleading for tolerance, for creative plurality, for peaceful theoretical 
coexistence, for a free play of imagination, for friendly, open-minded, and joyful scientific cooperation 
and communication. (Beller, 1999, p. 210) 
                                                          
41 Cf. the fully justified criticism of Dickson (2002). 
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The “attitude” (Ibid., p. 325) Beller advocates in Bohm’s footsteps is dialogism. 
“[T]he notion of an overarching scientific method that guides an individual scientist is 
foreign to it.” (Ibid., p. 321) 
 
From the dialogical perspective, there simply are no final, stable, elements, or facts – everything can 
be questioned and doubted. Nor is there a total, final resolution of tension – conflicting voices coexist, 
or are temporarily put aside. Rarely are they completely extinguished. A paradoxical tension exists 
between the openness of a scientific text, addressed to the future, and its solid roots in the past. … The 
dialogical nature of creativity explains why reinforcement, support from another voice is so important. 
(Ibid., p. 105f.) 
 
Dialogism takes “addressive response as the primary epistemological and social unit 
for the analysis of science. Thus the notion of a scientific thought presupposes the 
existence of an interlocutor to whom the thought is addressed or by whose statements 
the thought is triggered.” (Ibid., p. 308) Indispensability of an interlocutor however 
proves problematic at places and it creates the need to fake partners. For instance, 
Beller cannot show that Heisenberg ever read the works of the “lesser’ scientists” 
Norman Campbell or H.A. Senftleben. However, “Campbell’s suggestion that time is 
statistical in nature” (Ibid., p. 97) had already been stated by Boltzmann and 
concerning irreducible indeterminism the name Senftleben could easily be replaced 
with Exner whom Heisenberg’s teacher Sommerfeld knew well (Sommerfeld, 1926) 
and whose priority in this matter Schrödinger defended untiringly. 
 Dialogism accepts the “preeminence of disagreement” and considers factual 
agreement as “useful but of little explanatory power.” Moreover: “Too much emphasis 
on agreement, combined with the philosophical thesis that theory is underdetermined 
by experimental data, has resulted in the excesses of the sociology of knowledge and 
the flattening of the cognitive to the social by social constructivists.” (All ibid., p. 309) 
“In the dialogical approach, the historical, philosophical, and sociological merge into a 
unified viewpoint, rather than being independent perspectives.” (Ibid., p. 313) In 
dialogism there is “no essential difference between the process of discovery and that of 
justification.” (Ibid., p. 316f.) Such “dialogues underlay both the open-minded 
foundational research and the erection of the orthodox interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 2) 
 Beller is aware of the danger that the dialogist attitude could lead into 
relativism. To prevent this, she heavily counts on institutionalized rules of dialogical 
conduct. “What became distinctive of modern science was not so much the scientific 
‘method’, or scientific ‘norms’, but the strongly institutionalized communication 
scheme” (Ibid., p. 312), above all the Royal Society. Now if this is all to distinguish 
science among other activities – presumably apart from empirical adequacy – 
relativism or at least elitism are lurking because even outdated theories could 
successfully win before the Academic High Court. Beller’s gentlemanlike rules of 
dialogical conduct are surprisingly lax. “Scientists appear to be too opportunistic; they 
often betray their ‘beliefs’ and ‘commitments’.” (Ibid., p. 311) “It was on the 
efficiency of the mathematical tools, and not on the metaphysical ‘paradigmatic’ issues 
that there was agreement in the community of quantum physicists … agreement on the 
potency of these tools prevented scientific practice from disintegrating, be the 
philosophical disagreements as large as they may.” (Ibid., p. 4) But, “outside a 
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dialogical context formulas are mute.” (Ibid., p. 104) I doubt whether institutions so 
created suffice to keep the scientific enterprise together. 
 Within Beller’s dialogist history, there is no such thing as the quantum 
revolution. She intends a “general critique of the revolutionary narratives, … an 
analysis of how revolutionary stories in history of science are constructed, how 
division between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is fabricated, how the opposition is 
misrepresented and delegitimized.” (Ibid., p. xiii) The target is of course Thomas S. 
Kuhn who “incorporated the Copenhagen ideology into an overarching theory of the 
growth of scientific knowledge.” (Ibid., p. 13) But the “communicative, interactional 
nature of scientific creativity is as alien to the revolutionary as to the revolutionary 
narrative.” (Ibid., p. 269) Moreover, 
 
incommensurability excludes the possibility of being suspended between two different, incompatible 
worlds, of creatively participating in both, of sustaining for long a creative tension between the old and 
the new. Such work is possible only during a short period of crisis, disarray, inconsistency. 
Incommensurability logically dictates total unquestioning, dogmatic commitment. (Ibid., p. 292) 
 
Interestingly, Beller claims that “close historical links exist between the notion of 
incommensurable paradigms and the ideology of the Copenhagen dogma.” (Ibid., p. 
287) It was Norwood Hanson (1958) who imported Heisenberg’s notion of a closed 
theory into philosophy in order to defend the Copenhagen interpretation by developing 
“incommensurability as linguistic untranslatability.” (Beller, 1999, p. 296) 
Subsequently, so Beller holds, incommensurability “was swiftly, perhaps hastily, 
superimposed on Kuhn’s emerging Structure, most likely as a result of an encounter 
with Hanson’s work.” (Ibid., p. 301) By citing a favorable review of Bohm by 
Feyerabend (1960), on the other hand, Beller “disclose[s] the importance of Bohm’s 
alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation in the emergence of a post-positivist 
philosophy of science.” (Ibid., p. 287) Bohm’s plea against dogmatism thus explains 
the “creativity and longevity of ‘normal science’”. (Ibid., p. 306)  
 I wonder whether this parallel represents anything but rhetorical consolidation. 
But my point here is the identification of the Copenhagen paradigm with a closed 
theory in Heisenberg’s sense by which Hanson’s book was motivated. According to 
Beller the upshot is that “[u]nder the Copenhagen interpretation, quantum mechanics 
can neither be modified by small changes nor supplemented by hidden variables.” 
(Ibid., p. 289) This conclusion needs substantial qualification.  
 Heisenberg (1947) gives four criteria for a theory to be closed. First, “the 
concepts stemming from experience must be made precise by definitions and axioms, 
and their relations fixed, so that it is possible to coordinate to these concepts 
mathematical symbols among which a consistent system of equations exists.” (1947, p. 
334) This is just a standard fact of axiomatized theory in the style perfected by the 
Hilbert school, which since the 1920s could be found in any text written by Logical 
Empiricists. Second, “the concepts of this theory must be anchored directly in 
experience, the must ‘denote’ something in the world of phenomena.” (Ibid., p, 334) 
Standard wisdom again; axiom systems may contain unintended models that are 
unphysical. Third, the limits of the domain of applicability of the axiomatized theory, 
that is the phenomena adequately described by it, are not given a priori but they are up 
to experience. The ideal is that the axiom system permits one to derive uniquely all 
relevant laws of the respective field; the axiom system is then complete and 
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categoric..42 Hilbert’s (1900) axiomatization program took the theoretical frameworks 
as they were presented by theoretical physicists, so that Heisenberg’s point ultimately 
concerns the relation between a theory formulated with mathematical precision and 
empirical phenomena. As I have argued elsewhere (Stöltzner 2001a), von Neumann’s 
Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1932) was the most perfect 
realization of Hilbert’s program of the axiomatization of physics, and Heisenberg was 
so tightly connected to Göttingen to know this for sure. Thus although von Neumann’s 
name does not appear in Heisenberg’s short paper, one can safely conclude that von 
Neumann’s book stood at the back of the first three criteria of the notion of closed 
theory. 
Only the fourth criterion moves away from axiomatics proper and steers 
towards Bohr’s thesis of the indispensability of classical concepts.  
 
Even when one has moved beyond the boundaries of the “closed theory”, when accordingly new 
domains of experience have been ordered with new concepts, the conceptual system of the closed 
theory nonetheless represents an indispensible part of the language in which we talk about nature. The 
closed theory belongs to the preconditions of further research; we can express the result of an 
experiment only in terms of earlier closed theories. (Ibid., p. 335) 
 
The last sentence indicates that Heisenberg took closed theories as a sort of historically 
relativized a priori. Rejecting a biologically conditioned absolute a priori, Heisenberg 
introduced a hierarchy according to which concepts like space, time, and causality 
were a priori to a higher degree than the closed forms of more recent theories. 
 
The development [of physics since the Middle Ages] appears to us as a sequence of intellectual 
structures, “closed theories”, which form out of single empirical questions as a seed crystal and which 
eventually, when the full crystal has formed, detach from experience a purely intellectual structures 
[geistige Gebilde]. (Ibid., p. 336) 
 
It appears to me that here Heisenberg simply intended to locate quantum physics 
within the German philosophical tradition. And the solution he took was quite a 
familiar one form relativity theory. In 1920 Reichenbach had tried to devise the notion 
of a relativized a priori, but he left this position after a correspondence with Schlick 
who argued that relativization of any sort violated the very intentions of Kant’s 
concept of a category. (See Friedman, 1994; and above) A relativized a priori is not 
simply self-contradictory, as Beller (1999, p. 199) believes; there existed various neo-
Kantian relativizations at that time. Yet a mitigated transcendental-philosophical 
background of this kind is not required for assessing the axiomatic approach, for 
contemplating irreducible indeterminism, or the rejection of a particular alternative 
interpretation. This should be one of the lessons of the present book.  
Suffice it to note at this place one important point about possible modifications of 
axiom systems. When Heisenberg at another occasion wrote that in closed theories 
“[t]he connection between the different concepts in the system is so close that one 
could generally not change any one of the concepts without destroying the whole 
system,” (Beller, 1999, p. 288) this misses an important aspect of the axiomatic 
                                                          
42 This notion of completeness has to be distinguished from the syntactic one figuring in Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems which – in Tarski’s version – denotes the fact whether all formulas true in a system are provable within 
it. One might well ask how later developed theories of measurement relate to Gödel’s notion of completeness 
(Breuer, 1997). 
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method. There are axiom systems which remain consistent even if one modifies one 
particular axiom that is independent of all others. Non-Euclidean and non-
Archimedean geometries can be obtained in this way and at least the former has found 
prominent applications in general relativity. The same is true for von Neumann’s 
axiomatization of quantum mechanics. One of the axioms used in the No-hidden-
variable theorem was too restrictive – even physically counterintuitive. (See Stöltzner 
2002c) Contrary to von Neumann’s belief, a modification at this point makes possible 
to obtain empirically equivalent formulations of quantum mechanics, among them 
Bohm’s theory. When Beller concludes that “[w]hich of the assumptions one in fact 
discards depends on the local, theoretical, and sociopolitical circumstances” (Beller, 
1999, p. 304) rather than upon deeper philosophical commitments, this plays down the 
important insight reached in Bell’s (1966) criticism of von Neumann’s proof. 
 Heisenberg is not the only quantum physicist in whom Beller detects aprioristic 
convictions. Also Bohr’s “attempts to arrive at true, certain, final knowledge by the 
mere analysis of the conditions of experience” (Ibid., p. 205) revived Kant’s attempt to 
win Newtonian mechanics the status of a priori knowledge. Where has the 
Copenhagen positivism gone which, to Bohm and Cushing’s mind, stood in the back 
of the notorious finality claims? Reverting the direction of influence, Beller holds that 
“it was the need, or the desire, to argue for finality against threats from the opposition 
that led Heisenberg and Bohr to take an forceful operational stand.” (Ibid., p. 203) 
Among quantum physicists, positivism was initially a concept “in flux” which only 
later became canonized for rhetorical purposes. 
 “A strong belief in, or commitment to, any metaphysical presupposition acts too 
much like a straitjacket in a creative, conceptually fluid phase of scientific activity” 
(Ibid., p. 214) in which the actors are driven by a network of dialogues, opportunist 
motives and the power of formal tools.  
 
The point is not that philosophy cannot influence science. Creative scientists might adopt a certain 
foundational stand (sometimes indistinguishable from a traditional philosophical stand) in order to 
pursue a definite line of research. Such a philosophical orientation is, however, local and provisional. 
The longevity of philosophical “commitment” is conterminous with its usefulness in solving the 
problem at hand. (Ibid., p. 58) 
 
Since philosophy has only limited influence on scientific practice, “scientists may give 
all authority in interpretative matters to a few leaders, whose philosophy they are 
willing to accept.” (Ibid., p. 4) Thus, philosophical influences exist: “the idealist 
German philosopher Fichte might have been a surprising source of Heisenberg’s idea 
of the reduction of a wave packet.” (Ibid., p. 58)43 But even when in the phase of 
rhetorical consolidation authoritative scientists refer to such a background, one cannot 
and one should not measure them by professional standards. Beller calls it a myth “that 
philosophical writings necessarily deal with ‘eternal’ epistemological or ontological 
issues, such as the ‘realism’ of atoms … [and] that philosophical writings are in 
principle intended to produce a systematic contribution to their subject.” (Ibid., p. 173) 
This weak requirement seems to me at odds with Heisenberg’s philosophical 
ambitions (See below). 
                                                          
43 Weyl seems to be a particular well-suited case in point here because his philosophical interests changed as did 
his scientific orientation. (See Scholz 2001). 
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 More generally, the concept of philosophy used by Beller is too restrictive to 
assess the conceptual developments within the quantum generation. It does not suffice 
to count only references to and influences from academic or classical philosophy – or 
what Frank had called ‘school philosophy’ – because that particular epoch witnessed 
the emergence of a scientific philosophy that rejected autonomous philosophical 
objects and an independent philosophical method but announced an analysis of science 
which availed itself of scientific methods. Even though Logical Empiricism was not 
dominant at the time, it stood in the tradition of the German scientist-philosopher who 
crossed the boundary between the respective discourses. Classical examples of 
relevance in the present context were Hermann von Helmholtz, Johannes von Kries, 
Gustav Theodor Fechner, Ernst Mach, and Max Planck. Philosophical commitments in 
this tradition were close enough to the scientific development to be modified if deep 
changes – not necessarily revolutions – so required and they were in turn capable to 
influence scientific practice. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that trained 
scientists, such as Schlick, moved into professional philosophy but continued to 
publish in media of the scientific community, such as Die Naturwissenschaften, and 
consequently were read by and corresponded with scientists; compare the many letters 
Schlick received by top scientists reacting on his second theory of causality (Section 
7.4.). 
This brings us eventually back to the Forman thesis. To my mind, Beller willy-
nilly introduces a substantial milieu-dependence of science just because she rejects the 
stabilizing force of philosophical commitments which are independent of rhetorical 
goals and not backed by authorities.  
 
The variety of audiences to which orthodox quantum physicists addressed their statements was a major 
source of contradictory elements in their writings. Heisenberg adopted Bohr’s positivist approach for 
mathematically unsophisticated audiences, yet he employed elements of a realistic ontological 
interpretation when addressing his mathematically skilled colleagues. (Ibid., p. 172) 
 
Incoherent as they were, within the range of his philosophical convictions, 
Heisenberg’s orientation was strongly influenced by the respective audience. This was 
precisely Forman’s starting point, and he investigated academic addresses to prove that 
the influence was even causal. Moreover, “[i]n dialogical accounts that acknowledge 
the essential formative role of scientific controversies, the line between the “cognitive” 
and the “social” becomes blurred.” (Ibid., p. 144) Accepting dialogism seems to entail 
that the Weimar scientist either acted by retrenchment, in case they found enough 
addressees within a sufficiently rich scientific community, or had to interact directly 
with the general cultural milieu. However scientists reacted, the influence of the milieu 
could not reach the formalism because, as did Cushing, Beller separates the formalism 
– here scientists act primarily as opportunists – and the rhetorically conditioned 
interpretation. So it seems that the weak Forman thesis could get well along with 
Beller’s account. This however is not her intention. 
 
In their recollections, the founders of quantum mechanics described their efforts to construct the new 
quantum mechanics as guided by a belief in indeterminism. Historians and philosophers of science 
often follow this lead, seeking the sources of such beliefs in the cultural milieu (Jammer 1966; Forman 
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1971). Yet we find no strong opinions expressed on the issue of causality during the creative stages of 
the erection of the new theory. (Beller, 1999, p. 26)44 
 
The same applies with respect to Forman’s (1984) extension. Admittedly, there was 
“social pressure (for Anschaulichkeit).” (Beller, 1999, p. 109) “Yet Heisenberg showed 
little desire to tackle the issue of Anschaulichkeit, until subjected to concrete scientific 
pressure – by Schrödinger.” (Ibid., p. 70) Moreover, “description of acausality in 
quantum mechanics as an expression of the zeitgeist (Forman 1971) … provides only a 
limited perspective. The notion of zeitgeist is itself a monological notion.” (Beller, 
1999, p. 313) Beller’s decisive argument against Forman, however, is that there simply 
was no genuine indeterminism before the advent of quantum mechanics. 
 
I know of no quantum physicist before 1927 who did commit himself to indeterminism. Physicists at 
the time thought statistically along classical lines (the uniqueness of quantum probabilities was 
recognized only after Born’s interpretation). In classical statistical theory one starts with an 
assumption about equally probable cases (elementary probabilities) and derives from there more 
complicated probabilities … . In quantum theory, however, complex probabilities (such as transition 
probabilities) were introduced a priori, without being reduced to elementary probabilities. As long as 
no consistent theory of probabilities was developed within quantum theory, there could be no verdict 
over indeterminism. For Born, Jordan, and Pauli, this reasoning was an undercurrent of their struggles 
with the issue of indeterminism. (Ibid., p. 61f.) 
 
This assessment is flawed in various respects. First, Schrödinger constantly 
emphasized his adherence to indeterminism (1922a, 1924, 1929). Second, by 1927 
even classical statistical physicists did no longer talk much about classical 
equiprobabilities. To be sure, the second edition of von Kries’ book (1886) appeared 
precisely in this year and the concept of range (Spielraum) signified less radical a 
departure from equiprobabilities than the relative frequency interpretation; but only 
few physicist remained committed to this interpretation. Third, the frequency 
interpretation had become widely acknowledged, and since Exner (1909) it was – 
together with a firm empiricist stand – the main argument in favor of indeterminism. 
Although the relative frequency interpretation did not solve all problems with 
probability in quantum mechanics, still in the mid 1930s it was strong enough to make 
von Neumann leave his brainchild Hilbert spaces (See Rédei, 1996). All this were 
interesting philosophical problems which will return again and again in the present 
book. 
 Without admitting the gradual and sometimes monological development of 
philosophical positions, Beller can only wonder why Heisenberg introduced a 
discussion about acausality into the uncertainty paper (1927) although the motive was 
absent from the previous correspondence with Pauli. 
 
We can only speculate about what caused Heisenberg to turn to this issue… Did Heisenberg read, 
hear, or see something of the acausal spirit prevalent in his cultural milieu? We probably will never 
know the answer. Yet realizing how contingent the introduction of the acausality issue into the 
uncertainty paper was, and how closely tied to the original content of the paper it later became, is very 
instructive. (Beller, 1999, p. 111)  
 
                                                          
44 Notice that Beller identifies causality with determinism (Cf. ibid, p. 59). 
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But at least the ambitious Heisenberg got his call to a great philosophical problem just 
at the right dialogical moment in time.  
 
Strong sentiments against causality quickly arose precisely because causality was an intrinsic part of 
the threat from the opposition. … The interpretative attempts of quantum theorists took place against a 
background of philosophical controversies about the changed status of space and time concepts 
implied by Einstein’s relativity. Young Heisenberg witnessed the emotional and politically charged 
confrontation between Einstein and the neo-Kantians. … [Being an] intensely ambitious man … 
Heisenberg wanted to be the new Kant [his teacher Sommerfeld had called for] – in his initial 
presentations of the uncertainty principle to academic audiences, he always described the 
abandonment of the “Kantian category of causality” as a natural continuation of Einstein’s overthrow 
of Kantian space and time as forms of intuition. (Ibid., p. 195)  
 
By that time, however, this honor was no more available. Long time ago Vienna 
Indeterminists had executed Mach’s criticism of the Kantian categories without 
distinguishing treatment of space-time and causality. In an article for Die 
Naturwissenschaften surveying the development of quantum mechanics from 1918 to 
1928, Heisenberg wrote alluding to the issue of causality: 
 
As with relativity theory, the physical understanding of quantum theory was accordingly only possible 
on the basis of a revision and extension of the world of classical concepts, that is, on the basis of a 
careful epistemological investigation of the concepts to be introduced in the theory. (Heisenberg, 
1929, p. 495) 
 
Summing up, Heisenberg’s position about causality agreed with Logical Empiricists 
while his concept of closed theory introduced a relativized form of synthetic a priori 
which Logical Empiricists should have emphatically objected to. Surprisingly, this 
difference did not appear during the discussion following Heisenberg’s (1931) talk at 
the Königsberg meeting for “Epistemology of the Exact Sciences.” But Logical 
Empiricists were usually reluctant to criticize leading scientists in public; they rather 
attempted to include them into their strategic alliances to combat metaphysical 
misinterpretations of modern science – even if such misinterpretations derived support 
from certain enunciations of these scientists themselves. 
 What can we ultimately make of the dialogist approach? Dropping the 
problematic indispensability of a dialogue partner or social context of addressees for 
any new claim advanced by a scientist, dialogism becomes close to truism. However, 
because of its narrow focus the dialogist analysis, on some instances, becomes close to 
watching Brownian particles under the microscope. One can hardly see how long-term 
commitments unfold and stabilize; to continue the picture, Beller could just notice that 
a sort of phase transition occurred circa 1927 and had to chance the temporal 
magnification of dialogical analysis. In both cases neither philosophical convictions 
nor Lakatosian research programs could be discriminated because, to my mind, they 
require a larger timescale to unfold. On the microscopic scale it is impossible from the 
very beginning to assess the commitments of the German scientist-philosophers and to 
verify whether philosophical positions played a role in their concept of science. This is 
a pity because, to my mind, they acted much more in a dialogical fashion that did the 
classical German philosophical schools, above all neo-Kantianism which by and large 
identified themselves by self-declared adherence to a certain philosophical school. But 
my main point here is that philosophical traditions if not committed to schools emerge 
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from dialogues with opponents and they involve precisely that kind of combination of 
outside self-identification and substantial internal disagreements which Beller found so 
characteristic of the Göttingen-Copenhagen dogma. In particular the Vienna Circle 
combined manifestos, a large series of historical self-identifications, the foundation of 
various projects and institutions which sought to integrate wider circle – from the 
Ernst Mach Society up to the International Congresses for the Unity of Science, the 
Encyclopedia Project, and the various organizations in exile.  
During the last two decades, detailed historiographical investigations into 
Logical Empiricism have uncovered a multitude of diverging voices, unraveled many 
internal strands, and found basic concepts in flux. Examples of explicit dialogues 
abound, among them the discussion with Wittgenstein that lead to a major division of 
the Vienna Circle after 1930 (Cf. Bergmann, 1993), and the protocol sentence debate 
between Carnap and Neurath (Uebel, 1992).45 This diversity stood in strange contrast 
to the party-like unity exhibited in the manifesto (Hahn, Neurath, Carnap, 1929) and 
Neurath’s historiographies of the movement. They felt themselves immersed in a 
hostile milieu dominated by ‘school philosophy’. Due to similar historical scrutiny we 
have meanwhile learned that the Copenhagen interpretation was of the same kind. 
 In its second phase (Chapters 7 & 8) the causality debate represented such an 
internal development. Without hiding their disagreements, in 1936 Schlick and Frank 
nevertheless sought a united stand against misinterpretations of Bohr’s concept of 
complementarity. (See Section 8.7.) Dialogues in these cases were more implicit than 
outspoken. But there were also open polemics, departing from the one between Planck 
and Mach (Section. 3.7.) In a very general sense, so I would claim, the entire 
philosophical debate about genuine indeterminism developed as a sequence of 
dialogues between Vienna and Berlin that extended over roughly two decades. The 
main dialogues will be Planck’s encounters with Mach, Exner and Schrödinger, 
Schlick’s and Frank’s diverging assessment of Mach, the mutually supportive dialogue 
between Frank and von Mises, Schlick’s dialogues with his teacher Planck, Schlick’s 
correspondence with Schrödinger, a group of less prominent encounters between 
Schottky, Nernst, and Petzoldt and between von Laue, Schrödinger, and von Mises. 
Important differences go back to distinct roots, most important the Machian and the 
neo-Kantian heritage which set the initial frontlines in the dialogue about Boltzmann’s 
legacy. Against the alternative between rational legitimation and historical 
contingency, I shall emphasize the stabilizing factor of honest – that is: not rhetoric-
driven – philosophical convictions and spot a forum in which many dialogues took 
place.  
 
                                                          
45 For a comprehensive account see the books of (Haller, 1993) and (Stadler, 2001). 
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3. The First Phase: Mach, Boltzmann, Planck 
 
 
In an interview with Thomas S. Kuhn, Philipp Frank in 1962 recalled his early years at 
the Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna where he had studied under 
Boltzmann, became a Privatdozent in 1909, and taught until his call to Prague in 1912.  
 
Boltzmann once said to me: “You see, it doesn’t make any difference to me if I say all atoms are 
merely pictures. I don’t mind this. I don’t require that they be absolute. I don’t say this. ‘An 
economical description’, Mach said. Maybe the atoms are an economic description. This doesn’t hurt 
me so much. From the viewpoint of the physicist this doesn’t make a difference.” Ludwig Boltzmann 
was rather philosophical about it. He did not require that you believe in the existence of atoms. And 
there wasn’t I would say any opposition from Mach’s viewpoint. The opposition only existed, so to 
say in the philosophical realm. Yes, it did exist there. Also, strange as it was, in Vienna the physicists 
were all followers of Mach and Boltzmann. It wasn’t the case that people would hold any antipathy 
against Boltzmann’s theory because of Mach. And I don’t even think that Mach had any antipathy. At 
least it did not play as important a role as is often thought. I was always interested in the problem, but 
it never occurred to me that because of the theories of Mach one shouldn’t pursue the theories of 
Boltzmann. (quoted from Blackmore/Itagaki/Tanaka, 2001, p. 63) 
 
In a letter to Arthur Eddington written in 1940, Schrödinger gave a similar testimony. 
Schrödinger who was three years younger than Frank had just begun his studies by the 
time of Boltzmann’s death and he stayed at the Institute of Physics as an assistant of 
Franz Serafin Exner until 1920. 
 
Filled with a great admiration of the candid and incorruptible struggle for truth in both of them, we did 
not consider them irreconcilable. Boltzmann’s ideal consisted in forming absolutely clear, almost 
naively clear and detailed ‘pictures’ – mainly in order to be quite sure of avoiding contradictory 
assumptions. Mach’s ideal was the cautious synthesis of observational facts that can, if desired, be 
traced back till the plain, crude sensual perception. … However, we decided for ourselves that these 
were just different methods of attack, and that one was quite permitted to follow one or the other 
provided one did not lose sight of the important principles … of the other one. (quoted from Moore, 
1989, 41) 
 
Quite contrary to this local Viennese synthesis, most German physicists shared Arnold 
Sommerfeld’s 1944 summary of the frontlines on the legendary 1895 Lübeck 
Naturforscherversammlung. 
 
Helm from Dresden gave the report on energetics; behind him stood Wilhelm Ostwald and behind 
both stood the Naturphilosophie of Ernst Mach, who was not present. The opponent was Boltzmann, 
seconded by Felix Klein. The conflict between Boltzmann and Ostwald resembled, both externally and 
internally, the fight between and bull and a subtle fencer. But on this occasion, despite all his 
swordsmanship, the toreador was defeated by the bull. (quoted from Deltete, 1999, p. 56) 
 
Max Planck, who would become the explicit and implicit dialogical counterpart of the 
tradition of Vienna Indeterminism, by then entertained a autonomous position 
emphasizing that both the first and the second law of thermodynamics were 
independent principles which were not reducible to molecular motions. Although his 
discovery of the law of radiation in 1900 chiefly contributed in turning the tide in 
favor of Boltzmann, Planck needed considerable time and intermediate steps to fully 
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reconcile himself with the probabilistic nature of the second law. Ultimately, he would 
do so only after the dialogue with Exner to be studied in Section 4.5., during which he 
still considered molecular disorder as a principle supplementing Boltzmann’s second 
law.46 Contrary to Exner, Planck continued to emphasize that any probabilistic law 
requires a determinist foundation. 
 The first half of the present chapter (Sect. 3.1-3.5) argues that Frank’s and 
Schrödinger’s accounts of the Viennese tradition are basically right. There existed 
important philosophical continuities between Mach and Boltzmann which escaped 
Planck’s attention, presumably because Boltzmann’s philosophy sharpened and 
developed only after the publication of the Lectures on Gas Theory (1896, 1898a). 
Philosophical issues became central to Boltzmann after 1903, when he took over 
Mach’s courses on natural philosophy. Mach had ceased to lecture after his stroke in 
1898 and took early retirement in 1901. But Boltzmann’s philosophical activities only 
led to four publications which were assembled together with earlier papers in the 
Populäre Schriften published in 1905. The effect of Boltzmann’s philosophical ideas 
was thus confined to the closer Viennese context, among them the Exner Circle (See 
Chapter 4), the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna, and those young 
scientists forming the “First Vienna Circle”.  
 Here are Frank’s recollections of Boltzmann’s philosophy lectures; they appear 
in an article investigating “The place of philosophy of science in the curriculum of the 
physics student”. They show an important element by which scientific philosophers 
wanted to go beyond the classical scientist-philosopher. 
 
Scientists who have been teaching the philosophy of science have mostly offered a kind of incoherent 
digest of philosophic opinions. … We meet the eclectic attitude even in the writings of such excellent 
scientists as Jeans of Planck. I remember the lectures of a great physicist, Boltzmann, on the 
philosophy of physics which I attended as a student. Despite the personal greatness of the lecturer, the 
effect of the course was slight, because of a lack of coherent approach. We can notice, on the other 
hand, that scientists who built their books around a central idea have shaped the minds of science 
students for decades. I mention, just as examples, Mach, Poincaré, and Bridgman. (Frank, 1961, p. 
244). 
 
Today’s scholars can access Boltzmann’s notebooks for the philosophy lectures 
(Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990) and his correspondence (Höflechner, 1994).  
John Blackmore, who seems to be somewhat perplexed about Frank’s testimony 
that the Viennese physicists were followers of both Mach and Boltzmann47, has 
recently diagnosed a substantial shift in Boltzmann’s ontological attitude in favor of 
critical realism – by which Blackmore means the position of Arthur Lovejoy – after 
the meetings with Franz Brentano in April 1905. 
 
One can see the apparent changes … by comparing his December 1904 criticism of Brentano’s 
philosophy with his later May to June criticisms. In the earlier period, he attacked concepts and the so-
called a priori as mere words and above all dismissed the value of philosophy itself. But by May and 
                                                          
46 Cf. (Kuhn 1987) for Planck’s piecemeal conversion to Boltzmann. Apart from the Preisschrift, Planck wrote 
on philosophical matters only after 1908. His own interpretation of the 1900 discovery, to wit, that he had 
obtained a new constant of nature, did not significantly change thereafter. Hence the most contested point of 
Kuhn’s book, whether Planck actually thought about a quantum theory from the very beginning, is irrelevant for 
the scope of the present investigation.  
47 (Blackmore 1995a, 133 note 18) asserts “that some caution is in order” because Frank was almost 80 years old 
at the time of the interview.  
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June he had not only changed most of his targets of criticism but begun to classify concepts, develop 
his own a priori theory, and above all his new classification of world views. (Blackmore, 1995b, p. 
171) 
 
To my mind, Blackmore’s investigations remain inconclusive simply due to the sparse 
and often cryptic material in the lecture notes. A very late change of mind is of course 
possible, but I am skeptical especially because Boltzmann had already adapted Mach’s 
epistemology to a justification of his atomism. In a realist setting, Boltzmann’s two-
tired reality criterion (See Sections 3.4. & 3.5.) would make no sense at all. 
 This Chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the basic tenets of 
Mach’s philosophy of science. Sections 3.2 – 3.4 assess how Boltzmann’s thinking 
developed against and departed from the Machian background. Their writings 
embarked onto a dialogue that also involved divergent interpretations of third parties, 
among them Ostwald and Petzoldt. Section 3.5 investigates Boltzmann’s mathematical 
atomism which was the basis of the irreducible indeterminism characteristic of his late 
philosophy. 
Max Planck twice stood in dialogues with Mach, an inner one and a fierce 
polemic. First, Planck’s allegedly Machian Preisschrift on The Principle of 
Conservation of Energy (Planck, 1908b) contained manifold references to Mach’s 
earlier study (Mach, [1872] 1909) and was indebted to his historico-critical method 
(Section 3.6). Second, the open polemics with Mach (Section 3.7) set the stage for 
Planck’s later encounters with the Vienna Indeterminists and they remained a point of 
reference ever since. Planck explicitly charged Mach’s positivism as irreconcilable 
with the progress achieved by Boltzmann’s treatment of the second law of 
thermodynamics. In Section 3.8, I shall deal in more detail with the core tenets of 
Planck’s principle-based methodology and his combination of convergent and 
structural realism. The final Section 3.9. is dedicated to the consequences those 
diverging views had on the three protagonists’ understanding of culture. I shall remain 
very brief here because the objective of this section it only to demonstrate that all three 
actively participated in the ideological and cultural debates of the day; in this respect 
there will be a solid tradition among the Vienna Indeterminists. 
 Boltzmann’s main motivation for embarking onto philosophy was that 
statistical mechanics unearthed foundational problems of that kind which typically 
challenged a scientist-philosopher. Energeticists’ and Mach’s philosophical criticisms 
forced Boltzmann further into this terrain. Most important was the criticism which 
Mach’s Theory of Heat had leveled against Boltzmann in 1896. Boltzmann’s rejoinder 
in the following year asserted that Mach’s “writings on these matters have 
substantially contributed to the clarification of my own world view.” (Boltzmann, 
1905, p. 142/51) The principal thesis of the first half of the present chapter supports 
this allusion. In Boltzmann’s hands, Mach’s views about scientific method proved a 
surprisingly useful tool in defending his brainchild statistical mechanics. Above all, 
Boltzmann supplemented Mach’s approach with a modern conception of physical 
theory, but he remained committed to the empiricist basis and to Mach’s notion of 
causality. And indeed the Machian tools were sharp enough to spot the deep 
ontological cleft between Boltzmann’s main opponents, the energeticists Ostwald and 
Helm, and Mach himself, a cleft which escaped the attention of most German 
physicists. Boltzmann’s transformation of Mach, it appears, paved the way for Franz 
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Serafin Exner’s synthesis of radical empiricism and indeterminism which became the 
local philosophical credo among the Vienna physicists. 
 Does all this mean that the philosopher Boltzmann was just the rhetorical 
consolidation of the atomist Boltzmann? After all, statistical mechanics was a rather 
clumsy theory the foundations of which were buried in Boltzmann’s writings; the 
situation only changed with the encyclopedia article of the Ehrenfests ([1912], 1990). I 
do not think that Boltzmann’s philosophy is exhaustively appraised by such a 
dialogical reading. Admittedly, Boltzmann was not a systematic philosopher, he 
followed no coherent approach and often developed his own views in correspondence 
or by criticizing other philosophers. Nevertheless, the most important themes of his 
philosophy remain constant and his views do not oscillate depending upon the 
addressee. Also Mach’s philosophy, apart from the clear-cut general thrust, contained 
plenty of rough edges, in particular when later editions of Mach’s works assented to 
new results which were hardly reconcilable with the main message of the book. Thus I 
think Boltzmann is a reasonable scientist-philosopher. As we shall see below, some 
philosophical views of his, like the concept of reduction, have a rather modern appeal. 
 Mach’s rank as a philosopher – although he always rejected this classification – 
is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, he is rarely read and his prestige among later 
colleagues strongly depended on the author’s intention. Views range from presenting 
the historico-critical analysis as an indication that Logical Empiricists in their 
European period did not disregard history at all, to equating Mach’s neutral monism 
with what is commonly believed to be Berkeley’s radical idealism; on the latter 
reading, Mach dissolved the world into a flood of directly observable elements – a 
brand of sensualism which can hardly form a basis of modern science. Mach’s 
philosophical legacy within physics was both praised and contested already during the 
last years of his life. His historico-critical investigation of the development of 
mechanics, first published in 1883, earned him great recognition and – other than his 
first pronouncement of these ideas eleven years before (Mach, 1909) – gained 
substantial influence on physics proper when Einstein took Mach’s criticism of the 
basic concepts of mechanics as the starting point of his special theory of relativity. 
Thus far the merit of Mach’s Mechanics remained unchallenged until Planck’s 
polemics against Mach disputed the value of the whole approach for physical science. 
The polemics prompted many German physicists to take Planck’s side, in particular, 
when the number of criticisms against relativity theory by various Machians increased. 
Comments about Mach subsequently either described him as a forefather of relativity 
theory or emphasized that he had achieved no more than the negative part unraveling 
the implicit presuppositions of the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time. It 
was the polemics with Mach that made Planck a widely recognized scientist-
philosopher, and in the years following 1910 he played this part to an increasing 
extent. For instance, both contributions to the physics volume of the encyclopedia Die 
Kultur der Gegenwart (1915a, 1915b) were of a rather philosophical kind. In later 
years, when Planck had become the true successor of Helmholtz as the 
“Reichskanzler” of German physics (Cf. Heilbron, 2000), he took the increasing 
number of public addresses as an occasion to intervene into ethical and religious 
discourses as well. 
 The basic philosophical set-up for the struggles about Boltzmann’s legacy 
statistical mechanics between Vienna and Berlin contains three parts. (i) The starting 
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point are the highly improbable events that were admitted by Boltzmann’s statistical 
derivation of the second law of thermodynamics. (ii) On the basis of a Kantian or neo-
Kantian epistemology causality is intimately linked to empirical realism because to 
qualify as empirically real some thing had to fall under the category of causality 
however relativized. When Mach replaced causality by functional dependences this 
bond was severed, such that – in compensation – an new reality criterion had to be 
sought. More generally this point can be considered as a radically empiricist 
conception of natural law which shifted the burden of proof on the determinist. (iii) 
There existed two theories of probability which accommodated the strange events 
admitted by the second law. In von Kries’s Spielraumtheorie they were integrated into 
a deterministic Kantian universe. In Fechner’s Kollektivmaßlehre there existed 
collective objects (Kollektivgegenstände) and genuinely statistical laws for them; they 
are of no other type than the familiar – apparently deterministic laws. In brief, Vienna 
Indeterminism is characterized by the full acceptance of the improbable events, a 
radically empiricist conception of natural law and ontology, and the frequentist 
interpretation of probability. In this full-blown version, Vienna Indeterminism began 
with Exner and was advocated by Schrödinger (Chapter 6), and Frank and von Mises 
(Chapter 8). But we have to bear in mind that, as outlined in the Introduction, one 
cannot treat this tradition simply as a philosophical school endorsing theses (i)-(iii). 
Physics and the philosophy closely linked to it were too much in flux, such that a more 
historical approach is in order that accommodates a variety of intermediate positions as 
long as the tradition in itself remains clearly visible.  
In this perspective, the main step launching the tradition of Vienna 
Indeterminism was Mach’s separation between causality and realism (ii). The 
empiricist notion of causality as such can well be prolonged back to Fechner48 and 
Hume. After long and painstaking reflections, however, Mach severed the bond with 
Fechner’s realism that had been expressed in the idea of a gravitating planetary atom 
and atomistic conception of electricity. “Mach accordingly has played off the 
psychophysicist and anti-metaphysicist Fechner against the atomist and 
metaphysicist.” (Heidelberger, 1993, p. 213)49 Consequently Mach did not adopt 
Fechner’s irreducible indeterminism and the frequentist interpretation of probability 
that stood at its back. Mach considered determinism as empirically unprovable, but 
still an unavoidable regulative principle. Regarding the highly improbable events, he 
remained neutral because atomism was just a – somewhat problematic – hypothesis to 
explain our familiar sensations of temperature in which the strange events of (i) have 
not yet be seen. Boltzmann, however, utilized Mach’s radical empiricism as the 
epistemological basis to win statistical laws an equal status as compared to the other 
laws of physics. Although his views on probability developed after he had, in passing, 
endorsed von Kries’s interpretation, he never arrived at the frequency interpretation.  
Above and beyond his adaptationist conception of experience and knowledge, 
Mach’s own – apparently modest – reality criterion consisted in the uniqueness and 
approximate stability of facts. While for Mach theories were in first place an 
                                                          
48 Heidelberger (1993, p. 380), for instance, finds this motive in von Mises (1921, 1930); cf. Sect. 8.2. & 8.3. 
49 There is also indirect evidence that Mach’s concept of causality paved the way for indeterminism. Karl 
Pearson to whom The Analysis of Sensations was dedicated based his Grammar of Science on the Machian 
methodological program of careful classification of facts and comparison of their mutual relationships and 
sequences (Cf. Porter, 1994, p. 146f). Denying accordingly the integrity of scientific objects, the prospect that all 
science is fundamentally statistical becomes viable. 
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economically conceptualized and structured inventory of facts, Boltzmann insisted that 
theories must reach beyond the facts already known in order to be testable. Conceived 
ontologically as intuitive and purposive (zweckmäßig) pictures, theories gained a 
certain independence, such that Boltzmann could require of them mathematical 
precision, uniqueness, simplicity and pervasiveness of the underlying mechanisms 
without immediately caring whether they were an economical representation of a 
given fact. But mechanistic or atomistic reduction only amounts to a reality criterion if 
an ontology for these basic entities is specified. Rejecting, as Mach, materialist 
mechanicism, Boltzmann turned to a constructivist account of mathematics that, 
surprisingly, recurred to Mach’s basing mathematics on empirical acts of counting. 
Boltzmann’s indeterminism still suffered from an insufficient theory of probability, 
since earlier or later he had to invoke a priori assumptions to justify probability 
distributions for the atoms within the classical setting. 
Planck, initially rejected all three points of Vienna Indeterminism; after 1914, 
however, he would resign himself to their presence in the physical world view. But he 
never abandoned the position that any probabilistic theory required a determinist 
foundation. One of the core advocates of relativity theory thus remained committed to 
the Kantian set-up as far as causality was concerned. This outlook concerning 
causality was combined with a strong emphasis on universal formal principles, such as 
the Principle of Least Action. They formed the basis of Planck’s reality criterion which 
can be seen as a combination between structural realism as regards the formal 
principles and convergent realism as regards the constants of nature and core objects 
instantiating the principles, such as the metric of space-time. Finally, to Planck the 
distinction between reversible and irreversible processes assumed categorical status 
while for the empiricists Mach and Boltzmann it was just of a relative kind.  
 
3.1. Mach on Economy, Monism, and Causality 
 
In his ‘Leading Thoughts’, Mach condensed his biological-economical theory of 
knowledge into a single slogan: “Adaptation of thoughts to facts and adaptation of 
facts to each other.” (Mach, 1910, p. 226/133f.) This adaptation starts from instinctive 
experiences that make us isolate those features of the world which are of relevance to 
our practical life and imitate them in thought in order to communicate them to others. 
“But, within the short span of a human life and with man’s limited powers of memory, 
any stock of knowledge worthy of the name is unattainable except by the greatest 
economy of thoughts.” (Mach, 1988, p. 501/586)  
 The principle of economy was one of the pillars of Mach’s adaptationist 
epistemology. The many misunderstandings which one can find in the literature are 
not least a consequence of the principle’s opaque and variegated character. Economy 
of thought emerges from three distinct roots: the practical economy of craftsmanship, 
the biological superiority of economically organized forms, and its didactic value. 
While these roots are of a descriptive nature, when it comes to scientific theories Mach 
emphasized the principle’s methodological character calling it a “very clear logical 
ideal” (Ibid., p. 508/594). Yet economy of thought was merely a “teleological and 
provisional leitmotif,” (Ibid., p. 508/594) or – in Kantian wording – a regulative 
principle. It was anything but a determinative principle – comparable to a Kantian 
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category – because Mach constantly emphasized that “there is no result of science 
which in point of principle could not have been found wholly without method.” (Ibid., 
p. 501/586) “Only when the essential point has been found, method can straighten up 
and finish off.” (Mach, 1991, p. 319) This antimethodological tendency in Mach’s 
epistemology escaped Planck’s attention (Cf. Sect. 3.7). 
 Mach’s adaptationist epistemology contained a stark asymmetry between 
experience and theories. Theories never exhaust the manifold of experience and 
constitute merely a most economical representation of scientific facts. This led to a 
rather queer terminology within Mach’s three-stage account of the development of 
science. In a sheer inversion of common usage, The Science of Mechanics talked about 
the ‘principle of the lever’ (instead of ‘law’), while one finds the ‘theorem of least 
action’ – to Helmholtz and Planck the ‘principle’ par excellence.50  
 
But even after we have deduced from the expression for the most elementary facts (the principles) the 
expression for more common and more complex facts (the theorems) and have intuited [erschaut] the 
same elements in all phenomena … [t]he deductive development of science is followed by its formal 
development. Here it is sought to put in an order easy to survey, or a system, the facts to be 
reproduced, such that each can be found and reproduced with the least intellectual effort. (Ibid., p. 
444/516) 
 
How does this intuition which “is the basis of all knowledge” (Mach, 1991, p. 315) 
work? Mach demonstrates how the law of inertia is intuited from the ‘principle of the 
inclined plane’. 
 
Galileo runs his eye over several different uniformly retarded motions, and suddenly picks out from 
among them a uniform, infinitely continued motion, of so peculiar a character that if it occurred by 
itself alone it would certainly be regarded as something altogether different in kind. But a very minute 
variation of the inclination transforms this motion into a finite retarded motion, such as we have 
frequently met with in our lives. And now, no more difficulty is experienced in recognizing the 
identity between all obstacles to motion and retardation by gravity, wherewith the ideal type of 
uninfluenced, infinite, uniform motion is gained. (Mach, 1988, p. 296/335f.) 
 
Mach’s epistemology, accordingly, relies on a principle of continuity that backs this 
method of variation as the basic tool of the scientific enterprise (See below). Intuition 
marks both the beginning and the endpoint of a lengthy adaptive process. On the one 
end, “all so-called axioms are such instinctive experiences” (Mach, 1987, p. 221). The 
impossibility of a perpetuum mobile neatly corresponds to our everyday experiences. 
On the other end, Mach’s historico-critical analyses – in particular the Optics (1921) 
and the Mechanics (1988) – broadly discussed various apparatus – historical and self-
constructed ones – at which the student could intuit the fact in question by varying the 
determining circumstances. The correctness of the law or principle thus intuited “we 
not only see but feel”. (Mach, 1988, p. 339/394) 
 Scientific knowledge is of humble beginnings. Once we have abstracted some 
sufficiently constant elements within our experiences and found some constant 
relations among them, we seek to find a measure and units to numerically tabulate 
these relations and to find a comprehensive rule generating these values. By 
                                                          
50 Admittedly, Mach does not consequently stick to this terminology throughout the book and in Knowledge and 
Error (first published in 1905) he returns to the common use for the abstract ‘principles’. The authorized English 
translation by McCormack uses the word ‘principle’ in all cases. For Helmholtz’s influential view, see (Hecht, 
1994). 
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distinguishing accidental and constant relations we are led to the concepts of cause and 
effect.  
 
 As soon as we can characterize the elements of events by means of measurable quantities, as is 
possible immediately for space and time and by detours for other elements of sense perceptions [e.g. 
heat], the mutual dependence of elements is much more completely and precisely represented by the 
concept of function than by those of cause and effect. (Mach, 1991, p. 278/205)  
 Close analysis almost always reveals that the so-called cause is only the complement of a 
whole complex of conditions [German: Umstände] that determine the so-called effect. (Ibid., p. 
277/204) 
 The law of causality is sufficiently characterized by saying that it presupposes a dependence of 
the phenomena. … The law of causality is identical with the supposition that among the natural 
phenomena α β χ δ … ω there exist certain equations [of the form f(α β χ δ … ω)=0 or an equivalent 
form]. … The existence of changes in nature demonstrates that the number of equations is lesser than 
the number of α β χ δ … ω. (Mach, 1909, p. 35f.) 
 In speaking of cause and effect we arbitrarily give relief to those elements to whose 
connection we have to attend in the reproduction of a fact in which it is important to us. There is no 
cause nor effect in nature; nature has but an individual existence; nature simply is. [Die Natur ist nur 
einmal da.] Recurrences of like cases in which A is always connected with B, that is, like results under 
like circumstances, that is again, the essence of the connection of cause and effect, exist but in the 
abstraction which we perform for the purpose of mentally reproducing the fact. Let a fact become 
familiar, and we no longer require this putting into relief of its connecting marks, … and we cease to 
speak of cause and effect. (Mach, 1988, p. 496/580) 
 
Thus for Mach, talk about cause and effect was just the initial stage in attaining 
scientific knowledge by mentally reproducing the facts in the most economical 
fashion. If we find measurable quantities to represent the elementary experiences, we 
can write down a table of simultaneously measured values. If there exists a functional 
dependence between these elements, this indicates a causal law. While in his 1872 
booklet on The History and Origin of the Theorem of the Conservation of Work (1909) 
this concept of causality was limited to the domain of physics, in The Analysis of 
Sensations it became the basis of Mach’s neutral monism. The first step to acquire 
causal laws is the analysis into elements. 
 
[D]ifferent complexes are found to be made up of common elements. The visible, the audible, the 
tangible, are separated from bodies. The visible is analysed into colors and into form … [and further 
on into] the primary colors, and so forth. The complexes are disintegrated into elements, that is into 
their ultimate component parts, which we have been unable to subdivide any further. The nature of 
these elements need not be discussed at present; it is possible that future investigations may throw 
light on it. We need not here be disturbed by the fact that it is easier for the scientist to study relations 
of relations of these elements than the direct relations between them. (Mach, 1918, p. 4/5f.) 
 
Machian elements are not ultimate, a priori indivisible and irreducible substances, but 
the particular elements of the analysis depend on the stage of scientific research. 
Ultimate elements would have plainly contradicted Mach’s anti-atomism. Moreover, 
even in practical research it is not necessary to reduce scientific assertions to their 
elements; Mach’s point was just that such a reduction remains possible in principle. 
Denoting by the letters A B C the physical elements, by the letters K L M the 
physiological elements of our body, and by the letters α β χ the psychological 
elements, such as volitions or memory-images, we obtain the possibility to 
characterize various complexes through functional relations existing between 
elements.  
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Usually, now, the complex α β χ … K L M …, as making up the ego, is opposed to the complex A B C 
…, as making up the world of physical objects; sometimes also, α β χ… is viewed as ego, and K L M 
… A B C … as world of physical objects. Now, at first blush, A B C appears independent of the ego, 
and opposed to it as a separate existence. But this independence is only relative, and gives way upon 
closer inspection. (Ibid., p. 7/9) 
 
On this basis the contrast between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’, between a stick put half 
into the water and its image, dissolves into simply two facts which represent “different 
combinations of the elements, combinations which are differently conditioned.” (Ibid., 
p. 8/10) What is commonly called a body, or a thing, or the ego are just complexes of a 
sufficient permanency. “As soon as we have perceived that the supposed unities 
‘body’ and ‘ego’ are only makeshifts, designed for provisional orientation and for 
definite practical ends … [t]he antithesis between ego and the world … vanishes.” 
(Ibid., p. 11/14) “The ego is as little absolutely permanent as are bodies.” (p. 3/4) Or 
more bluntly: “The ego is unsalvable [Das Ich ist unrettbar].” (Ibid., p. 20/24) “The 
primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). … The elements constitute 
the ego (I).” (Ibid., p. 21/23) The same holds for bodies. Again Mach did not intend an 
ontological reduction to sensations because the latter are neither atomistic nor 
subjective – in the sense of classical idealism. Functional dependences easily cross the 
woolly border line between the approximately stable complexes we experience as 
‘subject’ and ‘object’. 
 
It is therefore important for us to recognize that in all questions in this connexion, which can be 
intelligibly asked and which can interest us, everything turns on taking into consideration different 
basic variables and different relations of dependence. That is the main point. Nothing will be changed 
in the actual facts of in the functional relations, whether we regard all the data as contents of 
consciousness, or as partially so, or as completely physical. The biological task of science is to provide 
the fully developed human individual with as perfect a means of orienting himself as possible. No 
other scientific ideal can be realized, and it is meaningless. (Ibid., p. 29f./36f.) 
 
Let me recapitulate four points about Mach’s neutral monism. First, the ontological 
basis of everyday experience and science are elements and the functional dependences 
among them. These elements are, however, not universal entities as Boltzmann’s 
atoms but which elements we pick depends upon interest and purpose. One should not 
be misled by the phenomenalist suggestions carried by Mach’s repeated identification 
of elements with suggestions. Mach’s “sensations” are neither mental nor physical. 
Mach and later William James and Bertrand Russell believed that this neutrality was 
tenable, but many other philosophers did not believe so.51 Second, certain complexes 
of functional dependences are sufficiently stable to count as a fact or an object which 
is constituted by facts and the perceptual relations. It may well be that in the course of 
time some elements of the same fact are replaced by others if we investigate the fact 
from a different angle, or guided by different interests. Facts can become rather large, 
in which case we obtain a whole complex of conditions. Third, there is nothing which 
escapes being part in functional dependences; there is no Fichtean pre-reflective ego. 
Fourth, the basis of Mach’s neutral monism and of his whole epistemology is 
biological corroboration, aka survival. For this reason, instinct and naive realism of the 
                                                          
51 Concerning the further development of this conception, see the entry “Neutral Monism” in the Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy penned by Nicholas Griffin. 
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man on the street are more effective, viz. adaptive, than philosophy. After Boltzmann, 
this strong biological orientation disappeared from Vienna Indeterminism and gave 
way to a sociological approach. (See Sect. 8.5.) Let me return to causality and 
determinism more specifically. 
 Mach’s concept of function circumvents the notorious time-series problem of 
classical causality inasmuch “all direct dependences [appear] as mutual and 
simultaneous” (Mach, 1991 p. 279/206). Although Mach stressed that by considering 
chains of simultaneous functional dependences one can describe irreversible and non-
instantaneous processes, the simultaneity of functional dependences excludes any kind 
of irreducible indeterminism for these basic entities themselves. Apart from the 
concept of function, the second part of the researcher’s methodological equipment (Cf. 
Mach 1991, p. 286/210) is the method of variation which is “the basic method of 
thought experiments, as with physical experiments.” (Mach, 1991, p. 191/139) 
Variation is grounded in the principle of continuity which permits to apply the method 
of comparison and to build analogies of different strength. Analogy represents an 
“abstract similarity. Analogy may in some circumstances remain entirely concealed to 
direct sense observation and reveal itself only through a comparison between the 
conceptual interconnections [Beziehungen] of the characteristics of one object with the 
interconnections of the characteristics of the other.” (1991, p. 220/162) Among the 
examples Mach discusses, one can discern three types of analogies: More or less 
instinctive ones as that between the flow of heat and the movement of a substance 
(1987, p. 274) far-reaching and fruitful ones, such as between light and sound on 
which Huygens’s optics is based (1918, p. 372); finally, purely formal ones, such as 
empirically equivalent mathematical expressions. In Mach’s view, analogies act 
heuristically in theory formation as well as for the purpose of communication. But they 
never establish factual identities. Thus, their validity is limited in time, and a hitherto 
fertile analogy can impede scientific progress. The analogy of light and sound, for 
instance, prevented Huygens from discovering diffraction which seems to follow 
naturally from his theory of light. 
 Wholly in accordance with his opponent Planck, Mach considered determinism 
as a regulative principle of the scientific enterprise, but he went on to maintain (in 
contrast to Boltzmann and Planck) that theorizing never exhausts the manifold of facts.  
 
There is no way of proving the correctness of the position of ‘determinism’ or ‘indeterminism’. Only if 
science were complete or demonstrably impossible could we decide such questions. These are 
presuppositions that we bring to the consideration of things. … However, during enquiry every thinker 
is necessarily a theoretical determinist, even if he is concerned with mere probabilities. Jacob 
Bernoulli’s law of large numbers can be derived only on the basis of deterministic presuppositions. … 
The propositions of the calculus of probability hold only when chance events are regularities masked 
by complications. Only then can the mean values obtained for certain time spans make any sense. … 
[But:] No fact of experience repeats itself with absolute accuracy. … Therefore even the extreme 
theoretical determinist must in practice remain an indeterminist, especially if he does not wish to 
speculate away the most important discoveries. (Mach, 1991, p. 282f./208) 
 
Mach’s views on probability were rather traditional and he played down what Fechner 
– to whom Mach was intellectually indebted in so many respects – had accentuated, to 
wit, that changes in the initial conditions are an incessant source of indeterminism. To 
the extent that Mach treated probability as something relative to deterministic 
presuppositions, he agreed with von Kries’s view. Of course, to Mach determinism 
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was only a regulative principle, not a category. Moreover, Mach’s natural laws were 
approximately stable functional dependencies, so that the distinction between 
nomological regularities, the natural laws, and ontological regularities emphasized by 
von Kries’s was blurred. 
Fechner was a realist concerning the existence of gravitating atoms. Mach, on 
the contrary, wanted to avoid any association of his elements with sensual atoms or 
substances. Even on a more general level than explained above, on the level of science 
as a whole, functional dependences constituted the basic elements of Mach’s ontology. 
“One recognizes the relations between condition and conditioned, the equations which 
cover greater or less domains, as the inherent permanency, substantiality, as that 
whose ascertainment makes possible a stable world picture.” (Mach, 1919, p. 431/390)  
 This radically relational ontology had, first of all, consequences for the status of 
scientific theories which Mach conceived as “bringing into parallelism a domain of 
facts with another more familiar domain” (Ibid., p. 461/415), or as an indirect 
description. Examples show even more clearly that Mach, in effect, considered 
theories as a kind of analogy which enable a physical phenomenology that is void of 
hypotheses. Direct descriptions are even free of theories. “Imagine that the ideal of 
complete, direct, conceptual description has been obtained for a domain of facts: we 
can, I think, say truly that this description achieves everything the investigator can 
require.” (Ibid., p. 404/370) So far, there exist only fragments of this goal, “for 
instance, d’Alembert’s (or Lagrange’s) equations which comprise all possible 
dynamical facts, or Fourier’s equations which comprise all conceivable facts of heat 
conduction.” (Ibid., p. 461f./415).  
 In The Science of Mechanics, Mach considered all other theorems of mechanics, 
among them the Principle of Least Action, as versions of d’Alembert’s theorem. 
Hence, they were “new only in form and not in matter.” (Mach, 1988, p. 389/452). 
They constitute rules by means of which problems can be treated “by routine forms” 
(Ibid., p. 325/376) such that only mathematical difficulties remain whereas their 
physical content can always be intuited at a model, such as the equilibrium of strings.  
 Within today’s physical science one could rephrase Mach’s ‘physical 
phenomenology’ as a brand of ‘effective theory’ that fits certain parameters to 
experimental data in order to avoid any specification of an underlying microstructure. 
This strategy derives support from Mach’s definition of a scientific concept as “a 
stimulus to a precisely determined though often complicated, testing, comparing or 
constructing activity.” (Mach, 1919, p. 403/369) Yet, present-day experimentalists’ 
pragmatism is often coupled to naive realism while Mach’s ontology was based on 
functional dependences directly describing a fact.  
In Mach’s works one can discern facts of different size: the ‘principles’ of 
mechanics, effects such an interference or heat conduction, and ‘grand facts’, such as 
d’Alembert’s principle or energy conservation. Facts admit different descriptions. “It 
is the same grand fact” (Mach, 1988, p. 312/356) which is present in Newton’s axioms 
built upon by the concepts force, mass, and momentum, and in Huygens’s ‘sphere of 
ideas’ applying the concepts of work, mass, and vis viva.  
 In the end, Mach’s relational ontology runs into a dilemma. On the one hand, a 
given fact can – depending on our practical purposes – be functionally described in 
various ways that might even have equal economy. On the other hand, Mach excludes 
the reduction to a set of primary qualities – as atomists hold – because this gains an 
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illusory unity at the price of artificial hypotheses. Moreover, functional descriptions 
will ultimately exhaust the fact. Given conventionalism and the ideal of an ultimately 
stable description – though not in a absolute sense –, one accordingly wonders how 
Mach’s epistemology by conceptual adaptation could delimitate and keep together its 
single ‘grand facts’ – and so avoid the pernicious alternatives, that there is either just 
one grand fact, to wit, our entire world, or myriads of small facts the boundaries 
between which are drawn by practical interests only. 
 
3.2 Action Principles, Uniqueness, and Stability 
 
Mach avoided this dilemma by introducing a further ontological principle: uniqueness. 
It acts as a selection criterion for the factual solution among all possible ones. This 
type of reasoning, to Mach’s mind, is expressed in the Principle of Least Action which 
states that the actual dynamics is distinguished among all possible ones by the 
stationarity of the action integral. The set of all possible dynamics is construed in 
terms of variations which necessarily vanish for the dynamics making the integral 
stationary. Let me make this point more precise by first investigating Boltzmann’s 
stand on the Principle of Least Action. My emphasis here lies on the joint relationships 
between variation and uniqueness, on the one hand, and extremality of a quantity and 
stability, on the other hand, rather than on the details of variational principles.52 
 Boltzmann’s first major contribution to physics sought “to give a purely 
analytical, completely general proof of the second law of thermodynamics, as well as 
to discover the theorem in mechanics that corresponds to it.” (Boltzmann, 1866, p. 
195) But he arrived at his goal, the Principle of Least Action, only for a strictly 
periodic system – not quite a generic case in thermodynamics – and he could not give 
any hint for a generalization. Although he would subsequently assign ever increasing 
importance to statistical concepts in understanding the second law, as late as in 1899 
he returned to his old idea – at that time as a vague outlook closing his lectures at 
Clark University. “It turns out that the analogies with the second law are neither 
simply identical to the Principle of Least Action, nor to Hamilton’s Principle, but that 
they are closely related to each of them.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 306) In the second 
volume of his Lectures on the Principles of Mechanics, Boltzmann further elaborated 
on this analogy (1904, §§47-48). This persistent adherence to a rather unfruitful idea 
seems surprising, in particular, if one takes into account Planck’s contention (See 
Section 3.8) that the Principle of Least Action was governing all reversible processes 
in nature while the second law introduced a fundamental irreversibility into physics. 
There are, to my mind, two possible reasons why Boltzmann never gave up this 
unsuccessful idea to bridge a gap which Planck considered as the most fundamental 
one in physics. First, in virtue of their wide range of applicability, Boltzmann might 
have hoped for a suitably generalized extremal principle to do the job. Second, he did 
not consider the distinction between reversible and irreversible processes as 
fundamental. This was a consequence of adopting Mach’s empiricist account of 
natural law. Thus, in a certain sense, this persistent adherence to his 1866 idea is the 
                                                          
52 The Principle of Least Action prompted many philosophical discussions in the period under investigation. 
While Planck and Hilbert cherished its unificatory powers, Logical Empiricists suspected it of illegitimately 
crossing the border between the synthetic and the analytic (See Stöltzner, 2003b). 
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counterpart of the later view of Vienna Indeterminists that reversible processes are just 
idealizations or macroscopic limits of random processes. (Cf. Chapter 4) 
 Boltzmann emphasized that the Principle of Least Action yields all equations of 
motion while energeticists had to add further propositions, such as independent energy 
conservation for each direction in space. Although Boltzmann did not claim that the 
“appearance of equations analogous to the mechanical ones in the theory of heat, 
electricity, and so on” (Boltzmann, 1904, p. 136/257) justified a reduction of these 
fields to hidden mechanical motions, he nevertheless contended: 
 
Only it would certainly be clearer if we could explain not only all phenomena of motion in solid, 
liquid and gaseous bodies but also heat, light, electricity, magnetism, and gravitation by means of the 
idea of motions of material points in space; that is by means of a single unitary principle, instead of 
requiring for each of these agencies a whole inventory of entirely alien concepts like temperature, 
electric charge, potential and so on … (Boltzmann, 1904, p. 137/258)  
 
Mach, instead, did not see any ontological advantage in such a unifying principle, 
although he 
 
admit[s] that it is possible to discover analogies for the Principle of Least Action in the various 
departments without reaching them through the circuitous course of mechanics. I look upon mechanics 
not as the ultimate explanatory foundation of all the other provinces, but rather, owing to its superior 
formal development, as an admirable prototype of such an explanation. (Mach, 1988, p. 406/471) 
 
To Mach, Boltzmann’s 1866 linkage between the Principle of Least Action and the 
second law was initially a surprising result.  
 
Yet there is no reason for being surprised. When once it has been found that quantity of heat behaves 
like vis viva, and thus an analogue of the theorem of vis viva is applicable to it, it is not to be wondered 
at that the remaining mechanical principles (which are not essentially different from this principle) 
may also be applied in the theory of heat. (Mach, 1919, p. 364/334) 
 
Hence, Boltzmann did not discover “a new proof of the mechanical nature of heat.” 
(Ibid.) In view of Boltzmann’s subsequent piecemeal elaboration of the theory against 
the criticisms of Loschmidt and Zermelo, it is surprising that Mach regarded the plan 
of the 1866 paper as already accomplished and merely rejected its interpretation.  
 There are, to my mind, two sources of Mach’s misapprehension. First, similarly 
as the energeticists, Mach considered the Principle of Least Action and energy 
conservation as at bottom equivalently complete descriptions of a mechanical system, 
and he hardly distinguished between variations and differentials. Euler’s precaution in 
‘perfecting’ this analogy is deemed as “singularly timid” (Mach, 1988, p. 457/532). In 
‘A Word from Mathematics to Energetics’, Boltzmann (1905, p. 106) spotted the 
energeticist Helm’s principal fault precisely in this erroneous identification. Second, 
what for Boltzmann represented a unifying theoretical principle of mechanics, for 
Mach and even more for his Berlin ally Joseph Petzoldt was intimately linked to the 
ontological principle of uniqueness. 
 To Mach, the core of the Principle of Least Action lies in variation within a 
system of determining conditions. The feature of minimality present in it only stems 
from its historical origin in the world-view of a materially economical (or 
parsimonious) nature. 
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Notice that the Principle of Least Action, like all other minimum principles in mechanics, do not 
express other than that in the instances in question precisely so much happens as possibly can happen 
under the conditions, or as is determined, viz., uniquely determined by them…[T]he principle of 
unique determination has been better and more perspicuously elucidated than in my case by J. Petzoldt 
in a work entitled Maxima, Minima and Economy…: “In the case of all motions, the paths actually 
traversed can be interpreted as distinguished [German: ausgezeichnete] instances chosen from an 
infinite number of conceivable instances…”…I am in entire accord with Petzoldt when he says: “The 
theorems of Euler and Hamilton, and not less that of Gauss, are thus nothing more than analytic 
expressions for the fact of experience that the phenomena of nature are uniquely determined.” The 
uniqueness of the minimum is decisive. (Mach, 1988, p. 404f./470f.)  
 
In the cited article Petzoldt argued that those curves for which the variation does not 
vanish occur at least pairwise. As this was at bottom a Leibnizian idea, so is its 
philosophical interpretation.53 “Thus one can conceive the Principle of Least Action 
and the related theorems within their domain of validity as analytical expressions for 
the principle of sufficient reason.” (Petzoldt, 1890, p. 216) Pondering that a reversion 
of particle motion would violate the principle of uniqueness, Petzoldt in 1895 even 
concludes that the unidirectionality of physical and physiological processes is closely 
connected to this principle which he declares “the supreme law of nature” (Petzoldt, 
1895, p. 203) although it was not based on positive experience, but represented a 
regulative condition of the possibility of knowledge. Analogously, Ostwald had 
proposed his ‘principle of the distinguished case’ as a generalization of all minimum 
principles. “If there is present an infinite number of possibilities for a process, then 
what actually happens is distinguished among the possible cases.” (Ostwald, 1893, p. 
600) Of course, a “certain difficulty in applying the principle is to find in each case the 
characteristic quantity the variation of which is to vanish.” (Ibid., p. 602) However it is 
philosophically framed, the requirement of uniqueness does not in general suffice for a 
derivation of the equations of motion.  
 In his 1890 paper, Petzoldt set up an even higher barrier against assessing 
Boltzmann’s statistical interpretation of the second law than Mach had ever done when 
approving Boltzmann’s 1866 idea. He argues that Mach’s merely subjective principle 
of economy cannot provide a measure to treat objectively purposive biological 
structures. Instead, Fechner’s global tendency toward stability permits a reconciliation 
of teleology and causality on a general level.54  
 
Purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit] as large as possible is the goal of all development. Thus the 
teleological principle coincides with the principle of tendency toward stability, and the latter mediates 
between the former and the law of causality. This conception, however, signifies a generalization of 
the notion of purpose, since one has to declare all stable states as purposive. (Petzoldt, 1890, p. 226) 
 
In my view, this central role of the principle of stability is a consequence of Petzoldt’s 
and Ostwald’s assumption that the possible worlds really existed. This hypothesis was 
not shared by Mach who had insisted on the individual existence of nature. (See Sect. 
3.1)  
In the Theory of Heat, Mach defends his principle of economy against Petzoldt 
by insisting, firstly, that in physics there “is no choice between the actual happening 
and another. For this reason I have not used the notion of economy in any way in this 
                                                          
53 See (Stöltzner, 2000c). 
54 See (Heidelberger, 1993) for a general account of Mach’s and Petzoldt’s reception of Fechner. 
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domain.” (Mach, 1919, p. 393/360) But Mach does not further insist on this principal 
difference between economy and stability and considers it mainly as a matter of 
terminology. At another place, Mach detects in Petzoldt’s account the danger of 
“falling into a kind of Aristotelian physics by ascribing to organisms a tendency 
toward stability.” (Ibid., p. 382/351)  
Boltzmann had, in passing, expressed similar misgivings about possible world 
arguments. “Nor do I examine whether, as Herr Ostwald holds, the actual world is a 
special case among all possible ones, or whether the latter are just fancy combinations 
of the actual in a slightly modified arrangement.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 131) And in 
the lecture notes, one can find a passage in which Boltzmann rejects any strong form 
of modality. “All that is, is necessary; there is nothing which could be otherwise as 
well.” (Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 161)  
Petzoldt, on his part, even extended the principle of stability to the realm of 
mental phenomena, to aesthetics and ethics. In this way, Mach’s principle of economy 
of thought is changed into an objective cognitive stability. 
 
The economical order of a system of conceptual reactions [Begriffsreactionen] means nothing but such 
an arrangement for which there exists no longer a condition for further change in the relations among 
the single concepts and between them and the complexes of sensations and ideas eliciting them. 
(Petzoldt, 1890, p. 429)  
 
We shall see in Section 3.8. that this daring extension of Machian economy comes 
rather close to Planck’s convergent realism which was based on the ideal of a stable 
physical world view, that is, a stable system of relations between basic physical 
concepts expressed in a few principles. 
 Despite his valid criticisms against Petzoldt, Mach still cherished stability as the 
core of the second law. 
 
It may be mentioned that Boltzmann, presumably without being acquainted with the views just 
mentioned [among them Fechner’s and Petzoldt’s], demonstrated that a physical system when left to 
itself, gradually goes over into “more probable states” and finally into the “most probable state”. 
Closer consideration shows that this “most probable state” is at the same time the most stable. (Mach, 
1919, p. 381/351) 
 
Boltzmann (1905, p. 154/53 n. 9) frankly admitted his ignorance and retorted: 
 
The assertion that a system of very many bodies in motion tends, bar unobservably few exceptions, to 
a state for which a specifiable mathematical expression denoting its probability becomes a maximum 
does seem to me more than the almost tautological statement that the system tends towards the most 
stable state. (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 154/53) 
 
Boltzmann also observed “that all concepts of [thermodynamic] phenomenology are 
derived from quasi-stationary processes and no longer hold good for turbulent 
motion.” (Ibid., p. 148/45) And he kept repeating that far from equilibrium only the 
mechanical approach yielded definitive results. 
 To summarize the above discussions, if general ontological principles, such as 
uniqueness and stability, are employed in the constitution and explanation of facts, 
they are in danger of relapsing into Kantian a priori conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge or at least relativized versions thereof. Petzoldt’s move to reclassify the 
erstwhile synthetic a priori judgments as less suspicious regulative principles was not 
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an unprecedented strategy in those days; thus several neo-Kantians moved from the 
first to the third Critique. Clearly distinguishing minima, maxima, and economy from 
their objective counterparts, uniqueness and stability, Petzoldt still revealed dualistic 
tendencies which Mach, in his need for a reality criterion, partially endorsed. For both 
reasons, Mach’s redefinition of causality in terms of functional dependences could not 
fully thrive. By separating more clearly the facts and the theories – which do not face 
facts instantaneously and one by one – Boltzmann could better avail himself of the 
Machian conception of functional dependences as an ontological basis for physical 
theory. To him, uniqueness was the major requirement imposed upon theory and it 
rendered atomism – on the theoretical level – inevitable. Yet, Boltzmann’s setting 
apart facts and theory created the need for a new reality criterion because, like Mach, 
he rejected any a priori knowledge. In their correspondence about causality, 
Boltzmann puts his finger on Mach’s ontological problems and appeared – in sheer 
inversion to the received view – as the more determined empiricist. This shall concern 
us next. 
 
3.3 Boltzmann on Causality and Probability  
 
On October 1st, 1893, Boltzmann initiated a correspondence with Mach. 
 
Are you still holding that the energy law can be deduced from the principle of causality? 55 … Can you 
prove the impossibility of such a perpetuum mobile from the law of causality alone? I believe that the 
impossibility of the perpetuum mobile is a purely empirical proposition that can be always refuted by 
experience in cases not yet examined. (from Höflechner, 1994, p. II 199) 
 
Unfortunately, all letters by Mach are lost. But in Boltzmann’s letters one finds no 
trace of polemics – just as he had announced in his first letter. In his answer to 
Boltzmann’s inquiry, Mach had apparently invoked his principle of unique 
determination, but Boltzmann did not regard this as conclusive because the functional 
dependences could be more complicated than Mach assumed, so that further 
experience was needed to obtain energy conservation. Moreover, “[t]he law of 
causality does not seem to require that, if there are n equations among m+n 
phenomena, every phenomenon is a unique function of arbitrary m of them.” (Ibid., p. 
II 202) By the end of the month, both agreed that the theorem of energy conservation 
is empirical.  
 Except for the notorious notion of uniqueness, Boltzmann’s ideas about 
causality largely agreed with Mach’s. He replaced cause and effect by functional 
dependences and emphasized that identical conditions never return. Regularity is both 
an experience and a presupposition of scientific research. “[W]e are thus free to denote 
[the law of causality] either as the precondition of all experience or as itself an 
experience we have in conjunction with every other.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 163/75) 
When Mach diagnoses a human ‘desire for causality’, Boltzmann discerns a general 
tendency that our mental habits, among them causality, which have evolved 
throughout the centuries, ‘overshoot the mark’ by still seeking explanation or 
definition of the inexplicable elementary concepts. Boltzmann also found a pictorial 
expression for Mach’s insistence that the value of concepts lies in their making us act 
                                                          
55 Boltzmann refers to (Mach, 1909) and modifies Mach’s example of the tuning fork. 
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successfully: “With the concepts of cause and effect one cannot operate a tramway.” 
(Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 280) Likewise Boltzmann treated the notion of continuum 
(See Sect. 3.5). 
 There are, however, two important differences. First, beyond restating Mach’s 
linkage of functional causality to psychology and sense physiology, Boltzmann 
connects the issue of causality much closer to classical philosophy, in particular to 
Kant’s theory of rationality. All laws of thought are inherited habits of thought that 
have become a priori conditions of knowledge, “but it seems to be no more than a 
logical howler of Kant’s to infer their infallibility in all cases.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 
398/195) In the Kantian antinomies, adaptation overshoots the mark.  
 
Indeed people racked their brains over the question whether cause and effect represent a necessary link 
or merely an accidental sequence, whereas one can sensibly ask only whether a specific phenomenon 
is always linked with a definite group of others, being their necessary consequence, or whether this 
group may at times be absent. (Ibid., p. 354/166) 
 
Second, in a fragment for the lectures, titled “Cause and Effect”, Boltzmann links 
causality to probability.56  
 
Before any experience takes place, both [an accidental sequence or a causal link between phenomena] 
is equally probable. But my repeated experiences render it infinitely improbable that all observed 
regularity would be accidental, and infinitely probable that actual actually takes place. (Fasol-
Boltzmann, 1990, p. 282) 
 
Still at the time of his philosophy lectures, Boltzmann considered probability as degree 
of certainty and he seems to have favored the logical interpretation of Johannes von 
Kries. In his 1886 academy address on the probabilistic character of the second law, 
Boltzmann approvingly quoted von Kries’s seminal book (1886), yet without further 
discussing his approach or mentioning the Spielraum (range) concept (Cf. Boltzmann, 
1905, p. 37/22). As the relevant chapter of Kries’s book titled “On the Application of 
Probability Calculus in Theoretical Physics” was almost exclusively based on 
Boltzmann’s writings, one obtains the impression that Boltzmann was just glad that 
somebody had accomplished the task of providing a philosophical basis to his 
statistical mechanics. Yet Boltzmann was aware that applying logical probability 
requires “that the mechanical conditions of the system are known.” (Boltzmann, 1905, 
p. 37/22) As Martin Klein has shown, prompted by his critics Boltzmann through the 
years made several major changes in his use of the concept of probability, most of 
which were not fully noticed by his readers. The first of them in 1877 led from “a 
theory emphasizing kinetics and based on the special assumptions about collisions 
underlying the Boltzmann equation, to a theory emphasizing combinatorial statistics 
and independent of collision analysis.” (Klein, 1973, p. 84) In a second 
reinterpretation, Boltzmann “took the probability of a distribution to be the fraction of 
any sufficiently long time interval during which one could expect to find the gas 
described by this distribution.” (Ibid., p. 88)57 And he, finally, insisted against Zermelo 
on “the typical or representative character of the Maxwell distribution” (Ibid., p 91) 
within the set of initial conditions.  
                                                          
56 For a more extensive discussion of ‘A5’, see (Blackmore, 1995b), ch. 7. 
57 For a general discussion about Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics, see (Brush, 1990) and (Cercignani, 1998) 
who, unfortunately, repeats the old stereotype of the titans’ war between Boltzmann and Mach. 
 97
 But despite these modifications, developing statistical mechanics as a science of 
its own right that studies “the properties of a complex of very many mechanical 
systems starting from the most varied initial conditions” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 
360/171) was aggravated by obtaining a proper concept of equiprobability. “However, 
this being the fundamental concept, it cannot in turn be derived and must be regarded 
as given.” (Ibid., p. 361/171) On January, 31st, 1906, Boltzmann’s notes for the 
philosophy class read: 
 
Knowledge by the law of causality not in the same way from experience. Source of experience. We 
stand58 under its influence. One seeks probability from a priori probability. [This] only [makes] sense, 
if equally possible cases. Necessarily subjective from our classifications or after known causal law. 
(Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p.145) 
 
To my mind, Boltzmann here argues that in the same way as we necessarily order 
experiences by (functional) causality, we pose equiprobabilities in order to base 
probabilistic laws. Both are achieved either by classifications, e.g. the symmetry of a 
die, or according to already empirically known laws, such as: “We can infer from 
experience that in lotto every move is equally probable.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 163/75) 
To be sure, the Kriesian account combined aprioristic and empiricist elements because 
given the range (Spielraum) of possible outcomes their relative weight was determined 
empirically. Already at the time when he endorsed von Kries’s theory of probability, 
Boltzmann had accepted Mach’s empiricist notion of natural law. The Boltzmann of 
the philosophy notebooks is still further from Kriesian territory when he contemplates 
that there could be “deviations from the principle of energy [conservation], perhaps 
only of the second law, also from the area law, or from the center of mass law.” 
(Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 106) 
But Boltzmann never made the final step to base probability entirely on 
experience, although in a letter to Felix Klein in 1899 he expressed his misgivings 
about Emanuel Czuber’s abstract definition of the object of probability calculus (cf. 
Höflechner, 1994, p. II 318) and paralleled them with his earlier criticisms of “the 
boring and uninformative definitions of number, addition, etc.” (Ibid., p. II 270). 
While in the latter case he calls – citing Mach – number ‘a purely empirical concept’, 
he apparently was not acquainted with Fechner’s relative frequency interpretation of 
probability posthumously published in 1897. Recall that as Fechner and Mach, 
Boltzmann considered the law of causality not as an a priori precondition of 
experience but as a very general empirical fact. Moreover, the relative frequency 
interpretation would fit so neatly to his own definition of statistical mechanics as an 
autonomous science. Thus in effect many piers of the bridge toward this interpretation 
had already been set. The only problem would have been to find the appropriate 
collective objects (Kollektivgegenstände). 
 Why did Boltzmann never read Fechner; not even after Mach had publicly 
criticized his ignorance? Perhaps it was the context of the tendency to stability 
emphasized by Mach and Petzoldt which made such reading unpalatable to 
Boltzmann. And as Boltzmann’s rebuttal of Zermelo’s criticism depended upon the 
existence of a measure on the set of possible initial conditions, the Kriesian notion of 
range (Spielraum) provided an appropriate framework. But one could also argue the 
                                                          
58 Here I cannot make sense from the transcription from Boltzmann’s shorthand other that changing ‘entstehen’ 
(originate, emerge) into ‘stehen’. See (Blackmore, 1905a, p. 169) for a translation of the entire note. 
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other way round. According to Fechner’s, indeterminism arose from the novelty of 
initial conditions, so that even laws of nature may change on a cosmological scale. 
This could have given some philosophical justification for the strange events admitted 
by the second law. As did Mach and all Vienna Indeterminists, Fechner held that it is 
impossible to ultimately decide the conflict between determinism and indeterminism. 
(See Heidelberger, 1993, § 7.1)  
Boltzmann’s ignorance is even more surprising if one takes into account that 
after 1897 the Kollektivmaßlehre was immediately discussed in the literature and that 
it was clearly recognized as an alternative to the Laplacian definition and to von Kries. 
Shortly after Boltzmann’s death, “about 1908 Fechner’s theory of collectives 
apparently was standard knowledge for everyone working on probability theory and 
statistics in the German-speaking area.” (Ibid., p. 376) Thus matters remain puzzling. I 
think that Michael Heidelberger is quite right that Fechner’s thoughts about probability 
were too much embedded into his general and often hermetic outlook to be quickly 
accessible for someone who was – in stark contrast to Mach – unfamiliar with their 
philosophical context.59 Major support for this conclusion derives from the fact that 
Franz Exner, who was familiar with Fechner’s writings, quickly accomplished the 
missing step towards the relative frequency interpretation and subsequently turned 
Boltzmann’s second law it into a rather comprehensive world view. (See Sect. 4.1.) 
 Boltzmann himself, however, both having rejected Mach’s principle of unique 
determination and ignoring Fechner’s collectives had to find an ontology for statistical 
mechanics in another way. 
 
3.4. Theory Reduction, Pictures, and Ontology 
 
Comparing atomism and phenomenology, Boltzmann was at pains to distinguish his 
main opponents, energeticists, from Kirchhoff and Hertz’s mathematical and Mach’s 
general phenomenology. In 1897 he contrasted atomism to mathematical 
phenomenology and to energeticist phenomenology emphasizing that the first two 
agree to the extent that “differential equations … are evidently nothing but rules for 
forming and combining numbers and geometrical concepts, and these are in turn 
nothing but mental pictures.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 142/42) He subsequently advanced 
the constructivist argument to be discussed in Section 3.5. Two years later, he deemed 
energetics a relapse into metaphysics and distinguished it from phenomenology which 
he now divided into a mathematical and a general branch. General phenomenology 
was characterized by a dictum of Mach, who before had been listed as a mathematical 
phenomenologist: “electricity is nothing but the sum of all experiences that we have 
had in this field and still hope to have.” (Ibid., 221/95) After the pattern of Hertz’s 
Principles of Mechanics (1894), mathematical phenomenology follows a modified and 
reinterpreted Euclidean approach. Instead of positing a priori self-evident axioms, the 
axioms are justified only by comparing the laws derived from them with experience.  
                                                          
59 Michael Heidelberger, private communication. Indeed both contexts of Fechner’s indeterminism listed in 
(Heidelberger 1993, 338-353), “Freedom and Physiology” and “Epigenesis and Philosophy of History”, were 
quite extraneous for Boltzmann. His preparatory notes for the philosophy lectures do not mention Fechner either, 
cf. (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 13). 
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 In his lectures at Clark University delivered in the same year, Boltzmann 
compared the deductive and the inductive approach in mechanics. 
 
Since the deductive method does not constantly mix external experience forced on us with internal 
pictures arbitrarily chosen by us, this is much the easiest way of developing these pictures clearly and 
consistently. For it is one of the most important requirements that the pictures be perfectly clear. … 
There is not the slightest proof that one might not excogitate other pictures equally congruent with 
experience. This seems to be a mistake but is perhaps an advantage at least for those who hold the 
above-mentioned view [of theories as pictures]. … However, it is a genuine mistake of the deductive 
method that it leaves invisible the path on which the picture in question was reached. (Ibid., p. 
262/107f.) 
 
Bringing forward Mach’s historical-critical method against Hertz’s approach is not the 
main reason why Boltzmann pursued a different route. Granting the superb simplicity 
of Hertz’s concrete pictures, he nevertheless considered them as a program for the far 
future. “For the time being, however, alongside Hertzian ones we shall not be able to 
forgo simple and directly useful pictures that can be worked out in detail.” (Ibid., p. 
269/113) This is the reason why Boltzmann’s Lectures, in formulating the general 
equations of motion, prefer to “start from action at a distance and only later to deduce 
Hamilton’s principle.” (Boltzmann, 1897, p. 24/241) Boltzmann repeatedly credited 
Hertz for the picture conception of scientific theory, but he rejected Hertz’s “demand 
that the pictures we construct for ourselves must obey the laws of thought” 
(Boltzmann, 1905, p. 258/104). This was too Kantian a requirement for Boltzmann’s 
pictures because the habits of thought were only acquired in a biological adaptation 
process.60 
 In the second and third Clark University lectures Boltzmann confronted his 
students with a genuinely inductive presentation “by starting directly from the facts as 
they present themselves to unprejudiced observation, letting the pictures grow 
gradually from these facts and introducing each abstraction only when there is no way 
left of avoiding it.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 270/114) Maintaining such purism proved 
difficult and it rendered Boltzmann’s sketch extremely clumsy. No wonder that the 
comparison in actu resulted in favor of the deductive mode of presentation. In 
particular, “only in the possibility of an exact presentation of all special cases possible 
the clarity and consistency of the pictures can be tested.” (Ibid., p. 301) In contrast, 
Mach’s inductive approach directed attention only to few special cases, the historically 
relevant standard models, and despite his critical investigation of alternative routes he 
did not fully assess the mathematical universality of the principles.  
 Boltzmann also set Machian phenomenology far apart from energeticist 
substantialism.61  
 
[A]s regards Ostwald’s energetics, I think it rests merely on a misunderstanding of Mach’s ideas. 
Mach pointed out that we are only given the law-like course of our sense impressions and ideas, 
whereas all physical magnitudes, atoms, molecules, forces, energies and so on are mere concepts for 
the economical representation and illustration of these law-like relations of our sense impressions and 
ideas. The last are thus the only thing that exists in the first instance, physical concepts being merely 
mental additions of our own. Ostwald understood only one half of this proposition, namely that atoms 
                                                          
60 See also (D’Agostini, 1990). 
61 Robert Deltete (1999) has recently argued that Georg Helm, who was Boltzmann’s opponent on the 1895 
Naturforscherversammlung, did not substantialize energy. 
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did not exist; at once he asked: what then does exist? To this his answer was that it was energy that 
existed. In my view this answer is quite opposed to Mach’s outlook. (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 368/175f.) 
 
In his attempted ‘reconciliation’ between mechanical and phenomenological physics, 
Mach had advanced a similar argument against Boltzmann’s pictorial atomism which 
he considered as ‘not altogether chivalrous’ because of the “fearful earnestness and 
naiveté [in which] these ideas were taken by the great majority of distinguished 
investigators.” (Mach, 1919, p. 363/334).  
 Boltzmann emphasized “that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely correct 
theory but rather a picture that is as simple as possible and that represents phenomena 
as accurately as possible” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 216/91) – a demand that could be 
fulfilled equally well by two theories. Already in 1873 he had praised Maxwell’s 
electrodynamics,  
 
partially because he starts from precisely determined assumptions and proves with mathematical 
acuteness that all magneto-electrical interactions can be explained from them, partly because this 
theory yields some consequences which still await confirmation by experiment and can thus serve as a 
touchstone for their correctness and the admissibility of this view. The other theories only reach as far 
as the phenomena are known, but not beyond that. (Ibid., p. 11) 
 
Beyond what one could call, in Lakatosian terms, the theory’s excess content, 
Boltzmann insisted that “without any hypothetical features one could never go beyond 
an unsimplified memory mark for each separate phenomenon.” (Boltzmann, 1897, p. 
2/225) Already differential equations expressing the functional dependences “are 
nothing more than rules for constructing alien mental pictures, namely series of 
numbers.” (Ibid., p. 3/226) Establishing Machian ‘grand facts’ is illusory since “of a 
comprehensive area of fact we can never have a direct description but always a mental 
picture.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 142/42) Hence, no reasonable unification can be 
achieved without conceptual simplification and the construction of basic universal 
pictures.  
 To Boltzmann’s mind, atomism has most closely approached 
phenomenologists’ ideal of finding a set of a universally valid equations. To Mach’s 
mind, however, theories were rather an economical ‘scaffolding’ for construing the 
functional dependences. Thus the difference between Mach and Boltzmann did not 
only lie in the hypothetical character of theories – which Mach stressed by far stronger 
than Boltzmann – but also in the systematic structure and conceptual purity which 
distinguished a theoretical system from an economically well-ordered catalogue.62 
There has to be a certain hierarchy in such a system according to which a successful 
explanation consists in the reduction to a few basic universal concepts that make 
possible a unified picture of physical phenomena.  
 What is the philosophical status of such a picture realism, in particular, as 
regards the most basic entities? The rich literature on this topic is far from an 
agreement.63 While Erwin Hiebert considers Boltzmann as both a philosophical 
                                                          
62 As a matter of fact, Einstein judged that Mach had only provided “a catalogue, but not a system” which should 
be built upon a few simple principles. See Société française de Philosophie (ed.): Comptes rendus des séances du 
6 avril 1922; quoted according to (Wolters, 1987, p. 109). 
63 The conception of theories as pictures is often described in the literature; a particular focus is to what extent 
Boltzmann’s views were indebted to Hertz and which traces of it in Wittgenstein’s thinking. See among others 
(Hiebert, 1980), (Curd, 1978), (D’Agostini, 1990), (de Regt, 1996 & 1999), (Wilson, 1989). 
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idealist and “pragmatic realist” (1980, p. 181), Henk de Regt calls for distinguishing 
the realist on the ontological level, the advocate of a picture theory on the 
epistemological level, and a scientist who “endorsed realism on the methodological 
level.” (De Regt, 1996, p. 42) Boltzmann indeed held that by recognizing processes 
independent of our thoughts and volitions, “we first obtain the concept of objective 
existence as something independent of momentary memory.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 
172/64) To my mind, one should be careful in drawing ontological consequences. As 
we shall see below, the 1897 paper ‘On the Question of the Objective Existence of 
Processes in Inanimate Nature’ quickly takes a strongly pragmatist tack by making a 
linguistic turn. In a later paper, de Regt distinguishes between the epistemological or 
representative role of pictures, to wit, the theory acting as analogy, and the 
methodological role of pictures, the employment of “specific mechanical analogies in 
order to obtain visualizations.” (De Regt, 1999, p. 116)  
Boltzmann’s concept of reduction to universal entities can thus be seen as an 
attempt to go beyond description in the sense of Mach and Kirchhoff and work out a 
concept of scientific explanation. And indeed we read at the beginning of his Viennese 
inaugural lecture: “It is the ubiquitous task of science to explain the more complex in 
terms of the simpler, or, if preferred, to represent [anschaulich darzustellen] the 
complex by means of clear pictures [Bilder] borrowed from the sphere of simpler 
phenomena.” (1905, p. 334/149) To Boltzmann’s mind, mechanical pictures are the 
simplest and most intuitive ones because they closely correspond to a successful mode 
of action. Thus instead of a realist preference of mechanicism we find Mach’s 
biological corroboration at work. “What, then, is meant by having perfectly correct 
understanding of a mechanism? Everybody knows that the practical criterion for this 
consists in being able to handle it correctly. However, I go further and assert that this 
is the only tenable definition of understanding a mechanism.” (Ibid., p. 335/150) This 
is the first pragmatist argument for the methodological superiority of a realist view on 
atomism. 
 The second one emerges from Boltzmann’s linguistic turn. Emphasizing the 
objectivity gained by learning a language, he ultimately considered “the realist mode 
of expression more purposive [zweckmäßig] than the idealist one.” (Boltzmann, 1905, 
p. 186/75) This choice is not a metaphysical commitment because “the simplest 
preconditions of all experience and the laws of thought one can, I think at best 
describe. Once admit this and all contradictions vanish that one previously met in the 
attempt to answer certain questions,” (Ibid., p, 186f./75) to wit, the paradoxes of 
classical metaphysics. It has been observed64 that this argument is a forerunner to what 
among Logical Empiricists became a pretty standard way to purge our thinking from 
metaphysics. Rather than taking their verificationist route, Boltzmann himself set out 
from an individual version of what Mach would call a direct description. “Our world 
picture would be ideally perfect if for each of our sensations we had a sign and a rule 
by which to construct from these signs the occurrence of all our future sensations and 
the way they depend on our volitions.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 166/59) But such a 
conception would be unable to transcend the limits of a given individual and to give 
any clue about what today is called the ‘problem of other minds’. 
 
                                                          
64 Blackmore (1995b) even speaks about Boltzmann’s ‘linguistic philosophy’; see also (Visser, 1999). 
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If … one believes to have proved that matter is merely the expression of certain equations between 
complexes of sensations [Empfindungen], so that the assertion that matter exists in the same way as 
our sensations exceeds our task of merely describing the phenomena, it would be well to remember 
that this would be proving too much; for in that event the sensations and volitions of all others could 
not be on the same level as the sensations of the observer, but would have to be taken as merely 
expressing equations between his own sensations. (Ibid., p.168/61) 
 
Boltzmann’s target is a still wide-spread misreading of Mach’s neutral monism which 
rests upon the dualist assumption that the subject is already constituted as an 
independent entity. It stood at the back of Planck’s attacks (See Section 3.7). But 
Mach approached the problem of other minds by us recognizing the analogy of certain 
characteristics of our own experiences, or sensations, and behavior with similar 
characteristics of other individuals. Rather than emphasizing the biological 
perspective, Boltzmann gave this insight a linguistic turn. 
 
The question whether the unicorn or the planet Vulcan exists in the sense in which the stag or the 
planet Mars exists has naturally a quite definitive sense, which is clear from our empirically known 
relation to the second two items. If, however, someone were to assert that only his sensations existed, 
whereas those of all others were merely the expression in his thinking organ [Denkorgane] of certain 
equations between certain of his sensations (let us call him an ideologist), we should first have to ask 
what sense he gives to this and whether he expresses this sense in an appropriate [zweckmäßig] way. 
Evidently he would still have to denote alien sensations with the same signs analogously arrayed with 
which he denotes his own; subjectively it would be indifferent to him whether he said that those 
sensations belonged to others who exist or to others whom he imagines, since for him others are only 
imagined. But since we use the verb ‘not to exist’ when we find that expectations expressed by certain 
mental signs are not confirmed by experience …, it would be inappropriate [unzweckmäßig] to say that 
all others, save the person here thinking, did not exist. (1905, p. 168/61) 
 
Thus the notorious problems of the absolute reality of the Ego, of the external world, 
and of other minds are meaningless insofar as the empirical notion of existence cannot 
be appropriately applied to it. But on the other hand, language acts as an objectifying 
factor which stabilizes the Machian functional dependences – the ‘equations’ in 
Boltzmann’s wording. “Language must use … terminology that is equally appropriate 
for all persons, ‘we must adopt the objective point of view’.” (Ibid., p. 173/64)  
Boltzmann was aware of the fact that the manifold of newly discovered types of 
radiation and radioactivity fortified his atomist position because he did not consider 
invariability and indivisibility as essential features of atoms.65 In this respect, the 
domain of validity of the atomistic hypothesis could be extended. 
 
[T]he ray of hope for a non-mechanical explanation of nature came … from an atomic theory that in 
its fantastic hypotheses surpasses the old atomic theory as much as their elementary structures surpass 
in smallness those of the old atoms. I need not mention that I mean the modern theory of electrons. 
(Boltzmann, 1904, p. 138/259) 
 
Boltzmann’s mature atomism did not aim at a mechanical reduction of physics, but 
involved a reduction argument that, in modern terms, can be considered as a type of 
theory reduction. Making this point more precise will help to understand his rather 
surprising ‘proof’ of atomism from the consistency of the differential quotient d/dt and 
it will also help us getting hands on Boltzmann’s reality criterion. 
                                                          
65 See (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 150/52 & 357f./168f.). 
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 Although Boltzmann agreed with Mach that science starts with instinctive 
experiences, he did not extend the principle of continuity to the level of theories. Their 
development is “full of discontinuities.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 201/79) Thus physical 
theory – in particular if it proceeds deductively – is free to choose the most purposive 
basic concepts as long as they are well-defined and the theory agrees with experience. 
In this way, atoms are defined by ascribing to them properties necessary to describe a 
certain domain of facts in such a way that the picture tentatively reaches beyond them. 
“Obviously all properties of bodies that do not arise simply from the joint action of the 
large number of elements must be ascribed to the elements themselves; there is no 
other way of obtaining a picture of extended and apparently continuous bodies having 
these properties.” (Ibid., p.160/56) In modern terms, Boltzmann’s atomism can be 
described as theory reduction to (hypothetical) universal pictures and their 
interactions. In his philosophy lectures, Boltzmann discussed the following example 
which goes back to the mathematician Georg (Jurij) von Vega (1754-1802). 
 
 
 
In classical point mechanics the gravitational -1/r potential becomes singular at the 
origin r=0. Thus, within celestial mechanics one cannot predict whether a point 
particle moving on a head-on orbit to the origin is reflected by the singularity or goes 
right through it. Boltzmann studies two possible approaches to this problem which 
represents an obvious failure of the principle of unique determination in Newtonian 
mechanics. If we suppose (Fig.1) that the pointlike planet A moves on an extremely 
eccentric orbit around the pointlike sun S and pass to the limit, then we obtain that the 
planet is reflected. If, on the other hand, we suppose A already on the head-on orbit 
(Fig.2), but suspend the gravitational force within a very small but finite sphere around 
S, then the planet goes through S and reaches the point B. If we do not choose either 
limiting procedure and stick to the notion of actual infinity, viz. to the continuum, we 
are left with a paradox.  
 Today one resolves this ambiguity by performing the classical limit of the 
corresponding quantum mechanical time evolution. This yields reflection.66 Also 
Boltzmann’s original conclusion referred to a more fundamental discrete empirical 
theory, to wit, mathematics. 
 
We must consider it [matter] to be composed out of a finite number of discrete [material] points, if we 
are to be capable of drawing reliable inferences. We can let the number of points grow enormously, 
yet the inferences always stay unique. But if we think it actually as a continuum, then we get into set 
                                                          
66 See the example in (Thirring, 1995). 
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theory; every minute we reach places where we cannot infer uniquely, and the purpose of thinking is 
just to infer uniquely everywhere.…That is in fact the proof for the atomistic constitution of matter 
expressed in our philosophical language. (Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 200) 
 
 
3.5 Mathematical Atomism and Constructivism 
 
Boltzmann’s qualms about the continuum even concern the mathematical structure of 
dynamics. 
 
For my feeling there is still a certain lack of clarity in the differential quotients with respect to time. 
Except for the few cases where one can find an analytic function that has exactly the prescribed 
differential quotients with respect to time, then in order to set up a numerical picture, one will always 
have to imagine time as divided into a finite number of parts before one proceeds to the limit. Perhaps 
our formulae are only very closely approximate expressions for average values that can be constructed 
from much finer elements and are not differentiable in a strict sense. As to that, however, there are so 
far no indications from experience. (Boltzmann, 1897, p. 26f. /243f.) 
 
Since, to Boltzmann’s mind, a consistent definition of the differential quotients 
requires a limiting procedure, he calls “differential equations merely symbols for 
atomistic conceptions.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 145/44) Recalling his conception of 
physical atomism cited above, one wonders to which ‘mathematical’ atoms and their 
interactions the macroscopically observable properties should be ascribed. In 
Boltzmann’s writings I find four different though not mutually independent answers.  
 First, he considered heat conduction and electrodynamics as atomistic theories 
because their ‘conceptual objects’ are “dependent only on the immediate 
neighborhood.” (Ibid., p. 146/51) Phrased in modern terms, atomism is already 
suggested by local interactions while mechanics was based on action-at-a-distance.  
 Second, “we are also aware of examples of very rapid oscillations and cannot 
prove exactly whether in certain cases there might not be motions, such as the thermal 
motion of molecules, that are better represented by a some kind of Weierstraß function 
than by a differentiable one.” (Ibid., p. 283/123f.) Boltzmann (1898b) also 
contemplated whether the H-curve was a non-differentiable function.67 In the 
discussion following a lecture of Klein in the Philosophical Society of the University 
of Vienna in October 1905, Boltzmann even considered Weierstraß functions as a 
typical feature of practical measurement. 
 
It is noteworthy that those non-differential curves enjoy a certain similarity with those of practical 
physics as recorded registering devices which, for instance, picture the change of temperature during 
one day. If one takes a very precise registering device the spring flickers up and down and yields a 
curve which is not altogether continuous. (Boltzmann, 1906, p. 9) 
 
 Third, Boltzmann’s ideas about a discontinuous dynamics were based on his 
assumptions about the atomistic nature of time that lapses like the pictures in a 
cinematograph (Cf. Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 105). In a letter to Brentano68, 
Boltzmann even estimated the number of atoms in a second as 101010
10
– a number 
                                                          
67 See also his correspondence with Felix Klein (Höflechner, 1994, p. II 277-280). 
68 See (Höflechner, 1994, p. II 384) and (Blackmore, 1995a, p. 125). 
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which grossly exceeds its counterpart for matter, the number of atoms in a gram 
molecule 6⋅1023 named after Loschmidt and Avogadro. “The number of points of time 
can be made so great that the probability becomes great that a very improbable 
condition can occur in the whole world.” (Ibid., p. 282f.) Thus, in the (presumably 
finite) Universe there could be regions in which the entropy decreases and time flows 
backward. And thus the “force law must differ in time depending on whether one 
proceeds in time in one or another direction.” (Ibid., p. 283) This cosmological idea 
was another characteristic of the local Viennese tradition; it attracted criticism from 
the other side of the aisle. (Cf. Sections 3.7. and 5.5.2.) 
 Fourth, space and time are still not at the most fundamental level because 
atomism is only our mental picture of reality. To attain an ontology for the basic 
concepts a physical theory is reduced to, Boltzmann develops a constructivist reality 
criterion that replaced Mach’s intuition of sufficiently stable complexes of functional 
dependences among the determining elements. It involved the empiricist foundations 
of mathematics. 
 
Space and time are continuous. Our pictures, numbers in first place are discontinuous. Matter is 
continuous, our pictures, atoms in first place are discontinuous because we cannot think infinitely, but 
nature can do it. (Ibid., p. 106)  
 
Mach and Boltzmann insisted against Kant that space and time were not based on a 
priori pure intuitions, but abstracted from experience. But while Mach based space and 
time in our physiological organization (Cf. Mach, 1991), Boltzmann emphasized that 
“space [and also time] has been construed by means of the concept of number alone, 
without any help from intuition.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 388/187) Assenting to Felix 
Klein’s criticism of the Kantian concepts of space and time, he bluntly asserted: 
“Intuition does not prove anything. Intuition just repeats what we have sensually 
perceived.” (Boltzmann, 1906, p. 9) In his philosophy lectures, he even elucidated the 
concept of a manifold by a non-Euclidean color space in order not to bias the 
foundations of geometry by our common intuitive experiences. Numbers, however, are 
empirical concepts themselves. In his letter to Klein and in the lectures, Boltzmann 
approved Mach’s definition of number.69 
 
Numbers are also names. Numbers would never have originated had we possessed the capability of 
picturing with absolute distinctness to ourselves the members of an arbitrary set of like objects as 
different. We count where we desire to record the distinction between similar things; i.e., we assign to 
each of the like things a name, a distinguishing sign. (Mach, 1919, p. 67/69) 
 
I regard the propositions of arithmetic to have been reached by [inner] experience. … I long ago 
characterized mathematics as economically ordered experience of counting, made ready for immediate 
use, the purpose of which is to replace direct counting…by operations previously performed. (Ibid., p. 
68/70) 
 
On this basis, Mach considered the continuum as a ‘convenient fiction’ and rejected 
Boltzmann’s mathematical atomism. The latter, however, played again the part of the 
firm empiricist and rejected all kinds of absolute truths. “The concepts of differential 
and integral calculus divorced from any atomist notions are typically metaphysical, if 
                                                          
69 See (Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, p. 159) and (Höflechner, 1994, p. II 270). Boltzmann’s philosophy has recently 
been the object of several investigations: (Tanaka, 1999), (De Courtenay, 2002), (Wilholt, 2002). 
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following an apposite definition of Mach we mean by this the kind of notion of which 
we have forgotten how we obtained it,” (Boltzmann, 1905, p.160/56) to wit, by 
starting from finitary operations and passing to the limit.  
 In modern terms, Boltzmann’s mathematical atomism appears as 
constructivism, however with significant qualifications. He accepts actual infinities in 
pure mathematics or geometry, and, albeit ‘suspecting’ the principle of the excluded 
middle of entailing an inconsistency under certain circumstances, he nonetheless 
considers it ‘convincing’ for number theory – but not for the liar paradox that 
‘overshoots the mark’. Similarly, complete induction is justified by the fact that this 
‘whole mechanism’ has so far held true in all mathematical experiences.70 Boltzmann 
naturalizes these mechanisms and considers “the brain as an apparatus or organ for 
producing world pictures” and speaks of a “mechanism that has developed in the 
human brain.” (both Boltzmann, 1905, p. 179/69) He even imagines the representation 
of psychic phenomena by a machine. In the end, an atomistic or mechanistic (but non-
mechanical) theory of our laws of thought makes the constructivist reality criterion 
converge to the reduction criterion by singling out the basic entities of a universal 
theory. As Alois Höfler who had led so many discussions with Boltzmann in his 
Philosophical Society, would remark in his obituary: “Boltzmann was atomist until the 
impossible.” (Höfler, 1906, p. 2) This sigh could have easily been echoed by Max 
Planck who shared Höfler’s Kantian background and thus rejected any physicalist 
reduction of ethics and religion. (See Sect. 3.9.) 
 
3.6. How Machian Was the Early Planck? 
 
The relationship between Mach’s positivism and Boltzmann’s atomism provides the 
background of and, perhaps, the motivation for the polemic which Planck launched 
against Mach in December 1908. Planck’s attacks surprise by their harshness, in 
particular, because in subsequent years he would hardly mention the names of those he 
criticized – see his protests against Exner’s irreducible indeterminism (Sect. 4.5.) or 
against Pascual Jordan’s basing free will upon quantum theory (Planck, 1936). 
Although in letters to Wien and von Laue, Planck denied any intention to “wound a 
worthy old man”, he believed “to owe it to his convictions.” (Cf. Thiele, 1968) 
Heilbron rightly wonders “how Planck believed that his answer would not wound 
Mach.” In the rejoinder “Planck’s inner compulsion pushed him over the limits then 
allowable in philosophical combat.” (All Heilbron, 2000, p. 55) And Planck continued 
his inner dialogue with Mach’s positivism throughout the years in all papers dedicated 
to philosophical questions; and thus he shaped the image of Machian positivism 
among German physicists. 
 
The exchange with Mach gave Planck the status of a philosopher. To him it did not represent a 
promotion: philosophy, he said, was arbitrary, and every man was entitled to choose his own; science 
was “obligatory”, the same for all mankind, and more important in proportion to its large constituency. 
But his new status promoted him in others’ opinion and opened a wide field of activity. “People 
complain” wrote theologian Harnack, “that our generation has no philosopher. Unjustly, they now 
belong to other faculties. Their names are Max Planck and Albert Einstein.” (Ibid., p. 59f. using a 
letter from Planck to Harnack from 1914 and a statement of Harnack made in 1911). 
                                                          
70 Cf. (Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, pp. 167-171). 
 107
 
To be sure, theologian Harnack was not the standard representative of the 
Geisteswissenschaften of the day. In 1913 he became the founding president of the 
Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft and thus the head of several newly founded research 
institutes for basic and applied science.  
 The ardor of Planck’s criticism is often linked to three factors: his final 
conversion to Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics which, according to Kuhn (1987), 
occurred at about this time; Planck’s initial sympathy for Mach’s philosophy which 
proved an impediment for his own research; and more vaguely, Boltzmann’s tragic 
death in 1906, that is, about the time when radioactivity and black-body radiation were 
beginning to turn the tide in favor of atomism.  
 Planck’s personal relationship to Boltzmann, to be sure, never was an easy one. 
Ernst Zermelo whose recurrence paradox had sparked a heavy polemic against 
Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics in 1896-1897 was Planck’s assistant and, in a 
somewhat mitigated tone, Planck supported Zermelo’s view. In the following year also 
Planck himself had a short confrontation with Boltzmann. It concerned irreversible 
radiation phenomena and took place in the Berlin Sitzungsberichte of 1898; Boltzmann 
showed that Planck’s reasoning had been too general. Boltzmann’s correspondence 
with Klein (Cf. Höflechner, 1994, p. II 279-281) reveals that he took the matter rather 
seriously until Planck published Boltzmann’s rejoinder. Boltzmann commented to 
Klein that “as regards uprightness and fairness he [Planck] has grown in my opinion.” 
(Ibid., p. 281) But their relation never became an easy one. After Boltzmann’s death 
the University of Vienna made an offer to Planck to succeed Boltzmann, but Planck 
decided to remain in Berlin. 
 In his Scientific Autobiography written early in 1945, Planck describes their 
complex relationship. The passage quoted here contains pieces which Planck had 
already published in 1933 in a paper dedicated to “The Origin and Impact of Scientific 
Ideas”, such that his frustration is not just an 86 year old man’s regret. Right before the 
passage quoted here Planck sketched how energeticists compared the transition 
between two temperatures with the raising and lowering of a weight. On this account, 
endorsed by Mach as well, the second law could be derived without any reference to 
irreversibility and, as there existed only differences of temperatures, there was no 
absolute zero either. To Planck, the difference between reversible and irreversible 
physics was fundamental to all physics. 
 
It is among the most painful experiences of my scientific life that I succeeded only rarely or yet, I am 
inclined to say, never in winning general approval for a new assertion for the correctness of which I 
could provide an entirely cogent but only theoretical proof. Thus happened also here [as regards the 
irreversible character of the second law of thermodynamics]. No one listened to all my good reasons. 
There was simply no way to prevail against the authority of men like W. Ostwald, G. Helm, and E. 
Mach. To be sure, I was entirely certain that my claim of a fundamental difference between heat 
conduction and the falling of a weight would ultimately prove to be correct. But it was annoying that I 
did not have the satisfaction that my assertion had prevailed, but that its general approval was brought 
about from an entirely different angle which was in no connection with the considerations by which I 
had justified my assertion, to wit, by the atomistic theory as advocated by Ludwig Boltzmann. …71 
 Thus the factual development of these matters amounted to a victory of my assertion …, but 
my involvement into this fight was completely superfluous; for even without it the about-face would 
have taken place just in the same way. … 
                                                          
71 A passage very similar to this paragraph can be found in (Planck, 1933, p. 147). 
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 After what has been said I could only play the part of Boltzmann’s second [in the fight against 
Ostwald] whose service was, however, not acknowledged at all, yet not even welcome. For Boltzmann 
knew quite well that my viewpoint was substantially different from his. He was particularly annoyed 
that my attitude towards atomic theory, which represented the foundation of his whole research work, 
was not only indifferent but rather a bit negative. The reason was that at the time I attributed to the 
principle of increase of entropy the same exceptionless validity as to the principle of the conservation 
of energy, while in Boltzmann the former principle only appears as a probabilistic law which, as such, 
admits exceptions. There are cases in which the quantity H increases. In his derivation of the so-called 
H-theorem, Boltzmann did not deal with this feature, and my talented student E. Zermelo vigorously 
indicated the lack of a rigorous justification of the theorem. Indeed, in Boltzmann’s calculation the 
assumption of molecular disorder was not mentioned, which is indispensable for the validity of the 
theorem. He seemed to have presupposed it as evident. At any rate, he cuttingly responded to the 
young Zermelo with a harshness that was also directed at myself who had approved the publication of 
Zermelo’s paper. In this way it occurred that Boltzmann all his life, even at later occasions, both in his 
publications and in our private correspondence, maintained an irritable tone against myself which only 
in the last years of his life changed into a friendly assent after I had reported to him the atomistic 
justification of my radiation law.  
 After all it was evident for me that Boltzmann would ultimately prevail in the fight against 
Ostwald and the energeticists. The fundamental difference between heat conduction and a purely 
mechanical process was generally acknowledged. In all this I had the opportunity to recognize an – or 
so I believe – notable fact. A new scientific truth usually does not prevail in the way that its opponents 
become convinced and declare themselves informed about the change, but that the opponents die out 
one after another and that the new generation from the very beginning becomes accustomed to the 
truth.72 (Planck, 1990, p. 14f.) 
 
The last paragraph sounds as if copyrighted by Thomas S. Kuhn. As it was originally 
written down in 1933, one may wonder whether back then it did not also describe 
Planck’s own position with respect to the younger generation of quantum physicists 
whom, to be sure, he generously supported despite his deep-seated reluctance to accept 
genuine indeterminism. Browsing through Kuhn’s (1987) comprehensive study of 
Planck’s works on black-body radiation, we see that real or alleged scientific 
revolutions are not necessarily created ex post in order to meet clashes with the 
opposition by suitable rhetoric. At least to Planck’s mind, there occurred two 
conceptual ruptures. Immediately in 1900 he realized that he had discovered a new 
constant of nature which within his philosophical world view (See Sect. 3.8) signified 
an important step towards the ideal of absolute knowledge. But if Kuhn’s account is 
right, the need for the quantum discontinuities – or the quantum revolution – occurred 
not before 1906 and only in 1908 Planck had understood how radical a change was 
required. This is the year at the end of which he delivered his Leyden lecture on “The 
Unity of the Physical World View”. 
 In his rejoinder to Mach’s response (1910), Planck (1910a) contended that in 
his Kiel years (1885-1889) he considered himself “to be one of the most committed 
followers of Mach, which as I freely acknowledge exercised strong influence on my 
physical thinking. But later, I turned away from it, because I had begun to see that the 
glittering promise …, the elimination of all metaphysical elements from physical 
theory of knowledge, could in no way be carried out.” (1910a, p. 1187/142) Hiebert 
extends the time span back to Planck’s dissertation in 1879. “His earliest reactions to 
Mach’s views appeared in 1887 in an essay which merited the second prize of the 
philosophical faculty of Göttingen.” (Hiebert 1967, quoted from Blackmore, 1972, p. 
                                                          
72 The final two sentences appear in (Planck, 1933, p. 248) in a biblical wording. 
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218) Blackmore concludes that after the black-body theory had made Planck “a strong 
admirer and sword-bearer of Boltzmann”, he “looked for and found a scapegoat who 
he thought was the primary cause for the unjust isolation and disdain which had been 
forced on Boltzmann’s ideas for so many years by so many of his physical colleagues 
and which in large part had been responsible for his own fruitless investigations and 
wasted years.” (Both Blackmore, 1972, p. 220) Stressing that the Leyden lecture was 
delivered fifteen months after Boltzmann’s death, Kuhn rightly calls for qualifications. 
On the one hand, Planck overrated both his own failure and the merits of Boltzmann in 
convincing physicists of the independent character of the second law. On the other 
hand, in Planck’s early works there are passages “not easily reconciled with his having 
taken a positivist position.” (Kuhn, 1987, p. 279) 
 How Machian was Planck’s 1887 Preisschrift on The Principle of Conservation 
of Energy? In a certain sense it stood in direct comparison with Mach’s 1872 booklet 
On the History and Origin of the Theorem of Conservation of Work which, according 
to later declarations of the author, already contained the gist of the epistemology 
expounded in the Mechanics. And indeed, Planck made repeated references to it, while 
Mach’s Mechanics speaks quite favorably of Planck’s study. The introduction to the 
second edition of the Mechanics (Mach, 1988, p. 16/xxv) mentioned the Preisschrift, 
and in § 5.1 Mach considers Planck’s formulation of the law of causality as “different 
only in form” (Ibid., p. 519/607).73 
 In the Preface to the first edition of the prize essay, Planck gives quotations 
from a letter accompanying his submission. There one finds several Machian passages, 
and affirmative references to Mach continue throughout the historically oriented first 
chapter of the booklet, in particular, as regards the epoch prior to Helmholtz. The 
principle of conservation of energy, according to Planck, is of such a general and 
universal nature “that one cannot be careful enough in purging it from all those 
hypothetical ideas which one is inclined to make up so easily in order to facilitate the 
overview over the lawful connection of the most diverse natural phenomena.” (Planck, 
1908b, p. viii) Thus Planck’s presentation intended to base the principle primarily on 
purely empirical facts. The first reasonably precise formulation of a the principle was 
the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile which he describes as “a merely empirical 
fact, because humans more and more cared to gain work than lose it.” (Ibid., p. 4) 
Huygens was “instinctively convinced” (Ibid., p. 6) of its correctness because it was so 
closely related to our primary experiences. Stressing Julius Robert Mayer’s priority for 
the general principle and the definition of the mechanical equivalent of heat, Planck 
remained critical about Mayer’s metaphysics-laden elucidation of the result. “Never 
could an effect emerge without a cause, or conversely no cause remains without effect. 
… Cause and effect thus are equal in a certain sense.” (Ibid., p. 25) Yet when judging 
this train of thought one should not forget, so Planck, that in virtue of its generality the 
principle cannot be proven deductively in an ordinary sense, such that Mayer’s 
elucidations are the best available source “to obtain a clear and intuitive understanding 
of the principle, that is, to link it with the ideas and principles familiar to us.” (Ibid., p. 
30) 
 We also find Mach’s principle of historical continuity at work. In Helmholtz’s 
hands “the principle of conservation of energy has now become parallel to the 
                                                          
73 Interestingly, the broader context of the passage contains Mach’s general plea for energeticism in the theory of 
heat. 
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principle of conservation of matter, a principle which we are familiar with already for 
a long time and which has become, as it were, part of our instincts.” (Ibid., p. 41f.) But 
when discussing the mechanical world view expressed in Helmholtz’s enunciation of 
the principle, Planck significantly departed from Mach. 
 
From the validity of the principle [of conservation of energy] one can by no means deduce the 
necessity of the mechanical conception of nature, while conversely the principle indeed turns out to be 
a necessary consequence of this conception, at least if one assumes central forces. This latter 
circumstance together with the desire to form a coherent view of the action of natural forces 
sufficiently explains the fact that the mechanical theory was accepted so quickly and without 
objection. And indeed this theory has been confirmed everywhere with flying colors; or at least I do 
not presently share the fears as to whether this theory – as an overly narrow-minded conception of 
natural phenomena – is feasible in general. (Ibid., p. 57f.)  
 
A footnote citing (Mach, [1872] 1909) leaves no doubt whose fears are meant. At the 
end of his historical tour, Planck discusses the acceptance of the mechanical theory of 
heat around 1860.  
 
In these days, a new epoch for the development of natural sciences began. Until date one everywhere 
depended upon the inductive method unless one had already succeeded in finding those basic laws 
from which all single phenomena emerge, such as in mechanics or astronomy. From now on, one was 
in possession of a principle which, well-tested in all known domains by careful research, provided an 
excellent guide also for wholly unknown and unexplored regions. (Planck 1908b, p. 101) 
 
Thus already in Planck’s most Machian writing the goal of a unified world view is 
visible, a motive which would become one of the cornerstones of Planck’s later 
philosophy of science. Admittedly, also Mach had emphasized the inescapability of a 
unified world conception, but rather than being stable this world conception was too 
provisional to derive any reductionist endeavors from it. To Planck, the idea to base all 
science on a few principles was the undisputed guiding star (See Sect. 3.8). Compare 
the beginning of Planck’s 1887 booklet with the opening passage of his 1915 entry on 
“The Principle of Least Action” for the encyclopedia Die Kultur der Gegenwart.  
 
There are two principles which serve as a foundation for the present edifice of exact science: the 
principle of conservation of matter and the principle of conservation of energy. Ahead of all other laws 
of physics however comprehensive, they hold an unchallenged precedence; for even the great 
Newtonian axioms … only extend over a special part of physics: mechanics. (Planck, 1908b, p. 1) 
 As long as there exists physical science, its highest desirable goal had been the solution of the 
problem to integrate all natural phenomena observed and still to be observed into a single simple 
principle which permits one to calculate all past and, in particular, all future processes from the present 
ones. It is natural that this goal has not been reached to date, nor ever will it be reached entirely. It is 
well possible, however, to approach it more and more, and the history of theoretical physics 
demonstrates that on this way a rich number of important successes could already be gained; which 
clearly indicates that this ideal problem is not merely utopical, but eminently fertile. … Among the 
more or less general laws which manifest the achievements of physical science in the course of the last 
centuries, the Principle of Least Action is probably the one which, as regards form and content, may 
claim to come nearest to that final ideal goal of theoretical research. (Planck, 1915a, p. 68) 
 
Reading these emphatic lines one may safely consider the Principle of Least Action as 
the embodiment of Planck’s unificationist methodology of science. As we shall see 
below, what in the Leyden speech had changed as compared to the 1887 position is 
that the unifying principles had become of a more abstract kind. Planck’s later 
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reductionist aspirations became redirected at formal theoretical principles rather than 
basic quantities, such as matter or energy, and accordingly were finally decoupled 
from the mechanist world view.  
 In the second, the systematic part of the Preisschrift, Planck’s realism is clearly 
discernible. Initially, he started with a primary definition of energy that was not far 
from Mach’s. But when contemplating whether a substantialist interpretation of energy 
based on analogy could be useful, he seems to have forgotten Boltzmann’s above-
quoted admonition against Ostwald’s energetics which, to my mind, was a fair account 
of Mach’s antireductionism. A “substantialist interpretation of energy not only 
increases the Anschaulichkeit, but also represents a direct progress in research” 
(Planck, 1908b, p. 117) because now one could further investigate the transitions from 
one form of energy into another. Planck was not after Anschaulichkeit in first place, be 
it based on energeticism or mechanics, but after unification. 
 Rejecting a mechanical deduction of the principle of conservation of energy as 
not general enough, Planck provided an indirect proof of it from the empirical 
impossibility of a perpetuum mobile which crucially depends upon “the assumption 
that it is always possible in some way to transform a material system from a given state 
into any other.” (Ibid., p. 159) Through this condition, Planck’s proof of this empirical 
principle heavily relies upon experiences not yet made and thus violates the basic 
presuppositions of Mach’s empiricism. In the first section of the Mechanics, Mach had 
strongly criticized Archimede’s geometrical proof of the law of the lever because it 
contained implicit assumptions about the determining conditions which despite the 
argument’s elegance must have been previously intuited in nature. And Mach 
concluded that “the aim of my whole book is to convince the reader that we cannot 
make up properties of nature with the help of self-evident suppositions, but that these 
suppositions must be taken from experience.” (Mach, 1988, p. 44/27) Thus Planck’s 
search for deductive proofs ran counter to Mach’s methodology, and while Boltzmann 
had emphasized the mutual completion of the deductive and inductive methods, 
already the early Planck exhibits a clear preference for theorizing. 
 
However swaying the number and significance of those inductive proofs [of the principle of 
conservation of energy] appears to us, probably nobody is so inveterate an empiricist not to feel the 
need for another proof which, built upon a deductive foundation, lets the principle emerge in its most 
comprehensive meaning from some even more general truths. (Planck, 1908b, p. 149f.) 
 
No surprise to find a footnote in which Planck asserts not to agree with all the views 
outlined in Mach’s 1872 study. (Ibid., p. 156) Although Planck emphatically rejects all 
attempts “to accept the mechanical theory as an a priori postulate of physical 
research”, he nevertheless considers “the mechanical world view as the goal of 
research, a goal which will possibly and probably be reached.” (Ibid., p. 155) It seems 
to me that Planck’s mitigated mechanical reductionism was not so far from 
Boltzmann’s views of theory reduction to basic entities and their interactions.  
Considering the second law of thermodynamics as an independent principle, 
Planck at that time would however have rejected Boltzmann’s reality criterion as 
insufficient because, beyond Planck’s Mach-inspired dislike of atomism, it did not 
involve any principle of comparable generality and introduced irreducibly probabilistic 
elements. To the 1908 edition, Planck added two footnotes in which he insists on a 
strict separation between both laws of thermodynamics. While the first law can be 
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derived from the principle of the conservation of energy, the second “until to date can 
be explained no other than by way of probabilistic considerations.” (Ibid., p. ix) But 
science, or so Planck would continue to stress in various dialogues with Vienna 
Indeterminists, could not content itself with this state of affairs. The reason was 
Planck’s Kantian conception of causality which can also be found in his prize essay 
right after the author has rejected aprioristic forms of mechanicism. “Natural science 
only knows one postulate: the principle of causality; for this is the condition of its 
existence.” (Ibid., p. 155) This was far cry off from Mach’s functional dependences 
which emerged out of our biological interaction with the physical world. And also 
Boltzmann had fought against bestowing the status of a necessary precondition upon 
what is just a practically successful habit of thought. Thus we see that Mach’s above-
quoted assent to Planck’s concept of causality was only appropriate for Planck’s 
criticism of Mayer. 
 
3.7 The Planck-Mach Controversy 
 
Let us look closer at Planck’s Leyden speech. Since, at bottom, several core elements 
of Planck’s attacks on Mach – above all the Kantian conception of causality – were 
already present in his early philosophy, the new anti-Machian thrust mainly required a 
change of emphasis within the diverging strands of Planck’s early thinking and an 
elaboration of the realism based on formal principles and constants of nature. This 
broader perspective is useful not to be misled by the combatants’ talking at cross-
purposes in important respects.  
 At the beginning, Planck distinguished two mutually enhancing and correcting 
methods in science. Careful description in the sense of Kirchhoff and Mach, on the one 
hand, is confined to observations as the only legitimate basis of physics. Theoretical 
research, on the other hand, boldly generalizes particular results and seeks a 
conceptual unity in the manifold of experiences. While originally physical science had 
been divided along the lines of our distinct senses into acoustics, theory of heat, etc., 
modern theoretical physics amalgamated and unified many originally distinct domains.  
Mach’s reply, the “Leading Thoughts”, emphasized that “certainly no one has 
any objection against [unifying systems in physics], least of all representatives of the 
economy of thought.” (Mach, 1910, p. 230/136) But Mach could never assent to 
reducing one domain of experiences to another; for instance, the Mechanics does not 
consider hydrodynamics and acoustics as part of mechanics proper. (Cf. Mach, 1988, 
p. 224/246) This was not to say that different senses corresponded to different physical 
worlds; in contrast “[e]very event belongs, strictly speaking, to all domains of physics 
which are separated only by a classification which is partly conventional, partly 
physiological, and partly historical.” (Ibid., p. 510/596) 
 While Mach and the empiricist tradition defined the basic quantities of physics 
by reference to specific sensory experiences, such as heat and muscular effort, Planck 
diagnosed “that the human-historical element in all physical definitions has 
significantly diminished.” (Planck, 1908a, p. 3) Today “temperature is theoretically 
defined by the absolute temperature scale which is taken from the second law of 
thermodynamics, in the kinetic theory of gases it is defined by the living force of 
molecular motion, practically by the volume change of a thermometric substance or by 
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the deflection of the scale of a bolometer or thermometer.” (Ibid., p. 3) Mach and the 
energeticists, to be sure, had rejected the grounds of both theoretical definitions. To 
Planck’s mind, the whole development of theoretical physics was characterized “by 
the unification of its system which was reached by a certain emancipation from the 
anthropomorphic elements, in particular from the specific sense impressions.” (Ibid., 
p. 4) Having achieved this emancipation for the second law of thermodynamics, was 
the “life work of Boltzmann” (Ibid., p. 14), while Mach’s epistemology signified a 
relapse into an outdated anthropomorphism.  
 Planck outlined this process of simultaneous de-anthropomorphization and 
unification at the example of the reinterpretation of the second law. Carnot’s cyclic 
processes did not lead to a precise notion of the irreversibility of the process of heat 
conduction because the whole problem was “too much tailored for human demands 
primarily interested in the gain of usable work. If one wants to obtain a definitive 
answer from Nature, one has to approach her from a more general viewpoint that is 
less interested in economy.” (Ibid., p. 9) And Planck’s clue to Nature’s secrets was the 
separation between reversible and irreversible processes. Being “much deeper than, for 
instance, the opposition between mechanical and electrical processes, this distinction 
accordingly … will become the most distinguished explanatory reason [vornehmste 
Erklärungsgrund] for classifying all physical processes and finally play the lead in the 
physical world view of the future.” (Ibid., p. 11) This distinction of processes 
corresponds to the distinction between the two basic principles in Planck’s mature 
world view.  
As Helmholtz had shown, all reversible processes are governed by the Principle 
of Least Action which, according to Planck’s above-quoted commendation, comes 
closest to the ideal of scientific inquiry. Since this principle is more general than the 
principle of conservation of energy and makes possible a unique answer to all 
problems of reversible physics, Planck even claimed that this side of the physical 
world view could be considered as completed. “In the realm of irreversible processes, 
however, the Principle of Least Action is no longer sufficient because the principle of 
entropy increase introduces an entirely novel element into the physical world view that 
is in itself extraneous to the action principle.” (Ibid., p. 11) Thus for Planck, 
Boltzmann’s tenaciously associating the second law with the Principle of Least Action 
(See Sect. 3.2) was doomed to failure from the outset. Of course, Planck admitted that 
“the disadvantage of reversible processes is that they are merely ideal; in real nature 
there exists not a single reversible process because every natural happening more or 
less involves friction or heat conduction.” (Planck, 1908a, p. 11) Nonetheless, he 
attributed a clear explanatory priority to reversible processes because they permitted a 
causal description of nature. More explicitly than Boltzmann, Exner would stress 
precisely the opposing view. (See Sect. 4.1) 
 While following Clausius’ definition, the second law remained still associated 
with thought experiments based upon ideal processes, that is, upon the impossibility of 
a (de-anthropomorphized) perpetuum mobile, full emancipation of the second law as a 
true principle was achieved by Boltzmann’s “general reduction of the concept of 
entropy to the concept of probability. … Nature simply prefers more probable states to 
less probable states insofar as only transitions in the direction of increased probability 
occur.” (Ibid. p. 14) But there is a prize to be paid for this progress, “the renunciation 
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of a truly complete answer to all questions concerning the details of a physical 
process.” (Ibid., p. 14)  
 
A second disquieting drawback seems to be the introduction of two types of causal connection 
between physical states: absolute necessity, on the one hand, and mere probability, on the other hand. 
… If a warmer body loses heat to a colder body contiguous to it, this is only enormously probable and 
by no means absolutely necessary; for one could well imagine very particular arrangements and 
velocity states of the atoms for which just the opposite happens. Boltzmann has drawn therefrom the 
conclusion that such strange events contradicting the second law of thermodynamics could well occur 
in nature, and he accordingly left some room for them in his physical world view. To my mind 
however, this is a matter in which one does not have to comply with him. For, a nature in which such 
events happen … would no longer be our nature. As long as we have to do only with the latter, we will 
be better off not to admit such strange processes but, conversely, to search for that general condition – 
and assume it to be realized in nature – which excludes from the very beginning those phenomena 
which contradict all our experiences. Boltzmann himself has formulated that condition for gas theory 
[which excludes these phenomena], it is generally speaking the ‘hypothesis of elementary disorder’. 
… By introducing this condition the necessity of all natural events is restored; for if this condition is 
realized the increase of entropy directly follows in virtue of the calculus of probability, so that one can 
nearly call the principle of elementary disorder the essence of the second law of thermodynamics. 
(Ibid., p. 14f.) 
 
Planck’s reasoning makes clear that despite the praise of Boltzmann, and the adoption 
of statistical mechanics, he does not admit the improbable events into physics. While 
the late Boltzmann admitted violations of the second law, Planck posited a general 
principle excluding this: elementary or molecular disorder. While Boltzmann 
contemplated that in disjoint regions of the universe time could run in different 
directions because one of them locally violates the second law – yet without touching 
the law’s validity for the universe as a whole –, Planck assumes that such a subsystem 
with decreasing entropy is always coherent with another one like two light rays 
stemming from the same source. Thus the price for a categorical validity of the second 
law seems to be some spooky non-local entanglement, not unlike ideas popular in 
present-day interpretations of quantum mechanics. “Do these strange consequences not 
remind us of mysterious relationships in intellectual life which often remain concealed 
to us and can accordingly be neglected without loss, but which may exhibit effects 
wholly undreamt-of once particular external circumstances are concurrent.” (Ibid., p. 
17f.) To a Viennese ear, this treatment of molecular disorder had to sound 
metaphysical. Compare Mach’s response. 
 
I cannot deny my aversion to hypothetico-fictive physics. Thus I have developed my own particular 
opinion about Boltzmann’s probability investigations concerning the second law as based on the 
kinetic theory of gases. If Boltzmann discovered that processes in accordance with the second law are 
very probable while those contrary to it are only very improbable, then I cannot accept that it has been 
proved that nature behaves according to this theorem [Satz]. Also, I don’t think it is right for Planck to 
accept the first part without wanting to accept the second part, for both halves of the conclusion are 
inseparable from each other. (Mach, 1910, p. 231,137)  
 
Of course, Mach rejected Boltzmann’s proof of the probabilistic second law from 
hypothetical atoms and remained committed to phenomenological thermodynamics. 
Neither did he accept Planck’s attempt to restore causality by banning the actual 
occurrence of improbable events through the condition of molecular disorder. Mach’s 
worries about the probabilistic character of the second law did not stem from the 
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problem to accommodate it into his wide notion of causality, but from his combined 
dislike of atomism and mathematical deductions in physics. Once the latter obstacles 
had been removed, Mach’s conception of causality as sufficiently stable functional 
dependences came to buttress the probabilistic character of basic physical laws. 
In the fourth section of his Leyden speech, Planck launched a vigorous polemic 
against Mach. It commenced from his joint belief – supported by the above historico-
critical analysis of the second law of thermodynamics – that, on the one hand, modern 
physics had already become sufficiently disentangled from human economy and other 
anthropomorphic features, and that, on the other hand, our physical world view had 
reached a sufficient uniformity and stability. This progress, he concluded, was 
irreconcilable with Mach’s epistemology. Planck targeted, above all, Mach’s anti-
realism and the principle of economy. Both are deemed fruitless maxims for scientific 
research. “By their fruits shall ye know them!” (Planck, 1908a, p. 24/132) – a biblical 
allusion which more than anything else was to provoke Mach. And it did. 
 
One sees that physicists are on the best way to becoming a church and they have already acquired the 
familiar means. Let me answer plain and simple: If belief in the reality of atoms is so essential to you 
then I renounce the physical way of thinking …, in short, I thank you for the community of believers. 
Freedom of thought is more precious to me. (Mach, 1910, p. 233/138f.) 
 
Mach’s rhetoric makes the issue of atomism appear more central than it actually was. 
Whether the old Mach really admitted to have seen atoms in the spinthariscope or 
not74, his epistemology undoubtedly had problems to integrate theoretical entities 
above and beyond their use as successful hypotheses. Mach’s attitude towards 
atomism, accordingly, was not at all different from his general position towards 
abstract principles, such as the Principle of Least Action or molecular disorder. Planck 
was of course right to observe that  
 
Machian positivism was a philosophical expression of the unavoidable disillusionment [of the exalted 
ambitions of the mechanical world view]. In the face of a threatening scepticism [prominently 
expressed in Emil du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus], he deserves full credit for having rediscovered 
that the only legitimate starting point of all scientific research is sense perception. But he overshoots 
the mark by degrading the physical world view together with the mechanistic one. I am firmly 
persuaded that the Machian system, when really carried through, contains no internal contradiction, 
but equally it seems certain to me that its basic significance is only formalistic. It does not really touch 
the essence of natural science at all, the demand for a constant world picture which does not depend 
upon the changing epochs and peoples. Mach’s principle of continuity offers no substitute; for 
continuity is not constancy. (Planck, 1908a, p. 130) 
 
From a Machian standpoint, Planck’s quest for absolute constancy sounded 
tantamount to renewing the shattered absolute foundations simply by replacing the 
basic substances with abstract principles. Mach could just retort that Planck’s “concern 
for a physics which is valid for all peoples and all times, up to the Mars dwellers, 
while so many physical problems of the day press upon us, seems very premature to 
me, indeed almost comical.” (Mach, 1910, p. 232/136) Even the Mars dwellers, to 
Mach’s mind, would have to care for their survival in the most economical fashion and 
develop their own science step by step. 
                                                          
74 See the recollections of Stefan Meyer translated in (Blackmore, 1992, p. 151f.). As a matter of fact, Mach saw 
α-particles at the newly founded Institute of Radium Research. 
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 Planck’s criticism of Mach’s positivism distorted the anti-substantialist 
ontology of neutral monism into a Berkeleyian sensualism, holding “that there are no 
other realities than one’s own sensations and that all natural science in the last analysis 
is only an economic adaptation [Anpassung] of our thoughts to our sensations by 
which we are driven by the struggle for existence …. The essential and only elements 
of the world are sensations [Empfindungen].” (Planck, 1908a, p. 20/129) Mach put 
Planck’s wording right and countered with his famous slogan about the task of 
science: “Adaptation of thoughts to facts and adaptation of facts to each other.” 
(Mach, 1910, p. 226/133f.) Contrary to Planck’s belief, Machian facts were not 
isolated sensations, but they are constituted by relatively stable functional 
dependences between the (non-atomistic) sensational elements. While Mach’s 
relational ontology avoided any absolutist commitments, to Planck’s lights, an 
increased constancy of the world picture warranted stronger ontological conclusions. 
“This constancy which is independent of every human – especially every intellectual – 
individuality, is that which we now call the real [das Reale].” (Planck, 1908a, p. 
22/131) 
 And in later years Planck did not hesitate to subject even the allegedly most 
Machian theory of modern physics to this general convergence to absolute reality. To 
his mind, relativity theory taught us that outdated absolute concepts are relativized just 
in order to find deeper absolute concepts. “Yet when space and time have been denied 
the character of being absolute, the absolute has not been blotted out, it has just been 
moved more backward, to wit, into the metric of the four-dimensional manifold.” 
(Planck, 1925, p. 154) Interestingly, Planck derived support for convergent realism 
from Kant’s critical philosophy. Since there is no way to distinguish between ‘world 
view’ and ‘world’, we can interpret ‘world’ itself as the ideal aim of all scientific 
research. Evidently Planck’s convergent realism was fundamentally at odds with the 
highly flexible reality criterion used by Mach and the Vienna Indeterminists. 
 While in the Leyden speech, Planck mainly attacked the practical infertility of 
the principle of economy as compared to the quest for absolute knowledge, to serve as 
a maxim for the working scientist, the rejoinder to the “Leading Thoughts” regarded 
economy as an element of the practical life world. By Mach’s “generalizing it without 
further ado, the concept of economy … is transformed into a metaphysical one.” 
(Planck, 1910a, p. 1187/142) And Planck ironically reminded his readers that Mach 
had branded as metaphysical those “concepts of which one has forgotten how one had 
arrived at them.” (Ibid., p. 1188) Answering criticism by Adler (1909), Planck rejected 
Petzoldt’s (1890) redefinition of Machian economy as stability.  
 
In reality, these two concepts are worlds apart from one another. For economy is inseparable from 
purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit] while the concept of stability has not even the slightest thing to do 
with purposiveness. One could just as easily make variability or capacity for evolution a demand of 
‘economy’. (Planck, 1910a, p. 1188/143) 
 
We have seen in Section 3.2. that there was indeed an important cleft between both 
conceptions, a cleft in virtue of which Petzoldt’s stability was a metaphysical principle 
while Mach’s economy of thought was not. Thus Planck’s charging the principle of 
economy of metaphysics, at bottom, hit only Petzoldt’s objective reinterpretation of it. 
But Planck explicitly agreed with Adler that stability of our world view was a worthy 
goal of the scientific enterprise, a goal which could not be reduced to economy. And 
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he thus implicitly assented to the Fechnerian metaphysical tendency standing behind 
Petzoldt’s conception of stability. At bottom, Planck’s convergent realism was a 
metaphysical position that substantially departed from a verbal reading of Kant’s 
critical philosophy. 
 Turning from the ontological to the methodological aspects of Machian 
economy, in the above passage Planck criticized that this principle is in retrospect 
adaptable to whatever scientific progress. Planck was right in so far as Mach’s usage 
of the principle of economy in his historico-critical writings was so all-encompassing 
that it could not be cashed out into set of precise methodological rules for the 
advancement of science. But Planck misunderstood the descriptive-normative nature 
of the principle of economy (Cf. Sect. 3.1). It is a biological-economical principle that 
factually governs the development of science from instinctive experiences onward. 
Only at later stages of the evolution of science, its application becomes regulative. Still 
then the principle of economy is no methodology guaranteeing success, so that 
Planck’s criticism partly missed its target. Planck, on his part, considered the quest for 
a stable world view as the only reasonable advice to the working scientist. 
 
Therefore the physicist, if he wants to promote science, has to be a realist, not an economist, which 
means that in the flow of appearances he must search above all for that which is lasting, unchanging, 
independent of human senses. In this economy of thought serves as means but it is not a final purpose 
[Endzweck]. (Planck, 1910a, p. 1190/146) 
 
Planck’s rejoinder also contained two specific criticisms of Mach’s physical works. 
Firstly, in the Theory of Heat Mach conflated both kinds of perpetuum mobile that are 
connected to the first and second law of thermodynamics respectively. “Mach does not 
even devote a syllable to the fact that the two basic principles about the impossibility 
of perpetual motion are completely different from one another, that the first is 
reversible …, but the second is not. … I must particularly stress that at the time Mach 
wrote his book (1896), the facts had already been made completely clear … forty years 
ago.” (Planck, 1910a, p. 1189) Yet one must add that while for Planck this difference 
was the most important in present and future physics, a characteristic trait of 
energeticism had been to play down irreversibility at best and, accordingly, reject the 
idea of an absolute zero. Still in 1915, Mach called energetics “a fully seething field.” 
(Mach, 1915, p. 18), at a time when Ostwald (1909) had long abandoned his aversion 
against atomism. Secondly, Planck assailed  
 
Mach’s strenuously fought for but physically entirely useless thought that the relativity of all 
translation movements also corresponds to a relativity of all rotary movements, that therefore, one 
cannot decide at all in principle whether, for instance, the fixed stars rotate around the Earth at rest of 
the Earth rotates around the fixed stars. … The conceptual errors about physical matters which this 
unallowable transfer of the principle of the relativity of rotary movements, from kinematics into 
mechanics has already caused, … would lead us too far astray. It therefore naturally follows that 
Mach’s theory cannot possibly account for the immense progress which is intimately associated with 
the introduction of the Copernican theory. (Planck, 1910a, p. 1189f./145)  
 
The relativity of all rotary motion attacked here was the motivation for what became 
known as Mach’s principle. And this relativist maxim proved extremely fertile for 
extending the theory of the solar system beyond Copernicus and Newton, because 
together with the principle of equivalence it became a cornerstone in the early history 
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of general relativity. A passage in Philipp Frank’s textbook Philosophy of Science 
demonstrates that contemporaries – or at least those who were as active in the field as 
Frank – were fully aware about the target and the inconsistency of Planck’s position.75 
 
[Planck] had definitively approved Einstein’s theory of relativity, but he regarded Mach’s theory, 
according to which the rotation of the Foucault pendulum is due to an action emanating from the fixed 
stars, as a fantastic assertion which has its source in Mach’s theory of knowledge. … However, 
Einstein started a new analysis of Newtonian mechanics which eventually vindicated Mach’s 
reformulation. (Frank, 1957, p. 153) 
 
Although Einstein later dismissed Mach’s principle, still today it continues to attract 
considerable attention in its various forms.76 Until the 1920s it also remained a 
research topic of the Vienna physicists (Cf. Thirring, 1918; see Sect. 4.7.2). 
 
3.8. Formal Principles and Planck’s Realisms 
 
Let me turn back to the issue of theoretical principles, now in a more general setting. 
Planck’s convergent realism as outlined in the polemics with Mach combined the 
tendencies of de-anthropomorphization and unification. Universality and simplicity 
outscored all Anschaulichkeit. With respect to the high demands which special 
relativity posed to our abstractive capacities, Planck concluded that the “measure of 
success of a new physical hypothesis is not its intuitiveness [Anschaulichkeit] but its 
efficiency. Once the hypothesis has proven fertile one gets used to it, and a certain 
intuitiveness arises little by little.” (Planck, 1910b, p. 36) And in his inaugural speech 
as Rector of the University of Berlin he provided an impressive list. “[I]n all recent 
conflicts [between facts and theories] the great general physical principles held the 
field, namely, the principle of conservation of energy, the principle of conservation of 
momentum [Bewegungsgröße], the Principle of Least Action, the laws of 
thermodynamics,” (Planck, 1913, p. 44) while well-accustomed intuitive foundations 
had to give way. This notion of principle was diametrically opposed to Mach’s directly 
intuited principles, e.g., of the lever or the inclined plane.  
 If Planckian principles were to suit the quest for absolute reality, they had to be 
of a sufficiently abstract kind and be adaptable to scientific progress. Otherwise they 
would face the classical objection that in the course of history almost all successful 
scientific theories have turned out to be false. This seems to me the reason why the 
Principle of Least Action and constants of nature play such a pivotal role within 
Planck’s philosophy of physics. While the latter provide something unchangeable and 
really absolute, the former corresponds to a kind of structural realism rather than to a 
world formula in the sense of the old mechanical reductionism. More than previous 
advocates of the Principle of Least Action, Planck, rightly, emphasized that only after 
a precise mathematical specification of the Lagrangian and of the conditions for the 
virtual displacements the principle ceased to be “an empty form” (1915a, p. 70) and 
became at all meaningful. Different physical theories correspond to different 
                                                          
75 See also (Norton, 1995, p. 36f.) 
76 Today Mach’s principle is rather an umbrella term for a motley group of different philosophical and physical 
principles. See the list on p. 530 of (Barbour & Pfister, 1995). 
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Lagrangians, and if certain types of constraints, focal points, or caustics are present 
one has to be extremely careful not arrive at inconsistencies. 
 This role as an invariant but ‘empty’ form corresponds to that type of structural 
realism launched by the French conventionalists Poincaré and Duhem.77 Structural 
realism became a common theme of the neo-Kantian Cassirer (1910) and the pre-
positivist Schlick (1920). “Theories in the exact sciences … can inform us about the 
real structural relations though not about how these structural relations are realized.” 
(Gower, 2000, p. 92) Barry Gower has shown that there existed a structuralist tradition 
from Richard Dedekind to David Hilbert according to which “[n]o particular physical 
system need be determined by a scientific theory, so understood, and it does not 
provide information about any physical system in which the structure is realized.” 
(Ibid., p. 75) As a matter of fact, Hilbert’s trust in the universality of the Principle of 
Least Action and his pursuit of formal invariants even exceeded Planck’s (Cf. 
Stöltzner, 2003b). To be sure, structural realism so conceived heavily draws upon the 
motive of unification, but – other than for Hilbert – the theoretical physicist’s job is 
not finished by singling out the mathematically deepest level, an axiom system or a set 
of invariants which holds true equally for ‘points’, ‘lines’, and ‘planes’ as for ‘tables’, 
‘chairs’, and ‘beer mugs’. Constants of nature and the metric of space-time thus 
supplemented Planck’s structural realism as presumed final, or at least more absolute, 
elements instantiating the universal structures. Hence, Planck’s structural realism 
incorporated a non-substantialist type of convergent realism. One reason for this joint 
strategy was that Planck, other than Hilbert, did not assign any ontological qualities to 
mathematical truths. To him mathematics was, at least partially, “an empirical science 
about intellectual culture.” (Planck, 1914, p. 55) While such a formulation still agreed 
with an empiricist foundation of mathematics in the style of Mach and Boltzmann, in 
the following year, Planck insisted on a principal difference between mathematics and 
physics. Unlike physical theories, mathematical theories cannot contradict one another, 
“such that in mathematics one cannot speak of an opposition of theories, but only of an 
opposition of methods.” (Planck, 1915b, p. 79) 
 Let us follow Planck’s combination of structural and convergent realism in 
more detail. As had Boltzmann, Planck emphasized that the Principle of Least Action 
is stronger than the principle of energy conservation, but full clarity is obtained only in 
relativity theory where this principle “contains all four world coordinates in fully 
symmetrical order” (Planck, 1910b, p. 38) and is invariant under Lorentz-
transformation, while energy and momentum are not. Thus, the Principle of Least 
Action unites the energeticist view of nature based on the conservation of energy and 
the mechanical view of nature based on the conservation of momentum, a unification 
in virtue of which the principle was enthroned over all reversible physics. Planck’s 
reverence for its universality rehearsed the 1887 praise for the principle of 
conservation of energy, but additionally gave it a mathematical twist. “The 
fundamental importance of the Principle of Least Action became generally recognized 
only when it proved its applicability to such systems whose mechanism is either 
completely unknown or too complex to think of a reduction to ordinary coordinates.” 
(Ibid., p. 76) In contrast to the differential equations of motion, the Principle of Least 
                                                          
77 Structural realism is a position commonly associated with Poincaré. Here I follow Gower’s (2000) analysis 
that also Duhem’s notion of natural order can be interpreted in such a way. 
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Action as an integral principle is independent of any choice of coordinates and a 
fortiori invariant under coordinate transformations. 
 Planck’s emphasis on invariance extended to other fields as well. In 1910, he 
admitted that his law of black-body radiation required a fundamental break with 
classical electrodynamics in favor of an elementary discontinuity in nature because 
classical physics unavoidably yielded Jeans’s law, in blatant contradiction even to 
everyday experience.  
 
In my opinion, one will not for this purpose have to give up the Principle of Least Action, which has 
so strongly attested its universal significance, but the universal validity of the Hamiltonian differential 
equations; for those are derived from the Principle of Least Action under the assumption that all 
physical processes can be reduced to changes occurring continuously in time. Once radiation processes 
do no longer obey the Hamiltonian differential equations, the ground is cut from Jeans’s theory. 
(Planck, 1910c, p. 239) 
 
Apparently, Planck considered the applicability of the Principle of Least Action to 
discontinuous functions as a major virtue. Such functions had indeed become an 
important source of progress in the genuinely mathematical development of variational 
calculus; and also Boltzmann had been very interested in Weierstraß functions for the 
H-theorem (See Sect. 3.5.).  
 Except for a statement made much later in the context of science and religion78, 
Planck was at pains to avoid any smack of teleology however provisional or heuristic 
within his cherished Principle of Least Action, even though, to his mind, it led to a 
certain extension of the concept of causality. 
 
Who sticks to the principle of causality alone will demand that causes and properties of a motion can 
be made comprehensible and deducible from earlier states regardless of what will happen later on. 
This appears not only feasible, but also a direct requirement of the economy of thought. [sic!] Who 
instead seeks for higher connections within the system of natural laws which are most easy to survey, 
in the interest of the aspired harmony will from the outset also admit those means, such as reference to 
the events at later instances of time, which are not utterly necessary for the complete description of 
natural processes, but which are easy to handle and can be interpreted intuitively. (Planck, 1915a, p. 
71-72) 
 
In mathematical physics, for instance, one keeps redundant variables in order to 
maintain the symmetry of the equations. Similarly for the Principle of Least Action 
and its kin, “[t]he question of their legitimacy has nothing to do with teleology, but it 
is merely a practical one.” (Ibid., p. 72) This was an interesting mixture of pragmatism 
and pursuit of higher unity. 
 Let me turn to the constants of nature and Planck’s convergent realism. His 
quantum of action and Boltzmann’s constants characterizing thermal radiation plus the 
gravitational constant provide a universal system of units that does not depend on 
convention. “By them it is possible to define units of length, time, mass, temperature 
which necessarily remain valid for all times and for all cultures including 
                                                          
78 The Principle of Least Action, according to the late Planck, introduced the causa finalis into physics, but the 
teleological and the causal approach represented only different mathematical forms of the same fact. However, in 
a religious perspective it was important that there existed an objective regularity “which admits a formulation 
that corresponds to purposive action. This represents a rational order of the world, to which both nature and man 
are subjected to.” (Planck, 1937a, p. 303) 
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extraterrestrial and extrahuman ones.” (Planck, 1908a, p. 16). Two years later he 
provided a longer list with respect to special relativity. 
 
If … the notion of a mass point that has hitherto been assumed as fundamental loses the properties of 
constancy and invariability, what then is the truly substantial [Substantielle], what are the invariable 
building blocks from which the edifice of the physical world is composed? … The invariable elements 
of the system of physics based upon the principle of relativity are the so-called universal constants: in 
particular, light velocity in the vacuum, the electric charge, and the rest mass of the electron, the 
“elementary quantum of action” gained from thermal radiation …, the gravitational constant, and 
probably many others. These quantities have a real meaning insofar as their values are independent of 
the constitution, the position, and the velocity state of an observer. (Planck, 1910b, p. 39) 
 
Both invariances are of a different kind. In the first case, Planck praised the invariance 
under change of scale, that is, that due to these fundamental constants there exists a 
way to define the length independent of the ell measure of the present king. In the 
second case, the invariance is weaker and holds only with respect to relativistic 
transformations between observers. The most fundamental type of invariance appeared 
in Planck’s encyclopedia entry dedicated to “The Mutual Relation of Theories”. Not 
only did the abstract principles always prevail in the changes of physical theory, but 
each major step towards the ideal aim of absolute knowledge uncovered a hitherto 
unknown constant of nature. First, “[t]he modification brought into mechanics by the 
principle of relativity contains as its essential part the introduction of a new universal 
constant alien to classical mechanics, the velocity of light in vacuum.” (1915b, p. 82)  
 
[Second,] the initially stark opposition between dynamics and theory of heat was overcome by the 
principal renunciation of the assumption of absolute lawfulness in all thermal and chemical 
phenomena, combined with the introduction of the atomistic approach which operates with a number 
of new characteristic constants of nature, the atomic weights. … But [the sacrifices of dynamics] are 
probably not over with the discontinuity of matter. The laws of thermal radiation, specific heat, 
electron emission, radioactivity unanimously indicate that not only matter itself but also the effects 
originating from matter … possess discontinuous properties, which once again is characterized by a 
new constant of nature: the elementary quantum of action. (Ibid., p. 83f.) 
 
After a long-winded development (Cf. Kuhn, 1987) Planck, in those days, had finally 
accepted discontinuity although the quantum remained an alien element within his 
semi-classical theory. But he called for further unification. No doubt, in a different 
form and under a different name, the quantum would remain “an integrating part of a 
general dynamic.” (Planck, 1915b, p. 84) In 1915, the principle of elementary disorder 
that had been the linch pin of his criticism against Exner in the year before (See Sect. 
4.5.) had disappeared from his account. Planck cited Brownian motion as direct 
evidence for statistical oscillations of an equilibrium state. What, however, remained 
forever a core element of his thinking was the priority of dynamical laws over merely 
statistical ones. Instead of molecular disorder, he continued to insist that statistical 
regularity and probability calculus are “based upon the determination [Festsetzung] of 
equally possible cases. The situation is not changed by putting these determinations 
into the definitions, as is for instance done when developing probability calculus from 
the notion of collective.” (Planck, 1937b, 316f) Planck’s insistence shows how closely 
related, in effect, empiricism and the relative frequency interpretation were in those 
years. Throughout the years investigated by the present study, Planck remained a 
Kriesian in the interpretation of probability.  
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3.9. Mechanics, Mechanicism, and Culture 
 
The polemics between Planck and Mach sparked wider philosophical circles. 
Opponents and followers of Mach took side. On Mach’s side there were Petzoldt, 
Adler (1909), and Frank (1910). At the beginning of his rejoinder, Planck (1910a, p. 
1186) noted that he had received positive reactions from neo-Kantian philosophers. 
And also his former student Moritz Schlick would take Planck’s side until the 1930s 
(See Sect. 7.1. & 7.2.). Quite interesting is Ostwald’s short review published in his 
own Annalen der Naturphilosophie. Ostwald who three years before had given up 
energeticism in favor of atomism, accepted the tendency of abstraction which Planck 
considered as the core tenet of modern physics but he rightly reminded his readers of 
Mach’s basic intention to provide a unified methodological view for the whole of 
empirical science that did not halt at disciplinary boundaries. Compare Mach’s remark 
in the “Leading Thoughts”: “Physics does not own the entire world; there is biology as 
well and it is part and parcel of the world view.” (Mach, 1910, p. 237)  
 
Let us imagine that the ideal world picture intended by the author [Planck] has been completed. It will 
inform us about all observable physical phenomena insofar as it permits us to calculate them in 
advance from the given data. … But what will this world picture tell us about the biological, 
physiological, and psychological facts? Obviously nothing, and the more exactly nothing the more 
perfectly it is elaborated in the sense of Planck’s exposition. For the elimination of these other 
elements is (with complete justification) the duty of the creator of a physical world picture. (Ostwald, 
1911, p. 105) 
 
Mach’s antireductionist stance was not only a consequence of his epistemological 
holism, but also of neutral monism as outlined in The Analysis of Sensations. “If there 
is no essential difference between the physical and the psychical, we shall hope to 
trace the same exact connection, which we seek in everything that is physical, in the 
relation between the physical and the psychical also.” (Mach, 1918, p. x/xli) 
Consequently, the Mechanics ended with a section dedicated to “The Relations of 
Mechanics to Physiology.” 
 
A philosophy is involved in any correct recognition of the subsumption of special knowledge under 
the great body of knowledge at large – a philosophy that must be demanded of every special 
investigator. The lack of it is asserted in the formulation of imaginary problems, in the very 
enunciation of which, whether regarded as soluble or insoluble, flagrant absurdity is involved. Such an 
overestimation of physics, in contrast to physiology, such a mistaken conception of the true relations 
of the two sciences, is displayed in the inquiry whether it is possible to explain feelings by the motions 
of atoms. (Mach, 1988, p. 521/610) 
 
Among Mach’s targets was probably also Boltzmann who in his 1900 Leipzig 
inaugural address had developed an all-encompassing conception of mechanics 
grounding all natural sciences, medicine, and the intellectual realm. Advocating a 
mechanical interpretation of Darwin’s theory, Boltzmann extolled that now “we can 
explain the genesis of the concept of beauty, just as that of the concept of truth, in 
terms of mechanics.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 314/134) 
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It is of great advantage to united action in peace and war if young men are inspired to great and noble 
things, friendship and love, freedom and patriotism, but how easily this drive degenerates into empty 
phrases…. In this way, we understand from mechanical reasons why one youngster is aglow with the 
poetry of Schiller while many condemn the poems of Heine, which nevertheless have a powerful and 
irresistible influence on others. (Ibid., p. 315/134) 
 
There always exist antagonistic tendencies which remain in due equilibrium: between 
Schiller and Heine, between the conservatives and the emancipated, between wealth 
and the mortality of the rich. Most interestingly, Boltzmann was quite reluctant to 
introduce his indeterminist ideas into these considerations, and the stationary equilibria 
do not emerge from chance but are mechanically maintained. Exner’s theory of culture 
will be more radical in this respect. 
 Mach was loath to reduce culture to mechanics. In a small booklet titled Culture 
and Mechanics which appeared in the year before his death, Mach attributed to the 
biological and physiological a priority over mechanics and culture of a much more 
general kind than within the adaptationist program prevailing in the Mechanics. 
Already there Mach had described the continuous evolution from man’s first 
instinctive experiences to craftsmanship as stepwise economical adaptations and a 
symbolical transfer – by means of language, functional dependences, and theories – of 
the skills to posterity until the age of modern science, when this knowledge was 
systematized and methodically extended. But while back then Mach had focused on 
the various facts and theories, Culture and Mechanics reached back past the starting 
point of the Mechanics and investigated the instinctive origin of tools, weapons and 
machines, the material prehistory of culture in general. 
 The prehistory of mechanics begins in the age of slavery by subsuming the 
forces of many individuals under a common goal. The first technical inventions thus 
consisted in “mimicking and simultaneously multiplying the work of the human 
hands…. The sweeps of a gristmill are, as it were, hands arranged continuously.” 
(Mach, 1915, p. 16) The wheel and the nut and the screw (figure 3) developed 
instinctively from our sense of touch. Even the intuition of pure metals emerges 
necessarily once the appropriate ores happen to get into the fire. “As in a child, in the 
case of need again and again reminiscences pop up like a flash – need, unabashed 
force, almost automatically makes use of everything that is in an individual – thus 
identical things came off simultaneously at different places, but in most different 
ways.” (Ibid., p. 27) What is more, discoveries are even enforced by the physical 
conditions. Once “magnetite, pyrite, argillaceous earth, lime and coal” (Ibid., p. 80) 
are together at disposal, the development of the burning oven, of ferrous metallurgy, 
and even of nitroglycerin results from a continuous sequence of accidental discoveries 
and instinctive experiences.  
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Fig. 3. The screw sensed on a rope (right) and the nut sensed by the finger nails (left). 
 
Most startling, however, is that Mach considered this evolution of material culture as 
necessary for the development of our present stage of culture and as more basic than 
all theoretical insights. To prove this thesis he imagined a large-scale thought 
experiment. 
 
Let us imagine that during one night all our possessions [tools, machines, bridges, etc., taken over 
from past generations] would be lost; to be sure, knowledge, skills, experiences would have remained, 
but any connection between yesterday and today would be missing, nothing, absolutely nothing would 
be at our disposal – we would be in dire need. Wouldn’t we be forced to improvise, as during infancy, 
the hammer by a stone, and wouldn’t we run in a circle of hopeless embarrassments despite all our 
knowledge? We would have to start anew!  
 Certainly, our knowledge, our intellectual heritage, would spare us millennia of detour and 
going astray, but … what would be the use of Michelson’s analysis of the sunken meter in 
wavelengths of the cadmium-line – wouldn’t we have to take the trouble to modestly carve our first 
screws from wood …? With the wooden screw in our hand … we would see the real and inexorable 
demand of continuity, which cannot be abridged by any wit or knack, that lies between the primitive 
start, the improvement and the final completion.  
 We would have to build machine after machine, in a long and uninterrupted chain, one 
improving and complementing the other, each one would have to run and produce for a certain time, 
filling its place in the chain in order to bring about the final goal. (Ibid., pp. 84-85) 
 
For later readers, this argument was probably as stunning as Boltzmann’s atomistic 
explanation of poetry. Both ideas, and Mach’s entire booklet, remained practically 
unmentioned during the further phases of Vienna Indeterminism although most 
protagonists of this tradition, and its opponents, actively involved themselves in 
matters of culture or society.  
Notice two peculiarities of Mach’s thinking.. First, although physics represents 
the formally most developed scientific theory, it does not occupy a preferred position 
either in a methodological or ontological respect. With due qualifications concerning 
ontology and his Machian methodology, Boltzmann put atomistic first in both 
respects. Planck similarly declared physics as the paradigm of all science, but in 
contrast to Boltzmann and following the Kantian model he strictly distinguished 
empirical science from the noumenal realm of ethics and religion. They were not 
hermetically separated but determinism and free will complemented one another as did 
knowledge and action. Although Logical Empiricists would reject this distinction as 
metaphysical, they nevertheless accepted the primacy of physics and demanded that 
psychology follow similar methods. Physicalism would acquire two different 
meanings in the Vienna Circle: while Carnap required a reducibility of all basic 
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statements to statements of physical science, Neurath settled for requiring that only 
expressions about spatio-temporal phenomena occur in them. This did not mean that 
neutral monism or the reduction to observational elements disappeared, it just became 
detached from the causality debate until questions about quantum measurement arose.  
Second, what completely disappeared after Mach and Boltzmann, was the 
biological and physiological basis of science. In particular, the principle of economy 
developed into a principle of simplicity and accordingly moved from biology into the 
field of language. This development already started with Exner, who also devoted 
more space to the intellectual and cultural realm than any other advocate of Vienna 
Indeterminism. 
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4. Exner’s Synthesis 
 
On September 8th, 1906, the morning edition of the Neue Freie Presse published two 
obituaries of Boltzmann on its front page. After a sketch of Boltzmann’s scientific 
career, Ernst Mach emphasized that despite his myopia the deceased was “almost 
unparalleled as an experimenter”. Moreover, Boltzmann combined extraordinary 
mathematical abilities with a complete knowledge of the literature. Discussing 
“Boltzmann’s lifework”, the experimentalist Franz Serafin Exner focused on the 
kinetic theory of gases and the atomistic world view, in which Boltzmann “found the 
best mainstay in the struggle against the lately popular, but unclear ideas of 
energeticism, which are propagated in particular by Ostwald and his followers. 
Against all these theories which signify, in effect, a step backward, Boltzmann fought 
a stubborn, but righteous and meritorious struggle in which his sharp mathematical 
weapons always led him to victory.” 
 When roughly a decade later, Exner in his capacity as secretary general of the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences wrote an obituary for Mach in its Annalen, the tone 
was less emphatic.79 He emphasized that Mach’s most important scientific 
achievement were his historical-physical studies which laid the ground for his 
international fame. 
 
Two moments guided his historico-critical studies: to point out how during the course of the historical 
development of science the laws of nature are found and formulated by those who discovered them; 
moreover to show the way how this formulation can be carried through by comparison and analogy 
with already known and familiar laws, with a minimal expenditure of work by avoiding anything 
superfluous or unnecessary which only entices the wrong track of false pseudoproblems. By 
eliminating all that the investigation of which has no sense, there emerges more clearly what the single 
sciences can really investigate: the manifold universal [allseitige] inter-dependence of the elements. 
This economical principle of science was one of his leading thoughts. (Exner, 1916, p. 333) 
 
Exner was not a blind propagandist of Boltzmann, even though in his Curriculum for 
the Austrian Academy of Sciences he recognized the “valuable stimulations” (1917, p. 
9) he had received from Boltzmann during his first Vienna period.  
 What Exner achieved – so the present chapter argues – was that particular 
synthesis between Boltzmann’s and Mach’s thinking which Frank and Schrödinger 
diagnosed in their recollections as the local philosophical creed prevailing among the 
Vienna physicists. He did so by strengthening the empiricist traits in Boltzmann’s 
thinking and supplementing his late indeterminism with a more suitable interpretation 
of probability. Boltzmann had initially studied Mach’s epistemology against the 
backdrop of the mechanics-energetics controversy, and it played an important role 
within his defense of the kinetic theory of gases. To Boltzmann, mechanics, after 
having overcome the old materialist approach, was an all-encompassing picture even 
applicable to Darwinism and culture. Exner, too, was a physicalist but he understood 
physicalism in a broader and less reductionist sense than Boltzmann. This placed him 
half way between Boltzmann’s atomism and Mach’s antireductionist naturalism. As 
we see in his obituary, Exner read Mach almost exclusively as a physicist or a 
                                                          
79 This difference should not be exaggerated; the front page of an newspaper and the annals of an academy 
represent very different rhetorical contexts. 
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philosopher of physics, and thus from Exner on the key role of biology and 
psychology in justifying scientific theories disappeared from the tradition of Vienna 
Indeterminism. 
 Exner’s return to the wider Machian horizon made possible what represents, to 
my mind, his most important contribution to Vienna Indeterminism. In his 1908 
inaugural address as Rector of the University of Vienna, he integrated the relative 
frequency interpretation of probability into a firm empiricist outlook to obtain a better 
foundation for the irreducible indeterminism characteristic of the late Boltzmann. On 
Exner’s account, exact laws were just the macroscopic limit of purely random events 
at the microlevel. This signified a major step of abstraction. Neither Machian elements 
nor pictorial atoms were the ontological basis of scientific theory, but events and 
processes. This move led to a substantial increase in the flexibility of scientific 
theorizing.  
 Exner’s new way of interpreting Boltzmann’s indeterminism was not just a 
matter of being familiar – in contrast to Boltzmann – with the philosophical context of 
Fechner’s thinking into which the frequency interpretation was deeply embedded. 
Rather than being a natural consequence of pursuing the descriptivist ideal in physics 
as defended by Mach and Kirchhoff, a genuinely statistical world view was germane to 
psychology and the social sciences in general. Bridging the gap between the sciences 
and the humanities and integrating the idea of indeterminism as defended by the late 
Boltzmann into an indeterminist world view required such a broadly-minded physicist 
as Exner. A polymath in many respects and driven by a great veneration for the arts, in 
Exner a third guiding influence can be discerned, Alexander von Humboldt’s physical 
description of the world. All this is the agenda for the first two sections of the present 
chapter. 
 Beyond the thematical aspects, Exner’s personality (Section 4.3) played a 
crucial role in disseminating what – before the causality debates began at about the 
mid 1920s – could have been regarded as a mere syncretism of a philosophizing 
physicist. Exner’s synthesis and his genuine indeterminism became the credo for a 
whole group of younger Viennese physicists. Exner neatly fitted into an institution that 
was both more philosophically-minded – inspired by the local philosophical tradition 
of Mach and Boltzmann – and more cohesive on the personal level than other 
comparable physics institutes in the German-speaking world (Section 4.7). Thus Exner 
and his circle became the connecting link between the late Boltzmann and the second 
half of the tradition to be investigated in later chapters. 
 No surprise that Exner’s introductory Lectures on the Physical Foundations of 
the Natural Sciences written down during the years of the war contained a long 
philosophical chapter “On Natural Laws” in which his empiricist and indeterminist 
theory of causality was elaborated at considerable length. The last section of that 
chapter represents his rejoinder to the criticism which Planck, right at the beginning of 
the war, had directed at Exner’s Inaugural Address. Section 4.4. is dedicated to the 
Lectures, and Section 4.5. reconstructs the dialogue with Planck. In core philosophical 
respects, empiricism and causality foremost, this dialogue continued the polemics 
between Planck and Mach, and it would in turn be continued by Exner’s former 
student Schrödinger, after he had become Planck’s successor in Berlin (See Sect. 
6.3.5) and when he criticized Schlick’s ignorance of Exner (Sect. 7.4.). 
 128
 When right at the end of the war, Spengler’s Decline appeared and quickly 
spellbound the German intellectual milieu. Spengler severed the bond Humboldt’s 
Cosmos had woven artistically between the empirical world and its internal mirror 
image in the individual. The harmonic picture of Nature was torn into pieces. The 
humanist Exner was prompted to react in a twofold way. Accepting Spengler’s 
pessimism regarding the arts, he emphatically defended the objectivity and constant 
growth of the sciences against the relativism of Decline. This two-tired response for 
and against Spengler was based on Exner’s particular version of indeterminism and 
historical causality. At the end of his life, Exner even embarked onto revitalizing – or 
rather extending – the Humboldtian project against Spengler by writing a 
comprehensive indeterminist theory of culture, within which culture comprised 
everything from the formation of the stars until Western civilization. Section 4.6. 
shows more than anything else how inappropriate the picture of the German cultural 
milieu drawn by Forman is for the local Viennese context. 
 
4.1 The Inaugural Address and Its Context (1908) 
 
At noon October 15th, 1908, Exner delivered his inaugural address as Rector of the 
University of Vienna “On Laws in Science and Humanistics.” His objective was 
nothing less than to oblige his colleagues from all faculties to pursue the same goal, 
“the study of truth, of that objective truth that exists unaffected by human sentiment 
and thought.” (Exner, 1909, p. 3) Against the standard argument – at least since the 
times of Wilhelm Dilthey – in favor of a distinct methodology for the 
Geisteswissenschaften, Exner rejected any absolute methodological difference between 
the sciences [Naturwissenschaften] and humanistics and instead ascribed the factual 
differences between both realms of knowledge to a difference in the objects studied by 
them. This intention was also reflected by the Rector’s somewhat idiosyncratic 
terminology. The German original “Humanistik” refers to “humanistisch” which is not 
only the adjective to “Humanismus” (humanism), but also to the Greek and Latin 
classics and the type of gymnasium centering around them. Benndorf’s obituary relates 
that Exner “remained an unconditional supporter of humanistic education and held that 
nothing proves better the necessity of humanistic studies than the attacks put forward 
by its adversaries.” (Benndorf, 1927, p. 398).80  
 Exner’s unifying move, of course, immediately raised the classical question as 
to why the humanistic disciplines – in contrast to the sciences – never formulate 
mathematically precise and universal laws, but obtain weak regularities at best. 
Surprisingly, the Rector addressed exactly the opposite question and investigated why 
physics was at all able to obtain strict laws. He asserted that all processes are processes 
in nature, be they biological, historical, economical, or linguistic ones. Thus they fall 
                                                          
80 After some illuminating remarks about the rather recent origin of the English “humanities”, Hiebert (2000, p. 
10) translates “Humanistik” as “the humanities”. In contrast to the German “Geisteswissenschaften” this 
wording captures a key aspect of what Exner was after. Still, although the pair “science–humanities” does not 
coincide with the German “Naturwissenschaft–Geisteswissenschaft”, it is typically associated with a certain 
methodological dualism of the sort Exner set out to reject. What has finally conduced me to concoct the 
translation “humanistics” for “Humanistik” (instead of “humanities”) is that both terms sound equally queer and 
cannot be found in a comprehensive vocabulary of English and German respectively. As a matter of fact, Exner 
used “Humanistik” only in his Inaugural Address. 
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under the laws of physics whose common basis is Boltzmann’s atomism. But Exner 
combined Boltzmann’s physicalism with Mach’s radical empiricism, thus finally 
severing the former’s bond with the mechanistic world view. The sciences’ common 
quest for truth notwithstanding, he held that “these laws do not exist in nature, only 
man formulates them and avails himself of them as linguistic and calculatory means.” 
(Exner, 1909, p. 7) From random collisions between atoms or molecules the kinetic 
theory of gases yields the laws of phenomenological thermodynamics in the limit of 
very, very many particles. Having adopted Mach’s flexible and more general notion of 
causality, Exner was able to apply Boltzmann’s probabilistic approach to any kind of 
natural process. The strict laws physicists observe emerge as the macroscopic limit of 
a very large number of random single events. And Exner went still further: in the 
molecular dynamics of a gas “we even observe regularities which are brought out 
exclusively by chance.” (Ibid., p. 13) 
 To render meaningful such a genuinely probabilistic approach, two points have 
to be observed. First, since laws justified on the basis of random micro-events hold 
strictly only in the limit of infinitely many single events, there cannot exist any 
absolute law, but only average laws, the probability of which is so high “that it equals 
certainty for human conceptions,” (Ibid., p. 16) that is, the statistical fluctuations stay 
below the threshold of measurability. Moreover, laws of nature can change on the 
cosmological scale without us detecting them in short-time experiments in the 
laboratory – an idea that reached back to Fechner. Second, “where the random single 
events succeed one another too slowly there can be no talk about a law.” (Ibid., p. 14) 
This is the case not only in humanistics but also in the descriptive sciences, regardless 
whether they concern living beings in biology or inanimate matter in geology. In 
principle, any discipline is able to reach relatively strict average laws during its 
development over eons upon eons. But within the long period needed for these laws to 
stabilize as statistical equilibria, the boundary conditions for the random single events 
typically change in such a way that the limit of infinitely many events changes too. 
Thus, the descriptive sciences can only reach weak regularities that explicitly take 
account of the constantly changing circumstances and complex boundary conditions. 
Biological laws, for instance, hold only ceteris paribus, that is, if the physical and 
chemical milieu does not change too drastically.  
 The second point clearly shows that Exner already argued on the basis of the 
relative frequency interpretation of probability. For, only if existence and uniqueness 
of the limit of relative frequencies is ensured for each randomly chosen subset of the 
set of single events, these events form a statistical collective and make it possible to 
define probability as this limit. This was a move Boltzmann had never made, but 
Exner was well prepared to do so already in 1908 (See Sect. 4.2.). When throwing two 
dice sufficiently often we see that – so Exner illustrated this approach – the more 
probable numbers of spots occur more frequently. This manifests the law of large 
numbers that is “unprovable but taken from the thousandfold experience of men and 
constitutes the basis of probability calculus. As the one and only law it indeed governs 
all happenings in nature.” (Ibid., p. 19) Looking around us, we at first do not discern 
any lawlike regularities, but rather that all natural processes are directed. Thus, to 
Exner’s mind, the second law of thermodynamics becomes the basic principle in 
nature. Boltzmann “was the first to give a definite and clear interpretation of this 
direction …, showing that the world ceaselessly develops from less probable into more 
 130
probable, and hence more stable, states.” (Ibid., p. 9f.) Also mankind as a biological 
species is part of the “development from the more uniform hence less probable state of 
the single cells…, to the more probable state of the differentiated species and genera. 
The constancy of our species within surveyable times indicates that rather probable 
states have already been reached.” (Ibid., p. 33) 
 Indeed, the second law of thermodynamics entails that ordered states exhibiting 
symmetries or other structural features are less probable than disorder. Any 
meaningful application of the second law, however, requires a precise definition of the 
respective measure of order. While this is easily possible in statistical mechanics by 
partitioning phase space, the above-mentioned biological example shows that it is far 
from evident in other fields. Already during Exner’s lifetime, the second law was 
typically invoked to argue that an organism’s growth not only requires energy, but – 
even to a larger extent – negative entropy. Taking metabolism into account, single 
cells are hence much more probable than a complex organism, a conclusion in stark 
contrast to Exner’s intuition. If one even wants, as does Exner, to turn the second law 
into a physicalist foundation of humanistics, the definition of order and disorder 
substantially determines the value and meaningfulness of the conclusions reached. Due 
to this problem Exner’s theory of culture in certain cases only produces explanatory 
tautologies. (See Sect. 4.6.2) 
 Exner generalized another feature figuring prominently in kinetic theory into a 
principal distinction between two levels. Natural laws represent a macroscopic order 
that constantly arises from molecular disorder at the microscopic level. If one jumbles 
up a well-ordered library by putting back the books at random, an ordered macro-state 
changes into a disordered macro-state. Similarly, perfect equality of all humans with 
respect to wealth, social status, and work corresponds to a highly improbable perfectly 
ordered society that is analogous to a gas with molecules of identical velocities.  
 
If we compare the state of a cultured nation [Kulturvolk] with that of savage tribes or even of the 
prehistoric human…, we find a remarkable uniformity on the former side in contrast to plenty of 
inequalities in physical, intellectual and social respect on the latter which increase the more the older 
the culture becomes. (Ibid., p. 26) 
 
Statistically, however, the men in the street prevail by far. The inescapability of every 
culture’s historical course does not force the single human into fatalism or “to pay 
homage to the oriental kismet,” (Ibid., p. 40) because despite the law-determined 
global (or macroscopic) distribution of a property there is no constraint on its local (or 
microscopic) distribution, that is for an individual or a small group. But social 
engineering cannot hold up the course of nature in the long run.  
 
Often the call for retributive justice, or perhaps even for complete equality in wealth is raised. But this 
would be as irrational as complaining that the brickstones of a house under construction do not go up 
by themselves. This distribution cannot be changed because it is simply the necessary consequence of 
the respective state of the culture. (Ibid., p. 40) 
 
The evening edition of the Neue Freie Presse of the same day published large parts of 
Exner’s Inaugural Address on its third page and reported an “exceptionally large 
attendance of the students” and a “thunderous and continuous applause” of the 
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audience.81 In a long obituary, Hans Benndorf, Exner’s former student and a close 
friend of the family, related that the speech “made a great stir” even outside academia. 
(Benndorf, 1927, p. 403) Similar recollections can be found in Kuhn’s interview with 
Philipp Frank. 
 
Frank: I would say that Vienna was a big school of physics. … I studied mostly with Boltzmann. But 
Exner, you see, became connected with the basis of quantum theory by one thing, by one lecture. I 
think it was his inaugural lecture as Rektor. – It was about the role of statistics in physics. And then he 
said one thing which became rather famous; he said that it may be that the basis of physics will be 
statistical. And it may not be that every statistical law can be derived from dynamic laws. Because 
generally, of course, the [reigning] idea had been that statistics only gave an average. The basic laws 
were the Newtonian laws. But it was Franz Exner who already said that maybe this was not true. It 
could be that the basic laws are statistical. I think that this concept had a great influence on 
Schrödinger.  
 
Kuhn: I haven’t read Exner’s address but I did read Schrödinger’s [1922] essay on this. But was this 
something the rest of you also knew? Or has that statement only become famous since Schrödinger?  
 
Frank: Oh no, no. It was already known at that time. It was widely discussed even when I was a 
student … All the physicists in Vienna were interested in the philosophy of science. Hence if there 
was anything connected with philosophy of science [such as the status of statistical laws] it would be 
widely discussed. Admittedly, Franz Exner was not well-known for his interest or publications in 
philosophy of science, but in this matter he did clearly lead the way. Exner was an experimental 
physicist who usually left philosophical matters to Mach and Boltzmann who was the theoretical 
physicist. At this time, I think that Exner’s main field was connected with electricity, atmospheric 
electricity. It was the beginning of ion theory – of ions and electrons at this time. Oh yes, it was much 
discussed whether the foundation of this was statistical or not, because everything was connected with 
philosophy. (quoted from Blackmore, 2001, p. 61f.)82 
 
These testimonies show that in Vienna Exner’s viewpoint was not so “subterranean” as 
Forman assumes. The Inaugural Address made enough of a stir to prompt a reaction of 
Planck. Frank and in particular Schrödinger would constantly point to Exner’s priority 
as regards the fundamental statistical character of physical laws. How did Exner arrive 
at this idea or, rather, what motivated him to go beyond the late Boltzmann? Exner’s 
philosophical background shall concern us next. 
 
4.2 Preconditions of an Indeterminist World-View 
 
In his Curriculum Vitae, Exner remembers: 
 
During the senior years at the Gymnasium the proclivity to the natural sciences came out more and 
more and if I should say what in those days had been of particular influence on me, then I would have 
to mention above all the writings of A. v. Humboldt which already at the time aroused the strongest 
impression on me because of their universality. It was perhaps an unconscious tradition [of his 
deceased father Franz Exner] that I felt the wish to occupy myself with purely philosophical problems, 
such as in particular with Herbart’s system, especially with his psychology and metaphysics …. 
Among all the natural sciences, physical geography fascinated me in particular, and I thought of 
dedicating myself to it; but already during the Gymnasium I realized that to this end a reliable physical 
                                                          
81 Evening edition (Abendausgabe) of the Neue Freie Presse, October 15, 1908, p. 3. 
82 I have deleted some brackets inserted by Blackmore because they are irrelevant for the present argument. 
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basic knowledge is necessary, and thus I wanted to devote myself to the studies of physical 
phenomena which I actually did. (1917, p. 3) 
 
Exner remained a physicist all of his life, not least because of the generality of that 
science. But philosophy and physical geography would come into their own right. 
 Apart from the dominant influence which Herbart’s philosophy exerted in 
Austria during the days of Exner’s studies, there was also an important family context. 
His father Franz Exner (1802-1853), who was a professor of philosophy at Prague 
University and a leading figure in the educational reforms of the post-revolutionary 
Austria, was a renowned Herbart scholar. Due to his eye troubles Franz Exner needed 
a reader, and the job was given to the young student of chemistry Josef Loschmidt. To 
Loschmidt, who was of humble beginnings, the house of the Exner’s became the 
entrance door to another world of philosophy, literature, and the arts. After Franz 
Exner’s and his wife’s early deaths, Loschmidt was among those taking care for the 
Exner children in Vienna. And finally in 1891, Franz Serafin would become 
Loschmidt’s successor as professor of physical chemistry.83 In two commemorative 
articles on Loschmidt, Exner (1895, 1921) relates that once his father had seen the 
growing philosophical interests of his reader, he gave him a philosophical problem to 
solve.  
 
The problem … to carry through Herbart’s psychology in a strictly mathematical fashion became the 
reason why Loschmidt finally renounced philosophy and dedicated himself to the natural sciences. 
The conviction which he arrived at during this work, that it is entirely hopeless to advance on this way 
because the application of mathematics to psychology is erroneous in point of principle, made him a 
renegade, and – so he used to say – “renegades are the worst enemies.” Nonetheless, Loschmidt never 
regretted the efforts dedicated to philosophy; to the contrary, he always spoke of this time with the 
highest gratitude. Indeed I believe that the philosophical composure and … his mentality constantly 
directed at the essentials had their roots in those days. (Exner, 1921, p. 178) 
 
In the rather similar passage of his 1895 newspaper article, Exner made clear that he 
shared Loschmidt’s verdict by adding the following parenthesis: “still today many 
philosophers stick to the applicability of mathematics in this realm although no one 
knows how to apply it.” (Exner, 1895) 
 From Exner’s Curriculum Vitae and the episode with Loschmidt one can 
conclude that he had thoroughly studied Herbart’s philosophy and it is safe to assume 
that he knew Fechner’s manifold criticisms of it.84 Exner almost certainly knew 
Fechner’s work in physics, and at the beginning of the new century the interest for the 
philosophical work of Fechner had increased. To be sure, many ideas of Fechner were 
contested by the interpreters. Franz Serafin’s brother Sigmund, elder by three years, 
was a world-renowned physiologist and held a chair at the University of Vienna as 
well. So he was probably well-informed about the recent state of psychophysics. On 
the other hand, he was skeptical towards mathematical psychology and in the Lectures 
he neither took up the psychologist elements in Mach’s thinking nor Mach’s theory of 
measurement. Apart from Exner’s pondering that the laws of nature change on the 
                                                          
83 The bulk of the biographical information reported in the present chapter can be found in (Karlik/Schmid, 
1982), which in turn often relies upon (Exner, 1917) and (Benndorf, 1927). A succinct summary can be found in 
(Hanle, 1979, pp. 228-232). 
84 On the multifarious relation between Fechner and Herbart which was by no means a simple opposition, see 
(Heidelberger, 1993). 
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cosmological scale, I have not found any incontrovertible allusion to Fechner’s 
writings – and this idea was at bottom already touted in Boltzmann’s philosophy 
lectures. (See Sect. 3.5) As the documentary evidence remains inconclusive, it remains 
open whether Fechner’s philosophy was a particular motivation for Exner to adopt the 
relative frequency interpretation of probability.  
 Thus I shall rather pursue a different line of influence here that brings into play 
the whole of humanistics. This wider context is backed by the manifold references to 
issues of society in the Inaugural Address and by Exner’s later indeterminist theory of 
culture. 
 In a recent paper, Erwin N. Hiebert has spotted a broad tendency “in which 
probability and chance, as generated from within the social and humanistic disciplines, 
came to inspire and motivate investigators in the physical sciences to take a deeper 
look (deeper than classical mechanics allows) at processes that occur in nature.” 
(Hiebert, 2000, p. 7) An entire constellation of Austrian physicists around Exner 
“initiated an algorithm of statistical and probabilistic thinking that was borrowed from 
the humanities.” (Ibid., p. 10) What Hiebert terms the “Austrian Revolt in Classical 
Mechanics” had been prepared by Boltzmann and his teachers Loschmidt, who found 
the size and diameter of molecules, and Josef Stefan, who obtained important results in 
kinetic theory; and it was the younger generation of Exner’s students Stefan Meyer, 
Marian von Smoluchowski, Egon von Schweidler, Friedrich Kohlrausch, and Erwin 
Schrödinger85 who “were able to carry the atomic-molecular-kinetic theory of matter 
(wedded in this case to probabilistic thinking) into newly discovered arenas, such as 
radioactivity and quantum thinking. … Indeed radioactive decay was the first example 
of discovery of a natural phenomenon that exhibits genuine probabilistic nature.” 
(Ibid., p. 13) This was a remarkable step across a cleft which gave so ample living 
space for Spengler’s Decline. 
 
Before the turn of the century, all appeals to mechanics had shared the common feature of being 
embedded in classical, deterministic, and causal thought leaving no room for probability, chance, 
randomness, or chaotic behavior. By contrast, contingency, probability, chance (absence of assignable 
cause), randomness, and chaos were known components of the world of phenomena that characterize 
the social sciences and the humanities. Indeed it was contingency that radically set them apart and 
alienated them from the mechanical model that had been put in place for the exact sciences. (Ibid., p. 
9)  
 
Hiebert takes the existence of the Austrian revisionist mechanics as an example of a 
reverse case of influence in which a less exact science donated to a more exact science. 
Such influence blocks to a large extent – so Hiebert argues – those reductionist 
endeavors virtually characteristic of modern physics. And indeed Exner gave the 
reduction issue a new twist. Had Boltzmann maintained that biology, psychology, and 
the humanistic disciplines could profit from a reduction to atomistic theory, Exner’s 
indeterminism “courageously changed the nature of the search for common frontiers 
by demonstrating that the exact sciences and the humanities are complementary in that 
they both are anchored in the probability and not the certainty of events.” (Ibid., p. 25) 
The new theoretical basic entities were of a different kind. 
                                                          
85 Hiebert’s list also includes Richard von Mises, who had studied at the Technical University in Vienna, and 
Reinhold Fürth, who had studied with Anton Lampa and Philipp Frank in Prague, and became a professor there. 
I am pretty fine with adding those important indeterminists of Austrian origin who not members of the Exner 
circle, and suggest to amend the list with Frank. 
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For Exner there is nothing out there in the world except a continuum of events that are more or less 
readily, or with more or less difficulty, brought in line with acceptable explanation in search of 
objective truth. There is no end in sight, no final solution; there is no theory of everything. The task is 
endless and open-ended in the exact sciences, as in the humanities. Their boundaries need not be cast 
in stone, but unrestrained extrapolation from one discipline to another undercuts the rich depth of 
human learning. (Ibid., p. 25f.) 
 
Hiebert is right in stressing Exner’s combined rejection of mechanist reductionism and 
of a foolproof methodology for the natural sciences; both rejections were part of the 
Machian heritage. But Exner did not take the Machian tack countering ontological 
reductionism by stressing that physics, biology, and psychology stood on a par the 
provisional unified world view (Cf. Section 3.9.). To Exner, the objects of the sciences 
were different in kind, but probability calculus provided a unified methodological 
approach that was not committed to strong forms of reductionism be they based on the 
existence of atoms or the fitness for survival. Although Exner endorsed Boltzmann’s 
atomism, he did not advocate a theory reduction to universal pictures as specific as 
Boltzmann. (Section 3.4.) The relative frequency interpretation of probability allowed 
Exner a more general approach because it dispensed him of an explicit description of 
the basic entities – be they inferred from the interactions or hypothetically assumed. It 
was sufficient that one could spot a sufficiently large number of single events or 
processes that, in the limit, reproduced the macroscopically observable laws. Exner 
might thus be called an areductionist on the ontological level who, at the same time, 
advocated a methodological reduction to abstract theoretical entities, collectives of 
events and single processes, rendering consequently the second law a meta-principle 
basic to all sciences and humanistics. This also prevented him to repeat Boltzmann’s 
exaggerations about the mechanical nature of cultural phenomena (Cf. Section 3.9.). 
 Exner’s new outlook was embedded into a historical perspective according to 
which the scientific world view, and all of the single laws or weak regularities in 
nature had emerged in the course of the world’s history. Once found they represented a 
possession that, in stark contrast to Spengler, could never be lost entirely. Taking 
Hiebert’s perspective, it becomes clear why Exner felt so strongly about Decline that 
he devoted the entire Preface to the second edition of his Lectures to it. He was not the 
hard-boiled physicist who could simply dismiss the book because of its blatant 
misunderstanding of scientific facts. “Exner knew that he was speaking for a 
generation of scientists who had recognized, or more correctly, were beginning to 
recognize, that the search for truths in physics implied an openness to ideas coming 
from disciplines traditionally thought to belong to areas of learning beyond the borders 
of physics.” (Ibid., p. 22) Exner did not react with adaptation, but rather sat down to 
write a counterproject. (See Sect. 4.6) 
 One of Exner’s manifold inspirations for seeking common frontiers and 
methodological unity of science and humanistics in a weaker sense than Boltzmann’s 
theory reduction and Mach’s economy of thought stemmed from the intellectual 
sweetheart of his youth, Alexander von Humboldt’s physical geography. In his most 
famous work Cosmos: Outline of a Physical Description of the World, Humboldt 
outlined a particular way to mediate between the scientific and aesthetic aspects of 
nature. Each of the five volumes that appeared between 1845-1862 quickly became a 
bestseller. Hanno Beck writes: “People scrambled for the book which after the 
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adventures of a wildly speculating Naturphilosophie,… after a long reign of 
Romanticism befriended the German intellectual world with empirical science, which 
– presented comprehensible and in stylistic perfection – bewitched a bourgeoisie 
[Bürgertum] committed to education;” (Humboldt, 1993, vol. 2, pp. 410f.)86 a 
bourgeoisie – one might add – that after World War I would scramble for the two 
volumes of Spengler’s Decline mirroring their deep-seated pessimism and skepticism 
toward modern science and technology. Humboldt’s physical description of the world 
[physische Weltbeschreibung], instead, built a bridge between science and human 
sensitivity. Its main impulse was “the endeavor to conceive the appearances of the 
material bodies within their general context and to comprehend Nature as a whole that 
is moved and animated by its inner forces.” (Ibid., vol. 1, p. 7) 
 Most importantly, Humboldt understood physical description of the world as an 
autonomous scientific discipline embracing both the Earth and outer space. Its highest 
goal consisted in the recognition of unity in the manifold, in the investigation of the 
inner connections in sidereal and tellurian phenomena. But Humboldt’s new universal 
science was not tantamount to an encyclopedia of the single sciences. Although 
physical description presupposes, for instance, physical science, “it teaches the 
distribution of magnetism on our planet according to relations of intensity and 
direction, not the laws of magnetic attraction and repulsion or the means to cause 
strong electromagnetic effects.” (Ibid., vol. 1, p. 45) In virtue of its universal objective, 
Humboldt’s new science contained only the general laws of orography or 
hydrography, not a comprehensive cartography of single mountains, vulcanos, or 
currents.  
 In Machian terms, Humboldt’s physical description of the world could be 
interpreted as a phenomenological science that aspired at a direct description of the 
observed facts, especially the distribution of certain phenomena across the world by 
means of specific equations, without attributing more than auxiliary value to – 
ontological or theory – reductionist hypotheses. Interestingly, the first volume of Die 
Naturwissenschaften contained an interpretation of Cosmos against precisely this 
background. Erich Metze opposed the then-common view that Cosmos was antiquated 
because contrary to Humboldt’s aesthetical mode of description, modern science 
aspired to a sober explanation of nature. “If it is furthermore claimed that the scientific 
methodology of Humboldt is in principle different from today’s, then this is based on a 
grave self-delusion. For us there exists no true difference between description and 
explanation of the world.” (Metze, 1913, p. 912). Quoting Kirchhoff, Metze 
concludes: “Even a sublime intelligence possessing the world formula as Laplace and 
du Bois-Reymond have imagined, could never transcend mere description.” (Ibid., p. 
913) Although Humboldt was aware of the distinction between description and 
explanation of the world, our limited knowledge forced us to content ourselves with 
the empirical laws while the causal nexus remained an unreachable ideal goal. Thus, 
the distinction was only of a practical kind and Humboldt, after all, considered 
explanation and description of the world as identical.  
 To my mind, this identification of Metze’s slightly overshoots the mark. In 
contrast to Mach, Humboldt’s new science did not stop at tolerating an incomplete 
world view, but intended to show by painting a preliminary unified image of Cosmos 
the existence of a unity of nature based on eternal causal laws. But Humboldt was well 
                                                          
86This edition contains only the first two books of the Kosmos which give the picture of Nature. 
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aware of the dangers of prematurely reducing all phenomena to a single principle – as 
had attempted Greek atomists and Pythagorean mathematicians. But contrary to the 
Ignorabimus and beyond a straightforwardly Machian approach that would unite the 
various branches of phenomenological knowledge per analogiam, Humboldt believed 
that physical description “by meaningfully arranging the phenomena lets us presage 
their causal connection.” (Humboldt, 1850, p. 4f.) Thus the prospect of a genuine 
explanation going beyond description remained. 
 Already in his early geographical work about the distribution of plants,87 
Humboldt applied statistical methods to the distribution of various physical and 
biological properties, an approach that in those days had been restricted to political 
geography. In the Preface to Ideas ([1807] 1960), Humboldt explicitly acknowledged 
the help and influence of Laplace and Jean Baptiste Biot. The Humboldt connection 
thus confirms Hiebert’s thesis that Exner’s indeterminism represented an intrusion of 
non-physical methods into physics. 
Let me come finally to that aspect of Cosmos which Exner would carry out in From 
Chaos to the Present. A parallel between both works was already suggested by 
Benndorf: “What the young man had attracted in Humboldt’s Cosmos, the universality 
of the approach, he worked out for himself in the course of a long, unusually rich life 
and, as it were, intended to leave it to posterity as the legacy of his personality.” 
(Benndorf, 1927, p. 404)88 Humboldt’s Cosmos described the objective content of the 
physical description of the world as “the real empirical view of the whole of nature in 
the scientific form of a picture of Nature [Naturgemälde].” (Humboldt, 1993, vol. 1, p. 
43) The first part of the second volume investigated “the reflection of the picture 
received from the external senses on the sentiment and the poetically disposed 
imagination.” (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 3) It studied the respective ways of stimulation, the 
aesthetic and literary description of Nature, landscape painting, and the cultivation of 
tropical plants. Finally, Humboldt outlined the “History of the physical description of 
the world: the leading factors in the development and extension of the concept of the 
cosmos as a natural whole.” (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 88) As these sciences differ from the 
natural sciences, so their history does not coincide with a history of the natural 
sciences. Instead, Humboldt’s theme was the historical development of one particular 
thought, of the idea of the unity of natural phenomena. In view of the popular talk 
about the “heat death” of the universe, it might seem surprising that Exner indeed 
believed that his general application of the second law of thermodynamics represented, 
constructively, such a unifying principle of science and humanistics. 
 Studying the emergence of the objective world view in From Chaos to the 
Present, so I argue in Section 4.6, Exner followed Humboldt’s model of the history of 
the physical description of the world and of the emergence of the notion of the cosmos. 
But he pursued a still more ambitious program embracing also those aspects of human 
culture which Humboldt had set apart. Although I would think that Decline and the 
post-war cultural developments it was embedded in, prompted Exner to actually write 
down his history of culture and try to get it published, it was anything but a bolt from 
the blue. Already in 1908 he had clearly expressed his comprehensive notion of culture 
                                                          
87 See the map in (Humboldt, [1807] 1960). Much more data is processed in (Humboldt, 1831). 
88 The fact that Benndorf still in 1937 cited the manuscript with the wrong title Vom Chaos zur Jetztzeit suggests 
that he had never seen it, which suggests in turn that the Humboldt context was evident to or even discussed in 
the Exner circle. 
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and much of the ideas written down after the war had already circulated in the Exner 
circle for years. The recollections gathered in the following section shed light upon the 
particular nature of Exner’s personality which was instrumental in transmitting Vienna 
Indeterminism to a new generation. 
 
4.3 Exner and His Circle 
 
When Exner began his rectorate in 1908, “he had reached the height of his activity, 
[and was] surrounded by a bevy of pupils who respected him like a father.” (Benndorf, 
1927, p. 403) In this way, Exner who had been extraordinary professor since 1879 and 
succeeded Loschmidt in 1891, became “during one generation the center of Austria’s 
physical life” (1927, p. 27) – so relates the obituary of Arnold Sommerfeld, who had 
formed his own school of students in Munich among them Heisenberg and Pauli. The 
most famous of Exner’s students included the early deceased Marian von 
Smoluchowski who developed a theory of Brownian motion independently of Einstein 
and Fritz Hasenöhrl who became the successor of Boltzmann, the Nobel laureates 
Viktor Hess who discovered cosmic radiation and Erwin Schrödinger who throughout 
his life stressed Exner’s priority for the idea of irreducible indeterminism, and Stefan 
Meyer who became the first director of the Institute for Radium Research [Institut für 
Radiumforschung] founded by Exner. In the 1920s and 1930s all but one Austrian 
chair in experimental physics was held by a former student of Exner’s. To be sure, 
Exner’s central role in Austrian physics also resulted from the fact that Boltzmann, in 
his second Viennese period (1902-1906), was no longer able to establish a circle 
around him and suffered from severe health problems. But the decisive point was 
Exner’s unparalleled personality. 
 Exner’s “exceptional understanding for the younger generation” (Benndorf, 
1927, p. 407) was based on his behaving as an equal among equals instead of 
commanding formal respect. Benndorf describes the intellectual atmosphere in 
Vienna’s Second Physical Institute as follows: 
 
In late afternoon we gathered for tea around “Väterchen” [Exner]. Everyone had to report on his work, 
there were no secrets and no priority claims. … Exner considered the fear of intellectual theft as a sign 
of intellectual poverty. We were talking about everything under the sun, discussed excitedly and 
argued about scientific matters. … For a scientist, Exner had an amazing historical knowledge and 
interest in the history of culture. The mutual dependence of different cultures, the laws of their 
development, were issues about which he had thought much and with which he could stimulate his 
audience. 
 Exner was of a gregarious nature, although he never went to parties and paid no visits; he 
abhorred such conventional undertakings. But in his own house … the closer and wider circle of 
friends typically gathered after dinner, without invitation everyone could come and go whenever he 
pleased. The spiritual center of the circle was Exner; he knew how to direct the conversation to 
interesting subjects…; he could narrate masterfully, in particular of his voyages. By means of pictures 
he let the miracles of India arise anew before our eyes…. That Exner was actually of an artistic nature 
including the respective weaknesses, can be seen from his vivid relationship to any kind of art. 
(Benndorf, 1927, p. 408) 
 
Exner’s voyages were an essential part of his life; they even fill several pages in his 
curriculum vitae for the Academy of Sciences. The vivid descriptions of archeological 
sites and monuments that one finds throughout From Chaos to Present leave no doubt 
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that the author had personally seen them, and they give an impression why his circle 
was so fascinated by the evening narrations. 
 According to Franz Exner, the son of Franz Serafin’s brother Adolf, the 
“Serafin evenings” were held every Saturday uniting both members of the Exner 
family and members of his Circle. Franz Exner’s recollections assembled in a privately 
printed booklet Exnerei confirm Benndorf’s description. He reports that one of his 
uncle’s students one told him that  
 
what they had learned from Serafin Exner within the narrower field of physics was much less 
important than the deeply lasting impression which his personality and his attitude towards science 
and scientific research exerted on all his disciples. … As his brother Adolf, Serafin was a master of the 
art of living [Lebenskünstler], yet in a different, peculiar way. My mother called him a pasha because 
he knew how to arrange his life completely in accord with his individual wishes and moods, however 
his wife and daughters might have sighed about it. (Exner, 1944, p. 23) 
 
The Exner family must be viewed as one of the leading academic families in the 
Habsburg Empire: an early-deceased father who played a major role in the academic 
and educational reforms after the failed revolution of 1848, four sons holding four 
university chairs, Adolf in law, Sigmund in physiology, Franz Serafin and Karl in 
physics, and one daughter, Marie von Frisch whose correspondence with Gottfried 
Keller documents the importance of the arts within the Exner family. And also four of 
their children would become university professors. Felix Exner, the son of Sigmund, 
once characterized the four elder brothers by four superlatives: “Adolf: the most 
intelligent; Schiga [Sigmund]: the most industrious; Serafin: the most educated; Karl: 
the most genial.” (Ibid., p. 30) Apart from Karl who was working in Innsbruck, the 
families made many common activities – the younger generation, for instance, 
attended Boltzmann’s philosophy lectures with great pleasure – and the families of 
Adolf and Franz Serafin Exner lived closely together in the “Pelikanwinkel” in 
Vienna. Four of the five Exner families spent all summer vacations together in their 
houses at Brunnwinkl at the Wolfgangsee, which thus became a family village unique 
of its kind.  
 Benndorf and the more comprehensive account written by Berta Karlik and 
Erich Schmid (1982) depict Exner’s scientific achievements as such. His early 
research was devoted to the physics of crystals and to the point density maximum of 
water. His mature works concerned four areas: (1) Electrochemistry or, more 
specifically, the theory of the galvanic element led Exner into an intense polemic with 
Ostwald about the drip electrode. Exner’s earlier criticism of Alessandro Volta’s 
contact theory, which still enjoyed a certain reputation in Germany, in favor of a 
chemical theory of the galvanic element earned him Mach’s recognition. On January 
26, 1883, Mach wrote to him:  
 
For your polemic I wish you good luck. German professors understand slowly, in particular if they 
have no mind to do so. Incidentally, this is always a matter of time. For me a main argument in this 
matter is that the chemical process which is able to replace a lacking difference in the potential niveau 
will also be able to generate it.89  
 
(2) By devising a simple and portable measurement apparatus, Exner became a pioneer 
of research on atmospheric electricity. He was also the first to assess the field in a 
                                                          
89 Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Nachlaß Exner, 294/30-1. 
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systematic way. Through various expeditions and by organizing a world-wide network 
of measuring stations, a rather extensive cartography of the variations of the 
electromagnetic field of the earth and of atmospheric electricity was reached. The 
results, by the way, falsified Exner’s own theory of the mutual dependence of these 
two phenomena. (3) The Viennese collection of meteorites propelled Exner to embark 
on a large-scale project in spectroscopy. Together with his assistant Eduard Haschek, 
they measured 100,000 spectral lines of all known chemical elements within 28 
months. Their large number of publications since 1895 were later assembled into three 
volumes full of tables and photographs of the different spectra of all known elements 
(Exner/Haschek, 1911). Once again, Exner’s main achievement consisted in finding a 
universal and simple method that without sacrificing much precision produced easily 
surveyable results and had an remarkable efficiency. Moreover, this method consisted 
in direct observation, so that it left no doubt about the maximum sharpness obtainable 
for a given line. (4) In the theory of colors, Exner strongly favored the Young-
Helmholtz three-component theory over Ewald Hering’s four-component theory. This 
launched a controversy with Franz Hillebrand, a psychologist and former disciple of 
Hering and Brentano, that only was resolved in the mid-1920s by Schrödinger. 
 Summing up Exner’s scientific achievements, Benndorf relates: “Although 
among them there are no epochal discoveries, Exner has, after all, put some solid and 
enduring stone into the building of science and he even partially laid foundations.” 
(Benndorf, 1927, p. 407) Yet, “in a certain sense the most important achievement” 
(Ibid., p. 404) were his Lectures on the Physical Foundations of the Sciences written 
during the war and first published in 1919. 
 
4.4. Exner’s Lectures (1919 and 1922) 
 
The 95 lectures were divided into four chapters: (1) Space, time, matter, and some 
general concepts; (2) Matter and its constitution; (3) Ether; (4) On natural laws; the 
final lecture contains an overall summary. The Preface to the second edition (1922) 
was entirely dedicated to a criticism of Spengler. Chapters 1-3 provided a fairly 
exhaustive treatment of then standard topics, occasionally including broad remarks 
about the historical development of these fields, but Exner also dedicated ample space 
to themes investigated by his school, such as the theory of colors and radioactivity. 
 In the fourth chapter, Exner commenced with an introduction to probability 
calculus and emphasized that only if we consider chance not as based on ‘imperfect 
knowledge’, but as an objective feature of nature, can we reconcile chance and 
causality by considering the law of causality as expressing that “on average the course 
of the phenomena is lawful.” (1922, p. 675) Exner adopted Mach’s redefinition of 
causality in terms of functional dependences. “Ernst Mach to whom one surely must 
attribute an influential voice, says: ‘There is no cause nor effect in nature; nature has 
but an individual existence’.” (Ibid., p. 675, quoting Mach, 1988, p. 496/580) As did 
Mach and Boltzmann, Exner considered the validity of the principle of causality as an 
empirical question. 
 
We shall not forget that the principle of causality and the desire for causality [Kausalitätsbedürfnis] 
have forced themselves upon us exclusively through experiences made at macroscopic objects and that 
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their transferal to microscopic phenomena, hence the presupposition that each single event is strictly 
causally determined, has no justification based on experience. (Exner, 1922, p. 703) 
 
This demise of the Kantian notion of causality can be related to the first lecture of the 
first chapter where Exner rejected the Kantian synthetic a priori concepts of space and 
time by reference to the special theory of relativity.  
Our most basic experience, Exner holds, is that all natural processes are 
directed. This fact – which is today typically called ‘arrow of time’ – could only be 
explained by the second law of thermodynamics in its statistical form because all other 
laws of physics (known back then) were reversible. This won the second law a 
superior status among all natural laws and thus indeterminism became primary. 
Referring to quasi-instinctive basic experiences was an argumentative figure of 
Machian origin, which was, to my mind, at odds with Boltzmann’s atoms as 
theoretical pictures. But the basic experience of directedness directly confronted 
Mach’s (1919) foundation of thermodynamics on the sensation of temperature. 
To be sure, by 1919, atomism was beyond doubt. Still, as no measurement is 
absolutely precise, the firm empiricist can only impose one condition upon the 
(unobservable) elementary mechanisms that underlie an (observable) average law. 
“[I]f physical phenomena result from many identical, mutually independent single 
events, then the causes assumed by the determinist act just as if there were no causes at 
all, but mere chance ruling” (Ibid., p. 681). Given the primacy of randomness, Exner 
even proposed to distinguish the macro-level and the micro-level according to their 
degree of lawfulness. 
 
Whether processes are to be conceived as microcosmic or macrocosmic does not depend upon the 
nature of the investigated matter, but whether the single case or the average of very many identical 
cases is the object of consideration. One could almost conversely infer the macrocosmic nature of 
processes from the existence of laws and infer their microcosmic nature from the lack of those. (Ibid., 
p. 695) 
 
Of course, this distinction is not an absolute one. Apart from the extreme cases of 
physics where strict laws emerge and humanistics where statistical collectives can 
hardly be formed, there is ample space to formulate weak regularities. While 
probability has an objective meaning, order does not.  
 
The most probable state of a macrocosm, however, is always that of disorder, for the simple reason 
that very few possibilities of ordered states always correspond to a great number of possibilities of 
disorder. In this we comprehend the concepts of order and disorder only from the human point of 
view, depending on whether it stands out by certain attributes. (Ibid., p. 696)  
 
Exner subsequently repeated the example of the jumbled library from the Inaugural 
Lecture. The proper designation of the ordered state against the disordered states in 
fields like biology and history still remained an unsolved problem. This lacuna will 
prove a major hobble for the laws or regularities in Exner’s indeterminist theory of 
culture.  
 Exner’s insight that all laws we experience hold only on average, gives the 
empiricist law of causality a new twist insofar as it “expresses nothing else but the fact 
that natural processes, to the extent we can observe them macroscopically, that is on 
average, are lawful.” (Ibid., p. 674) This was already Boltzmann’s position in the last 
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years of his life when he pondered that the force law depends on the direction of time 
valid in a certain part of the Universe. On this basis, Exner rehearsed the old 
Fechnerian idea that it was “presumptuous to claim that any law, e.g., gravity as it 
appears to us today, had also been valid in all earlier epochs of the World, or will be 
valid in all subsequent ones.” (Ibid., p. 667) 
 In the Preface to the first edition of his Lectures, Exner even appears to have 
shared Mach’s critical stance towards hypotheses the main target of which had been 
Boltzmann’s atomism. “May the hypothetical with its manifold possibilities stimulate 
reflection, facts are and remain the basis of research.” (Ibid., p. iv) Not even the most 
exact science can claim eternal validity. “We must content ourselves with knowing the 
facts, as they are presented to us by nature, as precisely as possible and being able to 
represent their mutual relations in such a way that we do not run into contradictions 
before long.” (Ibid., p. 66) Exner, however, objects to Mach’s narrow conception of 
theory and advocates Boltzmann’s program of explanation instead. “The kind of 
natural studies which had as its final aim only a description of nature in terms of 
systems of equations is unsatisfactory. And even though this ideal was in place for a 
while, today research is directed toward a molecular-mechanical understanding of 
natural processes.” (Ibid., p. 721) Nevertheless, facts, natural laws, have “objective 
reality” (Ibid., p. 724) while theories change drastically in the course of time.  
 Exner’s stance in the issue of realism, on the most general level, differed 
significantly from Boltzmann’s preference of a realist language and even more from 
Mach’s neutral monism. The second chapter of the Lectures commenced with some 
metaphysical considerations on the reality of the external world, or – so Exner – the 
problem of the Cartesian cogito.  
 
The world of sensations represents the immediately given. If we assume that each of these sensations 
is correlated to certain objective processes in the external world, then this amounts to a theory which 
we willy-nilly put forth, without whose assumption all human research would have to appear 
superfluous. This theory is based on the presupposition that the sensations are conditioned by 
processes in a real world external to us, and we can consider it an important task of research to 
ascertain the kind of correlation between internal and external world. … It may correspond to a 
philosophical desire to pursue this question further than it seems promising as regards positive results. 
For the natural scientist matters are different. He knows that all knowledge, even the most exact one, 
ultimately remains a theory that is only valid for who accepts certain assumptions, axioms, such as for 
instance for the theorems of geometry, without further proof. With someone denying the basic axioms 
of planimetry, we cannot come to terms at all on this subject matter. And thus we will consider it an 
axiom of physical research that the external world and the processes in it are real. (Ibid., p. 287f.) 
 
Does this passage refute my claim that Exner worked out a synthesis between Mach 
and Boltzmann? Indeed, large part of it could have been authored by Planck, the only 
difference being that he would have taken a transcendental rather than a linguistic tack 
and preferred to speak about a condition of the possibility of experience instead of an 
axiom. But when we look at those later passages in the book where Exner takes up the 
issue again, we see that he is after something else than Planck. Instead of advocating a 
convergent or structural realism, Exner’s remarks concern the problem of psycho-
physical parallelism. At the end of the third chapter, he motivates his four lectures on 
the theory of color as such. 
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We have to infer the external world from the internal world by way of complicated physical, 
physiological, and psychic processes, the interpretation of which, however, we typically have learned 
already during our childhood in years of practice. This presents a certain danger for the researcher. For 
the habits of thought which we have acquired from the experience of daily life are not always valid 
also in those new domains of experience which the researcher faces, yet they can even become a 
mighty impediment of further progress in this domain. … For this reason it is not superfluous to 
emphasize this border between direct perception of sensation [Empfindung] and its correlate, the 
external world, at least at one example. (Ibid., p. 626) 
 
Exner here, in effect, rejected Mach’s claim that this border line between the physical 
and the psychic was woolly if not inexistent and that it could easily be crossed back 
and forth by functional dependences. His claim was even stronger. “Strict and 
quantitative laws, accordingly, cannot be set up in the domain of sensations, and this 
difference forever separates our experiences in the external and the internal world.” 
(Ibid., p. 656) To properly understand this distinction we have to bear in mind that the 
strictly quantitative laws of the external world emerged from chance and that Exner 
consequently rejected all synthetic a priori categories for laws of nature. “When Kant 
set out from the presupposition that there must exist absolute knowledge, this 
represents a subjective and entirely unfounded opinion, which in him was caused by 
occupying himself with the theorems of geometry; but we shall quickly see that even 
those do not enjoy an absolute but only conditioned validity.” (Ibid., p. 9) In this way, 
having admitted the meaningfulness of the external world problem, Exner returned 
onto Machian territory by rejecting a priori knowledge within science and by a 
physicalism that was both all-encompassing and relaxed because the basic physical 
entities were no longer any substances of mechanical processes. As in the Inaugural 
Address, he asserted that all processes in nature are subject to the laws of physics; yet 
these laws were of a statistical nature, and there was a great leeway in the character of 
the individual events as long as they produced the macroscopically observable laws. 
The empiricist could be open-minded, for instance, whether the ether was a kind of 
matter or a kind of space or whether we simply ascribe properties such as 
polarizability to the vacuum. (Cf. ibid., p. 615) 
 Exner’s indeterminism did not only entail that all laws were at bottom average 
laws, even basic concept of physics, to his mind, were meaningful on average only. 
Here relativity theory and Boltzmann’s indeterminism twice conspired in a surprising 
way. First, special relativity has taught us that space and time cease to be absolute 
concepts. Boltzmann’s determination of the direction of time by means of the tendency 
towards more probable states entails that time ceases to be absolute also in another 
sense.  
 
The coexistence of progressive and retrogressive times is no more absurd than the simultaneous above 
and below in space; in both cases we are confronted with relative concepts which we derive from our 
respective experiences. … [I]t depends upon the standpoint from which one judges. For us time is an 
average value which progresses in the direction of more probable states. (Ibid., p. 65)  
 
Second, pointing to Kepler’s speculations of regular oscillations of the Earth’s 
gravitational attraction, Exner held that 
 
it is not excluded that the gravitational force might be subjected to fast oscillations of its strength 
[Intensität] and that its constant strength, as it appears to us, is only a statistical average over many and 
rapid oscillations. A recent theory of gravitation even assumes such periodic oscillations occurring 
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within very short time intervals as its foundation and presupposes that they propagate through space as 
longitudinal waves. (Ibid., p. 70) 
 
Gravitational waves were one of the distinctive consequences of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity.90 In the fourth chapter Exner even contemplated that gravitational 
force might be replaced by a statistical process in which the falling body moves along 
by fits and starts or even on a zigzag path. “Boltzmann has in conversation entirely 
agreed to this opinion and has considered it not only possible, but even very probable.” 
(Ibid., p. 670) 
 To obtain an ontological foundation for such average laws and concepts, Exner 
needed a reality criterion that was independent of the particular nature of the single 
events and consistent with the law of large numbers. His only option here was to 
accept the collectives of Fechner’s frequency interpretation as basic ontological 
entities. Since these are only realized in the limit of infinitely many events, all 
apparently deterministic laws admit exceptions – as long as their probability renders 
them inaccessible to experiment – and they cease to hold below a certain number of 
single events. On the other hand, the second law of thermodynamics, the probabilistic 
law par excellence becomes meaningless in microscopic domains. 
 Quite generally, Exner’s indeterminism intended to justify all types of 
regularities found in the world. Depending on the number of events studied by the 
respective science, the degree of probability varies between zero (in most humanities) 
and one (in physics). All descriptive sciences lie in-between, in particular because the 
external conditions change too rapidly for exact laws to stabilize. This was the main 
motive at the end of the Inaugural Address. Although this time Exner made only little 
mention of society and culture, in the fourth chapter he admitted that, at least 
temporarily, the inescapable tendency to equilibrium might be suspended on the 
macroscopic level.  
 
Also the acts of the single humans belong to the microcosm [where the second law does not hold], in 
contrast to those of human society; the latter are essentially directed at artificially withholding the 
most probable state, that of disorder. Decrees and laws, written and unwritten ones set by law and 
customs serve to this end. It is open to question whether similar tendencies also prevail in the realm of 
vegetable and animal organisms; but this seems well possible and in this case the second law would 
not hold true for organic forms as little as it does for a library kept in order, because the 
presuppositions of its validity, chance and disorder, would be absent. (Ibid., p. 699) 
 
This mitigated the conclusion of the Inaugural Address where any social interventions 
had been considered futile. 
The continuity between Boltzmann and Exner has sometimes been 
misrepresented in the literature. Paul A. Hanle, for instance, holds that on the basis of 
Exner’s indeterminism “we cannot in principle apply any mechanistic program of 
physics to molecular processes,” (Hanle, 1979, p. 256) while this was the case with 
Boltzmann’s. But Hanle simply misunderstands Boltzmann’s concept of atomism as if 
it relapsed into mechanical or deterministic explanation and he accordingly 
presupposes Planck’s anti-Machian reading of Boltzmann as the only possible one. As 
Exner broadly discussed his fundamental indeterminism in connection with the 
                                                          
90 Although their existence had soon become evident from his papers at about 1918, Einstein later erroneously 
convinced himself in print that gravitational waves could not exist. (I thank David Rowe for this hint.) At 
present, their detection is the focus of a large-scale research project. 
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example of Brownian motion (Exner, 1922, pp. 412-417), Hanle criticizes his “failure 
to distinguish between indeterminacy in principle and the practical inability to analyze 
the determinate causes in an aggregation of micro-physical events.” (Hanle, 1979, p. 
227) Here Hanle does not appraise the ontological consequences of the frequentist 
interpretation of probability and Exner’s staunch empiricism; both will also inspire 
Richard von Mises to advocate a purely indeterminist approach to Brownian motion. 
(Cf. Sect. 8.2.) The following passage from Forman on the basis of which Exner is 
classified as the earliest convert to acausality, is even further from understanding his 
philosophical stance.  
 
Although Exner cannot consistently maintain his empiricist posture and also categorically deny the 
existence of causality at the microscopic level, he wants very much to do so in order ‘to arrive at a 
unified world picture’ in which all law is purely statistical, a world of pure chance. He therefore does 
his best to convince his (lay) readers [sic!] of the implausibility of the existence of such a causal 
substratum, switching back and forth between, and largely confounding, the question of the validity of 
the laws of classical mechanics in the atomic domain and the validity of the principle of causality in 
the same domain. Influential as the lectures indeed were, they have in many respects an archaic air. 
Exner is a curious mixture of the philosophical currents of the two preceding generations, a self-
confessed mechanist-materialist yet clearly also a positivist in his view of scientific constructs 
(Forman, 1971, p. 75)  
 
– a fact that links him to “late nineteenth century positivist-monist repudiations of 
causality.” (Ibid., p. 74) After all, no surprise that Forman only mentions Exner’s 
criticism of Spengler without examining its content. 
 The fourth chapter of Exner’s lectures was not just an “appendix” (Ibid., p. v), 
as the author modestly called it. From the perspective of the present investigation it 
can be seen as the most concise and pointed philosophical account of the first phase of 
the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism, the first in which all three criteria mentioned in 
Chapter 3 were advocated firmly and in philosophical detail. This important role of the 
fourth chapter is not only manifested in later references by Frank and Schrödinger. 
Also the first footnote of Reichenbach’s classic Philosophic Foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics cites Exner as “perhaps the first” (1965, p. 1) to have criticized the 
assumption of strict causality. Reichenbach knew Exner’s Lectures very well because 
he had reviewed their first edition (1919) for Die Naturwissenschaften. He criticized 
their epic breadth and that the author remained silent about Einstein’s theory of 
gravitation. The second point is not quite correct. Apart from the above-mentioned 
remarks about gravitational waves we find a clear approval of Einstein’s successful 
generalization of the principle of relativity. “It is remarkable that there are facts, such 
that the progressive perihelion motion of mercury which hitherto could not be 
explained by the old, but are a direct quantitative consequence of the new theory.” 
(Exner, 1919, p. 63; 1922, p. 62) Expectedly, Reichenbach wanted to hear more than 
just half a page; presumably the passage was inserted only at a late stage of Exner’s 
writing down the book that had emerged from his regular lectures to students of 
pharmacy. But in assessing Reichenbach’s remark we should not forget that he was a 
30-year old physicist-philosopher who would become a main defender of relativity 
theory and an advocate of the indeterminist character of quantum physics. Exner, on 
his part, was a 70-year old experimental physicist, nine years older than Planck and 
thirty years older than Einstein. The first edition of the Lectures appeared just at the 
beginning of the public struggles about relativity theory in which many 
 145
experimentalists took the side of the skeptics if not of the critics. Without qualification 
Reichenbach’s review commended the 
 
unbiased attitude of the natural scientist who dislikes metaphysical speculations and who is conscious 
of the inductive character of all regularities discovered, even of the most general ones. …. Of 
particular importance seems to me that Exner unequivocally advocates the objective meaning of the 
probabilistic laws in which he rightly conceives a very general regularity of nature. (Reichenbach, 
1921, p. 415) 
 
This was, of course, also Reichenbach’s own position developed in the previous year 
(Reichenbach 1920a & 1920b). A subjective notion of chance built upon our ignorance 
of the true causes cannot be reconciled with an empirical content of the principle of 
causality.  
 The reviewer of the second edition of the Lectures, the physicist Wilhelm 
Westphal accentuated Exner’s defense of objectivism against Spengler subjectivism. 
“It deserves emphasis that despite all criticism Exner – precisely as a physicist – is 
objective enough to gladly welcome Spengler’s work.” (Westphal, 1923, p. 113).91 
Westphal referred to a passage in the Preface in which Exner acknowledges that 
Spengler’s  
 
extraordinarily interesting work, rich with original ideas and fascinating suggestions is doubly 
welcome in our banausic time. Nonetheless, the natural scientist – and only in this capacity shall I be 
judging here – cannot withhold serious doubts concerning the methodology of this work which in a 
way represents the antipode to the present book. (Exner, 1922, p. vi) 
 
While Spengler advocated a radically subjectivist view, to Exner’s mind, science was 
virtually characterized by its objective method; despite a constant change of theories 
we encounter the same facts as did the old Egyptians. Basing science on subjective 
intuitions or necessities of thought, among them causality, too often has led science 
astray, while “precisely the statistical approach to processes [des Werdens], at least to 
some extent, has clarified the notion of causality and has shown that in its generally 
accepted form it is not tenable.” (Ibid., p. xi) Against Spengler (1918, p. 556), Exner 
insisted that physics deals with processes and that Heraclides’s dictum was precisely 
the most general expression of this modern idea. Thus Spengler’s identification of 
laws and determinism is beyond the point of modern physics. Exner’s criticism, 
however, was not only of a methodological kind. And here he took up the above-
discussed rejection of Mach’s neutral monism. 
 
Indeed physical research from its beginning to the present has always pursued the same goal: the 
greatest possible detachment of the object from the subject, and in the course of time it has come 
considerably close to this goal, it has furnished the proof that there exists, no doubt, an object without 
a subject. (Exner, 1922,, p. vii) 
 
The empiricist distinction between facts and theories constitutes a core element of 
Exner’s criticism of Spengler in 1922. In contrast to the subjectivist, “[t]he physicist 
knows that his picture of reality hardly corresponds to reality completely, but 
additionally he does know that it is consistent with the facts – to the extent he knows 
                                                          
91 Hanle (1979, p. 255 fn. 112) lists further reviews of the Lectures. In view of the sub-milieu thesis defended in 
Section 5.3., I limit the discussion to reviews that appeared in Die Naturwissenschaften. 
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them so far – in all its essential properties, and if it does not exhibit these properties, 
he discards it as false and unsuitable.” (Ibid, p. vii) Thus “one must not identify the 
ever changing theories with the results of research.” (Ibid., p. ix) Precisely this 
erroneous identification constitutes the basis of Spengler’s thesis of the 
incommensurability of ancient and modern science. Moreover, Spengler confuses “a 
culture with its makers or its bearers; the latter are in fact organisms, individuals and 
peoples, and die as such. But – to stay within our realm – the result of exact research 
persists for all times.” (Ibid. p. x) This would become an important distinction within 
Exner’s own theory of culture. 
 
4.5 Dialogue at War Times: Exner Versus Planck 
 
On August 3, 1914, Planck – then Rector of the University of Berlin – delivered the 
annual speech commemorating the founder of the University “On Dynamical and 
Statistical Regularities.” After an introduction alluding to the patriotic virtues 
indispensable in the war that had just begun, Planck rejected a distinction in principle 
between absolute and exceptionless lawfulness [Gesetzlichkeit or Gesetzmäßigkeit are 
used interchangeably] in the natural sciences and arbitrariness and chance in the 
intellectual realm. So far Planck’s thesis was in accord with what Exner had advocated 
in the Inaugural Address; but the lines of argument were starkly different, if not in 
direct opposition to one another. Exner had put the law of large numbers and the 
second law of thermodynamics on top. Planck countered as such: 
 
On the one hand, for all human thinking, even on the highest heights of human intellect [Geist], the 
assumption of an absolute lawfulness superior to arbitrariness and chance represents an indispensable 
prerequisite; and, on the other hand, the most exact of all sciences, physics, is often compelled to 
operate with processes the lawful connection of which for the time being remains in the dark, and 
which, accordingly, can safely be called random in a properly understood sense of this word. (Planck, 
1914, p. 55f.) 
 
Planck emphasized that for practical investigations statistical methods are unavoidable 
and that statistical quantities already intrude into physics by the simple fact that each 
measurement contains errors. But this only teaches “the fundamental importance of 
performing an exact and fundamental separation between … the dynamical, strictly 
causal, and the merely statistical type of lawfulness for understanding the essence of 
all scientific knowledge.” (Ibid., p. 57) This distinction finds its expression in the 
sharp contrast between reversible processes, which are subsumed under one dynamical 
law: the Principle of Least Action, and irreversible processes governed by the second 
law of thermodynamics. While in the field of practical physics the causality violations 
implied by statistical laws do not justify any objection to them, the theorist must insist 
on the distinction between necessity and probability. 
 
This dualism which has inevitably been carried into all physical regularities by introducing statistical 
considerations, to some may appear unsatisfactory, and one has already attempted to remove it – as it 
does not work out otherwise – by denying absolute certainty and impossibility at all and admitting 
only higher or lower degrees of probability. Accordingly, there would no longer be any dynamical 
laws in nature, but only statistical ones; the concept of absolute necessity would be abrogated in 
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physics at all. But such a view should very soon turn out to be a fatal and shortsighted mistake. (Ibid., 
p. 63) 
 
Planck here precisely targeted the program Exner had launched in 1908. That his 
opponent’s name was not mentioned was characteristic for Planck’s style of scientific 
argument – except for his repeated personal attacks on Mach. 
 Exner well understood that the above passage was directed at him and 
responded to Planck point by point in his 94th lecture, the last before the summary. 
While he himself studied how probabilistic macroscopic laws emerge, so Exner 
related, Planck assumed a priori the existence of an absolute causality as a necessary 
precondition to understand both Nature and the intellectual realm. “But Nature does 
not ask whether man understands her or not, nor are we to construe a Nature adequate 
to our understanding, but only to reconcile ourselves as much as possible with the 
given one.” (Exner, 1922, p. 709) Mach could not have said it better. Exner also 
criticized Planck’s unjustified trust in our habits of thought, which made it likely “to 
fall into a sort of physical mythology” (Ibid., p. 709) by distinguishing a real world in 
which all natural processes are irreversible and an ideal world of frictionless motions, 
undamped oscillations, and the like. In empirical fact, one only encounters 
“irreversible processes that can come, however, arbitrarily close to reversibility.” 
(Ibid., p. 710) Between both idealizations there are many intermediate cases. “Whether 
a process is reversible or irreversible in fact only depends upon whether the recurrence 
of a certain state is practically observable.” (Ibid., p. 711) 
 The other crucial disagreement between Exner and Planck concerned 
probability theory. “It is claimed that in its applications probability calculus cannot 
dispense with the assumption of absolutely dynamical laws for the elementary 
processes” – here Exner almost literally quoted Planck (1914, p. 64) – “[however in 
actual fact] the assumption suffices that the elementary processes be equally 
characterized by average laws.” (Exner, 1922, p. 712) While Planck called for a 
dynamical explanation of statistical laws, Exner, on the contrary, asserted: “Nothing 
prevents us from regarding the so-called dynamical laws as the ideal limiting cases to 
which the real statistical laws converge for the highest degrees of probability.” (Ibid., 
p. 713) The only empirically justifiable requirement for the microscopic scenario is 
that in the limit it reproduces the macroscopically observed laws.  
 Planck’s rectorial address – in the same vein as the Leyden speech – 
emphasized instead that one could very well find an exact formulation of the second 
law that makes a precise assertion about single processes by amending it with the 
hypothesis of elementary disorder, that is, by claiming that each individual process 
does not deviate too strongly from the average of very many processes.  
 
Experimentally there exist no other means than repeating the respective experiment many times in 
succession, or equivalently to have it reproduced by distinct observers working independently from 
one another. Such a repetition of a particular experiment, or performing a whole series of experiments, 
is in fact precisely that procedure which is generally applied in practical physics. No physicist will 
ever limit himself in his measurements to a single experiment, if just because of the unavoidable 
measurement errors. (Ibid., p. 65) 
 
Planck’s reinterpretation of statistical laws by adding a condition about the relation 
between single experiments and their average result proves too much. It would even 
solve the notorious paradoxes of quantum mechanics because nobody doubts that this 
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theory accurately describes a long series of similar experiments. Moreover, pointing to 
experimental practices seems to be rather disingenuous for someone who advocates a 
categorical notion of causality. To be sure, Planck’s worries about quantum mechanics 
would be of a more basic kind because it became in principle impossible to posit a 
dynamical microlevel. Notice that after the 1914 speech he would no longer repeat the 
argument about elementary disorder in this form and stick to the aforementioned 
general argument about the necessary deterministic foundations of any probabilistic 
theory. 
 Planck also made clear that he intended to defend his reading of Boltzmann 
against Exner’s. Concerning the atomist hypothesis, Planck commended that 
“Boltzmann apparently avoided to endanger the import of his views and calculations 
by charging forward too boldly; it was important to him to describe the atomistic 
hypothesis as a mere picture of reality. Today we are able to go beyond this.” (Planck, 
1914, p. 60) This tamed Boltzmann neither reflected the universality of his atomism 
nor agreed with his partial adoption of Machian epistemology; for Boltzmann there 
was nothing beneath the atomistic pictures. At bottom, thus, Planck simply rehearsed 
the argument which he had already leveled against Mach: positivism can well provide 
an unassailable better-safe-than-sorry strategy but becomes infertile in the long run. 
 The final pages of Planck’s address returned to the humanities and intellectual 
life, using a piece of terminology which Exner would take up in the Lectures.  
 
[In this realm,] strict causality becomes much less important than probability, the microcosm totally 
falls behind the macrocosm. But nevertheless, also here in all domains up to the highest problems of 
human will and morality, the assumption of absolute determinism is the indispensable foundation of 
all scientific enquiry. But this requires some caution …, that the process to be measured is not 
disturbed in its course by an investigation. (Ibid., p. 66) 
 
And Planck introduced an argument that would remain, in increasingly detailed 
versions, his proof for the reconcilability of free will and absolute determinism. It is 
only possible to give a complete account of other personalities; if the thinking subject 
coincides with the object of investigation it constantly changes as knowledge of it 
proceeds. 
 
In this way science sets itself its own insurmountable limit. But man in his incessant aspiration cannot 
content himself with this limit, he desires to and must transcend it because he needs an answer to the 
most important, constantly recurring questions of life: How shall I act? – And a complete answer to 
this question he cannot find in determinism, nor in causality, but only in his moral sentiments, his 
character, and his world view [Weltanschauung]. (Ibid., p. 66) 
 
The difference to Exner is substantial because Planck posited a prereflective and 
spontaneous Ego that could be approached only by morality – the only field where 
Kantian reason can give laws to itself. For Mach the dualist Ego was unsalvable, while 
for Exner it was at least no fixed ground upon which to erect a Kantian-style ethics. To 
be sure, Exner rejected a mathematical description of our subjective sentiments. But he 
naturalized ethical feelings and religion; they emerged in the history of culture as did 
objective science itself.  
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4.6 Exner’s Indeterminist Theory of Culture 
 
In this section I shall investigate Exner’s theory of culture insofar as it contributes to 
the objective of the present book. In From Chaos to the Present, Exner, as it were, 
brought the statistical approach back to the field of society from which it had been 
imported into the natural sciences. But he also amended it with Boltzmann’s atomism 
in an abstract sense thus rendering the second law a meta-law for the whole 
phenomenal world. This permitted him to pursue a two-tired strategy with respect to 
the Spenglerian challenge. Exner agreed to the negative diagnosis about cultural 
decline, but he emphatically upheld that scientific progress as an emergent 
phenomenon of the macrocosm was immune to all threats from the cultural milieu 
however constituted. This was anything but an adaptation in the sense of Forman, but 
rather the attempt to amalgamate and actively reintroduce two traditions of the 19th 
century, Boltzmann’s atomism and Humboldt’s physical description of the world, into 
the post-war milieu. Exner’s theory of culture was not a spontaneous product of the 
post-war years. It reaches back at least to the year of the Inaugural Address. 
 
4.6.1 The Simple Astronomy 
 
As a document of Exner’s narrative skills and his magnificent style of lecturing, 
Benndorf (1927) cited a small booklet privately printed on February 14, 1908, under 
the title The Simple Astronomy First and Second Part. It had a baroque title page, was 
written in an antiquated style and garnished with verses.  
 The not quite anonymous author Ω.Σ. (Uncle Serafin) explains to a young 
female reader the contemporary knowledge about the stars, the planets, meteorites, 
etc., all of which are governed by Newton’s law of gravitation. In the second part, he 
depicts the natural history of heaven and earth. The booklet clearly stands in the 
classical literary tradition of educational books, but there are several places where 
Exner in effect reverted to an adult reader, above all when outlining the book’s 
purpose. 
 
There are enough hours in life when without purpose one reaches for an arbitrary book and hence a 
random grip in the library once played into my hands a work which bore the title “General History of 
the World.”. They were two imposing volumes and after having browsed through them I found therein 
listed, as is common, which wars humans waged in the days of the Persians and Egyptians, what 
happened under the Romans, which emperors and kings governed thereafter until lately…. And thus I 
have further brooded over what this couple of countries and millennia of whom this history of the 
world deals are to signify and whether only what has been created by man belongs to the world or 
whether all deeds of mankind are not rather a work of nature as thousands of others, and so brooding I 
loved to recognize what it actually is to make up a history of the world, and even a general one. And 
thus happened roughly what is written in this opus.… [T]his booklet shows that what is commonly 
called history of the world does not embrace more than a point in space and a moment in time. (1908, 
p. 268-270)92 
 
These lines reveal Exner’s comprehensive understanding of history and culture, both 
of which rest upon a nature that not only exhibits physical but also aesthetic and 
                                                          
92 The sparse punctuation of my translation follows the German original. 
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religious properties. If we look at the stars, we look into the history of the Universe 
because we discern what happened eons ago. Conversely, astronomy can predict 
events that will happen in millions of years in the future. Hence a main tenet of 
Mach’s empiricism is well confirmed: “Vain hope to glimpse into another world, there 
is only one world and this is the message that the meteorites confer directly to us.” 
(Ibid., p. 148)93 Spectral analysis of the light of the fixed stars yields the same result.  
 Again, the indeterminism that dominated Exner’s Inaugural Address of the 
same year came to the fore. In Newton’s days, the Universe had been considered as a 
huge clockwork. “[A]ll these worlds [the stellar clusters] do not lead their existence in 
complete independence of each other; for one elemental force joins them all however 
far they are mutually separated: gravitation which according to Newton’s law governs 
the action of each upon the other.” (Ibid., p. 135) In the second part, Exner broadly 
discussed the Kant-Laplace theory according to which the stars and planets were 
formed by matter aggregation. But the picture he drew for the Universe on that large 
scale replaced the Newtonian clockwork with Boltzmann’s kinetic theory. 
 
Why the fixed stars are in motion, nobody knows the answer; but that much is sure and can be easily 
ascertained, even the fixed stars closest to us cannot exert such a force at the sun that suffices to 
explain its motion. Perhaps it happens in the large as in the small; our air consists of small spherical 
molecules which are at large distances from one another and which all move in disorder in random 
straight lines without one exerting the smallest force upon the other unless two of them collide by 
chance. Hence in effect, our air presents the same scene in the small as do the clusters of stars in the 
large; however, what according to the dimensions here takes place in a split second there requires 
countless millions of years. (Ibid., p. 109f.) 
 
To Exner’s mind, this parallel has philosophical consequences: 
 
παντα ρει, in English: “Everything is in flux,” is the conclusion arrived at by the philosophers of all 
times and places, and not only the old thinkers of India but also the younger and contemporary 
explorers of nature. But, naive man, though he daily experiences the changes, does not believe in them 
and considers nothing so unchangeable as nature with its mountains and rivers. (Ibid., p. 235) 
 
Exner’s Simple Astronomy clearly demonstrates that his Inaugural Address was not the 
spontaneous declaration of an indeterminist philosophy that he would spell out only in 
his Lectures, at a time when almost everyone had accepted Boltzmann’s atomism. 
  
4.6.2 From Chaos to the Present  
 
Exner’s cultural aspirations went considerably further. But it took until his retirement 
in 1920 and the challenge exerted by Spengler’s Decline before he wrote down what 
had matured over the years and had been discussed at length in the Exner circle. 
Spengler’s book met with many reactions among scientists, who were responsive to 
his cultural diagnosis but decidedly negative with respect to his treatment of the 
sciences. In Exner’s case, the Spenglerian challenge did not only aggravate the 
statistical physicist who defended the values of science and intended to apply his 
approach – to the extent that this was possible – to all humanistics. Spengler’s thesis 
about the decay of ancient science provoked also the humanist, which Exner 
                                                          
93 This passage contains one of very few emphases in the book. 
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understood in a more global sense than Humboldt. Spengler’s Decline, it will turn out, 
was the true heir of those two imposing volumes “General History of the World” 
which had motivated Exner’s Simple Astronomy.  
 Exner did not live to publish From Chaos to the Present, but the 436-page 
mimeographed typescript must be considered as a full-fledged first draft. At least he 
sent the manuscript whose Preface consists of eight strophes and is dated November 
17, 1923, to the Viennese publisher Julius Springer94 in the spring of 1924, half a year 
before he temporarily lost his eyesight by a brain stroke from which he would not 
recover fully until his death. Still in 1925, a small booklet From Prehistoric Times 
appeared in Steyrermühl’s Tagblatt-library which contained material from the initial 
chapters of the manuscript. 
 Let me give a brief overview of Exner’s entire manuscript. After his poetic 
Preface, Exner stressed that his main aim is not just to broaden the horizon of classical 
humanistic ideas about the history of the world. “Who in himself feels the urge to 
understand the world surrounding him and its phenomena will soon become aware that 
such is possible only if he recognizes how all that has come into existence, and 
conversely he tries in vain to fathom the past as long as the present remains unknown 
to him.” (Exner, 1923, p. 4) Just a glimpse at the stars teaches us that the present 
includes the laws of nature and the past extends back to the formation of our solar 
system. Consequently, the first chapter contains roughly a summary of those topics 
that had made up the Simple Astronomy. Exner then moves on to outline the 
development of the Earth up to its present shape and discusses basic results of physical 
geography and paleontology. Observing that both the Earth and life are unfinished, he 
once again pronounces his leitmotif παντα ρει, which “for the most part strikes the 
eye in all living” (Ibid., p. 68) and opens the way for evolution and development. 
When discussing Greek culture later in the book, Exner remarks that “Heraclides was 
called the obscure, probably because the problems treated by him were far from the 
spirit of the day. But with his παντα ρει (‘Everything is in flux’) he only expressed 
what later, much later became the basis of all natural science.” (Ibid., p. 259) 
 Two particular aspects of Exner’s précis of primeval evolution are of interest in 
the context of indeterminism. First, the founder of the Institute of Radium Research 
happily pointed out that nuclear decay naturally furnishes a geological and 
paleontological chronology that is no longer based on mere comparison of different 
forms. Second, his exposition of Darwinism linked up to his frequentist account of 
probability. 
 
                                                          
94 In Exner’s papers one finds three documents with the letterhead of the Viennese publisher Julius Springer. 
On February 9, 1924, Leo Friedlaender, the Prokurist of the publisher, wrote:  
Dear Herr Hofrat! 
I kindly ask you to commit your manuscript to the bearer of this letter and this letter at the same time 
counts for an acknowledgment of receipt of your manuscript (without preface and index).  
And on April 17, 1924, Exner receives another letter: 
Dear Herr Hofrat! 
 I have the honor to deliver to you the attached acknowledgment of receipt of your manuscript 
by the Steyrermühlverlag (signed Dr. Winkler) and I give my most respectful regards. 
ppa Julius Springer Leo Friedlaender. 
The acknowledgment dated April 16, 1924, reads: “The signed publisher confirms receipt of the manuscript of 
Hofrat University Professor Dr. Franz Exner ‘Vom Chaos zur Gegenwart’.” (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 
Nachlaß Exner, 294/86). 
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It appears as if this evolution initially proceeded slowly, but later became faster and faster, to wit, the 
lower the organisms the slower their progress to higher levels. It looks as if nature must find the ways 
of development by trial and error, where that has died out which was not capable of development. And 
do we not meet the very same in other areas again? In every science, in every art the same repeats 
itself again and again, the first groping attempts take most of the time…. (Ibid., p. 97) 
 
It was a prerequisite for the empiricist reading of the frequentist account of probability 
that there was enough time that all possibilities could be actually tried out.95  
 After discussing the various prehistoric ages distinguished by their prevailing 
technology, Exner turns to the historical time – from 4000 BC on – that once again 
started from a chaos of peoples because mankind presumably emerged at different 
places. “Only where a certain appreciation of outstanding individuals as against the 
mass gains ground, where weighing has replaced counting, there can be talk of a 
beginning culture.” (Ibid., p. 157) Exner subsequently discusses millennium after 
millennium, studies how culture after culture emerges and decays, how they develop 
new institutions and ideas, the viable core of which is passed on to the cultures 
supplanting them and which are exchanged with others until the culture of Europe 
attains global character. In all of this, From Chaos to the Present impresses the reader 
with its enormous factual material that also gives due space to non-European cultures. 
And on his journey through history and the cultures, Exner discovered various (ceteris 
paribus) regularities in the development of both nature and culture. 
 
4.6.3. The Emergence of the Objective World View  
 
As did Mach and Boltzmann, Exner advocated a naturalist epistemology. Thus, also 
the emergence of the objective world view and of the single sciences represented 
objective events in the cultural evolution of mankind. In From Chaos to the Present, 
Exner initially discusses some sciences that were developed very early by various 
peoples, for instance, the grammar of the Indians or the four millennia of Chinese 
objective history. The crucial point in such cases was that the drive to know 
transcended the purely practical requirements. In ancient Egypt this had not been the 
case; the pyramids were built exclusively by means of ramps; however “with an 
appropriate understanding the merely empirically employed principle of the inclined 
plane would have sufficed to make use also of all the other simple machines,” (Exner, 
1923, p. 201) to wit, the lever, the block and trackle, the screw, and the wheel and 
axle. This passage contains two implicit references to Mach’s Mechanics. First, Mach 
called the inclined plane, the lever, etc., “principles” while he downgraded energy 
conservation, etc. to “theorems” (Cf. Sect. 3.1). Second, he claimed the factual 
equivalence of all simple principles or machines.  
 When the Phoenicians sailed around Africa (or when the Vikings discovered 
America), the cultural effect was poor.  
 
Had these voyages been undertaken some centuries later, their results would have been entirely 
different, we would have learned also about the peoples then inhabiting the African coast. But, in such 
enterprises it always matters that they are carried out at the right time, at a time when mankind is 
already capable of understanding and adapting their results. (Ibid., p. 221) 
                                                          
95 See Frank’s treatment of probabilistic evolution (Sect. 8.5.). 
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This capability required a radical change in culture which – at least in the Occident – 
separates two distinct worlds. It took place in the Hellenistic school of Alexandria 
from 300 BC to 300 AD, from Euclid to Ptolemy and Hero. 
 
The natural sciences clearly stood in the center of this development and the transition to them was a 
step whose significance is often not sufficiently acknowledged. It was a step leading from the 
subjective world view to the objective one, the question was no longer how the world appears to us but 
how the world is and how it would be even if there were no humans, and not only how the course of 
events is but also why this happens thus and not otherwise. (Ibid., p. 278) 
 
Belief was replaced by the critical search for truth. After proof and experiment had 
become the criteria of knowledge, all findings could be reproduced and disseminated 
more easily, in like manner as writing had accelerated the contacts among peoples. 
Moreover, “precisely due to the objective truth of its results, science has the 
remarkable property that there is no ‘way back’ in it, but only a necessarily arising 
expansion, and this will survive all future epochs as long as mankind still has ideals.” 
(Ibid., p. 281) To properly apprehend Exner’s continuist thesis and render it consistent 
with the cultural pluralism admitted by the statistical regularities, recall that – in 
contrast to Spengler – Exner distinguishes facts and theories. While the latter are often 
subjected to dramatic upheavals, factual knowledge once attained never gets lost, at 
best it is temporarily inactive. 
 While science in general emerged in Alexandria, Exner credits the Arabs – 
Geber’s early chemistry foremost – for developing experimental science that is 
characterized by the “wish for a theoretical understanding of natural processes…, of a 
classification of the phenomena into groups that belong together according to their 
causes.” (Ibid., p. 330) “The sober and entirely objective approach to natural processes 
by the Arab researchers was a counterweight against Greek speculation that should not 
be underestimated.” (Ibid., p. 364) 
 In an admittedly defective form, Exner here accentuated an insight – which has 
become standard today – that the emergence of modern science requires both a 
theoretical and a practical component. But he assumed only a very loose connection 
between socio-political and spiritual-cultural developments. Observing that the Incas 
and Mayas directly advanced from the Neolithic Period to the Historical Age without 
developing a culture based on bronze or iron, he asserts: “This fact … proves that the 
connection between cultural and technical progress actually is less intimate than is 
commonly believed.” (Ibid., p. 126) Nevertheless, Exner considered the usual 
sequence of the archeological ages in which the cultures are classified according to the 
prevailing technology as a ceteris paribus regularity (Cf. Exner, 1925).  
 
4.6.4. Culture is a Natural Product 
 
One ought to be blind not to see that the cultural achievements of Stone Age man have been preserved 
to the peoples until the present day…hammers, chisel, saw, awl and needle, cloth and pottery, bow and 
arrow, and daggers and sword, all that lives today as in those days and awaits being replaced by better 
ones. … But it is not only the technical achievements of the prehistoric man which persist in all 
cultures, it is also the spiritual and ethical sentiments, provided that we can assume them in the earliest 
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times. The age-old custom of human sacrifice is retained in all cultures, but in an always more 
spiritualized form. (Exner, 1923, p. 141) 
 
Although material tools played an important role, throughout From Chaos to the 
Present Exner – in contrast to Mach’s thought experiment (Sect. 3.9.) – put main 
emphasis on spiritual content, on the scientific and cultural ideas, and on the social and 
ethical development. They reveal a continuous – but not deterministic – progress while 
the life of the individual cultural organisms is full of ruptures and discontinuities. This 
difference resembled the distinction between the microcosmic level where 
discontinuous and random changes occur like molecular collisions in a gas and the 
macrocosmic level where certain weak regularities emerge and admit reasonable 
predictions. Also for Exner historical predictions were possible. 
 
By the same necessity [as the quality of a semen determines the fruit] our present state results from all 
previous events, and who is ignorant of this connection or even denies it, is at loss when confronting 
the future; for only one who has recognized how something has come into existence can justly foresee 
the further development. (Ibid., p. 277) 
 
But all historical predictions yield only average values and tendencies to equilibrium 
which, in stark contrast to Spengler’s fatalist determinism, admit manifold exceptions. 
Yet, to apply his indeterminist theory and to compare cultural units with 
microparticles, Exner needed a further hypothesis to exclude any historical teleology 
that could counteract, positively or negatively, the tendency to equilibrium. Here 
physicalism came in.  
 
Only where very catastrophic events – be they of physical or political kind – occur, what has been 
achieved already long before could go to ruins, as has, for instance, been caused to the old cultures of 
Central America by the brutal invasion of the Spaniards. But this is a highly singular case that can be 
explained by all kinds of circumstances; usually even the greatest political events, such as the marches 
of Alexander the Great, may well create or destroy empires but not cultures. In the cultural life of a 
people, political circumstances generally play a minor role; culture is a natural product with its own 
laws of growth which are not affected by political deeds to any considerable extent. What brings about 
culture is in first place the spiritual inducement [geistige Veranlassung] of the people and no less the 
external physical influences, the properties of the soil, the conditions of rain and irrigation in the 
country. (Ibid., p. 397) 
 
Combining physicalism and indeterminism, Exner was able to maintain 
simultaneously the idea of cultural and scientific progress of mankind and a theory of 
the single culture’s life that in some of its consequences was not all too different from 
Spengler’s. This can be seen from a drawing in the Conclusion of From Chaos to the 
Present (figure 4). Exner emphasized that the “heights which are to illustrate the 
respective state of the cultures are entirely arbitrary; for who could numerically 
compare the heights of different cultures… . One immediately realizes that the four 
older cultures have undergone a much slower development than all subsequent ones, a 
fact which, of course, was caused by the relative secludedness of these countries in 
earlier times.” (Ibid., p. 434) This observation provides the clue to two very general 
weak regularities that can be discerned in Exner’s manuscript and that are often called 
“laws”. 
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Fig. 4. The succession of different cultures. The letters denote Babylonian (B), Egyptian (Ae), 
Chinese (Ch), Indian (I), Greek (G), Assyrian (A), old Persian (P), Roman (R), East Roman 
(Ro), Arab (Ar), and European (Eu) culture. 
 
 
First, the life of a single culture is the shorter the higher its cultural level has become. 
“It is comprehensible that in the course of progress random external influences attain 
more and more weight and bring a more rapid pace into the development. The very 
same we had seen with respect to the geological epochs, to wit, the higher organisms 
stand, the quicker are they subjected to changes into more purposive [zweckmäßigere] 
forms, and the same may well hold true for cultural evolution too.” (Ibid., p. 119) As 
Exner identified the more purposive states in biological evolution with the more 
probable ones, this meant that the higher a culture had become the more rapidly 
external influences changed the most probable state.  
 Second, an increase of interactions between various sectors of a single culture 
and, in particular, between different cultures accelerates the evolution in the same 
sense as an increase in molecular collision rate, that is, a higher temperature, leads to 
the equilibrium state more rapidly. Exner’s unswerving physicalism makes it tempting 
to compare (morphologically) the above figure to a probabilistic distribution function 
familiar from statistical mechanics, for instance, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution 
for the velocity of molecules in a gas (figure 5). Perhaps figure 4 then could be seen to 
measure the new scientific and cultural ideas contributed by the culture at a certain 
stage of its development. Within such a setting the cultural world might be viewed as a 
permanent interaction of different national cultures, and these in turn as the interaction 
of certain sub-cultures within them, such as science, arts, or economy, all of which are 
represented by a distribution function whose multiplication yields the overall 
distribution function. Perhaps these remarks exaggerate what for Exner – who had 
explicitly denied the measurability of culture – only represented an analogy. Yet they 
provide an interesting illustration of how his theory of culture perfectly availed itself 
of the micro-macro distinction of statistical mechanics. 
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Fig. 5. The Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution 
 
Still, the main problem of the probabilistic approach remained to define a measure of 
order and disorder. Thus in the concrete applications of Exner’s probabilistic laws the 
specter of tautology is lurking; in particular, when we reach our own cultural sphere, 
traditional value judgments step in as an allegedly physicalist measure.  
 
The effect of this law [that the higher development yields the faster progress] was substantially 
supported by the favorable situation and arrangement of the Mediterranean area, a circumstance which 
in the history of the world was never offered to mankind. In a most favorable climatic position, 
equally far from the frosty pole and the overly hot equator the adjacent peoples bore in themselves the 
germs of cultural development, and the extended coastline and the numerous large and small islands 
in-between offered the most favorable opportunity for navigation and thus for trade, for the intimate 
contact among the peoples, and for the foundation of colonies in remote countries. (1923, p. 217) 
 
Exner’s introduction to the first millennium BC comes rather close to arguments 
familiar from natural teleology. The boundary conditions are so suitably arranged that 
interaction and progress follow with bare necessity and without any statistical 
fluctuations. Here Exner’s interaction law simply degenerates into an idle tautology. 
Yet this caveat against the nomological value of the interaction principle shall not 
lessen its importance as an antidote against Spengler’s segregation of the independent 
cultural organisms. Moreover, Exner’s detailed comparison of the interacting 
Mediterranean cultures with the isolated cultures of India and China is quite 
suggestive.  
Taken in this weaker form as an empirical fact, interaction was a necessary 
condition for Exner’s main thesis about continuous progress in cultural history because 
it enables other peoples to take over and adopt the intellectual and scientific 
achievements of decaying peoples and extinct tribes. For instance, the most important 
deed of Alexander the Great was the planned dissemination of Greek culture in Asia, 
an impact that lasted much longer than Greek statehood. European culture stands at the 
end of the tendency of increased interaction among cultures because owing to its 
technological superiority it is about to become a global culture. Once again, we see 
that indeterminism and physicalism do not safeguard against writing justificationist 
history.  
 The emergence of the objective worldview was intimately linked with the 
circumstance that religion develops into ethics, which accordingly constitutes the 
common root of religion, art, and science. “What is basic to all of them, what 
constitutes their root is the ethos. With its awakening also culture begins, and this can 
be described as the state of a people whose life is essentially organized according to 
 157
ethical principles.” (Ibid., p. 159) Philosophical ethos emerges from religion in various 
ways. “One will expect each religion to originate from the belief in a deity [as a 
primitive explanation of natural phenomena], but in Buddhism the old Gods of the 
Brahman religion have been dethroned and replaced by the principle of causality 
which solely rules the world.” (Ibid., p. 292) But this important intellectual 
achievement of India was short-lived. Buddhist philosophical ethics was too complex, 
so that the Indian people soon returned to the old Gods. But this relapse was less 
harmful than it appears. “[T]he cultural effect of the religions does not lie in their 
How, but in the first established ethical principles for life, and according to nature 
these are quite the same in all religions.” (Ibid., p. 380) Despite their progressive 
ethical content, all religions are in danger of ossifying into mere dogmatism. 
 Exner’s distinction between macrocosm and microcosm and the two laws also 
found their expression in biological terms. “The most general law of nature which is 
valid for all vegetable and animal life … reads: Nature does nothing for the individual, 
but everything for the genus. The individuals do not enjoy the protection of Nature, as 
long as the genus only is preserved.” (Ibid., p. 157) In cultivated nations this law of 
primitive society might seem suspended, but in reality it constitutes precisely the basis 
of their instability. “If higher culture truly has originated in the esteem for the 
intellectual characteristics of individuals, if thus a people brings the individual in a 
certain opposition to the genus, then it acts against the general law of the organic and 
accelerates its decline.” (Ibid., p. 158) In the struggle for existence between cultivated 
and uncultivated peoples as well as between educated and uneducated men, the latter 
“will always have the advantage, his acts are solely determined by the goal to be 
reached, not by the means leading to it, the educated one will find on his way 
everywhere inhibitions of ethical nature which prevent him to seize the most effective 
means.” (Ibid., p. 206) Thus, uncultivated tribes without individual differentiation – a 
highly improbable state, as Exner had remarked back in 1908 – can be united under a 
common goal while the distribution of individual characteristics represent a stable 
equilibrium state that cannot be changed so easily.96  
 
After all, culture appears to be identical with the possession of ideas, in the single human as well as in 
the people; after them man aspires when philosophizing about religion, in artistic work, or finally 
when seeking the truth in science. In this sense one can say: ideals are the only thing that truly exists. 
(Ibid., p. 159) 
 
Agreeing mainly with Spengler that all fine arts, except for music, have reached the 
stage of exhaustion and degenerate into decorative or formalistic exercises, Exner 
emphatically exempted science from the overall decline. The age of science was not 
over at all but full of steady progress.  
 
Although for most of the arts these days [of growth] seem to be already over, this is certainly not so 
for the sciences, and even less so because the highly developed technology equips the scientist with 
ever new means. The experiences of the past two centuries show that each science generates other 
sciences in its wake, and before our eyes the fields extend almost to infinity out of which always new 
ones sprout and which for interminable times promises rewarding work for the searching mind. (Ibid., 
p. 431) 
 
                                                          
96 Needless to say, a decade after Exner’s death some of the most cultivated nations of Europe had been united 
under a fascist leader’s will with devastating consequences for their interactions. 
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4.6.5. A Ringerian Mandarin? 
 
Here ends chapter 33. In the subsequent Conclusion Exner turned his interaction thesis 
into a lament against the degeneration of culture into civilization. 
 
[W]hat initially had been the product of a long development on a national basis and from ethical 
principles gradually becomes the outcome of habitual and conventional forms, the sense for the history 
of the present, the question as to why something is so and not otherwise is lost and it suffices to know 
how it is. In this way dies not only the comprehension of all institutions, but also of the whole 
surrounding of man. A telling example is the great American union; undoubtedly ahead of Europe in 
civilization, it is nevertheless constrained to satisfy its cultural needs from there. (Ibid., p. 435) 
 
Recalling the productive role of interaction for cultural and scientific development 
Exner had repeated over and over again, this severe and pessimist criticism surprises. 
But already in the next sentence the author poured out his heart and returned to a 
motive that had already figured prominently in his Inaugural Address. 
 
Yet a banausic trend prevails in the world and everyone cries for equality. Nature, however, is an 
enemy of equality and everywhere turns the equal into the unequal. From the uniform chaos solar 
systems and their planets developed, from the uniformly melted masses of the earth internal forces 
created the most different types of rock, mountains and valleys, from the first monocellular organisms 
all the multifarious forms of plants and animals evolved, and even the hordes of the most primitive 
humans in which all were of equal right finally brought out craftsmen, artists, kings and philosophers. 
We thank what we are to all these generations passed away long before, in particular, to our ancestors 
from the ancient world. 
Shall thus the hollow phrases about equality of those who only live in daily triviality and who 
constantly tend to burn the bridges leading back to antiquity, and who believe to be able to replace 
culture by civilization, shall these phrases and their aftermath be spared to mankind as long as the sun 
shines. But the future lies in the dark. (Ibid., p. 436) 
 
With these rather pathetic words Exner’s impressive opus ends. All the scientific 
objectivity so vigorously defended against Spengler has passed away once cultural 
history has reached the present. That such a conclusion was at all possible reveals once 
again some of the internal incoherencies and shortcomings of Exner’s indeterminist 
theory of culture, above all, the problem of defining an appropriate probability 
measure. While in the case of the Mediterranean area the very specific boundary 
conditions chosen rendered probabilistic evolution a mere tautology, here all is 
dominated by a value judgment necessary to identify culture with a national 
distribution of properties that was of Gaussian, Maxwellian, or similar type. 
Civilization is, on the one hand, the final product of the interactions fostering cultural 
growth. On the other hand, is it characterized by vast ignorance of this process and by 
slogans heading back into the primordial state of total equality and sharp individual 
values of all societal attributes that, after all and in accord with Spengler, makes 
civilization the enemy of culture. Evidently Exner’s long-defended progressivist 
account of culture collided with a brand of Spenglerian pessimist cyclism for humanity 
as a whole.  
 What were the motives for Exner’s radical about-face when entering his own 
epoch? Let me provide some circumstantial evidence for his motivations that derive 
from interpreting Exner – in contrast to Mach – as a Ringerian mandarin. In a seminal 
study, Fritz K. Ringer has analyzed the feeling of menace prevailing within Germany’s 
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intellectual nobility between 1890 and 1930. Ringer’s study deliberately did not 
include natural scientists, in particular because they exhibited a different attitude with 
respect to positivism and technology. But in his theory of culture Exner speaks not 
exclusively as a natural scientist.  
 During the four decades covered by Ringer the mandarins’ only capital, their 
education, suffered various devaluations. To check for some of the characteristic traits, 
the mandarins vigorously defended the idea of the rational state. (Cf. Ringer, 1969, p. 
8ff.) Indeed, Exner (1923) ranked the law of Hammurabi and the subsequent 
development of state institutions much higher than the Babylonians’ achievements in 
war. Another typical characteristic of the mandarin is the above-detected rigid 
differentiation between culture and civilization. The cry for equality, for participation 
of the people in politics, threatened the exclusive position enjoyed by the mandarin, a 
position that was not based on high birth but on a qualification passed over within the 
family. The mandarin followed the doctrine that the “state derives its legitimacy not 
from divine right, for that would stress the prince’s whim, nor from interest of the 
subjects, for that would suggest a voting procedure, but exclusively from its services to 
the intellectual and spiritual life of the nation.” (Ringer, 1969, p. 11) Similarly, 
Exner’s history of the world had judged each nation according to the value of the 
ethical and scientific ideas achieved by it, while it had strongly reduced the role of 
great kings and emperors which dominated in the state historiography. Moreover, this 
doctrine explains Exner’s opposition both against national organisms centered around 
a sovereign and against worldwide civilization. Compare his attitude during World 
War I. Benndorf’s obituary bitterly complained that “Exner was lacking any 
understanding for the war; he only viewed in it a stigma of human morality [Gesittung] 
and ignored its historical necessity; and from his point of view he could never grasp 
how a man of science could deliberately prefer to take part himself in the fight 
murdering the nations.” (Benndorf, 1927, p. 404) This passage alludes to Exner’s 
former student and Boltzmann’s successor, Fritz Hasenöhrl, who was killed as a war 
volunteer in 1915. Apparently, Exner’s teaching was not successful in every respect. 
As a matter of fact and contrary to Benndorf’s belief, Exner considered wars as “a 
necessary consequence” of the appearance of new peoples; “but fortunately they play 
only a minor role in the development of humankind.” (both Exner, 1923, p. 187) 
 Despite Exner’s ambivalence with respect to modern civilization, it is crucial 
that a major item on Ringer’s list does not apply. While the mandarins bemoaned the 
decline of science, Exner exempted science from his final mandarin pessimism about 
civilization, at least as long as science did not degenerate into merely banausic 
technological know-how. In Exner’s case, this difference cannot be fully explained by 
the positivism and support of technology required from any practicing natural scientist. 
Rather do I think that the economical situation of the Vienna physicists in the days of 
Exner was exceptional because they stood in the middle of a belated “Gründerzeit”.  
 
4.7. The Institute of Physics 
 
Founded in 1850 by Christian Doppler, the Institute of Physics was the oldest 
institution of its kind in the German-speaking world. However, until the eve of World 
War I it was lacking an appropriate building, and its funding could not compete with 
 160
comparable German departments. It was only Franz Serafin Exner who in 1910 could 
open the new Institute of Radium Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and 
who in 1913 succeeded in ending the six decade long accommodation malaise by a 
spacious building next to it. As we shall see from Exner’s and Boltzmann’s 
recollections of the earlier epoch of Stefan and Loschmidt, the situation was 
aggravated – to remain in Ringer’s economical picture – by self-imposed trade barriers 
and a poor publicity that rendered their scientific capital non-convertible. Boltzmann 
and Exner were the first to hold positions in Germany.  
 Exner’s activity as a founder might explain the split outcome when checking for 
the mandarin criteria: in cultural matters Exner undoubtedly resounded the core 
mandarin ideas but he remained an unswerving optimist in scientific matters. In this 
section I shall provide some material how Boltzmann and Exner viewed the history of 
their institution, in particular in order to show that despite the mentioned deficiencies 
there existed a remarkable team spirit the importance of which cannot be 
overestimated for assessing the later cohesion of Vienna Indeterminism, in particular 
in the case of Schrödinger. Exner thus continued – with the above-discussed very 
personal twist – the local traditions of an institution unique of its kind.  
 The second characteristic of the Vienna Institute began only with Mach and 
Boltzmann. Here is another passage from Kuhn’s interview with Frank who studied 
there from 1903 to 1907 that stresses the philosophical aspirations prevailing at the 
place. 
 
TSK: In retrospect, how would you say doing science in Vienna was different from, say, if you had 
done it at Munich or Göttingen? 
F: I would say that one of the [most important] things was that in Vienna [the professors and students] 
were more interested in the philosophy of science, and definitely more than elsewhere. It was very 
strong. It was probably the influence of Mach at that time, as well as other people who followed a 
similar line. Yes, it was strong, very strong, I would say. (quoted from Blackmore, 2001, p. 66) 
 
This philosophical orientation has guided my considerations for the period after Exner 
because my aim here is not to contribute a brief history of the Institute of Physics.97  
 
4.7.1 The Era of Loschmidt and Stefan Seen by Boltzmann and Exner 
 
Here are Boltzmann’s recollections about the remarkable spirit of the old Institute at 
Wien-Erdberg.  
 
Stefan and Loschmidt … were different in many respects. Stefan was universal and treated all chapters 
of physics with equal love; Loschmidt was one-sided, when brooding over an issue day and night, he 
turned his mind away from practically anything else. Stefan was practical, he treated the applications 
of his science to technical and industrial purposes with pleasure and skill; although once active in 
factories, Loschmidt was the prototype of an impractical scholar.  
 In one respect, however, both were completely identical, in the infinite modesty, simplicity, 
and straightforwardness of their character. Never did they attempt to express their intellectual 
superiority in academic conventions. Albeit a student at first and then a long-time assistant, I have 
never heard from them any word other than as a friend addresses a friend; and altogether the Olympian 
                                                          
97 For a collection of the relevant historical facts, see (Binder, 1949) and also (Karlik and Schmidt, 1982). 
Binder’s thesis is rich in material but sometimes meager in conclusions. It should be read with care concerning 
all events between 1934-1945; still in 1949 certain things had not officially happened in Austria. 
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cheerfulness, the sublime humor which for the student turned the most difficult discussions into joyful 
play, have become ingrained to my mind so deeply that it became, as it were, part of my own 
character. I did not even suspect at that time that it was unseemly for me (a learner) to join in 
discussions in my normal tone of voice. On my very first day in the laboratory in Berlin when I 
harmlessly spoke in my usual manner, a single glance from Helmholtz explained the situation to me. 
When I tried to depict that glance to Herr Glan who was then an assistant there, he answered with 
pride: “You are here in Berlin.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 102)  
 
As would do Exner, Stefan “spellbound the academic youth.” (Ibid., p. 101) 
Boltzmann continued his teachers’ informal conventions and impressed his students 
and visitors, among them the young Walter Nernst (See Sect. 5.5.2.). According to a 
1944 letter written by Stefan Meyer to Hans Benndorf, Boltzmann left complete 
freedom to his assistants and “was not only a great teacher, but was in spite of his 
eccentricities a truly good man, with a strong and outspoken sense for his family and 
good will for others. But one could not get as close to him as to our Exner.” (quoted 
from Höflechner, 1994, p. III 9) All this fostered the production of new ideas. 
 
Yes, for my whole life, Erdberg has remained for me a symbol of serious, inspired [durchgeistigt] 
experimental activity. When I first succeeded in bringing some life into the physical institute in Graz, I 
named it Little-Erdberg as a kind of joke. Spatially it was not small; in fact it was twice as big as 
Stefan’s Institute, but for a long time I was not able to capture the Erdberg spirit there. Even in 
Munich when the candidates for doctor’s degrees came to me and would have gladly worked at 
something, they were at a loss what to do. I thought to myself that we at Erdberg were a different 
breed. Today we have the most beautiful instruments sitting around us, and one weighs the question 
accordingly what to do with them. We [at Erdberg] always had enough ideas; our concern was where 
to get the equipment. (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 100f.) 
 
Boltzmann combines his enthusiasm with a critical note. “To the best of my 
knowledge, neither Stefan nor Loschmidt ever traveled outside their native Austria. At 
least they never attended a Naturforscherversammlung and never entered into closer 
personal contact with foreign scholars. I must disapprove this; with less secludedness 
they could have achieved even more.” (Ibid., p. 102) Their recognition severely 
suffered from their this restraint. Loschmidt, so Exner complained, “who had given to 
the world the secure foundation of atomistic remained an unknown on many 
occasions.” (Exner, 1921, p. 177) And he demurred that Loschmidt’s number often 
was given the name of Avogadro “who had absolutely nothing to do with it.” (Ibid., p. 
179) 
 All restraint notwithstanding, the Vienna physicists closely followed the 
developments elsewhere and imported the spirit of modernity. Thematically there 
existed in effect a double axis between Vienna and England until the days of 
Boltzmann. First, most scientists had become so used to the two electric fluids that the 
ideas of Faraday and Maxwell attracted little attention outside England. “Only two 
physicists of the Continent immediately recognized the importance [of Maxwell’s 
theory]: Helmholtz and Stefan.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 96) The relatively great 
influence of British empiricism in Austria presumably also facilitated the reception of 
the philosophical aspects of Maxwell’s work at the Vienna Institute. Second, even 
during the heydays of energeticism Vienna remained a stronghold of the kinetic theory 
of gases in the works of Stefan, Loschmidt, and ultimately Boltzmann. 
 The most important contribution of these early days was Loschmidt’s paper 
“On the size of the molecules of air” of 1865. “On a few pages it contains the solution 
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of a problem which for millennia, since Democrit and Epicure, has occupied the best 
minds … Tremendous is the effect of measure and number.” (Exner, 1921, p. 179) In 
his newspaper article Exner extolled it as “by all means the most important and most 
far-reaching idea ever originating from the University of Vienna.” (1895) For there 
opened a “boundless cleft separating, since the beginning and until the end of time, 
Naturphilosophie and natural science” (1895) Interestingly, Boltzmann placed the 
discovery into the borderland between physics and philosophy and stressed the 
differences between the old and the new atomism. “While in those days [of 
Loschmidt] one was seeking for the ultimate elements of being, of matter in itself, 
today one asks from which elements to compose the ideal pictures in order to reach the 
best agreement with the phenomena.” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 241) 
 “Loschmidt was a master of experimentation … but the majority of his 
experiments failed partly because the means were insufficient, partly because his 
experiments were devised too fine such that the chances of their success were too 
low.” (Ibid., p. 232) Loschmidt’s last experiment ended after three years of fight 
against the insufficiency of his equipment with the following notebook entry “Given 
up because building is shaking.” (according to Exner, 1895) 
 When Stefan and Loschmidt died in 1893 and 1895, this intellectual atmosphere 
continued under their successors Boltzmann and Exner. During his final Viennese 
period, Boltzmann had to “share ‘his’ pupils with Exner” (Höflechner, 1994, p. 239). 
The old Physical Institute had been divided into three institutes and all the introductory 
teaching had been given to Exner. Although on the occasion of Boltzmann’s return in 
1902 both had a disagreement concerning laboratory equipment, which in large part 
was transferred to Exner, the available documents indicate a mutually friendly 
atmosphere including due respect for the excelling scientist on Exner’s part. 
 This sketch reveals two features of relevance for establishing a local 
philosophical tradition. Firstly, the Institute of Physics suffered from a certain isolation 
from the German physics community. Secondly, the institute’s intellectual atmosphere 
fostered philosophical and cultural discussions, such that it may be considered as a 
forum complementing Alois Höfler’s ‘Philosophical Society of the University of 
Vienna’. But most important for the dissemination of Vienna Indeterminism was the 
unique team spirit and the inclination to philosophy that extended beyond the narrower 
circle around Exner. 
 
4.7.2 The Institute after Exner’s Retirement: The Example of Hans Thirring 
 
To be sure, by 1918 the Olympian age of Vienna physics had ended although certain 
areas of physical research remained on a respectable level. After Exner’s retirement, 
the influence of his ideas persisted through his former students and assistants. 
Indeterminism and statistical causality were also basic tools for the daily research on 
radioactivity in the Institute for Radium Research now directed by Stefan Meyer.98 
Against this philosophical background, one can also understand the particular way 
how the Viennese physicists assessed statistical fluctuations in radioactive decay (See 
Coen, 2002). 
                                                          
98 See the respective sections of (Karlik/Schmid 1982) and more specifically (Reiter, 2001). 
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In the following I shall, however, focus on the theoretical physicist Hans 
Thirring (1888-1976) and discuss one of his papers in Die Naturwissenschaften. 
Thirring was one of the local Viennese bridges across which the philosophical 
discussion moved on into the days of the Vienna Circle. His paper represents an 
important document that Forman’s diagnosis about the Weimar milieu cannot simply 
be extrapolated to Vienna – although the German and Austrian scientific communities 
were closely linked – and shows that, contrary to Beller’s belief, Bohr was viewed as a 
kind of prophet even before 1926.  
 When in 1918 Gustav Jäger succeeded Fritz Hasenöhrl, he required a position 
for Thirring to assist him as a lecturer in modern theoretical physics. After Exner’s 
honorary year was over in 1920, Jäger moved to Exner’s higher-ranking chair and 
Thirring obtained the chair of theoretical physics. Thirring’s most important result 
(1918), which was later improved together with Josef Lense (1918), concerned rotary 
motion in general relativity. By considering two rotating concentric cylinders isolated 
from any other masses in the universes they studied the dependency of centrifugal 
force from the inertial frame. The discovered frame dragging effect was a quite 
specific and experimentally verifiable instantiation of Mach’s principle of the relativity 
of motion which Planck had so emphatically rejected. (See Sect. 3.7) 
 In the 1920s, Thirring was quite active in the popular and philosophical debates 
about relativity theory and he published several papers and reviews in Die 
Naturwissenschaften. Quite interesting is his rebuff of Einstein’s archenemy Philipp 
Lenard. Quoting long passages from the attempted alternative to general relativity, 
Thirring curtly concluded “that by introducing a sufficient number of additional 
hypotheses absolutely everything could be explained – science in the end will decide 
in favor of the explanation which is the simplest.” (Thirring, 1923, p. 229) Lenard’s 
strategy to avoid Einstein’s revolutionary but well-rounded and coherent theory “leads 
into a thicket of hypotheses and if pursued further it would become lost in endless 
speculations.” (Ibid., p. 230) 
 In later years Thirring became a board member of the Ernst Mach Society 
which acted as the public forum of the Vienna Circle and frequently lectured there 
(Stadler, 2002, Ch. 7.2.1 – 7.2.4). Together with the Society’s president Moritz 
Schlick, he spoke on the occasion of unveiling Mach’s bust in the Vienna Municipal 
Park in 1926. After 1933 Thirring took part in each of the lecture series organized by 
Karl Menger (Stadler 2001, p. 420f.) the first of which bore the programmatic title 
“Crisis and Reconstruction in the Sciences” (Cf. Sec. 1.1.2.3). Thirring lost his chair 
after the Anschluß in 1938; after the war his main activity was in international peace 
politics and wrote on various general issues, among them a joint criticism of Spengler 
and Nietzsche (Thirring, 1947, Ch. 9). 
 Thirring’s 1921 inaugural lecture at the University of Vienna qualifies as a 
source text for the Forman thesis and for the philosophical debates waged in Die 
Naturwissenschaften. Perhaps it has escaped Forman’s attention because it contains 
neither a direct reference to causality nor an explicit mention of the phenomenon of 
crisis. Rather is the speech dominated by an optimistic tone and characterizes “the 
present epoch as by all means an unprecedented bloom of physics.” (Thirring, 1921, p. 
1027). Combining technological and Machian vocabulary, he asserted that “the 
description of nature made by theoretical physics is the most efficient and most perfect 
with respect to the economy of thought we know of.” (Ibid., p. 1024) Interestingly, 
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Thirring contemplated a philosophical agenda for the next centuries to “investigate 
which kinds of mathematical description of natural phenomena exist and which one is 
the most efficient one.” (Ibid., p. 1025) At present, however, there are basically four 
different methods of inquiry. Thermodynamics, for instance, is built upon three basic 
laws from which the whole theory follows (without further hypotheses) by 
mathematically simple deductions. Although methodologically thermodynamics, 
accordingly, wins the palm among all physical disciplines, Mach and Ostwald went 
too far in opposing Boltzmann’s atomism. “It would, however be regrettable to 
consider classical thermodynamics as over and done with or as a mere corollary of 
statistics.” (Ibid., p. 1025) Rather is it a pattern of methodological purity that in many 
respects is paralleled by relativity theory; the major difference being that relativity it is 
not grounded in phenomena so intuitively evident as the absence of a perpetuum 
mobile but in revolutionary new concepts. No wonder that Thirring glorified Einstein’s 
achievements.  
Notice Thirring’s hymnus on Bohr in the section dedicated to the “atomistic 
[Atomistik] of matter and electricity as well as the mystic of radiation, quantum 
theory.” (Ibid., p. 1026)99 Methodologically, this field stands in sheer opposition to 
thermodynamics and is dominated by tentative hypotheses about unobservable 
particles, which are advanced in a trial and error fashion. Yet this was not a sign of 
indigence. 
 
Atomistic and quantum mechanics are, however, sciences of imagination; in a certain sense they 
remind one of the sciences of antiquity and the middle ages. The Greeks worked a lot with 
imagination, and perhaps even more our ancestors in the middle ages. If some holy man, who enjoyed 
sufficient authority among his ecclesial brothers, had an inspiration, this was straightway raised to a 
divine dogma – and in a certain respect something similar still happens in physics today. One only 
works now more efficiently and tolerates the dogmas only as long as they yield fruitful consequences 
that agree with experience. 
 A man so divinely gifted that he apparently succeeds in tracking down the secrets of the 
microcosm in a purely intuitive way, is … Niels Bohr in Copenhagen. Bohr’s theory of the spectral 
series has not arisen on a secure deductive path out of empirical facts but in an intuitive manner from 
the imagination of his head. (Ibid., p. 1027)  
 
At the surface level, Thirring’s praise for Bohr seems to fulfill the demands of the 
post-war milieu insofar as he commended the dominant roles of imagination and of the 
individual within contemporary physics. It is also quite interesting that Bohr’s 
authority apparently is not just a post 1926 creation as Beller (1996, 1999) suggests.  
 Yet all this rhetoric of genius was blooming in the field of a rather low-brow 
empiricism based on trial and error. Consequently, the absence of the simple and 
unifying deductive framework in atomic physics did not trigger a diagnosis of crisis. 
Here is how the quoted passage continues. “As long as it [Bohr’s theory] proves 
successful with respect to experience and helps us to unravel the mysterious labyrinth 
of the spectral series, we have no reason to ask for the origin of its laws.” (Thirring, 
1921, p. 1027) And even if Bohr’s speculations ultimately failed, they would still 
enjoy the historical merit of having motivated many important experiments. Thus 
Thirring at bottom argued that, for the empiricist, methodological pluralism was not at 
all problematic because it resulted from the different historical evolutions of the single 
                                                          
99 Thirring here obviously alluded to Sommerfeld’s (1920) paper that had attracted a lot of attention; see Sections 
1.1.1.2. & 1.1.2.3. 
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fields of inquiry. His repeated emphasis on efficiency and economy can be traced back 
to the pragmatic aspects of Mach’s principle of economy. Although Thirring sided 
with Boltzmann as to the independent character of physical theory, he rejected any 
realist connotations even of successful physical concepts. The Mars dwellers would 
suffer the same empirical facts but describe them by means of totally different 
concepts embedded into their intellectual culture. This was of course an allusion to the 
Planck-Mach polemics, and Thirring visibly took Mach’s side. When comparing this 
account to the First Vienna Circle’s emphasis on French conventionalism, Thirring 
appears closer to Mach’s original teaching, or rather to the synthesis of Mach and 
Boltzmann characteristic for the Institute of Physics. This is, to my mind, also the 
reason why the issue of causality was not mentioned explicitly. Within an empiricist 
account and granting a plurality of the methods used in different fields of inquiry, 
there was no philosophical basis to a priori require a particular form of physical law or 
causal explanation. Or put differently, predictive success of certain functional 
dependences automatically implied the weak Machian notion of causality.  
 The Machian link also sheds some light on the issue of imagination in atomic 
physics as mentioned by Thirring. Mach continuously emphasized that hypotheses are 
created by the reconstruction, connection, and mutual adaptation of experiences in 
thoughts. This attributes a constitutive role to imagination, as Haller (1986c) rightly 
emphasizes. In the progress of science and in practical life, imagination is 
counterbalanced by the principle of economy and controlled by the empirical adequacy 
of the imagined facts. With Boltzmann and against Mach, Thirring asserted that this 
process does not hold at the level of our life-world, e.g., the experiences of heat and 
pressure, but continues into the microscopic realm and the expanses of the universe. 
This teaches that Thirring’s concept of imagination had only a partial overlap with the 
quests for Anschaulichkeit originating from the cultural milieu. In a nutshell, 
imagination concerned the context of discovery while Anschaulichkeit purported to 
play a role in the context of justification as well. It was a weakness of the Machian 
concept of intuition [Schau] – and perhaps a reason for his skepticism towards some 
parts of modern physics – that after a long process of refinement intuition together 
with biological corroboration came back as a final justification. (Cf. Sect. 3.1) 
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5. Die Naturwissenschaften as a Forum for Scientist-
Philosophers 
 
In its next phase the causality debate between Vienna and Berlin enters the short years 
of the Weimar Republic and the First Austrian Republic. After the lost war and the 
decline of the empires, the political conditions and the cultural milieus underwent 
severe changes. In spite of the far-reaching continuity of the academic elites, German 
and Austrian scientists suffered from the economical collapse no less than other 
comparably situated citizens. Moreover, German scientists were initially banned from 
international congresses and institutions. The generous support for physical research 
mentioned in Section 1.2. was thus one among few exceptions. Less dramatic, to be 
sure, but essential for the causality debate was a major change in the forum for 
philosophical debates among natural scientists that had occurred just one year before 
the war. It is the focus of the present chapter. 
As Forman (1971, p. 6) rightly observed, the philosophical reflections of 
scientists were typically made in front of a general academic audience on the occasion 
of the inauguration of a new rector or a new university professor, or during a 
celebration of an academy. But also the plenary sessions of the 
Naturforscherversammlung gave ample space for general and philosophical topics. 
After all, Lorenz Oken had founded this society in 1822 amidst German 
Naturphilosophie.  
 Often such speeches were printed as a separate booklet, but they also went 
through several journals, among them the Physikalische Zeitschrift in which the 
Planck-Mach polemics had taken place, and the journals of the learned societies and 
professional organizations. Later these papers were assembled in collections bearing 
titles such as Populäre Schriften (Popular Writings) – in the case of (Boltzmann, 1905) 
or (Mach, 1987) – or Physikalische Rundblicke (Physical Panoramas) – so reads the 
first collection of Planck’s papers which developed into (Planck, 1944).100 The 
appearance of such a book typically testified the author’s becoming – self-consciously 
of willy-nilly – a scientist-philosopher. One of the very few journals suitable for 
philosophical debates among scientists had been Ostwald’s Annalen der 
Naturphilosophie; yet in 1921 they ceased publication. 
 In 1913 the media landscape for scientist-philosophers changed. Philosophically 
oriented academic addresses from now on appeared to a growing part in the weekly 
journal Die Naturwissenschaften that strove to follow the major developments within 
the whole of natural science and present them in a generally comprehensible and 
captivating form. Other than within the publications of learned societies, there the 
general philosophical discourse was well-planned by the journal’s founder Arnold 
Berliner. This includes the second phase of the causality debate between Vienna and 
Berlin (Chapters 6-8). 
 Here is how Berliner and Curt Thesing, the first in a series of co-editors 
stemming from the biological sciences101, described the scope of the newly founded 
                                                          
100 The dissemination of Planck’s philosophical papers can easily be tracked in the bibliography of his non-
technical writings edited by Heilbron (1977). 
101 These were August Pütter (1914-1921), Hermann Braus (1922-1924), and Hans Spemann (1925-1934) who 
remained on the editorial board until 1940. 
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“Weekly Journal for the Progress of Natural Science, Medicine, and Technology” – so 
the initial subtitle102 – in a brief introduction. 
 
The rapidly progressing specialization in all domains of natural science [Naturforschung] makes it 
harder for the individual scientist to orient himself even about the adjacent domains. Utterly 
impossible, however, becomes the orientation about the more distant domains. On the other hand, the 
intellectual need not to lose the connection with the whole, is felt by everyone the more strongly the 
more he is forced to narrow down the field of his own work – after all in most cases he depends upon 
the help of other branches of natural science. … [Die Naturwissenschaften] intend to inform everyone 
active in the domain of natural science about the progresses in the whole of natural sciences. (“Zur 
Einführung”, Die Naturwissenschaften 1, 1913, p. 1) 
 
The editors’ introduction was followed by two short papers of the physicians Oskar 
Hertwig “Natural Science and Biology” and W. His “The Physician and Natural 
Science” which functioned as greeting addresses emphasizing the intimate connection 
between the life sciences and the natural sciences.  
 When proposing his journal project to the publisher Ferdinand Springer on 6 
May, 1912, Berliner had in mind a German analogue to the British Nature. Berliner’s 
more detailed letter of 6 August, 1912, contained a passage very similar to the above-
quoted introduction and continued as such:  
 
The endeavor to be topical makes it advisable to publish the Naturwissenschaften weekly, the 
endeavor to be captivating yields the type of its collaborators: It is necessary to interest [as possible 
contributors] the leaders of the single domains or at least those fully oriented about it, in particular 
those who can describe matters in an interesting and comprehensible fashion. (quoted from Autrum, 
1988, p. 2f.) 
 
As planned by Berliner, every issue began with a ‘top quality’ article by a well-known 
scientist. After reviews, authors of which were rewarded with a honorarium, there 
came reports of scientific meetings of general interest, brief communications 
(Zuschriften), and an overview of scientific research and teaching at universities and 
academies. In particular after the war, the brief communications were an important 
vehicle to rapidly disseminate new findings. (Cf. Holl, 1996, p. 133). While initially 
the percentage of reviews and communications was rather large, it decreased over the 
years. When in 1924 Die Naturwissenschaften became the organ of the 
Naturforschergesellschaft and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, they also published 
the news and communications of these societies, research reports of the KWG-
institutes, and the main lectures of the Naturforscherversammlung. Interestingly, the 
plan to make Die Naturwissenschaften the official organ of the 
Naturforschergesellschaft dates back to the founding year 1913, but the respective 
proposal encountered some opposition within the society. (Cf. Sarkowski, 1996, p. 
194f.) Nonetheless, there were discernible parallels from the very beginning. For 
instance, the journal’s table of content typically followed the system of the 
Naturforschergesellschaft.103  
 It took as breathtakingly little as eight months until Berliner’s proposal to 
Springer had materialized and the first number of Die Naturwissenschaften was out. It 
is also impressive that the editor reached his main goal almost instantaneously; 
                                                          
102 In 1922 the subtitle was changed into “Weekly Journal for the Progresses of Pure and Applied Sciences”. 
103 Perhaps due to lack of time, this was not done for each volume. 
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browsing through the 1913 volume one finds many prominent authors writing survey 
articles about a great variety of topics. It appears to me that Berliner’s 
Naturwissenschaften also gave a fair coverage of the whole domain of the natural 
sciences, technology, and medicine. To rigorously prove such a thesis would of course 
require a large-scale research project availing itself of modern bibliometric methods. 
Here I can only cite obituaries and recollections of scientists – mainly physicists – 
documenting that the weekly magazine had indeed informed them well about the 
whole of natural science.  
 All testimonies about Berliner emphasize the singular nature of his personality 
and how intimately it was connected to his brain child Die Naturwissenschaften. This 
was certainly the basis of his amazing success. For this reason the first section of this 
chapter assembles various fragments about a core figure of the Weimar scientific 
community that has hitherto been neglected almost entirely by historiography. My 
main objective is to show how deeply some younger scientists felt about Berliner and 
to what extent they admired his embracing equally science, technology, and the arts. It 
appears that Berliner, both a “man of culture” (Kulturmensch) and a “technical 
physicist” – using characterizations by von Laue and Ewald–, made many of them not 
feel estranged from arts and culture by their pursuing science and technology. One 
might view the unity in Berliner’s outlook as a continuation of the Humboldtian bridge 
between natural science and aesthetic sentiment which Exner had cherished so highly, 
of Helmholtz’s unified approach to the sciences and scientific aspects of the arts, and 
perhaps, above all, of the universalist Goethe, the poet, naturalist and manager. As we 
shall see, Helmholtz and Goethe figured prominently in Berliner’s thinking and his 
journal, and Metze’s paper on Humboldt (Section 4.2) did not slip into the first volume 
by accident. But there existed a substantial difference between Berliner’s appreciation 
of modern art and Exner’s feeling of a decline of art and culture. Moreover, the former 
director of the A.E.G. filament lamp factory and director of a journal dedicated to the 
progress of science and technology was far from being a Mandarin albeit his severe 
criticism of the contemporary state of the culture of writing. If one compares 
Berliner’s and Exner’s introductory textbooks, however, the latter clearly takes the 
more modern approach. What remains from Ewald’s testimony, though, is that there 
existed an important cultural influence on the younger physicists – being of the same 
age as the founders of the Vienna Circle – other than the well-known anti-scientific 
trends of Weimar culture.  
 Deeper scrutiny would be required here, but it seems to me justified to assume 
that those mainly young scientists gathering around Berliner and his journal felt not so 
fundamentally estranged by an allegedly crude technological and positivist rationality 
that they would readily succumb the anti-scientific Weimar milieu by the simple 
adaptive mechanism claimed by Forman. No wonder that Berliner’s 
Naturwissenschaften firmly took a stand against Spengler (Section 5.3.). Berliner’s 
perspective about the relation of science and culture – which was, of course, not shared 
by a number of authors of the journal – was embedded into a clear commitment for 
scientific modernism combined with a rejection of those opposing tendencies that 
emerged after the war, such as irrationalism or vitalism (with qualifications), and 
above all the Deutsche Physik. For this reason I shall claim with respect to the notion 
of cultural milieu the Forman thesis is based upon, that Die Naturwissenschaften can 
be considered as a modernist and science-oriented submilieu that provided scientists 
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with a cultural identity more specific than just being Bildungsbürger, such that they 
did not face the general milieu solely and directly. Considering the journal as the 
expression of a submilieu derives support from the strong emotional adherence to 
Berliner and his journal characterizing most recollections and obituaries. 
 Of course, dichotomies “modern” versus “anti-modern” are notoriously 
problematic. And even if the case could be made successfully in one science, matters 
probably would differ significantly in another science; for instance, while physicists 
would have considered teleology or Zweckmäßigkeit as anti-modern tout court, many 
biologists were searching for modern and empirically meaningful definitions of them. 
But we do not need a fixed set of methodological credentials and a submilieu thesis of 
full generality to assess the consequences of the present chapter for the Forman thesis 
and its wake. It suffices to repeat a result broadly discussed in Chapter 1. The history 
of physics between 1906 and 1945 was simply characterized by the fact that there 
existed a clear-cut division line between modernism and anti-modernism that exhibited 
the familiar scheme: the praise of progress versus the accusation of degeneration. The 
progressive sub-milieu – which embraced people conservative in other respects, 
among them Planck – constituted itself in the struggles about relativity theory which 
began right after the war. Already the first volume of Die Naturwissenschaften 
contained a strong criticism against relativity theory by Ernst Gehrcke (1913) which 
was rebutted by Max Born (1913). The encounter was yet far from the polemics that 
took place after the war and in which Gehrcke would become one of the leading 
figures on Lenard’s side, while Die Naturwissenschaften became an important 
stronghold in the “defense belt” (Cf. Hentschel 1990) around Einstein. It was in 
particular von Laue, Thirring, Schlick, and Born who participated in Berliner’s 
program to explain the new theory to the general audience of German scientists. As we 
see in a letter of Berliner to Schlick (Section 5.4.) this educational objective was more 
important to the editor of Die Naturwissenschaften than polemics as such, although he 
constantly published rebuttals of the works of Stark and Lenard. (See Section 2.1.2.3.)  
 After the Nazis had seized power, Berliner himself – as a Jew and a close friend 
of Einstein – quickly became the object of defame from the side of the Deutsche 
Physik. Although the journal was never directly political, and although one finds 
several authors in Berliner’s Naturwissenschaften who after 1933 became active 
national socialists, there are some papers which could be read as an expression in favor 
of the Weimar republic (Section 5.2.). At any rate, there were areas such as relativity 
theory where being committed to scientific rationality and modernism was tantamount 
to a political statement. Thus the dichotomy between those who – at least after some 
time – accepted relativity theory and those who combated it, and the criteria according 
to which such a decision was made, provides the coordinate system for all those 
debates about causality for which Die Naturwissenschaften provided a forum. 
 Apart from specific differences between German and British science, it was this 
strong and persistent philosophical element by which Die Naturwissenschaften 
differed from the model of Nature. Already the sheer numbers are impressive. (See 
Section 5.4.) The general overview of Ernst Lamla – then editor of Die 
Naturwissenschaften – commemorating the 50th volume rightly observes that an 
“exceptionally large number of papers [from 1924 until 1944] is dedicated to 
causality.” (Lamla, 1963, p. 10)  
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 However, Die Naturwissenschaften were neither striving for a maximally broad 
coverage of philosophical topics relevant to scientists nor following the trend of the 
profession. The selection of topics and authors reveals a clear stance, and Berliner’s 
guidance was perhaps stronger than in any other field. His correspondence with 
Schlick provides an example of how he approached authors and developed a topic he 
wanted to be covered in his journal. With a few exceptions, there were basically two 
classes of philosophical contributions up to 1930. On the one hand, a certain set of 
eminent philosophers, among them Kant and Schopenhauer, were covered in survey 
articles which are of a rather discursive kind; Berliner evidently held that they 
represented important intellectual background for his readers. Interestingly, most of 
the articles were authored by the philosopher and writer Moritz Kronenberg while 
university philosophers without any scientific background rarely appeared as 
contributors. On the other hand, Die Natuwissenschaften were the main journal for the 
scientists within the emerging movement of Logical Empiricism until this movement 
finally detached itself from the classical pattern of the scientist-philosopher and 
established themselves as a new scientific discipline, scientific philosophy, which 
found its expression in the manifesto of 1929 and the foundation of Erkenntnis in 
1930. This will be the core of Section 5.4.  
 In the final section, I shall briefly investigate a debate about causality that took 
place in Die Naturwissenschaften during the early 1920s between Walter Nernst, 
Walter Schottky, and Joseph Petzoldt. It shows that the philosophical terminology was 
considerably in flux. We find a Nernst strongly indebted to his teacher Boltzmann yet 
without having taken the late Boltzmann’s Machian tack. Schottky redefined the 
concept of causality in such a way as to meaningfully speak about stochastic causality 
and simultaneously introduces non-local interactions, while Petzoldt saw no need of 
action or sign of crisis because the Machian notion of causality was wide enough to 
accommodate all problems of quantum theory. This dialogue shows that the front line 
investigated in the present book extended beyond the narrower circle of personalities 
starring in the other chapters. 
 
5.1. Arnold Berliner and the Orchestration of Natural Science 
 
5.1.1 The Personality 
 
Obituaries and commemorative articles emphasize the eminent role of Die 
Naturwissenschaften for Weimar science and the singular nature of Berliner’s 
personality. There is a mournful tone in all of them. Compare von Laue’s report of 
Berliner’s tragic end written down in 1942 but published only in 1946.  
 
Berliner had wished to remain editor of Die Naturwissenschaften for twenty-five years, that is, until 
1938. Things turned out differently. In the summer of 1935 the publisher felt urged to dismiss him 
over night. Berliner finally got over the suddenness of the dismissal, and until the end he felt love and 
thankfulness for the house Springer. But it hit the roots of his nature [Wurzel seines Wesens] that his 
work was at all ended by force. Nevertheless he lived for another seven years, more and more 
oppressed by the growing persecution of Jews, more and more restricted in his activities. Finally, he 
retired like an hermit to his beautiful domicile in the Kielgan street which he only left when it was 
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absolutely unavoidable to visit a doctor or an authority. Two journeys to the USA, in autumn 1935 and 
in summer 1937, were gleams of hope within this misery. Unfortunately they did not lead to a position 
which had enabled him to subsidize himself there; and he proudly declined the greathearted offer of 
good friends to allow him a sort of pension over there. What still kept him alive then was partly the 
hospitality with which … he could entertain the friends who remained faithful to him until the end; 
many visitors came to the Kielgan street. Moreover, his mind remained active. Again and again he 
read in the books which were his whole life, wrote amendments and corrections to his textbook 
although it could not be published any longer; for he still hoped that matters would turn for better. He 
did not live to see it. When they even wanted to turn him out of his flat, his last refuge, he carried out a 
decision taken for this case long ago and took his life [on 23 March, 1942]. (Laue, 1946, p. 258)  
 
After the last phase of the holocaust had started, even Berliner’s influential friends 
were unable to protect him any longer. Through them the news of his death reached 
England, and in September Nature published two obituaries by his emigrated old 
friends Peter Paul Ewald and Max Born.104 They were well aware of the 
circumstances, as Ewald ended: “Now his friends deplore in his tragic escape from life 
the loss of one who represented much of the best cultural traditions of a bygone 
Germany, and of a warm-hearted and helpful friend.” (Ewald, 1942, p. 284) Ewald 
emphasized another important aspect. 
 
Berliner addressed himself mainly to the then young generation of men of science. Much of the 
success of the journal was due to Berliner’s vivid personality, his close contact with the majority of 
young physicists and mathematicians and his initiative in formulating the subject of articles he wanted 
written for his journal. Thus Die Naturwissenschaften became a mirror reflecting the development of 
science during 1913-30. (Ewald, 1942, p. 284)  
 
Affection of this generation for Berliner did not decrease with temporal distance. 
Wilhelm Westphal’s commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Berliner’s death joins 
in with the above-quoted obituaries. Evidently, for a group of young Berlin physicists, 
Berliner had become an intellectual father figure not unlike what Exner had been for 
his circle. Just compare the following passage with Benndorf’s recollections about the 
afternoon teas at Vienna (Sect. 4.3). 
 
[The volumes of Die Naturwissenschaften] reflect the entire dramatic development of the natural 
sciences in the first half of our century, and there exists hardly an eminent natural scientist 
[Naturforscher] who did not appear there at least once as a contributor. … Moreover, may we not 
forget that Berliner has written the first Textbook of Physics [1903] arranged according to the modern 
point of view. After having served for more than two decades as a most valuable source of knowledge 
for the younger generation, in the year 1933 it went up in flames on the disgraceful stake in front of 
the University of Berlin. And may we not forget the Concise Dictionary of Physics [1924] co-edited 
with his close friend Karl Scheel. … May we also remember with gratitude his silent activities as a 
counselor of the Springer publishing house. He has thus done more good for German science and 
technology that became known to the general public. 
 But may we above all not forget the man. We, the Berlin physicists of the years circa 1910 to 
1940 have the right to say: He was one of us. [Er war unser.] For us those decades are altogether 
unthinkable without Arnold Berliner. He represented a spiritual center around which we gathered 
again and again, in particular during the after hours [Nachsitzungen] of the Physical Society and the 
venerable Colloquium – and on most of these occasions until the last tram. We all loved him, this man 
of an exceptionally universal education, this fine mind open to all beauty, this rough diamond with a 
                                                          
104 Communication across the war front was difficult and could be effected, if at all, only via neutral countries. 
The same number of Nature contains an obituary of the Welsh physicist A.L. Selby who had died on July 22, 
1942. So it took presumably about three months until the news of Berliner’s suicide had reached his friends. 
 172
grim humor but with a warm heart, he whom nothing could infuriate more than when he believed that 
someone had been wronged.105 Whoever of us one day should write his memoirs, Arnold Berliner for 
sure will not be missing in them. (Westphal, 1952, p. 121) 
 
Born depicted Berliner’s appearance and character in quite similar terms. 
 
There was no Naturforscher-Versammlung and no meeting of the Physikalische Gesellschaft where his 
small and powerful figure with the characteristic beard and big spectacles did not appear, no scientific 
conference where his wise counsel was not welcomed. He never claimed to be a man of science, but 
only a “poor technician”. But he insisted that every article in Die Naturwissenschaften should be 
written in such a way that his “simple mind” could understand it. How few of the contributions proved 
up to the high standard which he set, and how lively was the ensuing correspondence. He had a 
collection of the most remarkable extracts from these letters, as material on the “psychology of the 
scientist”, whom he liked to describe as “mimosenhaftes Stachelschwein” (a hybrid of mimosa and 
porcupine). Perhaps he did not realize how well this description fitted his own character, which was 
the strangest mixture of infinite kindness, generosity, greatness of outlook and personal touchiness. 
 He was a technician by profession, an amateur scientist; but his real life was in literature, art, 
and music. He read abundantly and remembered everything. He knew the great galleries of Italy and 
Germany, and filled his home with good modern pictures. But his greatest pleasures were his annual 
visits to the Bach, Beethoven, Brahms festivals and to Bayreuth. Of his numerous friendships with 
men of importance he valued none higher than that with Gustav Mahler, the composer. (Born, 1942, p. 
285) 
 
Berliner was born in Breslau (today Wroclaw) in Silesia on 26 December, 1862. Von 
Laue relates that Berliner’s father unfortunately took his son from the humanistic 
gymnasium to the Realschule, “him who more than hardly anyone was destined for a 
humanist!” (Laue, 1946, p. 257) Similarly as it would be for Born many years later 
(Cf. Born, 1975, p. 122, and Holl, 1996), the house of his cousin Albert and Toni 
Neißer opened to the young Berliner the world of science, art and music. Since his 
Realschul diploma did not allow him to study medicine, Berliner became a physicist. 
In the rapidly growing A.E.G. company chaired by Emil Rathenau Berliner made a 
brilliant career. After some time in Hamburg and the United States he became the 
director of the Berlin filament lamp factory. After 25 years he left in 1912 because of 
irreconcilable differences with Rathenau. According to Ewald, Berliner’s technical 
achievements were considerable.  
 
Berliner belonged to the first generation of ‘technical physicists’ and worked in close connexion with 
Emil Rathenau as head of the physics laboratories of the A.E.G. during the period of rapid expansion 
of this firm. The development of the incandescent lamp carbon lamp and of X-ray bulbs owes much to 
him – he introduced the first ‘getter’, phosphorus, in the manufacture of lamps, and the large scars on 
his arms bore testimony of the early stages of experimenting with X-rays when their dangers were not 
yet realized. Among other technical problems advanced by Berliner was that of the phonograph. 
(Ewald, 1942, p. 284) 
 
It was presumably the house of his cousin Neißer in which Berliner first met Gustav 
Mahler. Their friendship developed during the early 1890s when both worked in 
Hamburg. Berliner supported some of Mahler’s projects, and Mahler sometimes stayed 
                                                          
105 Let me give the German original of this passage: “Wir haben ihn alle sehr geliebt, diesen ganz ungewöhnlich 
allgemeingebildeten, feingeistigen und allem Schönen offenen Menschen mit der rauhen Schale und einem oft 
grimmigen Humor, aber mit dem warmen Herzen, ihn, den nichts mehr empören konnte, als wenn er glaubte, es 
geschehe jemandem Unrecht.” 
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in his friend’s Berlin domicile. Mahler’s (1982 & 1983) letters testify their intense 
aesthetic and philosophical discussions,106 such that Mahler’s biographer, the 
sociologist Kurt Blaukopf, even considers “Berliner as a key figure to understand the 
thinker Gustav Mahler.” (Blaukopf, 1980, p. 222)  No wonder, after all, that 
Berliner chose a distinction from music to describe his own role with respect to pure 
science. 
 
For all his scientific talent and for all his love of knowledge, Berliner was not a scientist. He once 
described his position towards the latter by comparing it with the position of a conductor towards the 
composer. Despite his artistic sense which by no means can be appraised high enough he was, to be 
sure, even less of a creative artist. He belonged to a type of man that is, to the disadvantage of 
mankind, in danger of extinction: He was purely and simply a man of culture [Kulturmensch] in the 
sense that he was striving for an overview of as large as possible a domain of our culture with the goal 
to reach certainty about its authenticity, its concordance with ethical demands. (Laue, 1946, p. 258) 
 
So far I have provided a rather modernist account of the Kulturmensch Berliner. But 
there was an eminent conflicting voice.  
 On the occasion of Berliner’s seventieth birthday on 26 December, 1932, his 
Naturwissenschaften published a Festschrift. The double issue contains no less than 35 
contributions in which prominent scientists explained a current topic of their own 
discipline on two or three pages. They are preceded by three papers which deserve 
special interest here. In a sort of preface, Einstein restated the importance of Berliner’s 
goals as outlined in 1913, in particular, the need to overcome the growing 
specialization. After letting out Berliner’s characterization of a scientific author as a 
hybrid of mimosa and porcupine, Einstein asserted that “Berliner’s achievements were 
only possible because in him the desire for a clear overview over a maximally broad 
realm of research is exceptionally vivid,” (Einstein, 1932, p. 913) an attitude which 
also made his textbook (Berliner, 1903, 1928) so valuable for students. 
 
Berliner’s struggle for clarity and the general idea has enormously contributed to problems, methods, 
and results of science coming to life in many minds. The scientific life of our times cannot be 
imagined without his journal. To make knowledge come to life and keep it alive is equally important 
as to solve single problems. We all know what we owe to Arnold Berliner. (both Einstein, 1932, p. 
913) 
 
The second contribution was authored by Wolfgang Windelband, head of the 
department of personnel of the Prussian ministry of education (1926–1933). He was 
the son of Wilhelm Windelband, the founder of the Southwest-German school of neo-
Kantianism and inventor of the distinction between nomothetic and ideographic 
sciences, a philosophical distinction that was to underpin the rigid methodological 
separation between “Naturwissenschaften” and “Geisteswissenschaften.” And 
Wolfgang Windelband clearly followed his father’s lead by emphasizing that it is only 
Berliner’s great interest in history, in particular, the history of the church, which gives 
a historian the right to “violate the basic principle of Berliner’s editorial activity, to let 
only real specialists in the wide realm of the natural sciences get a word in his 
journal.” (Windelband, 1932, p. 914) Windelband characterized Berliner as an 
                                                          
106 The starving addressee of the letter no. 414 was, to my mind, certainly not Berliner. Herta Blaukopf has told 
me that Alma Mahler was not all too careful when assembling the edition of the letters. 
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adherent to the classical Prussian virtues and, interestingly, emphasized the feelings of 
decline so characteristic for the German mandarin.  
 
Among all those features of our times which repel him and direct his wistful look back to a more 
beautiful past, the decrease of general education to him is an instance of particular anguish. With 
amazement and sorrow he follows the symptoms of this course of disease, and harsh without reserve 
are his judgments about this result of our present system of education. … 
 It is also his sense for the arts which again and again makes him furious about … the poor 
stylistic quality of scientific works. (Ibid., p. 914) 
 
In the end, the reader witnesses an adoption of the Realschüler, physicist, and factory 
manager by a representative of the German “Geisteswissenschaft.” 
 
When we take the image of his personality and its relation to the spiritual content of life as a whole, 
then his life rounds into a superb and complete humanity. In this sense he, who often jokingly 
described himself as a “Klippschüler” [i.e., someone going to a second-rate school], succeeded in 
becoming a humanist of the best kind. (Ibid., p. 915) 
 
How can we interpret Windelband’s characterization of Berliner? Certainly, Berliner 
was a humanist and a Bildungsbürger “of the best kind”, but the motive of cultural 
decline seems a surprising epithet for a technician and manager dedicated to scientific 
progress and modern art. We would need more historical material here, but it seems to 
me that there exists no split in Berliner’s cultural attitude of the kind we encountered 
in Exner (Sect. 4.6.5). After all, educational reforms were on everyone’s agenda. The 
constant specialization in the sciences made the general overview an almost 
impossible task. With a look back to the days of Helmholtz, Berliner founded the 
Naturwissenschaften; with reference to the French encyclopedists, Otto Neurath in the 
1930s would embark into a similar mammoth enterprise. Hence, we do not get far with 
simple dichotomies here.  
 In actual fact, Berliner did not approach the question of style by mournful 
contemplation. Kronenberg discussed concept formation of philosophical concepts 
(1917a) and the issue of foreign terms in science (1918b). After 1934 Edmund O. von 
Lipmann published each year a list of the most blatant stylistic lapses from the 
chemical journals. In May 1935, Hendrik A. Kramers discussed scientists’ style of 
writing. He diagnoses a philosophical attitude in present physics that is akin to the one 
prevailing in the age of romanticism. But due to our present lack of knowledge, there 
is nothing bad in this. Bohr’s “incessant struggle for expression” (Kramers, 1935, p. 
301), the struggle for the right form of quantum mechanical results was also a struggle 
for clarity. 
Windelband’s adoption of the “Klippschüler” Berliner, to my mind, became 
only necessary by his presupposing a rigid distinction between science and the arts that 
in effect was at odds with Berliner personality. Windelband’s rhetorical captatio by 
modesty missed the point in another important respect. The dividing line between 
“Naturwissenschaften” and “Geisteswissenschaften” did not coincide with the border 
set by Berliner for Die Naturwissenschaften. To the contrary, the border line went 
right through academic philosophy. Apart from philosophical papers by scientists, 
Berliner accepted many contributions from guilded philosophers who were educated in 
or felt close to the natural sciences and their method – be they neo-Kantians or Logical 
Empiricists –, but he strictly excluded those philosophies which insisted on the 
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unbridgeable gap between nomothetic and ideographic disciplines (Cf. Section 5.4). 
Already in the first volume “The intrusion of scientific methods into the 
Geisteswissenschaften“ was discussed in a contribution by M. Brahn who stressed the 
constantly increasing value of scientific methods, e.g., in historical investigations. 
“Neither the historian nor the pedagogue can accomplish their work with [scientific 
methods only]; to this end they need a broadening of their considerations which only 
imagination can create, to this end they also need an instinctive attitude that does not 
originate from the sciences.” (Brahn, 1913, p. 69) 
 The eminent role of the discussions on causality in Die Naturwissenschaften 
becomes clear from the third contribution to the Festschrift authored by Max von 
Laue. Since von Laue thus entered into a discussion with Richard von Mises I 
postpone a closer discussion of his paper to Section 8.6. 
 
5.1.2 Berliner’s Textbook 
 
Berliner’s Textbook of Physics in Elementary Presentation appeared in five editions 
between 1903 and 1934. To Laue’s mind it was  
 
probably the only book of this kind whose author never was active in teaching. … Until the end of his 
life [Berliner] constantly completed and amended it to keep it up to date. It is profound as the man 
himself who never wrote anything down until he had completely understood it and thought it through 
in various directions. When in his old years some new findings proved to difficult for him, he had the 
respective section written by a friend. (Laue, 1946, p. 257) 
 
Among these friends were such eminent scientists as Walter Nernst, Fritz Haber, 
Walter Gerlach, and Otto Stern; cf. the Preface to the fourth edition (1928). The book 
sold well and found unanimous praise. Nernst, who gave the introductory course in 
physics, recommended the book to his students “as particularly profound, versatile and 
well thought out.” (Autrum, 1988, p. 2). Westphal, who himself authored an 
introductory textbook, called it the first modern textbook. According to Ewald, 
Berliner’s book was “conspicuous for stressing the application of physical knowledge 
to technical problems, many years in advance of a recognized ‘technical physics’.” 
(Ewald, 1042, p. 284) And indeed Berliner’s book contained many remarks about 
technical instruments and applications. 
 In the Preface to the first edition, Berliner explained that his “book is 
elementary in particular with respect to the form of the presentation, i.e., in the 
detailedness of the description which everywhere intends as much as possible to 
clearly explicate the particular features and to facilitate the reader’s own work.” 
(Berliner, 1903, p. iii) It is also elementary insofar as it presupposes only a basic 
mathematical knowledge and strives for clarity and distinctness of the subject matter, 
that is, for a simple arrangement by which the student does not face a new topic 
unprepared. Berliner’s preface is followed by a short foreword of the physician L. 
Hermann who recommends the book to the students of medicine. Had we not 
encountered a very similar structure in the first number of Die Naturwissenschaften 
this could have been seen merely as a maneuver to increase the readership. Most 
interestingly, in all his struggle for clarity Berliner never talked about Anschaulichkeit. 
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 Berliner’s introduction leaves no doubt how strongly the book was indebted to 
the heritage of Helmholtz. It is the task of physical science “to seek the laws by which 
the single processes in nature can be reduced to general rules and be determined from 
the rules.” (Ibid., p. 1) And the author also assents to Helmholtz that it is the primary 
aim to reduce all physical phenomena to phenomena of motion. Admittedly, many 
areas of physics are far away from that goal, but even in these cases “we do not have 
any reason to assume that this reduction is impossible but only that it is not possible at 
the present state of science.” (Ibid., p. 2) Still in the fourth edition of 1928 this ideal is 
maintained in a mitigated form. Compared to 1903 the introduction is shorter and 
contains a footnote stating that the development of the last two decades has led away 
from the mechanical world view “because the electrodynamic processes in free ether 
cannot be deduced from a coherent mechanical hypothesis. But the student finds in the 
basic idea [of the mechanical world view] such a clear guide that it would be 
unsuitable to introduce him into physics on a different route.” (Berliner, 1928, p. 1) 
 Let me add some words of comparison between the introductory textbooks of 
Berliner and Exner. Both were written in an equally broad and comprehensible style 
and presupposed only elementary mathematics. While Exner arranged his presentation 
into the three chapters space and time, matter, and ether, Berliner still followed the 
historical classification of subdisciplines, such as mechanics of points and liquids, 
acoustics, theory of heat, reorganizing though the sequence of topics. This has the 
consequence that while Berliner set out with the mechanics of mass points as the most 
easily comprehensible topic, Exner’s readers find themselves quickly driven into 
geometry and special relativity. Both authors emphasized topics close to their hearts. 
While Exner broadly covered the theory of colors and atmospheric electricity, 
“Berliner’s predilection for everything connected to optical imaging” (Laue, 1946, p. 
257) found its expression in a chapter on optics longer than all others and sophisticated 
folded figures which were to avoid the misunderstanding of perspective drawings. The 
main difference between both books perhaps lies in their philosophical outlook. While 
Berliner was, at least for pedagogical reasons, indebted to the classical tradition of 
Helmholtz, Exner added an entire philosophical chapter about natural laws which 
adopted the statistical point of view throughout. Thus Exner’s fourth chapter pointed 
to the future of physics much more than the physics of the textbook. Berliner’s equally 
strong philosophical interests remained under the surface of his book, such that its 
most modern aspect – apart from the fact that the book was constantly updated – might 
be seen in the intimate connection of science and its application. 
 
5.1.3 Berliner at Springer 
 
Indeed the publisher could not find a better editor than this one who apart from his love for and 
understanding of the ‘exact sciences’ had a heart for all biological matters due to his acquaintance with 
[the physician Albert] Neisser, who owing to his superb knowledge of human nature was capable to 
get near to the leading representatives of all these disciplines, and who made close friends with quite a 
few of them. (Laue, 1946, p. 258) 
 
Von Laue’s characterization extended beyond the narrower scope of Die 
Naturwissenschaften. “Berliner’s importance for the connection between the various 
scientific disciplines and the Springer-Verlag can hardly be estimated high enough.” 
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(Holl, 1996, p. 48) Not only did he steer the flagship journal, he was also an 
irreplaceable counselor to Ferdinand Springer. In his history of the Springer publishing 
house, Heinz Sarkowski writes. 
 
Springer’s internal advisers were scientists, with some of them being full-time journal editors, such as 
Victor Salle (from 1910) for internal medicine; Arnold Berliner (from 1913) for the natural sciences, 
especially physics and mathematics; Arthur Hübner (from 1928) for surgery; and Ernst Urban for 
pharmacy (from 1920). They received an monthly retainer and expenses, but were not employees in a 
legal sense. In addition there were numerous advisers who had close relations with Springer as author 
or editor: Richard Courant for mathematics, Max Born for physics (later Karl Scheel also), Richard 
Goldschmidt for biology (later Fritz von Wettstein), Walter Kaskel (until 1926) followed by Hans 
Peters for political science and economics, Karl Wilmanns for psychiatry from 1914. (Sarkowski, 
1996, p. 316) 
 
Apart from these activities Berliner co-edited with his friend Karl Scheel a Concise 
Dictionary of Physics (Berliner/Scheel, 1924), and he launched a series Scientific 
Monographies and Textbooks (Naturwissenschaftliche Monographien und Lehrbücher) 
that was joined to Die Naturwissenschaften. Although there are only nine volumes,107 
the series expressed the combination of applications and foundations of physics 
advocated by Berliner. The first book in the series was Schlick’s General Theory of 
Knowledge (1918), the second Moritz von Rohr’s The binocular instruments (1920), 
the third Born’s popular book on Einstein’s theory of relativity and its physical 
foundations (1920), the second edition of which had the subtitle “in elementary 
presentation”, and the sixth Peter Paul Ewald’s Crystals and X-Rays (1923). Further 
volumes covered stellar clusters, geophysics, and telescopes. 
 After Hitler had come to power, his followers among the scientists were 
installed into powerful positions; Stark became the director of the Physikalisch-
Technische Reichsanstalt and Lenard had the last word in all professorial 
appointments in physics. The autonomous organizations, such as the German Physical 
Society, to a certain extent could resist an immediate Gleichschaltung. The Springers 
came under pressure because the founder Julius Springer had been a baptized Jew. The 
first campaign against the “Jewish publishing house” was launched already in 1933 by 
the Nazi organization of doctors and it reached its first peak in 1935 when Julius 
Springer jr. was forced to retire. Ferdinand Springer jr. managed to steer the house 
until 1942 largely by utilizing the thicket of diverging interests and conflicting 
administrative competencies for scientific literature. (Cf. Sarkowski, 1996, pp. 342-
375) 
 Quickly Berliner became the target of a campaign. The fifth and last edition of 
his Lehrbuch came out in 1934, although it had already been burned by the Nazis on 
10 May, 1933.108 Moreover, Berliner lost many of his authors either by emigration or 
because they suddenly felt Die Naturwissenschaften to be unsuitable. Thanking 
Sommerfeld for the submission of a paper in 1934, Berliner wrote “Each paper which I 
now receive is truly a great help in misery.” And he added the copy of a letter by Hugo 
Dingler who rejected a review of a book of his “as beneath his dignity for obvious 
reasons”109. Dingler felt triumphant because over the years the reviews of his books 
                                                          
107 See (Sarkowski, 1992, p. 172). 
108 I have no reason to doubt that Westphal’s recollection is trustworthy although Berliner’s book was not on the 
list distributed to the Nazi students by Göbbels’ ministry. 
109 Sommerfeld-Nachlaß, Deutsches Museum, Munich. 
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had become more and more negative as he had become a harsh opponent of relativity 
theory. For instance, in 1933 Dingler’s History of Natural Philosophy (1932) was 
reviewed by the Logical Empiricist Edgar Zilsel (1933) who strongly criticized how 
the author had treated the historical sources and forced them into his epistemological 
outlook. 
 On 14 January, 1935, Professor Ubbelohde of the Berlin Technical University 
accused Berliner of “‘extreme propaganda activities on behalf of the results of Jewish 
scholars’ and pointed to Einstein’s birthday essay in Die Naturwissenschaften, ‘which 
can be considered as characteristic of the principle of mutual praise among Jewish 
scholars. – It seems particularly disquieting that one can still read on the title [page] of 
Naturwissenschaften that this journal is the official organ of both the Gesellschaft 
deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte … and of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft.’” 
(Sarkowski, 1996, p. 333f.) Rudolf Mentzel, personal representative of the minister of 
science, also stressed the second point in a memorandum on 9 April, 1935. 
 
I am of the opinion that it is simply unbearable that the official organ of the KWG is directed by a Jew. 
I am of the opinion that we as the supervisory ministry must put forward the demand, either: Berliner 
disappears from the editorship of Naturwissenschaften or the KWG is forbidden to call the journal the 
official [organ] of the KWG. I am in favor of immediate action! (from ibid., p. 334) 
 
Although Berliner had influential advocates, among them the president of KWG 
Planck, the matter could only be delayed, and Berliner had to resign as editor on 13 
August, 1935.  
 The central role of Berliner who throughout the years had run the journal 
together with a single co-editor from the biological sciences, is best seen by the 
impressive board that took over in 1935. Initially, the editor was Hans Matthée 
together with P. Debye, H. von Ficker, O. Hahn, M. Hartmann, F. Kögl, M. von Laue, 
F. Sauerbruch, H. Spemann, H. Stille, F. von Wettstein. In the next year Fritz Süffert, a 
former assistant to Spemann, took over, and the number of co-editors increased to 
twelve in 1936 and to fourteen in the year 1937. So one can conclude that Arnold 
Berliner, not among the scientific composers himself, was the conductor of a large and 
world-renowned orchestra of scientific voices. He thus must be considered on a par 
with the other Berlin conductors, some of which composers themselves, including 
Max Planck, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, or Walter Nernst. 
 
5.2 Relativity and Politics 
 
Library scientists hold that “scientific journals are comparable to standards round 
which the comrades-in-arms are gathering.” (Holl, 1996, p. 132) While in the 1920s 
progressive physicists tended to publish in the Zeitschrift für Physik edited by Scheel, 
the conservatives preferred Wien’s Annalen der Physik or even the Jahrbuch der 
Radioaktivität und Elektronik founded by Stark. Because of their ample scope, Die 
Naturwissenschaften do not really fit into this classification scheme – which, as the 
case of Schrödinger will show, has its limits in other respects. Yet there is at least one 
fight in which Berliner’s journal became the most important standard of the 
modernists.  
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After the war the struggle about relativity theory became extremely polemical 
and poisoned by antisemitism. Rather than taking part in the polemics, Berliner set 
himself the goal to explain the theory and its various experimental and philosophical 
consequences to the readers from all scientific disciplines. A major figure in this 
program of education and dissemination was Planck’s former student turned 
philosopher Moritz Schlick, but also von Laue, Born, Thirring, Riebesell and Einstein 
(1918) himself contributed to it. 
 Upon recommendation of the philosophers Erich Becher and Benno Erdmann 
who had already published in Die Naturwissenschaften, Berliner approached Schlick 
in 1916 to write a physically and philosophically comprehensible paper on the theory 
of relativity. The result (Schlick, 1917) impressed Berliner, and already in the 
following year he not only published Schlick’ Erkenntnislehre (1918) but also asked 
for a contribution on how the results of modern physics had influenced the concept of 
substance.110 Schlick apparently agreed, and Berliner kept pressing him softly year 
after year until Schlick remarked that all he had to say found entrance in his textbook 
chapter “Naturphilosophie” (Schlick, 1925). In the meantime Schlick had published a 
long paper on the principle of causality (Schlick, 1920) that was strongly motivated by 
relativity theory while atomic physics only played a marginal role (See Section 7.1.). 
On 31 May, 1920, Berliner wrote to Schlick that he had read the galleys of the paper 
several times and received valuable stimulations.  
 
One only advances toward a true understanding of Einstein’s thoughts step by step, but I believe now 
that I have again got on some steps further … 
 It am not so much astonished that the opposition against the new doctrine [Lehre] is large. For 
instance, there are strictly speaking no resources from which the philosophers could have informed 
themselves about the philosophical foundations of the theory of relativity. The physicists should have 
done more in this respect because not even the allegedly “popular” [allgemein verständlich] book of 
Einstein is truly popular, even less the work of Freundlich. One has, to my mind, not made sufficient 
concessions to those philosophers who are not at the same time physicists, and yet there are only very 
few of these. It is surely a great pity that in Halle there was nobody to explain to the guild of 
philosophers that in actual fact they probably have not yet fully understood the physical foundations. 
Apart from those philosophers who do not go along because the do not want to, there were certainly 
also those who would want to go along if the could obtain a true insight into the issues. In a few 
months, however, the philosophers will get into their hands such a book authored by Max Born which 
only presupposes the mathematics of the gymnasium and expounds in a clear and pleasantly readable 
way the foundations of mechanics and the special and general theory of relativity. After that, nobody 
who is truly concerned with penetrating into Einstein’s world of ideas will have the excuse that there 
is no literary aid for it. 
 
The letter continues with some remarks on similar ideas in the works of Helmholtz and 
Schopenhauer.  
 Two weeks before, Berliner had explicitly asked Schlick “in the name of a 
number of followers of Einstein”111 to defend relativity against the criticism of the 
Brentanist Oskar Kraus and Hans Vaihinger’s fictionalists. In his comprehensive study 
of the interpretations and misinterpretations of relativity theory, Klaus Hentschel 
(1990, Sect. 3.4.2) interprets the rather intricate events surrounding the Halle meeting, 
in particular the debate to find a suitable advocate for relativity theory, as a clear 
                                                          
110 Letter of Berliner to Schlick, Rijksarchief Noord-Holland. Longer passages from the correspondence between 
Berliner and Schlick are given in (Stöltzner, 2000a). 
111 Berliner to Schlick, 17 May, 1920. 
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indication for the formation of a “defense belt” around Einstein. This belt was not 
homogeneous but consisted of various strategies that were guided by different 
interpretations of the theory, a fact by which “the discussions about relativity theory 
were encumbered with philosophical disputes.” (Ibid., p. 164; boldface omitted) The 
background of the defenders ranged from Petzoldt’s orthodox Machianism, Schlick’s 
moving away from neo-Kantianism to conventionalism and empiricism, to those, 
including Planck and von Laue who did not believe that relativity required a departure 
from Kantian philosophy at all. Part of this genuinely philosophical debate was 
conducted in Die Naturwissenschaften.  
 Long after the struggles about relativity theory, Berliner approached another 
politically controversial topic that concerned the appropriate assessment of the history 
of physics. His letter to Schlick of 21 February, 1927 shows that his editorial strategy 
had not changed.  
 
Almost six years have gone by since Dühring’s death, and the enormous antipathy [against him] which 
has gradually developed in all his contemporaries, has prevented that someone worth speaking of has 
written about him at some point. Although Dühring has made it difficult for all his readers, who did 
not belong to his blind party-liners, to do justice to him to some degree, the fact remains that he was an 
extraordinary personality who beyond doubt was very stimulating and inspiring. Unfortunately, for 
instance, his Critical History of the Principles of Mechanics is completely unknown to the nowadays 
young generation, and this proves that exactly that which made Dühring famous, and rightly made him 
famous, has almost fallen into oblivion. Dühring has caused this himself by his excessiveness. But it 
would be desirable, for sure, to point to that out of Dühring’s life work which merits being kept in 
mind, and for this reason I would very much like to publish a paper on Dühring when the occasion 
arises. With this I intend a paper exclusively about the thinker Dühring without any biographical 
particularities, which would only cause an unpleasant polemic of his fanatic adherents.  
 
Dühring’s Critical History anonymously submitted to the University of Göttingen won 
the renowned Beneke award; it was the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of 
the development of the principles of mechanics. Coming a decade before Mach’s 
([1883] 1988) much more systematic assessment, the first edition (1873) enjoyed a 
considerable respect and was positively mentioned by Mach and Neurath (1915). Yet 
Dühring rewrote the second edition into a veritable diatribe against the Berlin 
mathematicians which ultimately led to the withdrawal of his venia legendi by that 
university. In the Weimar days, Dühring was an leading figure in some political circles 
close to the social democrats. The planned paper never appeared. 
 Apart from a critical solidarity with the Weimar Republic, there was no general 
political thrust of Berliner’s journal. Authors included scientists who later would 
become active national socialists, others who arranged themselves with it, later 
émigrés and – in the first years after 1933 – already emigrated scientists, and people 
with outspoken socialist views. The core of the spectrum was probably the set of 
political attitudes prevailing among the Berlin scientific elite, from Einstein to Planck. 
Here are some instructive examples.  
 Still during the war, Born (1918) published an obituary for his fallen student 
Herbert Herkner who, to his mind, had been the greatest talent Göttingen 
mathematicians had seen for a long time. Certainly this was a protest against the war. 
The number of 7 November, 1919, that is, a year after the fall of the monarchy, started 
with an article by Paul Jensen titled “Science and Democracy” which polemizes 
against the then popular idea that democracy contradicted human nature because 
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extant inequalities justify unequal treatment. Instead, Jensen argued that democracy 
fitted within a scientific world view. 
 
A treatment from a lofty standpoint teaches us … that, on the one hand, the overall evolution of the 
world, at least still for a long time, … runs in the direction of an increased harmony, or scientifically 
speaking, of an increased “stationary state” (dynamical equilibrium) and increased variety; namely, by 
a furtherance of the mutually stimulating and an equilibration of the mutually conflicting differences. 
On the other hand, a scientific analysis teaches us that in general this equilibration of differences does 
not happen by force but slowly and gradually, with relatively little destructions. For all happening is 
governed by energy differences and it consists in an equilibration of energy differences, both in 
organismic and in anorganic nature. (Jensen, 1919, p. 821f.) 
 
After the necessary revolution, democratization has thus become an educational and 
ethical task. Jensen’s views about society were in stark contrast with what Exner had 
outlined in his inaugural address (1909) and would reaffirm in his theory of culture 
(1923). While Exner held that the second law of thermodynamics, at least in the long 
run, blocked the planned equilibration of social differences – for this would amount to 
an improbable state –, Jensen adopted an equilibrium point of view that sounded a bit 
like belated energeticism. It is obvious that both conflicting conclusions crucially 
depended upon the definition of order or energy (Cf. Sect. 4.1). Politically, to be sure, 
Jensen’s paper was an important signal. 
 Two weeks before, Berliner himself had taken up his pen, which he rarely did in 
his journal, and defended in a rather patriotic tone his friend Fritz Haber, whose name 
is not mentioned, against public allegations connected with gas warfare. “Not a single 
nation or even a single person, but the long duration of the war and the fact that trench 
warfare was elaborated to an perfection undreamt-of before has to be blamed for this 
development.” (Berliner, 1919, p. 795) The philosophical justification of this defense 
was that science is entirely value-free. “[T]he task of the scientist must be entirely 
separated from the usage made of the results of his scientific research and from the 
question whether this usage conforms to the norms of international law.” (Ibid., p. 
794) When in 1925 Haber was accused by The Times of continuing war research in 
violation of the Versailles treaty, Berliner published an open letter of protest by 
Haber’s deputy director H. Freundlich.112 
 Haber’s fate was in a tragical way akin to Berliner’s. Both were of Jewish 
origin and had significantly contributed to building up the Berlin scientific 
environment under the Emperor and the Weimar republic. On January 29, 1934, Haber 
who had rejected to remain director of his institute in virtue of his veteran status, died 
in exile of chronic heart disease. The issue of Die Naturwissenschaften of February 16, 
1934, had an obituary for Fritz Haber on its front page. Von Laue praised character 
and scientific achievements of the deceased. 
 
His institute, as long as it existed, represented a widely renowned place of broadly conceived scientific 
research. On May 2, 1933, Haber turned in his resignation. Themistocles has passed into history not as 
the expatriate at the court of the Persian king but as the victor of Salamis. Haber will pass into history 
as the genial discoverer of the process to synthesize nitrogen with hydrogen which is at the basis of the 
technical extraction of nitrogen from the atmosphere. (Laue, 1934, p. 97) 
 
                                                          
112 Die Naturwissenschaften 13, p. 10-11. 
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Some weeks later and against the protest of minister Rust, Planck organized a 
memorial service.113  
 Another sign of political dissent was Edgar Zilsel’s obituary on the murdered 
Schlick in 1937. Schlick had been the main philosophical defender of relativity theory 
and some reports in the Vienna press treated Schlick erroneously as a Jew and held his 
philosophy virtually responsible for the tragic events.114 This was certainly not 
compensated by the fact that the most disgusting article came form a Professor Dr. 
Austriacus and might have been dismissed as a move by the Austrofaschists. 
Moreover, the author of the obituary was Jewish and a declared Marxist who had 
written several reviews critical against those now powerful under the Nazi regime.  
 That the obituary could at all appear was almost certainly owed to the 
intervention of Schlick’s old friend von Laue, who was a member of the editorial 
board, and the academic teacher of both, Planck. When on the occasion of his 80th 
birthday in 1938, Planck was asked to mention those among his students who 
remained closest to him, we find only two names: Von Laue who had become “both a 
famous physicist and a faithful friend.” “And I would like to mention another name 
that stands on quite a different side: Moritz Schlick who after completing a solid 
physical dissertation changed to philosophy and was carried off by a tragic accident.” 
(both Planck, 1938, p. 75) This was, as it were, an extremely guarded way of putting 
things at the end of a celebration that in itself represented a provocation to the Nazi 
authorities. Planck had directed the medal named after him into the hands of Louis de 
Broglie and as the honored had fallen ill, the French ambassador accepted the award in 
his place. Heilbron (2000, p. 183) is certainly right that mentioning Schlick’s name 
was a political gesture, but their mutual esteem as scientist-philosophers much greater 
than their differences of opinion in the 1930s suggest.115 
 
5.3 The Spengler Debate 
 
Apart from Westphal’s praise for Exner’s objectivity in assessing the Decline of the 
West (See Section 4.4.), Spengler’s opus received two decidedly negative treatments in 
Die Naturwissenschaften. The second of them, authored by the biologist Herrmann 
von Voß can still be subsumed under what Forman takes as the typical response of 
Weimar scientist to simply defend their disciplinary standards. (Cf. Sect. 1.1.2.2.) 
Similarly as Exner, von Voß held that “no doubt, quite a few unbiased observers will 
assent to [Spengler’s thesis about the decline of Western culture], for the signs of 
degeneration, of a decrease of spiritual force are all too clear and numerous.” But von 
Voß intended to “condemn once and for all the faked and sensational in the book and 
to open the eyes of wider circles to how the author handles the facts … [in particular 
that] he entirely disregards biology and only occasionally lapses into invectives against 
‘Darwinism’ and the Darwinists.” (both von Voß, 1921, p. 757)  
 In the year before, Paul Riebesell who in earlier volumes had already twice 
stood up for relativity theory and modern theoretical physics in general (Riebesell, 
                                                          
113 See (Heilbron, 2000, p. 162ff.) for how these events were embedded into Planck’s scientific policy as 
President of the KWG. 
114 Cf. the documentation in (Stadler, 2001, pp. 866-909). 
115 See, for instance, their correspondence in the Schlick-Nachlaß. 
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1916, 1918) attacked Spengler’s thesis of the incommensurability between Greek and 
modern mathematics. After all, modern axiomatics was shaped after the model of 
Euclidean geometry. Most interestingly are Riebesell’s remarks about causality. 
 
Science – not the philosophy of nature – will now as before stick to the principle of causality and will 
approach precisely Spengler’s problem of the predetermination of history with its new methods. For, 
by means of statistical laws – which Spengler incidentally does not recognize as mathematical laws – 
one has already successfully analyzed those mass phenomena, which historical questions are all about, 
to such an extent that results for the whole ensemble can be derived without knowing the 
psychological and physiological laws of the single humans. (Riebesell, 1920, p. 508) 
 
Evidently, Riebesell defended a wider concept of causality that incorporates statistical 
laws as genuine laws for mass phenomena and, accordingly, adopts the relative 
frequency interpretation. Contrary to Spengler’s historical determinism he advocated 
the statistical investigation of social and historical phenomena. History is about mass 
phenomena, not about individual cultural organisms. While Exner’s (1923) theory of 
culture had used the micro-macro distinction to provide a physical basis for a 
morphology of cultures – though in a non-cyclic and partly progressive sense –, 
Riebesell advocated the standpoint of modern empirical sociology. Thus he was much 
closer to the physicalist ideas advocated in the Vienna Circle, for instance, by Otto 
Neurath than to the physicalism prevailing within the Exner circle. 
 By its wider horizon Riebesell’s argumentation escapes Forman’s scheme. 
Neither can it be classified as an adaptation because the concept of causality is 
defended, nor did he, effectively and in rhetorical disguise, undermine the concept of 
causality because Riebesell expects that more phenomena can be explained by his 
wider notion of statistical causality.  
Comparing Riebesell and von Voß, we encounter a certain difference between 
the single sciences. While the physicist was eager to have a clear-cut front line against 
Spengler, the biologist, understandably, was more open to morphology. This also 
corresponds to the rather wooly fringe in the contemporary biological debates about 
causality and teleology. 
 But the difference between both reactions also shows that the submilieu which I 
find expressed by Die Naturwissenschaften is not homogeneous with respect to the 
Spenglerian challenge. It is true, both reactions were not just about mandarin 
prerogatives, as Forman seems to suggest, but about the methodological standards of 
scientific inquiry. But this common philosophical response combined with (at least) 
two different orientations on the cultural level. There were the Bildungsbürger who 
felt attracted by Spengler’s style and pessimism, among them Exner and perhaps also 
von Voß and Westphal. And there were those, including Riebesell, who rejected 
Spengler on much deeper grounds and who adhered to a modernist conception of 
science and culture. This second stance was commonly taken by Logical Empiricists. 
Forman is right that they were a fringe group within the general cultural context, but 
they were an important voice within the submilieu harboring the philosophical 
causality debates among German physicists. 
 To see how the Vienna Circle – by then still an inofficial group – formulated 
their alternative to Spengler, let us take a quick look at Otto Neurath’s 1921 booklet 
Anti-Spengler. Neurath criticized Spengler’s often circular arguments, that the 
selection of material was extremely biased, and that his theory of cultural cycles 
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elevated possibilities of cultural development into fatal necessities. Neurath’s principal 
criticism, however, targeted Spengler’s universal determinism and false rationalism. 
 
It is not the individual wrong results, the wrong facts, the wrong proofs, that make Spengler’s book so 
dangerous, but above all his method of conducting proofs, and his reflections on proof as such. 
Against this one must defend oneself. Anyone who wants to shape a happier future with hope and 
striving should know that none of Spengler’s ‘proofs’ is enough to prevent him; and whoever wishes 
to come to terms with the idea of ‘decline’ should know that he does so on the basis of a resolution, 
and not a proof. (Neurath, 1921, p. 142/161) 
 
This does not mean that we are free to act however we please. Neurath’s main thesis 
against Spengler is rather that the need for decisions is ineliminable from human 
practice, be it in science, culture or politics. Even the best scientific means can, in 
some cases, only lead to a set of equally rational alternatives. 
 
The wish to found action on perfect insight means to nip it in the bud. Politics are action, always built 
on inadequate survey. But a world-view, too, is action; embracing the manifold universe is an 
anticipation of unpredictable efforts. In the end all our thinking depends on such inadequacies. We 
must advance even without certainty! The only question is whether we are aware of it or not. 
 Our pseudo-rationalists dare not to face that fact. … And so the pseudo-rationalists press 
reason until it shows only one. (Ibid., p. 140/159) 
 
Although in a less expressive outfit and with some qualifications, the criticism of 
pseudo-rationalism remained a cornerstone in Neurath’s mature thinking. It was 
strongly indebted to Mach’s epistemological holism according to which each scientific 
result is embedded into a provisional world view. And the insight that not all actions 
can be determined by rational principles went well along with Vienna Indeterminism 
which, already on physical grounds, rejected Spengler’s universal determinism as 
metaphysical.  
 
 
5.4 Philosophy in the Naturwissenschaften 
 
In this section I provide an overview of the philosophical discussions in Die 
Naturwissenschaften during Berliner’s editorship. With a few notable exceptions they 
can be divided into three groups. First, until about 1920 there are several contributions 
by authors close to neo-Kantianism. Second, Die Naturwissenschaften quickly became 
an important forum of the German scientist-philosophers, that is, we find contributions 
of trained scientists which were clearly of a philosophical nature. Their number 
increased after the war when foundational problems in physics became more pressing 
than before. While one class of authors, among them Planck, von Laue, Schrödinger, 
von Kries, and von Mises, were renowned scientists who published also non-
philosophical articles in Die Naturwissenschaften, for those scientists who had in 
effect become philosophers, among them Frank and Schlick, Berliner’s journal became 
their main forum until the foundation of the Erkenntnis in 1930. This marked the 
constitution of scientific philosophy as a discipline of its own right. Third, as we saw 
in the case of the planned paper on Dühring, Berliner ran an education program in 
general philosophy for which the preferred author and reviewer was Moritz 
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Kronenberg. Contributions in this third class did not require a close connection to 
scientific methodology or basic problems of contemporary science. 
 Among the scientists writing on philosophical matters in the first volumes of 
Die Naturwissenschaften there seems to be a certain dominance of biologists who 
repeatedly addressed the dispute between developmental mechanics and vitalism, a 
debate in which initially the journal favored the former. In the first volume, for 
instance, Julius Schaxel held that Henri Bergson “cannot expect any applause among 
natural scientists” (Schaxel, 1913, p. 796) and in the third volume Schaxel (1915) and 
Albert Oppel (1915) contributed further critical assessments of Hans Driesch’s 
vitalism, which were rounded up by the co-editor August Pütter’s listing “The 
characteristics of life” (1915) without any ontologically independent qualities of living 
entities. After the war, so it seems, Driesch and Jacob von Uexküll enjoyed a better 
press.116 It was not Berliner who had changed his mind; in 1926 he wrote to Schlick: 
“Much as I should like to, even now I cannot get accustomed to the much too general 
terminology of the biologists, and I have long given up the hope to grasp the doctrine 
propagated by Driesch.”117 Rather does it seem that Die Naturwissenschaften gave a 
fair coverage of the general trend of biology and its philosophical foundations.  
 The most prominent physicist-philosopher was Max Planck. Although typically 
his popular lectures appeared as separate booklets before going through various 
journals (Cf. Heilbron, 1977), still a third of those published between 1913 and 1931 
which Planck later assembled into the fourth edition of his Wege zur physikalischen 
Erkenntnis (1944)118 appeared in Die Naturwissenschaften (1919, 1925, 1926). Fritz 
Reiche (1914, 1915, 1921) reviewed a further third (Planck, 1913, 1914, 1920); the 
first review cited the criticism of Exner’s indeterminism. Two of the missing three 
concerned explicitly philosophical topics: the freedom of will (1923a) and the reality 
of the external world (1930); the remaining one is Planck’s second Leiden lecture 
(1929a). But among Planck’s physical papers in Die Naturwissenschaften at least two 
(1923, 1927) significantly contributed to the debates on causality. In the year 1932 we 
find a brief summary (1932b) of Planck’s Guthrie lecture on “The concept of causality 
in physics” that later appeared separately as “Causality in nature” (1932a). Both 
collections of Planck’s popular writings were reviewed: G. Laski (1923) wrote on the 
Physikalische Rundblicke (1922) and Werner Heisenberg (1933) on the first edition of 
the Wege zur Physikalischen Erkenntnis (1944) because Schlick had declined owing to 
illness.119  
 Berliner published papers of the fathers of quantum mechanics even before 
1926. But the new theory led to a substantial increase of the philosophical discussions 
about its proper interpretation. A bibliography on “Causality and Probability” 
published in the second volume of Erkenntnis (pp. 189-190) contains 23 papers out of 
67 from Die Naturwissenschaften. Apart from those papers which have been and will 
be discussed in more detail in the present study, one finds (Bohr, 1928, 1929, 1930), 
(Born, 1929), (Heisenberg, 1929), (Jordan, 1927a, 1927b). Thus Göttingen-
Copenhagen was well represented in the discourse among the scientist-philosophers. 
                                                          
116 For a decidedly positive paper, see (Meyer, 1934). I am indebted to Veronika Hofer for having indicated to 
me the importance of the debate about developmental mechanics and vitalism. 
117 Letter of Berliner to Schlick, 26 August, 1926. 
118 This was the last edition during Planck’s lifetime. 
119 Letter of Berliner to Schlick, 24 March 1933. Schlick (1924) had reviewed the Physikalische Rundblicke for 
the German review journal Deutsche Literaturzeitung, see Sect. 7.1. 
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 The physiologist-philosopher Johannes von Kries was one of the most prolific 
contributors of the first decade. Covering the whole of his wide sphere of interests, he 
wrote on physiology (1921), (1923a), (1923b), Goethe (1919b), Kant (1924), the 
necessary and unique determination of the physical world view (1920), and the 
application of his interpretation of probability in physics (1919a) – a paper also listed 
in the above-mentioned bibliography. No wonder that we find also an obituary for him 
(Frey, 1929). 
 Let me now turn to the professional philosophers active in Die 
Naturwissenschaften. In the third volume we find a paper on non-Euclidean geometry 
by the neo-Kantian Richard Hönigswald (1915), a survey article on monism (Herbertz, 
1915), and several historical or commemorative works. Authors include Benno 
Erdmann on Emil duBois-Reymond (Erdmann, 1914) and Leibniz (Erdmann 1916); 
Erich Becher (1921) with an obituary for Erdmann, a paper on Lotze’s psychology 
(1917), and a review of a book by Hertwig (Becher, 1918); Theodor Ziehen on the 
philosopher Haeckel (1919) and with various reviews most important among which 
was a long critical discussion of the first edition of Schlick’s Allgemeine 
Erkenntnislehre (Ziehen, 1920); Aloys Riehl (1921) who played off Helmholtz as the 
true heir of Kant against the Marburg neo-Kantians;120 Oskar Kraus with a criticism of 
Leonhard Nelson (Kraus, 1918) and a paper about Francis Bacon methodology of 
imperialism (Kraus, 1919). In 1924, Die Naturwissenschaften celebrated Kant’s 200th 
birthday with papers of Adolf von Harnack (1924), a renowned theologian and 
president of the KWG, and von Kries (1924) on “Kant’s doctrine of space and time 
and its relation to modern physics”. There was no scholarly neo-Kantian writing on 
that occasion. 
 The philosopher and independent writer Moritz Kronenberg (1865-1935)121 
furnished no less that 13 survey articles. They mainly addressed historical topics, 
among them “Democritus and Natural Science” (1915a), “Historical and Scientific 
Materialism”, Schopenhauer (1919), “Goethe’s view of nature” (1924) and “Fechner 
and Lotze” (1925), and general philosophical issues, such as “Individuality” (1923) or 
“Fiction and Hypothesis” (1915b). In a programmatic article for the first volume titled 
“On the history of Naturphilosophie”, Kronenberg diagnosed a renaissance. 
 
[During the last 10-20 years] problems peculiar of Naturphilosophie stand in the center of the 
advancing research in the natural sciences, and in the most distinct domains it were questions of world 
view [Weltanschauung] …, philosophical basic terms which became the shibboleth of the parties or 
the keywords of exact scientific concept formation. (Kronenberg, 1913, p. 888)  
 
So Berliner’s philosophical education program was following a trend that already 
existed at the time of the foundation of Die Naturwissenschaften. A review of 
Kronenberg’s introductory work on Kant makes clear why he was just the right man 
for Berliner’s objectives. 
 
The author understands to properly choose his wording in an easily intelligible way without lapsing 
into trivialities, which partly can be explained from the fact that he never approached the questions as 
a partisan with passionate pros and cons. … At least one sees in the book – and this is no drawback – 
                                                          
120 Berliner’s letter to Schlick from 16 November, 1920, reveals that originally Ernst Cassirer had agreed to write 
the respective contribution on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Helmholtz’s death. 
121 Walter Killy und Rudolf Vierhaus: Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE), München: K.G. Saur, Bd. 6 
(1997), S. 117. 
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that the author himself is inclined towards the side of idealism …; but this idealism is never only 
romantic and speculative, but based on a comprehensive knowledge of the whole area of culture, in 
particular also towards the scientific side. (Buchenau, 1918, p. 602) 
 
With the debates about relativity theory and atomic physics after the war, the 
philosophy in Die Naturwissenschaften would take new forms and involve new actors, 
thus separating the classical philosophical topics from those discussed by the scientist-
philosophers. The contributions by guilded philosophers, in particular, by neo-
Kantians significantly decreased in number after 1920, the only exception being 
Kronenberg. The coverage of such matters was shifted into the review section, and 
once again the most reviews came from Kronenberg. The only other scholar with a 
comparably large number of philosophical reviews was the Logical Empiricist 
Zilsel122; as a matter of fact, in most of his 26 reviews he was more outspoken than 
Kronenberg. There was certainly also an economical factor behind these numbers 
because both Kronenberg and Zilsel had no academic positions and welcomed the 
honorarium. But this division between these two types of philosophical contributions, 
between the educational background papers and the philosophical discussions among 
scientist-philosophers, was also characteristic of the main papers. 
 After 1925, there are very few genuinely philosophical papers. Apart from a 
commemoration of the Göttingen philosopher Leonard Nelson by Otto Meyerhof 
(1928) and the mathematician Paul Bernays (1928), and the exchange of Riezler 
(1929) and Fleck (1930) on the concept of reality, we only find an article by Helmuth 
Plessner (1930) “On the problem of nature in contemporary philosophy”. This 
indicates that the philosophical shibboleth which Kronenberg in 1913 had diagnosed 
within natural science under the influence of the struggles about relativity theory had 
moved to the edge of the submilieu represented by Die Naturwissenschaften, 
separating thus scientist-philosophers, some of them occupying chairs in philosophy, 
from those philosophers who kept insisting on the priority of philosophy over the 
sciences. But this was more than a mere reaction to the debates about space and time. 
In the volumes of Die Naturwissenschaften of the 1920s we also witness the 
emergence of a philosophy of science in the modern sense. The relative weight of 
Logical Empiricists among the contributions in the section “General issues and 
philosophy” is considerable. Their 17 papers even outrank Kronenberg’s. 
 During the 1920s Die Naturwissenschaften were the top journal for those 
Logical Empiricists who had been educated or were still active as physicists or 
mathematicians. The situation would only change at the end of the decade when in 
1929 the Vienna Circle constituted itself publicly as a subgroup under its own 
manifesto (Hahn, Neurath & Carnap, 1929) and when in 1930/1 the first number of 
Erkenntnis appeared after long-winded efforts. (Cf. Hegselmann/Sigwart, 1991) Thus 
Logical Empiricist had finally constituted themselves out of the submilieu represented 
by Die Naturwissenschaften not only as a group but also as a discipline of scientific 
philosophy which needed its own scientific journal and its own congresses. Apart from 
Zilsel’s reviews the number of their contributions to Die Naturwissenschaften 
decreased after 1930. Another relevant factor was that during the 1930s Neurath 
energetically pursued the internationalization of the movement, a strategy in which the 
                                                          
122 For a list of these reviews, see (Dahms, 1993). 
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Italian Scientia – which had a somewhat wider scope than Die Naturwissenschaften – 
became an important forum a broader discourse. 
 Evidence for the significance of Logical Empiricists within Die 
Naturwissenschaften is the review of the first volume of Erkenntnis authored by Kurt 
Grelling, a member of Reichenbach’s circle in Berlin. 
 
The readers of the Naturwissenschaften are not unfamiliar with the fact that in the course of roughly 
the last decade a new philosophical direction has developed in close connection with the natural 
sciences, the exact ones in particular, which is characterized by the names Schlick, Reichenbach and 
Carnap. This direction has now begun to organize itself in a twofold way: in 1929 in association with 
the Prague meeting of mathematicians and physicists, and in September 1930 in association with the 
Naturforscherversammlung, it organized meetings which were much-frequented and produced highly 
interesting debates; and now it has created the present journal in which it introduces itself to the 
profession. (Grelling, 1931, p. 41) 
 
Grelling’s presentation in particular emphasized the unity of this new direction; 
despite their apparently diverging research programs both Schlick and Reichenbach 
were ultimately pursuing the same goal. Die Naturwissenschaften also took notice of 
the organizational activities of Logical Empiricism. Both the 1929 and 1930 
“Tagungen für Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften” were announced as parts 
of the 1929 meeting of the German Physical Society and the 1930 
Naturforscherversammlung123, and Reichenbach (1930a) published a report of the 
Königsberg meeting. 
 A mere listing of the philosophical contributions from the trained scientists 
among Logical Empiricists between 1917 and 1931 shows a high percentage of papers 
appearing in Berliner’s journal. The only exception was Reichenbach. In Chapters 7 
and 8 we will see that those papers were their most important ones for the debate on 
causality.  
Looking through Philipp Frank’s list of philosophical or popular papers124 from 
the years 1917-1931, we find four papers in Die Naturwissenschaften (Frank, 1917, 
1919, 1928, 1929),125 one in the Physikalische Zeitschrift (Frank, 1918), and his short 
opening speech of the Prague “Erkenntnislehre” conference in Erkenntnis (1930).  
Richard von Mises has five papers in Die Naturwissenschaften (Mises, 1919, 
1922, 1927a, 1930a, 1930b), one in his Zeitschrift für Angewandte Mathematik und 
Mechanik (1921); his Dresden inaugural address (Cf. Sect. 2.1.2.2.) appeared in the 
Zeitschrift der Vereinigung Deutscher Ingenieure (1920), and he had an article on the 
occasion of the 80th birthday of Joseph Popper-Lynkeus in an aviation journal (1918). 
The opening lectures of Frank (1929) and von Mises (1930a) at the Prague meeting of 
German physicists – on which the Vienna Circle went public – were republished in the 
first volume of Erkenntnis.  
 In contrast to Frank, von Mises continued to publish in Die 
Naturwissenschaften after 1930 and even after his emigration to Istanbul. Apart from a 
paper on population statistics (1932a), he wrote reviews about philosophical books and 
                                                          
123 Cf. Die Naturwissenschaften 18 (1930), 1067-1068, with the wrong title “Tagung für exakte Erkenntnislehre” 
but with abstracts of some of the talks. 
124 As done in Planck’s case I do not count newspaper articles; this is also a reasonable restriction adopted by 
Forman (1971). For Frank, Schlick, and von Mises, I have used the bibliographies in the respective volumes of 
the Vienna Circle Collection published by Kluwer. 
125 Additionally, Frank published there a review of Charlier’s lectures on statistics (Frank, 1922). 
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books addressing the relation of science and culture: (1933a), (1933b), and in 
particular about the popular Viennese lecture series arranged by Menger and his 
colleagues (1933c) and (1935).  
 In a short note of 1921, von Mises introduced his newly founded Zeitschrift für 
angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik (1921b) that intended to overcome the 
separation between mathematics and technology. When the Göttingen mathematician 
Richard Courant (1927a) argued that the separation between pure and applied 
mathematics, albeit useful for a certain time, must now be overcome because of the 
deeper unity of mathematics, von Mises (1927b) wrote a harsh response which 
Courant (1927b) tried to appease. 
 Von Mises (1932b) published a long positive review of Frank’s (1932) book on 
causality. Two years later, he (1934a) had an exchange with von Laue (1934) in which 
he took a firmly probabilistic approach against von Laue’s insistence on the necessity 
of a deterministic basis for natural science. The bulk of von Mises’s reviews was 
dedicated to the mathematical theory of probability – (Mises, 1932c) and the review 
essay (1934b) where he returned to his earlier criticism of Marbe (1919). Von Mises 
(1928b) is a critical review of the second edition of von Kries’s Prinzipien der 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (1886).  
 Between 1917 and 1931 Moritz Schlick published four articles in Die 
Naturwissenschaften, three articles in the Kant-Studien, and one paper each in three 
other journals. Together with (Schlick, 1917), (1920), (1931) I also include (Schlick, 
1922) because the next Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und 
Ärzte were already part of Die Naturwissenschaften. Among the various papers 
discussing relativity theory, Schlick’s (1917) was certainly the philosophically deepest 
one. Schlick also contributed a considerable number of reviews, and many offers from 
Berliners were passed on to Zilsel who himself published a paper on “The Asymmetry 
of Time and the unidirectionality of causality” (1927).126 As we have seen above, 
Berliner would have published more papers of Schlick. The list of offers includes 
contributions to the Festschrift numbers on the occasion of Planck’s 60th birthday in 
1918127 and the 60th anniversary of Planck’s Ph.D. in 1929. Berliner’s respective letter 
of 29 January, 1929, shows that he automatically counted Schlick among those close 
enough to Planck to be natural candidates. 
 
When I tell you that by the end of June Herr Planck celebrates the 60th anniversary of his Ph.D. then 
you conclude by your inborn logic that Die Naturwissenschaften will publish a special issue … and 
that, as a matter of course, I invite you to cooperate and, at the same time, rely on your earlier promise 
given half and half to take a stand concerning the philosophical side of the newest developments of 
theoretical physics. This would be a most valuable conclusion of the whole number … and you will 
find yourself in the best physical company one can imagine, provided that all accept the invitation. 
 
Planck’s above-quoted listing of Schlick was thus not just a consequence of his tragic 
assassination. 
 For Hans Reichenbach we find only three papers between 1917 and 1931 
together with a short communication (1919), the above-cited conference report (1930), 
and a series of reviews in Die Naturwissenschaften amidst no less that 39 
                                                          
126 As already stated, Zilsel’s approach to probability is closely linked to the “Anwendungsproblem” and thus it 
falls outside the scope of the present investigation for the same reason as does Reichenbach’s. 
127 Cf. Berliner’s letters of 5 October, 1917, and 20 October, 1917. 
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philosophical papers. After his two early papers on probability theory (1920a, 1920b), 
it took eleven years until Schlick’s criticism of his views on causality prompted 
another paper of his (Reichenbach, 1931). Reichenbach was already in Istanbul when a 
long paper on “Kant and natural science” (1933), appeared. In it he argued that 
scientific philosophy was a consequent continuation of Kant’s orienting philosophy at 
the model of natural science. 
 
The greatness of a historical achievement does not consist in presaging the future development, but in 
creating it. And this is the judgment which we contemporaries have to pass on Kant: … his doctrine 
belongs to the past in the same way as does the scientific world view of the 18th century – but most 
certainly he is among those few whose philosophical work has paved the way on which present-day 
philosophy of natural science strides on. (Reichenbach, 1933, p. 626) 
 
This was indeed quite a conciliatory statement if compared with the harsh farewell 
Schlick had given to Kantian philosophy a decade before at the peak of the debates 
about relativity theory. Evidently Reichenbach intended to stay in dialogue with the 
German scientists which were still influenced by neo-Kantianism. Such an aim was 
outside the scope of Erkenntnis because “Carnap and particularly Neurath did not want 
to concede space to the dispute with traditional philosophy” (Hegselmann/Siegwart, 
1991, p. 464) but rather considered their journal as an internal forum for scientific 
philosophy. Reichenbach’s paper once again exhibits the difference between his 
approach to causality and the debates investigated here. After showing how relativity 
theory dismantled the Kantian a priori categories of space and time, he came to the 
principle of causality which, to his mind, had a more general position within the 
Kantian system. 
 
It was not only modern quantum theory which has overcome this idea. Rather has the criticism of the 
Kantian conception of causality begun already earlier by purely philosophical considerations, more 
precisely in connection with the philosophical critique of the concept of probability. (Reichenbach, 
1933, p. 606.) 
 
Rather than reporting a simple historical fact, Reichenbach referred to his own view 
according to which both causality and probability acted both on the level our 
judgments and in objective nature. This made Reichenbach an indeterminist or a 
probabilist simply because scientific and every-day reasoning invoked probabilities. In 
this sense, for him, the alternative between determinism and indeterminism did not 
concern the physical world in first place.  
 
5.5 A Causality Debate: Nernst, Schottky, and Petzoldt 
 
Let me now turn to a debate on causality in Die Naturwissenschaften in which none of 
the main protagonists of Vienna Indeterminism appeared but which contained many 
characteristic elements of the debate analyzed in the present book. Both Schottky and 
Nernst accepted genuine indeterminism but remained committed to an ontology of 
single basic entities rather that mass phenomena. This placed them half way between 
the Vienna and Berlin traditions. 
 
 191
5.5.1 Schottky and the Prehistory of Quantum Non-locality 
 
In his paper “The problem of causality in quantum theory as a foundation of modern 
natural science altogether. Attempt of a popular presentation”, the theoretical physicist 
Walter Schottky (1921) followed a dramaturgy familiar to both sides of the aisle in 
causal matters. He diagnosed a crisis in modern physics which, hopefully and 
expectedly, would be overcome after substantial modifications of basic concepts. 
Schottky’s historical point of reference was not just Newtonian mechanics but the 
materialist world-view of substance (Stoff) and force.  
 
Not only is [by the year 1900] the whole world electric, but it is also much finer, more ethereal, and, as 
one could also say, more spiritual [geistiger]; for the view of nature no longer comprises only the 
material particles, their motions and forces, but also the whole domain in-between those material 
particles, and the states in this intermediate domain follow laws of their own, yet in constant active 
and receptive interaction with the motions of material particles. (Schottky, 1921, p. 493) 
 
The main lesson in modern physics, so he continued, was taught by relativity theory. It 
“required a complete modification of our conceptions about space and time” 
(Schottky, 1921, p. 439) which brought victory to local physics [Nahwirkungsphysik]. 
Locality in the precise sense of relativity theory supplemented the notion of a causal 
determination of natural phenomena with the idea that no causal influence could come 
as a bolt from the blue. The next, and perhaps the deepest change of world view was 
necessitated by quantum theory which “is not just the product of arbitrary moods and a 
craze for change, but has emerged from the discovery of entirely catastrophic 
disagreements between the consequences of the principle of locality and the true facts 
in nature.” (Ibid., p. 494) There were various attempts to bar or tame the demise of the 
principle of locality; for instance, Planck’s second theory of radiation in which the 
field remained unquantized. But at bottom this involves  
 
a distinction between different field actions according to their origin [which] contradicts the most 
characteristic idea of the theory of local action [Nahwirkungstheorie]. … Thus we have to concede – 
and this is a consequence which so far only few physicists have made their own – that these state 
variables of the theory of local action, whose reality was out of question for decades, strictly speaking 
have no relevance for natural science. (Ibid. p. 495) 
 
Schottky’s positivism was of a mild brand and quite far from Heisenberg’s (1927) 
meaning criterion. Instead he emphasized the inescapability of a concept of 
measurement that would become the backbone of Frank’s theory of causality (1932) in 
quantum mechanics and, as a matter of course, of many subsequent interpretations of 
quantum mechanics. 
 
[The physicist] cannot avoid to introduce auxiliary quantities and believe in their reality, as long as 
observations correspond to the presupposed behavior of these quantities. … [Yet] the basic and never 
misleading question is … what am I able to measure and what happens when I have found out this and 
that, or when I am doing this and that. However in the present state of affairs, precisely this simple 
question puts us in a most embarrassing position. … The law of causality itself, with its complete 
determination of future phenomena by the present and past ones seems to be questioned in its present 
form. (Schottky, 1921, p. 496)  
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The key unsolved problem of local physics is to find suitable measurable quantities. 
And Schottky apparently associated the concept of causality with local physics rather 
than Laplacian determinism in general. Nonetheless the second part of Schottky’s 
paper continues in quite an optimistic tone. 
 
[T]he assumption of a local action in space-time which as the more precise form of the law of 
causality has become part of us, apparently must be abandoned. As a miracle from these shambles 
rises the edifice of quantum theory. With very few laws … one comprises and orders a wealth of 
regularities [Gesetzmäßigkeiten] for which the more exact and detailed field theory provided no 
explanation. (Ibid., p. 506) 
 
The paper continued with a consideration which has become a popular starting point of 
present-day interpretative discourse in quantum mechanics. Interference experiments 
teach us that one cannot simply remove objects which have not been in the actual path 
of light. Thus a light quantum or a light knot128 cannot be localized, rather “it puts out 
its feelers, as it were, in all directions.” (Ibid., p. 509)129 Obviously, such a conception 
runs into conflict with relativity theory – another indication that the principle of 
causality based on local physics has been shattered by modern quantum theory. Being 
aware that he was moving into the field of conjectures and speculations, Schottky now 
made virtue of necessity and explicitly introduced an action-at-a-distance that thread-
like linked processes with absorption or emission of an elementary quantum of light 
energy. By introducing these threads “we do not distinguish between cause and effect, 
but only establish relations between the changes of state of the different particles.” 
(Ibid. p. 510) Historically this picture can be seen as a kind of Machian holism that 
was based on a network of relations only. Within this relational ontology so far only 
statistical laws were possible; they correspond to a view from the distance in which the 
individual threads cannot be distinguished from the classical continuum. “What can be 
ascertained by the concept of causality, what is determined by the temporal laws of 
nature, are only the conditions for the frequency of the occurrence of elementary 
events (threads) of a certain kind.” (Ibid., p. 511) As he would stress in a response to 
criticism, the existence of such laws was essential because “partial indeterminacy of 
the elementary processes would be absurd if one could not think macroscopic laws of 
a statistical but very general kind at its side. (Schottky, 1922, p. 982) 
 Schottky’s terminology was clearly in flux, and he did not give a precise 
definition of what he understood under the principle of causality and how he 
distinguished “Gesetze” from “Gesetzmäßigkeiten”. On the one hand, he took the 
principle of locality as elaborated by Einstein’s theory of relativity as the relevant 
instantiation of the Laplacian ideal. This concept of causality was so much in crisis in 
atomic physics that Schottky proposed to introduce non-local actions. With respect to 
the Laplacian ideal in general, he was wavering.  
 
For the time being one will still try to meet the “Laplacian requirement” by introducing unknown 
mechanisms …; but there are enough reasons, in particular from the side of quantum theory, which 
make probable, at least in the microcosm, a principal deviation from a principle of causality 
interpreted in this [Laplacian] sense. (Schottky, 1922, p. 982) 
 
                                                          
128 “Lichtknoten”, a terminology introduced by Einstein. 
129 This description can be found in the Feynman lectures (1969). 
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On the other hand, there remained strictly valid statistical laws for the atomic domain 
which Schottky took as causal laws valid for the frequencies of the elementary events. 
This was at bottom equal to the point of view defended by Riebesell, von Mises, and 
Frank who preferred to speak of mass phenomena and took them as new basic entities. 
While Frank and von Mises, accordingly, considered the individual events as outside 
the ontology accessible by quantum theory,130 Schottky remained committed to an 
ontology of single material particles. And as many present interpretations of quantum 
mechanics he introduced non-local interactions to this end and arrived at a holistic and 
relational picture years before Bohr’s talk about measurement apparatus and the 
indivisible experimental set-up would start. This makes Schottky’s paper quite 
interesting for the present book, in particular when we recall that initially Bohm (1952) 
had called his non-local pilot wave theory a causal interpretation. Hence in a 
rudimentary form non-local entanglement of atomic processes was already on the 
market by 1921, and it had been discussed in a widely read journal. In contrast to its 
present defenders among them (Cushing 1994) and (Beller, 1999), Schottky coupled 
non-locality with a positivist emphasis of measurement and an unabashed acceptance 
of statistical causality. None of these features were required by the Weimar milieu.  
 
5.5.2 Nernst and the Ontological Basis of Randomness 
 
Schottky at the time was still a Privatdozent. Walter Nernst instead stood at the height 
of his public recognition. He had just received the Nobel prize for chemistry, was 
rector of the University of Berlin, president of the Physikalisch-Technische 
Reichsanstalt, he was in the company of some of the political leaders of the Weimar 
republic, and he had even been courted to become German ambassador to the United 
States – despite his involvement with gas warfare.  
 Nonetheless, Nernst was anything but a scientific Mandarin. According to 
Frank, he “exhibited the mentality of a member of the merchant class. He had no 
national or class prejudice and was imbued with a type of liberalism that is often 
peculiar to business men.” (Frank, 1948, p. 134) This included occasionally 
unconventional manners and a “buoyant optimism.” (Barkan, 1999, p. 196) Nernst 
enjoyed close relationships with industry, in particular with Emil and Walter Rathenau 
at the A.E.G. 
 In his rectorial address commemorating the founder of the University of Berlin 
“On the Emergence of New Stars”, Nernst initially remembered his friend Walter 
Rathenau who had been assassinated some days before and saw this kind of deeds as 
in blatant contradiction to the ideals of university education. Rathenau “firmly 
believed in a logical development of polity [Staatswesen] under the modern 
conceptions and thus the preference for a special form of government did not find any 
support from him.” (Nernst, 1922b, p. 8) And although Nernst remained equally 
neutral with respect to the new republic, he emphasized “that after the gloomy October 
and November days of the year 1918 … nevertheless a good many things developed in 
a way better than many troubled citizens have imagined back then. Who of us, in 
particular, would have dared to hope that the cultivation of science at the German 
universities would undergo a continued growth that was essentially unhampered – 
                                                          
130 See Sections 8.3. and 8.5. 
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even though, of course, not removed from the hardships of these days.” (Ibid., p. 3f.) 
The crisis was thus no reason to be pessimistic about science. 
 Most results of Nernst’s research were intimately connected with concrete 
problems and industrial applications. He had a passion for automobiles and worked on 
combustion processes. He sacrificed many years for the construction of an electrolytic 
lamp, which required the accumulation of an enormous amount of empirical data about 
suitable materials. As Diana Kormos Barkan (1999) convincingly shows, this work 
was intimately connected to his most theoretical result, the third law of 
thermodynamics or Nernst’s heat theorem.  
 Among the characteristic elements of Nernst’s style of inquiry, Barkan notices, 
first, “the use of analogies from related domains in order to clarify processes for which 
he had not yet formed firm and intuitive notions.” (Barkan, 1999, p. 51f.) Such model 
building by analogy enabled him to use quantum theory at a very early stage. Second, 
Nernst showed an exceptional “experimental dexterity and ingenuity.” (Ibid., p. 127) 
“Yet he never became a pure empiricist. Instead, he kept theory and theoretical 
speculations in the foreground of his activities, and most of his experimental and 
instrumental innovations arose from theoretical elaborations of practical problems, 
where practice meant solving the questions at hand.” (Ibid., p. 53) Third, “despite his 
endorsement of the molecular hypothesis and the ionic dissociation theory … Nernst 
refrained from introducing or speculating about material entities still unknown or 
insufficiently explored. His contentment with formal relationships constitutes another 
characteristic of Nernst’s work in general.” (Ibid., p. 66) This was quite in line with 
the descriptivist ideal of Mach and Kirchhoff. Fourth, “Nernst insisted on seeking 
intuitive, workable thermodynamic cycles in addition to theoretical calculations.” 
(Ibid., p. 69) His quest for Anschaulichkeit accordingly was not prompted primarily by 
the Weimar milieu but rather continued the traditions of Mach, Boltzmann and Hertz. 
For this reason, Nernst was not attracted by the abstract principle view of 
thermodynamics that Planck advocated before he would accept Boltzmann’s atomism 
and invoke it for the justification of his radiation formula. Instead “Nernst [already 
then] sought to find positive correlations between kinetics and thermodynamics and 
insisted on always checking one against the other.” (Ibid., p. 74) 
 This was quite natural for a former student of Boltzmann working in physical 
chemistry. According to Barkan, “Boltzmann’s influence looms larger than anyone’s 
else in Nernst’s scientific biography.” (Ibid., p. 31) In the academic year 1885-6, 
Nernst studied in Graz and did his first independent scientific work. After his Ph.D. in 
1887, he returned there for several months. Although Nernst had worked at Ostwald’s 
institute in Leipzig from 1887 to 1890, he explicitly supported Boltzmann against 
Ostwald’s energetics at the 1895 Lübeck Naturforscherversammlung. “Boltzmann’s 
influence looms large in Nernst’s career, not only in his atomism but in the tolerant 
and anti-dogmatic philosophy and history of science.” (Ibid., p. 242) And indeed both 
philosophically oriented works written in the early 1920s set out with reminiscences of 
Boltzmann. This historical perspective will lead us to a reading of Nernst’s 
abandoning causality that is starkly different from Forman’s. 
 Nernst’s inaugural address as rector of the University of Berlin “The Domain of 
Validity of Natural Laws” concluded with a reverence to the Geisteswissenschaften.  
 
It is true, the exact sciences have been blamed to have tyrannized philosophical research. Perhaps one 
has to admit that the hitherto customary formulation of the principle of causality as an absolutely strict 
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law of nature laced the mind [Geist] in Spanish boots, and it is thus at present the task of natural 
science to loosen these fetters sufficiently so that the free stride of philosophical thought is no longer 
restricted. (Nernst, 1922a, p. 495) 
 
The Postscript significantly widened the philosophical perspective. 
 
Obviously it is less important whether or not one considers the principle of causality as strictly valid, 
but much more whether one conceives the processes in nature to be comprehensible or whether one 
holds that the human mind is incapable of following these processes down to their last details. For 
example, most religions well adhere to the doctrine that all events occur according to the will of a 
highest intellect, that is, with perfect logic, which coincides with what the principle of causality 
requires. Until recently, physics generally adopted the view that – at least in principle – all events can 
also be recognized by the human mind as taking place logically; this was at all times contested by the 
doctrines of all religions. Thus if in actual fact the at present repeatedly discussed view, which was 
also discussed above, according to which only statistical averages of the events are accessible to our 
scientific knowledge, would turn out to be justified, then one would indeed have to state a striking and 
hitherto hardly foreseen parallelism between theological and physical conceptions. (Ibid., p. 495) 
 
Notice that Nernst’s ‘conversion to acausality’ sounded somewhat hypothetical. But 
apart from a rhetorical captatio in front of the zeitgeist, what was the rational basis of 
this negative conclusion regarding causality? At the begin of the paper we find a 
confession of faith to empiricism as defended by his teacher Boltzmann. “[A] law of 
nature is nothing but idealized experience, a fortunate combination of larger or smaller 
a number of observational facts.” (Ibid., p. 489) Often the first step towards a new law 
of nature is based on analogy, as did, for instance, Fourier when treating heat 
analogous to a liquid substance. Or when Nernst himself “transfer[red] concepts from 
the theory of solutions to the then inconclusive conceptions of electronic structure and 
conductivity.” (Barkan, 1999, p. 179f.) Already the example of Fourier echoes Mach’s 
constant insistence of the principle of comparison as one of the specific instantiations 
of the principle of economy (Cf. Sect. 3.1). With reference to Boltzmann, Nernst also 
followed Mach’s historico-critical method: the step from an older conception 
[Vorstellungsweise] to the next does not replace falsity by truth, but leads to a more 
purposive [zweckmäßigeres] picture of the facts. The change of conception necessarily 
implies a change of the laws of nature. “Often one imagines the natural law as 
something rigid and unalterable; but we have to correct this idea once we enter into a 
more profound, historical consideration … [after which] the conviction forces itself 
upon us that we do not possess any natural law in final form.” (Nernst, 1922a, p. 491) 
Even in relativity theory the absolute constancy of the velocity of light could turn out 
to be merely an approximation. Analogously, quantum mechanics shows the limits of 
the theory of electromagnetic actions-at-a-distance. Yet on this view, the supplanted 
laws remain valid within certain domains and the full force of new conceptions and 
laws is visible only in more or less extreme cases, such as the perihelion of Mercury.  
 At this point, however, Nernst departed from Mach’s and Boltzmann’s 
teachings and considered the historical tendency that the laws of nature constantly 
become simpler not as owing to a biological advantage but rather as a “healthy kernel” 
of identity philosophy (Identitätsphilosophie), notwithstanding the wholesome 
criticism of Naturphilosophie by Kant and of the remaining negative traits of 
Naturphilosophie in Kant himself. 
 If one assumes that all laws of nature are only approximately true, “the curse of 
inexactness lies heavily upon each application” which Nernst considers “catastrophic 
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in a logical perspective.” (Ibid., p. 492) This put the principle of causality into 
question, at least when one followed Nernst’s definition of it. “If one presupposes that 
the existence of absolutely strict natural laws is assured, … this yields necessarily the 
so-called principle of causality.” (Ibid., p. 492) Nernst here understands causality as 
making possible, at least in principle, the existence of a Laplacian demon. But the 
Laplacian ideal of complete determinism has not only become questionable because in 
history so far every natural law has reached a limit of its validity. It was rather the 
second law of thermodynamics which showed a principal limitation. Similarly as 
Boltzmann and Exner, Nernst did not consider the second law as a stranger dwelling at 
the edge of the physical world. To the contrary, “[a]mong all laws [of physics] the 
thermodynamical ones occupy a distinctive position because unlike all others they are 
not only of a special kind, but applicable to any process one can imagine.” (Ibid., p. 
492) If one related all physical laws to the second law of thermodynamics, this would 
not reduce their significance or rank; “it would however put an end to the logical 
overuse of the laws of nature.” (Ibid., p. 493)  
 In the following lines, Nernst did not invoke the epistemological argument 
which Exner had put forward (Sect. 4.4), that for the empiricist there is no preferred 
choice between determinism and indeterminism and that he has to content himself with 
the approximate character of all laws of science. Rather did he introduce a very 
specific working hypothesis according to which the oscillations of the zero-point 
energy in the luminiferous ether explain why a given atomic nucleus decays at this 
very moment. At first glance this seemed to salvage the principle of causality but only 
at the price that “we arrive at an infinitely extended system in the face of which our 
laws of thought fail.” (Ibid., p. 494) Again, this was a move familiar from Boltzmann 
who had based his constructivist argument for atomism (Section 3.5) on our finite 
faculties of thought. Moreover, Nernst’s ether fluctuations represented an argument of 
theory reduction to a more fundamental level, this time in order to explain why the 
principle of causality was only approximately valid.  
 According to Forman’s reading of this passage, “it is clear that although Nernst 
wishes with all his heart and soul to renounce causality, he is simply unable to free 
himself from the implicit assumption that the world really is causal.” (Forman, 1971, 
p. 85) There is some truth in this suspicion but Forman is wrong to surmise that when 
Nernst had become aware of this defect, he added the above-cited postscript to leave 
no doubt about his will to confess. It suffices to read further in the text. 
 
It is … very likely [wahrscheinlich] that all our natural laws are of the same kind as the second law of 
thermodynamics, that is, that they are essentially of a statistical character. Even within the domains 
mentioned above a natural law could accordingly fail to a large extent every once in a while, it is only 
so extremely improbable for such a case to occur that for all practical applications it needs (at least in 
general) not be taken into account.  
 However, one cannot refuse to anybody the logical operation with absolutely exact natural 
laws as an abstraction, and thus one is also allowed to operate logically with the principle of causality 
in its strictest form as long as one remains conscious that in this way one leaves the grounds of 
experience and enters into the realm of purely speculative thought. (Nernst, 1922a, p. 495) 
 
Although rigid determinism was of a speculative kind, to Nernst’s mind, it remained 
practically useful. Having loosened the Spanish boots in itself did not commit the 
working physicist to abandon the principle of causality as long as he was clear about 
its limits. Indeterminism, on the other hand, was less speculative, but Nernst found 
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some undesirable features in the then current version of Boltzmann and Exner, which 
prompted him to introduce the zero-point fluctuations of the luminiferous ether. From 
a historical perspective thus there was indeed some inconsequence in his view. Nernst 
closely followed Boltzmann’s empiricist ideas about causality and he fully accepted 
the approximative character of natural laws. But the zero-point fluctuations showed 
that there existed substantial philosophical differences to the Viennese reading of 
Boltzmann. This becomes clearer in a small booklet titled The Universe 
[Weltgebäude] in the Light of New Research which was published in the year before 
and was based on popular lectures given at Berlin, Vienna and Prague. Its introduction 
started with a reminiscence. 
 
When I was studying at Graz in 1886, Boltzmann delivered his inaugural address to the Vienna 
Academy of Sciences on the second law of thermodynamics [1905, pp. 25-50]. Among other things he 
there asserted that all attempts to rescue the universe from heat death will remain without success and 
that he will not make such an attempt. (Nernst, 1921, p. 1) 
 
In his booklet, Nernst did embark onto such a rescue project which remains, as he 
frankly admitted, as speculative as all cosmology. Since the laws of the theory of heat 
are “the most general and most reliable laws we possess,” (Ibid., p. 13) their fatal 
consequence can be avoided only by a process consistent with them but running in the 
opposite direction. There are two special cases of this general problem of universal 
thermodynamics. First, the long-range nature of gravitation leads to a big crunch of all 
matter of the universe. Nernst’s strategy to avoid all these problems was a stationary 
universe with spontaneous matter creation that bears some similarities with the theory 
of Sir Fred Hoyle (1995). Second, the radioactive decay of heavy atoms provides the 
energy for the stars. Extrapolating then available knowledge Nernst took radioactivity 
to be a generic feature of all chemical elements down to the smallest ones. The 
universal decay chain ultimately leads to a “death of matter” (Ibid., p. 16) and its 
transformation into zero-point energy of the luminiferous ether. Nernst’s modernized 
heat death was compensated by a random process spontaneously creating heavy atoms 
from the ether which contains a very high amount of zero-point energy. Even an 
extremely low probability for this process sufficed to avoid the fatal heat death. In his 
commemoration address, Nernst (1922b) sketched a cyclic model for the fixed stars. 
Based on his stationary universe and the conviction that on average just as many fixed 
stars are formed as have perished within a given time, he estimated that fixed stars 
flash up approximately eight times during their life. The novae which appear to us as 
world catastrophies on the firmament are, on this view, simply a normal feature within 
the life cycle of a fixed star. 
 What was the philosophical basis for Nernst’s stationary cosmology? There are 
two conceptions about natural laws which Nernst emphatically opposed. First, he 
rejected the idea of an evolution of the Universe that involves an evolution of natural 
laws. This had been the old Fechnerian idea endorsed by Exner and the late 
Boltzmann. 
 
It is impossible for the scientist to assume that at a certain time the whole world was in a chaotic state, 
out of which the blazing suns condensed, to ultimately arrive at a state in which the re-formation of 
suns is no longer possible. In other words: the idea that all happenings of the worlds, as it were, began 
at a certain day and become completely extinct at a certain day, is in itself [extremely] improbable. 
(Nernst, 1921, p. 13) 
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Secondly, Nernst was aware that it is non-trivial to assume that our laboratory-verified 
natural laws are valid for the whole universe. But he firmly kept to this principle, 
today typically called the cosmological principle, and considered it as a precondition 
of natural laws. 
 
It was occasionally stated that there are regions of the cosmos in which, as in our Milky Way, entropy 
increases and such regions in which it decreases. In this way one simply denies our laws of nature; 
with such a trend of taste this booklet has nothing to do. (Ibid., p. 41) 
 
This was of course an allusion to Boltzmann who had even contemplated that the 
direction of time would differ in such regions. (See Sect. 3.5). Against this backdrop 
Nernst’s mechanism of matter creation appeared as a supplementary law posited to 
exclude a highly improbable but unwanted consequence of the genuinely indeterminist 
view. Precisely this had been Planck’s strategy to avoid recombining fragments and 
evaporating oceans by introducing the ‘hypothesis of elementary disorder’ (Sect. 3.7). 
But while Planck had argued for the inescapability of determinism, Nernst contended 
that laws of nature were approximately valid only.  
 Although Nernst could accept that the basic processes of nature were random, 
there had to be a mechanism that was sufficiently simple to be described by a 
statistical law of nature. Recall his remarks about the increasing simplicity in our 
knowledge of the laws of nature. But there was, to my mind, a more important 
ontological aspect. When requiring that some basic ontological entity, the luminiferous 
ether, carry the irreducibly indeterministic feature of our Universe, Nernst rejected 
neutral monism and radical empiricism according to which the basic ontology of 
physical world was construed in accordance with the basic laws of nature. There had 
to be a single deepest level of physical reality. 
 
5.5.3. A Defense of Petzoldt’s Mach 
 
The papers of Schottky and Nernst prompted a reaction by Mach’s old ally Joseph 
Petzoldt. In quite a schoolmasterly letter to the editor Petzoldt wrote that “the 
questions which both the articles of Schottky and Nernst have raised regarding the 
validity of the principle of causality have essentially been treated by the epistemology 
of natural science some decades ago and they were brought to a conclusion.” (Petzoldt, 
1922, p. 693) Petzoldt then recapitulated Mach’s rejection of the concepts of cause and 
effect and Mach’s “reduction of causality to the mutual functional dependences of 
coincidences between sensations [Empfindungskoinzidenzen] solely which are 
expressed in the equations.” (Ibid. p. 693) This conception can be applied equally well 
for local and non-local actions because the real basis of the concept of causality is the 
unique determination of natural phenomena. So far this was a faithful interpretation of 
Mach’s flexible notion of causality though in the notoriously misleading wording of 
‘sensations’ instead of ‘elements’. 
 In his rejoinder, Schottky argued that Petzoldt at best addressed the old problem 
of the temporal orientation of natural laws; “however the novel feature is that the 
mentioned elementary processes, which are closely and rigidly connected, must be 
without any explicable connection with other elementary phenomena both forward and 
 199
backward in time.” (Schottky, 1922, p. 982) This was indeed a blank spot of Mach’s 
relationalism and holism. The network of functional dependences had to be cut either 
by the approximative stability of a complex of functional dependences, by the 
intervention of our interests as investigators, or by a principle of unique determination. 
Schottky simply claimed that this was impossible in quantum theory. 
 Petzoldt’s more explicit criticism of Nernst reverted to the problem of 
induction. “[T]he laws of nature have attained a statistical character not only with the 
kinetic theory of gases and the second law of thermodynamics, but they have always 
possessed it and they had to possess it. Each law … is obtained inductively, deduced 
from a larger or smaller number of observations.” (Petzoldt, 1922, p. 693) And he 
explicitly mentions the method of least square distances. Accordingly, Nernst’s 
question whether natural processes could be partially chaotic “cannot altogether be 
decided by a direct experimental inquiry into nature.” (Ibid., p. 694) For, experimental 
physics is always approximative physics and can thus never completely apprehend the 
unique determination which is expressed in the physical equations only. That the 
decision between determinism and indeterminism remains open was also the position 
of Mach (Sect. 3.1), and Vienna Indeterminists would take this firmly empiricist 
stance without however relating probability and inductivist procedures. 
 As back in his (1890, 1895), Petzoldt invoked a determinative notion of 
uniqueness and effectively reduced both the principle of causality and the problem of 
induction to that single principle. More than in his earlier papers, stability became an 
all-encompassing property of the world. The stability of the animate world rests upon a 
greater stability of the physico-chemical world. “By this [convergence of instabilities 
to zero,] the principle of uniqueness rises to the rank of a postulate and ultimately to a 
law. The law of uniqueness is the inescapable presupposition, the logical a priori of the 
empirically given stability of ourselves and our [biological] environment.” (Petzoldt, 
1922, p. 694) Since the alternative between determinism and indeterminism cannot be 
decided empirically, Petzoldt came rather close to a transcendental argument for 
uniqueness in lieu of causality. This was certainly not a basis to assess the genuine 
indeterminism that was, with qualifications though, present in Nernst’s paper. But as 
we have seen above (Sect. 3.2.), Petzoldt’s use of the concepts of uniqueness and 
stability was substantially different from Mach’s, all positive cross-references 
notwithstanding. The manifestly ontological character of Petzoldt’s reasoning becomes 
now clearer than in his earlier dialogue with Mach. Schottky (1922) was right to 
remark that the macroscopic statistical laws rigorously following from quantum theory 
suffice to explain the biological stability claimed by Petzoldt however the individual 
events be connected. 
 In December 1928, Petzoldt wrote his last letter to the editor of Die 
Naturwissenschaften. It shows that his principle of uniqueness led to a view of 
probabilistic laws that was almost verbally equivalent to Planck’s – not quite an 
expected outcome for Mach’s closest German ally. The main target of the letter was 
Heisenberg. 
 
More and more frequently and particularly by younger physicists, the claim is made that all material 
events could be founded on the entirely lawless basis of atomic processes; macroscopic causality 
would not be harmed by that and find its expression in probabilistic laws. This completely ignores the 
previous question: how is probability and statistical regularity at all possible without the unique 
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determination of natural events? To pose this question already means to answer it in the negative. 
(Petzoldt, 1929, p. 51f.) 
 
Precisely this was Planck’s position which he had put forward against Exner’s 
indeterminism and which he maintained even after he dropped the requirement of 
elementary disorder (Cf. Sect. 3.7 & 4.5). Petzoldt once again argued by a chain of 
logical a prioris without invoking biological stability any longer.  
 
With the concept of probability of any natural events the uniqueness of natural phenomena is 
implicitly posited in the same way as with Kepler’s laws Newton’s law of gravitation is implicitly 
given. The latter is the indispensable presupposition, the logical a priori of Kepler’s laws. Equally the 
complete and unique determination of natural events [is the logical a priori] of all statistical regularity. 
(Ibid., p. 52) 
 
Petzoldt’s letter concluded with a complaint about the quantum generation. 
 
[O]ne recognizes that physical research can proceed without any loss of facilities, that all its formulas, 
in particular also all its probabilistic laws are justified, even if one does not doubt causality, that 
consequently the skeptical attitude with respect to the law of uniqueness of natural phenomena furthers 
physics not in the least, and that it is accordingly superfluous. Without deriving the least profit from it, 
the new physicists only cause useless and infertile difficulties to positivist epistemology which after all 
follows their strenuous path with sincere sympathy. (Ibid., p. 52) 
 
The quantum generation, Born and Heisenberg foremost, had explicitly used positivist 
arguments to justify the finality of quantum mechanics against future causal 
alternatives. And here one of the great old men of positivism charged them of 
tergiversation and faithlessness to the ideals of positivism on counts which could have 
come from Mach’s arch-opponent Planck – except for the organismic stability. What 
has gone wrong here?  
 At the surface level, Petzoldt followed the Machian notion of causality and 
accepted the fundamental inexactness of all natural laws. This made possible a full 
acceptance of statistical laws as the second law of thermodynamics, as did all Vienna 
Indeterminists, Schottky and Nernst, and it went against Planck’s quest for absolutely 
exact natural laws. But similarly as Nernst and Schottky, Petzoldt was unhappy about 
the ontological side and could not follow Mach’s firm empiricism to the extent that 
there were some highly improbable exceptions to the general determinacy. In contrast 
to Nernst and Schottky, however, Petzoldt did not devise a specific mechanism to 
ground randomness, but invoked a transcendental argument not so different from 
Planck’s arguments in favor of a determinist basis of physical science. Nernst probably 
would have considered Petzoldt’s uniqueness as a metaphysical principle. This might 
also be a reason why the contacts between Petzoldt and Logical Empiricists were less 
intimate during the 1920s than one might have suspected at first glance. And 
Petzoldt’s letters are not listed in the above-mentioned comprehensive bibliography 
about “causality” in the Erkenntnis of 1931. 
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6. Schrödinger: Indeterminism and Picture Realism  
 
Whenever Erwin Schrödinger wrote about causality and determinism, he 
acknowledged his teacher Franz Serafin Exner for the priority of a genuinely 
indeterminist conception of physics. Schrödinger abundantly cited Exner’s Lectures 
and dedicated the booklet (1932a) to memory of his. Today best known is 
Schrödinger’s 1922 Zurich inaugural address which was published in Die 
Naturwissenschaften only in 1929. On many other occasions Schrödinger explicitly 
defended the core theses of Vienna Indeterminism, and in 1929 he did so overtly 
continuing his teacher’s debate with Planck. By this time he already held Planck’s 
former chair at the University of Berlin – the most prestigious position in Germany a 
theoretical physicist could aspire at. The biography of Walter Moore (1989) provides 
ample testimony that Planck himself had done everything to attract him to Berlin. 
When Schrödinger came to Berlin in 1927 the confrontation between his wave 
mechanics and the Copenhagen-Göttingen matrix mechanics had already become a 
dispute about basic philosophical principles such as causality and reality. So what 
attracted Planck and the other Berlin physicists in Schrödinger’s thinking despite his 
unequivocal stand on these issues?  
 Above all, there was the fact that wave mechanics appeared closer to classical 
continuum physics and was more intuitive than the abstract and clumsy matrix 
formalism. But both theories were mathematically equivalent and Schrödinger’s 
interpretative efforts could not reach such a seemingly clear-cut stage as what later 
became known as the Copenhagen interpretation. Schrödinger derived his wave 
equation from an action principle in full correspondence with Planck’s firm conviction 
how progress in physics be made (See Section 3.6 & 3.8.).131 There was also a 
philosophical alliance between Schrödinger and the Berlin physicists in their quest for 
a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. They repeatedly stood up against the 
positivist type of arguments applied by Bohr, Heisenberg and Born. Schrödinger’s 
respective activities appear at odds with his constant adherence to Exner’s 
indeterminism and Mach’s positivism. 
 This situation leaves present interpreters with basically two alternatives. Either, 
Schrödinger repeatedly changed his mind: after, in 1924, emphatically endorsing the 
dismissal of causality inherent in the BKS-theory, in 1927 he favored unambiguously 
causality and realism, while at about 1930 and after his own failed interpretative 
efforts he reconciled himself with Copenhagen just to return to his causal and realist 
program after Einstein’s EPR-paper. Or, Schrödinger’s philosophical conception – as 
sophisticated as someone could be who had occupied himself with philosophy more 
broadly than most of his colleagues – contains in fact various levels that combine in 
different ways with the various conceptual problems posed by quantum mechanics. 
The latter interpreters often distinguish an ontological, an epistemological and a 
methodological level where Schrödinger follows different models among them Mach, 
Boltzmann and Vedanta. If this view is correct, it represents a drawback for those who 
want to count Schrödinger as an advocate manqué of the pilot-wave program, among 
them Cushing (1994) and Beller (1999). 
                                                          
131 Planck’s letter to Schrödinger of 2 April, 1926, expresses particular delight about this fact. 
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 To these two interpretative strands, the present book adds the historical 
perspective of Exner’s synthesis of Mach’s empiricism and Boltzmann’s atomism that 
was characteristic for the Vienna Institute of Physics. Part and parcel of this heritage 
were the empiricist rejection of all finality claims for any given scientific theory and 
the historico-critical perspective on theory change. More than just perpetuating the 
local creed, Schrödinger returned to the master texts themselves and introduced some 
new elements into Vienna Indeterminism. While Exner had considered the alternative 
between determinism and indeterminism as an open empirical question that 
presumably could never be finally decided, Schrödinger considered it a matter of 
convenience and referred to Poincaré’s conventionalism. Yet unlike the early Frank 
(See Sect. 8.1.), he did not count the law of causality itself as a convention. 
Schrödinger modified Boltzmann’s conception of theories as pictures in such a way as 
to allow him to favor a continuist picture of wave functions over a discontinuist 
atomistic picture. In this Schrödinger amply used the leeway inherent in the relatively 
weak empiricist conception of physical ontology. Due to the intimate connection of the 
basic ontology with the respective law of nature both wave functions and mass 
phenomena were admissible elements of reality. A concept of physical reality that 
depended upon the intervention or observation of a subject and the metaphysical 
dualism inherent in the Copenhagen interpretation, however, remained unacceptable 
for the neutral monist Schrödinger. But there are two important qualifications to this 
Machian heritage; also they hark back to Exner who had surprisingly exempted the 
subject from his all-embracing physicalism. And so did his former pupil Schrödinger 
who would follow the all-in-one view of the Vedanta in order to circumvent the 
problem of other minds which is often seen as the weak spot of Mach’s neutral 
monism. In contrast to Logical Empiricists and similarly as Planck, Schrödinger 
considered metaphysical questions not as meaningless but of great importance to 
humans. Yet they were only loosely connected to the philosophy of physics. 
 The first section of the present chapter provides the historical context for 
classifying Schrödinger as a Vienna Indeterminist. In the second, I give a critical 
overview of the rather diverging opinions about the consistency of his philosophy in 
the present literature. This will involve texts that fall outside the period of the present 
investigation. The third section analyses in detail Schrödinger’s philosophical papers 
relevant for the issues of atomism and indeterminism from 1913 until 1932. The 
discussion of Schrödinger’s views will be complete by an analysis of his 1931 
correspondence with Schlick in Section 7.4. and his dialogue with von Mises in 
Section 8.6. 
 My findings favor those who argue that Schrödinger largely did not change his 
mind with respect to indeterminism. But there was some development in his views 
about the suitable ontology for his wave mechanics. Yet he never became a 
metaphysical realist, but stayed on the ground of the weak ontology characteristic of 
Vienna Indeterminism. It was, accordingly, rather ontology than causality which 
marked the difference between him and the Göttingen-Copenhagen interpretation. But 
the intimate connection among both aspects, the peculiar tenet of Vienna 
Indeterminism, did not properly fit into the German philosophical context such that 
Schrödinger’s views were notoriously misunderstood by his contemporaries.  
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6.1. Schrödinger and Vienna Physics 
 
Schrödinger had two scientific fathers: Hasenöhrl in theoretical physics and Exner in 
experimental physics. “No other person has had a stronger intellectual influence on me 
than Fritz Hasenöhrl, except perhaps my father.” (Schrödinger, 1989a, p. 15) To the 
coming theoretician, Exner’s scientific teaching was less important in retrospect. Yet 
the special climate within the Exner circle and the themes discussed there became a 
most important inspiration for Schrödinger’s general view of the world above and 
beyond indeterminism. At the beginning of his inaugural address to the Prussian 
Academy of Sciences, Schrödinger looked back to the days when he entered the 
University of Vienna. 
 
The old Vienna Institute, which had just mourned the tragic loss of Ludwig Boltzmann, the building 
where Fritz Hasenöhrl and Franz Exner carried on their work and where I saw many others of 
Boltzmann’s students coming and going, gave me a direct insight into the ideas which had been 
formulated by that great mind. His sphere of ideas may be called my first love in science 
[wissenschaftliche Jugendgeliebte]; no other has ever thus enraptured me or will ever do so again. 
(Schrödinger, 1929d, p. 1/xiv) 
 
In 1910 Schrödinger obtained his Ph.D. under Exner with an entirely experimental 
work. His habilitation in 1914 consisted of a group of theoretical papers which were of 
interest to the Exner circle. Military service prevented him to accept a vacant 
assistantship with Hasenöhrl, such that he re-entered the University of Vienna in 1911 
as an assistant to Exner. Schrödinger’s recollections of this decade interrupted by war 
service are of a mixed kind. He was glad to “belong to those theoreticians who know 
by direct observation what it means to make a measurement.” (Schrödinger, 1989a, p. 
17) Yet we also find bitter criticism. 
 
I learned two things during these years: First, that I myself was not suited to be an experimentalist. 
Second, that the ground on in which I lived, and the people with whom I lived there, were no more 
suited than I to achieve experimental progress along great lines. This was mostly a consequence, 
among other things, of the tendency of the golden Viennese heart to place amiable bunglers 
[liebenswürdige Stümper] in key positions …, where they blocked progress. … Thus atmospheric 
electricity and radioactivity, which really had their beginnings in Vienna, were taken out of our hands. 
(Schrödinger, 1989a, p. 16f.)  
 
From the biography of Moore one can conclude that this was alluding to the 
experimentalists Gustav Jäger, Exner’s successor, and Felix Ehrenhaft; but 
Schrödinger did not have a high opinion of his friend Hans Thirring’s work in 
theoretical physics either (Cf. Moore, 1989, pp. 129-131; 475).  
 In 1918 Schrödinger received word that he was seriously considered for an 
associate professorship at the University of Czernowitz. 
 
I made up my mind to lecture there honestly on theoretical physics, initially according to the pattern of 
the splendid lectures of my beloved teacher Fritz Hasenöhrl, fallen in the war, but besides to concern 
myself with philosophy, deeply immersed as I then was in the writings of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, 
Mach, Richard Semon, and Richard Avenarius. My good angel intervened, since soon Czernowitz no 
longer belonged to us. (Schrödinger, 1989a, p. 44)  
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In 1920 Schrödinger turned down an associate professorship in Vienna mainly for 
financial reasons and accepted an offer by Max Wien to come to Jena. He quickly 
climbed up the academic ladder. After a semester each at Stuttgart and Breslau in the 
fall of 1921 he became professor for theoretical physics at the University of Zurich, 
where he found in Hermann Weyl a friend and kindred spirit in mathematical physics 
and philosophy including the distrust of classical causality. Schrödinger remained in 
Zurich until he succeeded Planck in 1927. As in the days of Boltzmann (See Sect. 
4.7.1.), there still existed a substantial difference in formal habits between the 
institutes in Vienna and Berlin. “Erwin introduced a style of informality into his 
lectures that was unlike anything ever seen before at the University of Berlin, where 
class lines were rigidly drawn.” (Moore, 1989, p. 242) In 1933 he emigrated to 
Oxford, in 1936 he accepted a call to Graz, and in 1938 he again had to emigrate to 
Dublin.  
It is somewhat strange that Moore finds Schrödinger’s research of the early 
1920s unsuitable for a genius. 
 
He was still reacting to various concerns of the somewhat isolated Vienna school, still using his great 
mathematical facility to make improvements in structures built by others, although he was now thirty 
years old, an age by which most great theoretical physicists have been prepared to rebel against the 
paradigms received from their university teachers. (Ibid., p. 97) 
 
Schrödinger himself was quite explicit that his reasons to do so consisted in his 
convictions about how a good theory look like.  
 
Only very slowly did I approach the modern atomic theory. Its inherent contradictions sounded like 
shrieking dissonances when compared to the pure and inexorably lucid development of Boltzmann’s 
reasoning. I even, as it were, fled from it for a while and, inspired by Franz Exner and K.W.F 
Kohlrausch, I took refuge in the sphere of color theory. … Only de Broglie’s idea of electron waves, 
which I elaborated into undulatory mechanics, brought a certain relief. (Schrödinger, 1929d, p. 1/xiv) 
 
His doubts, it seems, had not completely faded away even after his breakthrough in 
quantum mechanics. Outside inspirations were of great importance to Schrödinger. 
Compare his autobiographical note for the Nobel prize in 1933. 
 
In my scientific work (and also in my life) I have never followed one main line, one program defining 
a direction for a long time. … [I]f I am to have an interest in a question, others must also have one. My 
word is seldom the first, but often the second, and may be inspired by a desire to contradict or to 
correct, even if the consequent extension may turn out to be more important than the correction, which 
served only as a connection. (Schrödinger, 1984, p. 362f.) 
 
The passage continues with a brief description of his physical achievements. 
 
The most interesting topic in physics seemed to me, strictly speaking, Boltzmann’s probabilistic 
theory of thermodynamics, and some older works of mine … continue from there. A second group are 
the works on color theory which emerged from the contact with Kohlrausch and Exner and the study 
of Helmholtz. Of importance appears to me only the last result about the true meaning of the three and 
four color conception and its connection with the phylogeny of color vision. (Ibid., p. 363)  
 
Color theory also neatly corresponded to his philosophical interests because in the 
tradition of Machian epistemology physiological investigations stood side by side with 
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historico-critical analyses. Nonetheless, Moore overstates this link by calling 
Schrödinger’s work “the most impressive example in all the scientific literature, of 
how the philosophy of Mach can be applied to an actual problem.” (Moore, 1989, p. 
127) The third group mentioned were of course his contributions to quantum 
mechanics up to the seminal papers of 1926 which were strongly inspired by the work 
of de Broglie. 
 
6.2 Schrödinger and Philosophies: Repeated Changes or 
Consistent Program? 
 
Scholars substantially disagree about content and import of Schrödinger’s philosophy 
of physics. To some, he repeatedly changed his mind about fundamental issues such a 
causality and realism, to others, he tenaciously pursued a complicated philosophical 
program on various levels that was notoriously misunderstood by his Copenhagen 
opponents. Interestingly, interpreters’ stand in this respect strongly depends upon 
which importance they assign to Schrödinger’s philosophy within his overall scientific 
activities. To Beller, “Schrödinger was no less a philosophical ‘opportunist’ than his 
Göttingen-Copenhagen opponents” (Beller, 1999, p. 284), while Ben-Menahem 
(1989), Bitbol (1996), and deRegt (1997, 2001) take his philosophy very seriously and 
associate its core traits not only with the local Mach-Boltzmann tradition and his 
teacher Exner’s indeterminism, but also with a long list of classical and contemporary 
views on causality and realism. This list includes Schopenhauer (de Regt, 2001, Bitbol 
1996), neo-Kantianism (Beller, 1999), Husserlian and post-modern phenomenology 
(Bitbol, 1996), van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (de Regt, 1997), Putnam’s 
internal realism, Blackburn’s quasi-realism, and Sellars’ new phenomenalism (all 
Bitbol, 1996).  
The present study does not intend to amend this list by further names. Rather 
does it continue the local Viennese perspective by embedding Schrödinger’s views 
into a network of references to his tradition and dialogues with opponents. Thus 
contextualizing Schrödinger contributes to changing the image of an idiosyncratic 
loner some of whose philosophical ideas presaged modern developments to the same 
extent as some of his interpretative proposals have meanwhile reappeared in 
alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics. Expectedly, there are conflicting 
claims also here. Whereas Beller and Cushing affiliate him with the Bohmian camp, 
Bitbol emphatically rejects this and associates Schrödinger, albeit with qualifications, 
to the modal interpretation and Everett’s many-worlds-interpretation. But those 
classifications face a certain problem of evidence which is nicely described by Olivier 
Darrigol.  
 
Despite his dissatisfaction with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, Schrödinger 
never reached a satisfactory alternative. He just gave some hints about what to look for. The modern 
commentators of Schrödinger react to this tentativeness of his views in various ways. Some [Beller, 
for instance] see it as a sign of superiority, meaning that Schrödinger did not try to fix the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics prematurely. Others conclude that Schrödinger, like Einstein, 
was engaged in a quixotic quest. 
 In any case, Schrödinger’s reflections regarding the themes of holism, acausality and 
visualizability are not to be judged from their fertility in physics. Rather their usefulness should be 
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measured from the epistemological clarification they could bring to the field of quantum mechanics. 
(Darrigol, 1992, p. 275) 
 
On Darrigol’s account, Schrödinger was immersed in a foundational yet philosophical 
project that aspired deeper than his Copenhagen opponents who mainly sought a 
philosophical defense of their already established interpretation. 
 
6.2.1 Routes to Wave Mechanics 
 
Since Schrödinger did not tenaciously defend a well-entrenched interpretation of his 
own for a longer time, scholars have sought the changes in his views and tried to 
explain them. In Section 1.1.2.3. we have already encountered his alleged 1922 
conversion to acausality under the pressure of the Weimar milieu. Interestingly, two 
years before the famous adaptation thesis appeared, Forman and V.V. Raman (1969) 
held that Schrödinger remained rather neutral until the BKS paper of 1924. But Raman 
and Forman already set up the simplistic dichotomy between the approaches of Bohr, 
on the left, and Einstein, on the right, and claim “the partisans of the left, in their effort 
to eliminate light quanta entirely, came, by way of virtual oscillators, to the matrix 
mechanics; partisans of the right, in their effort to justify light quanta, came, by way of 
a radical parallelism between light quanta and material particles, to the wave 
mechanics.” (Raman/Forman, 1969, p. 299) More generally, they hold “that the anti-
Copenhagen alignment usually associated with the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics had already formed by 1923 over the issue of quantum mechanics to be 
sought for.” (Ibid., p. 314) Within this two-faction framework, Schrödinger 
commenced from an non-partisan attitude in 1922-24 until his enthusiastic appraisal of 
the BKS theory (Schrödinger, 1924a)  
 
Yet in late 1924 or early 1925 Schrödinger came down off the fence, onto the right-hand side. 
Schrödinger’s close personal relations with Willy Wien suggest that the stimulus to this shift is likely 
to have been as much personal and political as scientific … Thus by 1925 Schrödinger would appear 
to have become one of the few members of the Einstein-de Broglie faction. (Forman/Raman, 1969, p. 
301)  
 
And accordingly all his papers appeared in Wien’s ‘right’ Annalen rather than in the 
‘left’ Zeitschrift für Physik. To my mind, the close personal ties to the Wien brothers, 
however, rather reduce than increase the significance of Schrödinger’s choice of 
journal. Just about the time when Schrödinger was brooding over his new wave 
mechanics in late 1925, he was involved in an affair that brought him closer to Wien 
but, at least in a political sense, in opposition to Einstein. German and Swiss physicists 
set out to perform a Michelson-Morley experiment at a high altitude in the Swiss 
mountains to check a positive result for the ether wind obtained by Dayton C. Miller in 
1921 at the top of Mount Wilson. This alleged contradiction to special relativity was 
greeted by the enemies of Einstein. Although the experiment resulted in a further 
confirmation of relativity theory, regarding the organizational aspect of the project 
“Schrödinger found himself aligned with the more nationalist and antisemitic wing of 
the German physicists.” (Moore, 1989, p. 168) Schrödinger wrote to Wien, who was 
involved in planning the experiment, about this issue in the same letter from Arosa of 
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27 December, 1925, in which he reported his breakthrough: “At the moment I am 
struggling with a new atomic theory. If only I knew more mathematics!” (from Moore, 
1989, p. 196). Doubtlessly, when Schrödinger’s papers appeared they were greeted by 
Planck, Wien and Einstein as the prospect of a reintegration of atomic physics into 
classical physics (Cf. Planck, 1928, Sect. 6.3.5.) while they were criticized by the 
Göttingen-Copenhagen group.132 But it seems to me wrong to extrapolate this 
dichotomy backwards in time, into the dialogical phase – to use Beller’s terms.  
 Raman and Forman primarily inquire why Schrödinger happened to develop de 
Broglie’s ideas. To be sure, he acknowledged the stimulating function of Einstein’s 
elaboration of de Broglie’s matter waves and four years ago Schrödinger (1922b) had 
published similar ideas himself. But Raman and Forman find another reason more 
plausible. Already Martin J. Klein (1964) had argued that wave mechanics was the 
product of a tradition concerned with quantum statistics rather than with spectroscopy. 
Raman and Forman take this as justification for their dichotomic left-right scheme. 
Because of his stubbornly advocating a false energy level scheme, “among the central 
European physicists deeply involved in the problems of theoretical spectroscopy – and 
this was indeed the great majority of those seriously concerned with quantum theory – 
de Broglie must have had a very bad reputation.” (Forman/Raman, 1969, p. 296) 
Einstein was never involved in spectroscopy and also Schrödinger strongly felt about 
the logical gaps in the field.  
 Linda Wessels rather accentuates the continuity in “Schrödinger’s Route to 
Wave Mechanics” since the papers on gas statistics and stresses the foundational 
tendency of his scientific work. “[U]nderlying every step along the way was either a 
question about the physical significance of certain formal expressions, or a desire to 
capture theoretically an intuitive model of physical processes.” (Wessels, 1977, p. 313) 
Schrödinger’s “Remarks on the Statistical Definition of Entropy for an Ideal Gas” 
showed a way how to avoid definition of entropy from the microlevel but by a holistic 
approach: “the energy levels … of the gas molecules must now, of course, be derived 
from the energy level distribution of the body of gas as a whole, exactly the opposite 
of how it was previously done.” (Schrödinger, 1925b, p. 439; cf. Wessels, 1977, p. 
317) But only in 1926 Schrödinger discovered a holistic strategy that could guide the 
inference to molecular behavior and suggested to him a solution of the problem to 
understand the nature of molecules. His way of deriving Einstein’s gas theory, so he 
wrote, “means nothing else than putting into effect the deBroglie-Einstein undulatory 
theory of moving particles according to which the particles are nothing more than a 
kind of ‘wave crest’ of a wave radiation that forms the basis of the world 
[Weltgrund].” (Schrödinger, 1926c, p. 95)  
Darrigol distinguishes three periods in Schrödinger’s work in statistical physics. 
Initially he favored the molecular point of view in the sense of Boltzmann’s kinetic 
theory. Then in his work on the definition of entropy he “switched to a holistic 
statistical method, but remained attached to a separation of the dynamical model into 
individual molecules. … In the third period, Schrödinger adopted a fully holistic 
conception, in which the dynamical model was no longer analyzable in terms of 
individual molecules.” (Darrigol, 1992, p. 255) “The importance of Schrödinger’s 
statistical works was not so much their direct impact on other physicists, but their 
                                                          
132 This alliance can, for instance, be clearly seen by Wien’s angry reaction on Heisenberg’s criticism of 
Schrödinger (Cf. Moore, 1989, p. 222). 
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determining effects on his own reflections on other subjects.” (Ibid., p. 238) In a 
philosophical perspective and beyond the clarificatory achievements, it appears to me 
that Schrödinger’s holism in statistical mechanics basically put the Exnerian approach 
to natural laws into practice because there was no longer a preferred status of 
explanations from the microscopic constituents which were assumed to follow 
deterministic laws. After 1926 Schrödinger abandoned de Broglie’s treatment of 
particles and waves as separate entities in favor of a pure wave theory of matter which 
entailed an even stronger form of holism in virtue of the infinite extension of his wave 
functions. Borrowing an idea of Arthur I. Eddington, Schrödinger after 1937 
considered “the ‘particles’ as proper modes of vibration of the closed universe as a 
whole.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 48f.) Bitbol concludes that once Schrödinger had developed 
a second quantized formalism, the “radical inversion of roles between the states and 
the bearer of the states, between the whole and the parts, had just to be transposed to 
the theory of atomic phenomena.” (Ibid., p. 54) 
 Surprisingly, Schrödinger’s first paper on wave mechanics made almost no 
reference to the wave picture so that he “urged acceptance of his wave equation solely 
on the basis of its success with hydrogen and the fact that these results were obtained 
without the artificially imposed quantum conditions of the old quantum theory.” 
(Wessels, 1977, p. 331) Wessels offers two reasons why. Firstly, Schrödinger knew 
that his audience was “convinced that the key for solving the quantum problem was to 
surrender all hope for a theory based on physical pictures.” (Ibid., p. 332) Secondly, he 
had not yet established the stability of the wave packets. Only in the second paper do 
we find the more intuitive presentation of the theory by the formal analogy between 
optics and mechanics. But Schrödinger quickly recognized that the wave equation 
could not be interpreted as a description of the original matter waves and outlined an 
electrodynamic interpretation. Yet both interpretations could not be maintained and 
Schrödinger emphatically rejected Born’s interpretation of his wave function as 
producing the probability of a particle to be found at a certain place. Until the EPR-
paper he often just rehearsed certain elements of the Copenhagen creed in a critical 
perspective (Schrödinger, 1929e, 1930). This has led some interpreters to the 
conclusion that he had willy-nilly accepted the matrix mechanical interpretation until 
1935; and only in the late 1940 and in the 1950 he launched a new campaign that, to 
many readers, appeared as a return to his starting point of taking the wave function as 
the ontological basis. But this view has been contested by various authors. 
 Bitbol’s book considers Schrödinger’s interpretations of 1926 as “an early and 
simplistic way of coming close to the interpretation of the 1950s” and concludes from 
a retrospective analysis of his mature views that Schrödinger developed “by fits and 
starts … a coherent methodological program” (both Bitbol, 1996, p. vii) for which he 
also elaborated an intricate epistemological foundation. I find Bitbol’s thesis about the 
coherence of Schrödinger’s view in general quite appealing although there are several 
places where he associates them too quickly to quite a few modern views. Some of 
these links are inspiring, others suffer under an insufficient historical 
contextualization. The weak spot is, as we shall see, Mach’s empiricism.  
 Yemina Ben-Menahem criticizes Raman and Forman and holds “that 
Schrödinger did not change his views in any substantial way with regard to causality. 
To the end of his life he was ready to entertain the idea that some of the fundamental 
laws of nature are merely statistical laws and that chance is a legitimate element of 
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science.” (Ben-Menahem, 1989, p. 309) Although Schrödinger changed from 
considering acausality as more natural (1922a) to an undecided position – in his 
conventionalist account (1929a) –, he constantly repeated his skeptical arguments 
against the traditional Humean concept of causality and was “willing to accept chance 
as an irreducible element of physical reality.” (Ben-Menahem, 1989, p. 319) It is 
instructive that Ben-Menahem distinguishes three notions of causality current in the 
debates during the 1920s. Apart from the classical Humean notion of causality as 
regularity for which classical mechanics was the paradigmatic case, relativity theory 
suggested the different notion of causality as locality, and finally Bohr considered “a 
causal description to mean the laws of conservation of energy and momentum.” (Ibid., 
p. 313). Schrödinger (1922a) carried Boltzmann’s and Exner’s speculations about a 
statistical theory of gravitation (See Sect. 4.4) into relativity theory, so that 
randomness did not contradict relativistic causality. In none of the places where 
Schrödinger criticized discontinuity as the problematic feature of quantum mechanics 
he suggested that his aim was to restore causality. While Schrödinger kept insisting on 
(sufficiently continuous) space-time pictures, Bohr’s causal description was 
complementary to a spatio-temporal description of physical events. In these days, the 
notion of causality was considerably in flux. 
 The second main issue of Schrödinger’s philosophy of quantum mechanics is 
ontology, or rather what his repeated references to realism actually mean. Emphasizing 
Schrödinger’s indebtedness to Mach’s philosophy, Wessels stresses his adherence to 
the descriptivist tradition that reached back to Maxwell and Boltzmann who replaced 
the unsuccessful quest for explicit mechanical models by the use of consistent 
mechanical pictures. 
 
Schrödinger’s commitment to finding a coherent description of microsystems is best explained … by 
considering the formative role of traditional science on Schrödinger himself. Schrödinger learned his 
physics in Boltzmann’s Institute at Vienna. … There Schrödinger was trained to develop and use 
realistic intuitive and mathematical descriptions of microsystems to explain macrophenomena and to 
regard this as the proper approach to science – in explicit opposition to the approach urged by the 
other major influence in Vienna at that time, Ernst Mach. The text books and journals of the day 
reinforced this approach. … It was not until after the First World War that physicists would be weaned 
on the paradoxes of Bohr’s theory of the atom. They would learn to use a model, even several models, 
without worrying whether they had a complete picture, or even whether their models were entirely 
compatible with their theory, or with each other. Schrödinger was unwilling, probably unable, to adapt 
to this new way of working. Even at the time he invented and developed wave mechanics, 
Schrödinger’s commitment to the descriptive tradition was becoming outmoded. Yet that commitment 
was essential for the creative act for which he is best known. … There is an obvious irony in 
Schrödinger’s situation: his equation became the cornerstone of a new physics that rejected the 
descriptive tradition from which it sprang. (Wessels, 1983, p. 272f.) 
 
Wessels’ account derives support from Schrödinger’s above-quoted reminiscence that 
the “shrieking dissonances” of atomic theory kept him off that field for a while. But 
the allegation of anachronism prematurely echoes the criticism of Bohr and 
Heisenberg, and the relation of Mach and Boltzmann was considerably more complex. 
Also Darrigol considers the Bild-conception of physical theory as the most 
conservative trait of a thinker who in virtue of his indeterminism and holism was 
anything but an adherent to conservative methodology. Darrigol rightly emphasizes 
that Schrödinger did not refer to the Kantian pictures of Hertz which must obey the 
laws of thought, but to Boltzmann’s historically acquired pictures. Nevertheless, 
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“Boltzmann was not practically more inclined than a good Kantian to give up the 
presentation of phenomena in space and time.” (Darrigol, 1929, p. 272)  
 Bitbol, to the contrary, calls Schrödinger’s ontological attitude over-
revolutionary. “Schrödinger claimed more strongly than any other physicist that the 
gap between quantum mechanics and classical theories hindered any partial rescue of 
the classical concepts” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 22) and he criticized Bohr in correspondence 
for not having completely abandoned the classical corpuscular concepts. 
 
If you want to describe a system, e.g., a mass point, by giving its p and q, then you find that the 
description is possible only with a limited degree of exactness. This is very interesting, for it seems to 
me a limitation on the applicability of the old concepts of experience [Erfahrungsbegriffe]. But it 
seems to me imperative to require the introduction of new concepts, in which these restrictions no 
longer exist. For, what is in principle unobservable should not at all be contained in our conceptual 
scheme, it should not be possible to represent it within the latter. In the adequate conceptual scheme it 
must no longer appear as if our possibility of experience [Erfahrungsmöglichkeit] is restricted by 
unfortunate conditions. (Letter of 5 May, 1928, from Bohr, 1985, p. 464) 
 
Bohr answered in rather Kantian terms that the “old concepts of experience appear to 
be indissolubly linked to the basis of the human faculty of perception.” (Ibid., p. 465) 
Bitbol describes this difference as such: 
 
Would it be absurd to think that, by contrast, some spurious remnants of metaphysical (macro)-realism 
have been the actual reason for the Göttingen-Copenhagen physicist’s reluctance towards 
Schrödinger’s light-hearted tendency to endow new theoretical constructs (ψ-functions) with the status 
of ‘real entities’? Think for example of Born’s assertion that (macroscopic) physical apparatus ‘consist 
of bodies, not of waves’: consist, and not appear to consist. … Of course, the members of the 
Göttingen-Copenhagen group were very far from being just naive realists, even about the macroscopic 
bodies. However, the type of pragmatic analysis to which they submitted the concept of ‘real objects’ 
of daily life prevented them from going very far in their ontological inquiry.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 14)  
 
It is interesting to note that also Philipp Frank gave a pragmatic reason why concepts 
such as position and momentum should be maintained despite their obvious limitation 
(See Sect. 8.7.).  
 Mara Beller plays down Schrödinger’s above-quoted reference to Boltzmann’s 
evolutionary account of our laws of thought and a fortiori of our basic theoretical 
pictures. Rather does she consider it as one among Schrödinger’s rhetorical strategies. 
“While much insight can be (and is) gained by studying Schrödinger’s approach vis-à-
vis the ‘descriptive tradition’ of Helmholtz, Hertz and Boltzmann, Schrödinger’s 
‘commitment’ to it should not be taken too strictly.” (Beller, 1997, p. 427f.) His superb 
mastery of the matrix formalism and of the Copenhagen interpretation permitted him 
to be  
 
skillful in positivist analysis when criticising the orthodoxy. … In such criticisms, Schrödinger often 
presupposed the verificationist meaning of quantum formulas: the uncertainty relations, for example 
are not merely limits on the possible measurement values of physical variables – the uncertainty 
restricts the very definability of the concepts used. … Similarly, Schrödinger used positivistic 
arguments when ‘deconstructing’ the concept of a particle. (Ibid., p. 428)  
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Over the years, so Beller reads Schrödinger’s post-war Dublin lectures (1949-55)133, it 
was “the relative weight of positivistic and model-descriptive elements in 
Schrödinger’s argumentation that changed … according to the theoretical challenges 
he encountered.” (Beller, 1997, p. 429 and Beller, 1999, p. 284) Although Schrödinger 
had his unique intellectual style, in particular, an “intense quest for comprehensibility” 
he did not “adhere to any consistent philosophical tradition.” (both Beller, 1997, p. 
429) He freely changed positivist and realist strategies, according to the local 
rhetorical requirements, and “employed a causal or a statistical approach. according to 
the specific theoretical situation he encountered.” (Ibid., p. 431) But does 
‘addressitivity’ necessarily refute the prospect of a consistent philosophical program? 
As Beller, Bitbol detects an “awkward reciprocity” in “the fact that almost no creator 
of quantum mechanics could dispense with positivist-like arguments, at one stage or 
another of his investigation.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 9) And assenting to Ben-Menahem he 
holds that Schrödinger “taught orthodoxy to his students because he had nothing better 
to propose, whereas he expressed more overtly his doubts and his projects when he 
was due to speak to more specialized audience.” (Ibid., p. 82) Yet simultaneously 
Bitbol sets out to generalize Ben-Menahem’s analysis about the continuity in the 
concept of causality “to the whole of Schrödinger’s interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 31) 
 Beller does not underestimates the complexity of Schrödinger’s ideas about 
ontology. 
 
Yet an analysis of Schrödinger’s writings reveals instead a very sophisticated position, along neo-
Kantian lines: the concept of reality ‘as such’, as it objectively exists independent of all human 
observers, is indefensible, if not downright meaningless. … [Still it] is as indispensable in science as it 
is in practical life. (Beller, 1999, p. 282) 
 
Reality thus appears as a relative construct, quite in the sense of the invariances of 
neo-Kantianism. This point is also stressed by Bitbol (See below). 
 In Section 2.2.2., I have already criticized that Beller’s microscopic dialogical 
analysis leaves little space for truly philosophical motives to unfold among the 
founders of quantum physics. This also proves as a great hobble in assessing 
Schrödinger’s declared philosophical ambitions. Still, they are hardly reconcilable 
with Beller’s implicit presuppositions about the character of philosophy. While she 
seemingly accepts neo-Kantianism as a coherent philosophical tradition, positivism is 
treated as a volatile rhetorical strategem rather than a position that could be adhered to 
seriously. This has two negative consequences. First and more generally, the 
philosophical ambitions of scientists are measured against the ideal of adherence to a 
philosophical school. The attempts of the scientist-philosophers to develop a 
philosophy from amidst the single science thus do not qualify as philosophy, neither 
does as a consequence large part of Logical Empiricism. Second, Beller seems not at 
all interested in the type or historical context of positivistic or verificationist 
arguments. Heisenberg applied a positivist meaning criterion within a framework that 
was largely anti-positivist (See Sect. 2.2.2.). On the other hand, the Machian tradition 
– though not intended as a ‘school philosophy’ as neo-Kantianism – was sufficiently 
strong to find adherents. Thus an appropriate appraisal of what the Machian heritage 
                                                          
133 Beller (1997) is an essay review of (Schrödinger, 1992). 
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consists in, proves to be a precondition of assessing Schrödinger’s philosophy. 
Unfortunately, this is the point where one must diagnose substantial shortcomings in 
the literature.  
 
6.2.2 Between Mach and Boltzmann: The Issue of Realism 
 
In the case of Paul Hanle’s paper, the misreading of Mach produced the wrong 
impression of a deep cleft between Boltzmann and Exner (See Sect. 4.4.). It also leads 
to the false impression of a fundamental cleft between Exner and Schrödinger. Being 
more open to philosophical influences than Beller or Forman, Hanle claims that “there 
was a fundamental difference in their approaches to physics. While Exner was a 
dedicated experimentalist and a positivist in his attitude toward theory, Schrödinger 
devoted practically all his career to erecting the theoretical structure of physics and 
rejected positivism as inadequate.” (Hanle, 1979, p. 235) Moreover, “Schrödinger, like 
the Machists, was unhappy with ‘metaphysical’ methods in physics, but he recognized 
a need for some direction in research from metaphysical principles – from the Kantian 
scaffolding. Exner had denied that need.” (Ibid., p. 261) Hanle, strangely, takes it as a 
metaphysical stand that “for Exner the unity of the world was more fundamental than 
empiricism” (Ibid., p. 239), so that Exner erroneously took Brownian motion as an 
instance of genuine indeterminacy. Yet this was just an instance of Occam’s razor 
which, indeed, is more important to the empiricist than to a Kantian whose 
transcendental categories are laid down a priori. Schrödinger used ontological 
parsimony as an argument against Heisenberg’s quantum jumps. As they were neither 
required to account for observable effects nor an integral part of the formalism, they 
could simply be eliminated.  
 Boltzmann, whom Hanle reads in a rather Kantian fashion, and also 
Schrödinger clearly saw the difference between indeterminism in practice and 
indeterminism in principle. After 1926, Schrödinger (1929a, 1932a) repeatedly 
stressed it in print. But to the empiricist in the local Viennese tradition this difference 
was negligible and, accordingly, Schrödinger’s unequivocal support for indeterminism 
reached back to his Vienna days. Hanle is, however, fully right about Schrödinger’s 
attitude toward Born’s interpretation of his wave function.  
 
[S]uch an indeterminacy [in principle] was too stringent a restriction to place upon nature. Experiment 
had not decided whether nature is absolutely determined or is partially undetermined, whereas Born, 
Heisenberg, and Bohr had decided in advance. For Schrödinger, molecular indeterminacy was 
possible, even likely in a way, though not because of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle proved only that indeterminacy was built into quantum mechanics, not that it was built into 
nature. So Schrödinger abhorred the claims of closure of the theory. (Hanle, 1979, p. 268)  
 
Two recent interpretations have tracked the Machian influence to considerable detail 
and related it to Boltzmann’s Bild conception of physical theory. According to Henk 
de Regt,  
 
Schrödinger did achieve a synthesis between the ideas Mach and Boltzmann, by applying them to 
different domains: Mach’s to ontology and epistemology, and Ludwig Boltzmann’s to methodology of 
science. … Mach’s ideas had a stronger influence on Schrödinger’s philosophy while Boltzmann’s 
methodology was certainly more important for his discovery of wave mechanics. However, when it 
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came down to questions concerning how to best interpret quantum mechanics Mach’s philosophy 
became of equal importance. (De Regt, 2001, p. 99f.)  
 
“Schrödinger rejected the ‘strong’ methodological tenets of Machian positivism, and 
thus was left with the ‘weak empiricist methodology shared by all scientists: the 
precept that theories must be empirically adequate.” (De Regt, 1997, p. 479) Already 
in the first chapter of My View of the World (written in 1925 but published only in 
1961), Schrödinger filed his discontent with Machian descriptivism. 
 
[C]all to mind that feeling of anxious, heart-constricting desolation and emptiness that, I daresay, has 
crept over everyone on first comprehending the delineation given by Kirchhoff and Mach of the task 
of physics (or of science altogether): a description of the facts that is as complete and thought-
economical as possible. … Indeed, aiming at this goal in itself would not suffice to keep going the 
research work in any domain. By suspending metaphysics in actual fact, art and science would be 
exanimated into siliceous skeletons, incapable of the least further development. … But theoretical 
metaphysics has been eliminated. There is no appeal against Kant’s sentence. … Metaphysics does not 
form part of the edifice of knowledge but is the scaffolding [Gerüst], without which further 
construction is impossible. Perhaps we may even be permitted to say: metaphysics turns into physics 
in the course of its development. (Schrödinger, 1989a, p. 48f.; 1964, p. 35 translation altered) 
 
At first glance, Schrödinger seems to repeat Planck’s classical argument about the 
infertility of positivism for modern physics. Yet Planck had considered the greater 
fertility of realism as an argument in favor of convergent realism while Schrödinger 
just considered metaphysics as a scaffolding that can be removed once the edifice is 
finished. This was the way how, according to his mind, Boltzmann’s pictures acted in 
physics as an indispensable guide of progress. In his 1954 Nature and the Greeks, 
Schrödinger explained this Boltzmannian surplus of theory (See Sect. 3.4.) by the 
difference between description and understanding. He approved the positivist method 
of an economical description of the observed facts. But other than Mach and 
Kirchhoff, he believed that “even from the positivists’ point of view we ought not, so I 
believe, to declare that science conveys no understanding.” (Schrödinger, 1954, p. 89) 
The mechanical theory of heat or Darwin’s theory of evolution simply convey true 
insight beyond a mere storage of facts. This shows that in science a second feature is at 
work. “The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies the problem of 
understanding Nature by disregarding or cutting out of the picture to be constructed, 
himself, his own personality, the subject of cognizance.” (Ibid., p. 90) This 
“momentous step” which is not without gaps and pitfalls of paradox “might be called 
objectivation” or “the hypothesis of the real world around us (Hypothese der realen 
Aussenwelt)” (all ibid., p. 91) The last expression was of course a shibboleth for Mach 
and it became Logical Empiricists’ favorite example of meaningless metaphysics. 
 Yet the continuation of the passage shows that Schrödinger was not at all after 
metaphysical realism. 
 
Well, the ‘real world around us’ and ‘we ourselves’, that is our minds, are made up of the same 
building material, the two consist of the same bricks, as it were, only arranged in different order – 
sense perceptions, memory images, imagination, thought. It needs, of course, some reflection, but one 
easily falls in with the fact that matter is composed of these elements and nothing else. Moreover, 
imagination and thought take an increasingly important part (as against crude sense perception), as 
science, knowledge of nature, progresses. 
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 What happens is this. We can think of these – let me call them elements – either as constituting 
mind, everyone’s own mind, or as constituting the material world. But we cannot, or can only with 
great difficulty, think both things at the same time. To get from the mind-aspect to the matter-aspect or 
vice versa, we have, as it were, to take the elements asunder and to put them together again in an 
entirely different order. (Schrödinger, 1954, p. 91f.) 
 
This sounded like return to a truly Machian stand. But then, how should we read the 
principle of objectivation that, to Schrödinger’s mind, has originated back in antiquity? 
In a historical perspective, one might recall Exner’s thesis that the emergence of the 
objective world view constituted a cultural achievement basic to modern sciences 
rather than a metaphysically necessary principle. The principle of objectivation, 
accordingly, was nothing absolute and had its gaps, but to later generations of 
scientists it became a subconscious precondition of science. In a systematic 
perspective, Henk deRegt considers it as a “pragmatic, methodological assumption” 
(DeRegt, 2001, p. 99) and introduces a philosophical distinction that closer 
corresponds to Boltzmann picture realism, but does not reflect the large historical 
dimension which Schrödinger had assigned to objectivation. He distinguishes the 
domains of ontology, epistemology, and methodology. 
 
Ontological realism asserts that the world (whatever its specific constitution) exists independently of 
our knowledge of it. Epistemological realism asserts that scientific theories aim to provide knowledge 
about an unobservable reality behind the phenomena. Finally, methodological realism merely declares 
that scientists, when working with a theory, should act as if it truly represents reality in all respects. 
(DeRegt, 1997, p. 463f.) 
 
In view of Planck’s inference from the success of methodological realism to 
epistemological realism – or empirical realism in Kant’s terms – the boundaries 
between these domains might be more than “blurry” (Ibid., p. 463) on the general 
level.  
The local Viennese tradition was, to be sure, more specific and concerned the 
relation between Mach’s ontological and epistemological anti-realism and 
Boltzmann’s Bild-realism and the quest for anschaulich theoretical pictures. 
“Notwithstanding his persistent use of the expression ‘real’, Erwin Schrödinger’s 
interpretation was clearly inspired by his belief in Anschaulichkeit as a criterion for 
understanding, rather than by a realist epistemology.” (DeRegt, 2001, p. 98) Thus 
Anschaulichkeit did not restrict “the possible character of reality, but the possible 
character of understanding.” (Ibid., p. 96) Regarding the anschaulich description of 
atomic phenomena in space and time, Schrödinger wrote in his second paper on wave 
mechanics: “We cannot really alter our forms of thought, and what we cannot 
comprehend within it we cannot understand at all. There are such things – but I do not 
believe that atomic structure is one of them.” (Schrödinger, 1984, p. 118) And he 
criticized the absence of Anschaulichkeit in Heisenberg’s theory.  
 Looking at these arguments with the eyes of the Mach-Planck controversy, it 
appears that to all scientist-philosophers sharing Planck’s background, and to those 
who overlooked Schrödinger’s distinction between description and understanding, all 
this must have sounded as an assent to a Kantian categorical approach with its static 
and preconceived forms of thought and a criticism of positivism. What, however, 
bluntly contradicted Planck’s Kantian approach was Schrödinger’s insistence on 
Anschaulichkeit and space-time pictures. Stressing the historical tendency of 
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deanthropomorphization, Planck was primarily after simple principles of great 
generality and a deterministic regularity at the basic level. Insistence on 
Anschaulichkeit was better reconcilable with the Machian view. (See Sect. 3.1.) The 
only difference was that for Mach the objects of intuition were typically not parts of a 
theory but basic functional dependences, such as the law of the lever. Or in de Regt’s 
terms, Machian Anschaulichkeit corresponded to direct visualization, for instance, in 
classical mechanics, while Boltzmann’s represented an indirect and deeper form of 
visualization that conveyed a higher degree of understanding. Quantum jumps defied 
spatio-temporal visualization, and the “wave-particle duality prohibited an 
unambiguous visualisation of radiation.” (De Regt, 1997, p. 463) But non-uniqueness 
was as unacceptable for Boltzmannian pictures as for a physical theory. For Mach, 
who subsumed the use of direct pictures or indirect pictorial hypotheses under the 
principle of economy of thought, ambiguity was undesirable but not tantamount to 
inadmissibility in principle. Because of Mach’s physiological approach, pictures 
stemming from distinct senses, e.g., vision and temperature, need not be formally 
consistent as long as they did not leads to conflicting predictions about the empirical 
facts. As regards unique and universal theoretical pictures, Schrödinger clearly 
followed Boltzmann’s lead. 
 When Schrödinger first discussed the equivalence between his wave mechanics 
and matrix mechanics, the issue of descriptivism returned. 
 
Today there are not a few physicists who, like Mach and Kirchhoff, regard the task of physical theory 
as being merely a mathematical description (but as economical as possible) of the many empirical 
connections which exist between the observable quantities, that is, a description which reproduces the 
connections, as far as possible, without the intervention of unobservable elements. On this view, 
mathematical equivalence has almost the same meaning as physical equivalence. In the present case 
there might perhaps appear just to be a certain superiority in the matrix representation, because 
through its Unanschaulichkeit, it does not tempt us to form space-time pictures of atomic processes, 
which must then perhaps remain beyond control. (Schrödinger, 1984, p. 160) 
 
Schrödinger subsequently rejected the identity of mathematical and physical 
equivalence because of differences in fertility for coupling atomic theory with 
neighboring theories, such as electrodynamics. Thus after his equivalence proof, the 
surplus of wave mechanics was not ontological but pragmatic. 
 
6.2.3 The Ontological Conversion of Epistemology 
 
Let me return to Bitbol’s discussion of Schrödinger’s over-revolutionary attitude and 
investigate it from the perspective of the apparently conflicting local influences. This 
will support Bitbol’s claim that Schrödinger advocated an ontological conversion of 
epistemological arguments, or as he wrote in the above-quoted letter to Bohr, the 
search for “an adequate conceptual scheme”. This was precisely how Mach attributed 
reality to sufficiently stable complexes of functional dependences which Schrödinger 
supplemented by a Boltzmannian Bild-realistic comprehension of these dependences 
and by a theory reduction to the basic universal concepts they rest upon. All this, to my 
mind, does not support the post-modern interpretation or the anomalous parallelism 
between the facts and their theoretical picture or model that Bitbol advances. 
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Bitbol departs from the diagnosis that, on the metaphysical level, Schrödinger 
closely followed Mach’s anti-realism and extended it in two directions. By adding 
Schopenhauer’s elaboration of vedantic spirituality, according to which the whole 
world consists just of a single mind, he arrived at a substantive idealistic monism. Yet 
apart from this ontological perspective, there is also an “epistemological (or 
methodological)” (Ibid., p. 14) one. “The two faces of Schrödinger’s attitude towards 
the concept of ‘reality’ can thus be characterized as follows. Fully recognize that the 
‘real objects which surround us’ are nothing else than constructs, but take these 
constructs very seriously, since they are a precondition for our life.” (Ibid., p. 13f.) 
Bitbol’s opposition: ontology versus epistemology and methodology, accordingly, 
does not agree with de Regt’s distinction: ontology and epistemology versus 
methodology. But their disagreement is largely terminological, and I have a certain 
preference for Bitbol’s terminology because it better conforms to the emergence of 
Schrödinger’s ideas from within Mach’s epistemology. Concerning the cat paper, 
Bitbol writes: “Schrödinger [1935] was here again suggesting an ontological 
conversion of epistemological requirements, namely a projection of the epistemic 
limitations onto an appropriate system of intentionally aimed at entities.” (Bitbol, 
1996, p. 88) According to deRegt’s wording, this was plain epistemological anti-
realism because the assumption of a world behind the phenomena was barred. 
The main problem of Bitbol’s account is, to my mind, the interpretation of the 
intentional motivation of the quasi-realist strategy in science. Instead of the Machian 
stand, which Schrödinger (1932a) advocated himself, Bitbol chooses a transcendental 
or phenomenological approach. For, “a quasi-realist thinker like Schrödinger is a post-
modernist in philosophy.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 41) The turn from a classical to a post-
modern stance took place after Schrödinger’s two direct interpretations of the wave 
function had failed. “By 1929, he had acknowledged explicitly an irreducible distance 
between representation and appearances which is typical of the post-modern trend of 
thought.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 28) “Bohr’s strategy, which involved couples of 
complementary symbolic (wave-like and corpuscle-like) pictures, was replaced by a 
distinction between the picture and the events, between the (wave-like) content of an 
unique continuous representation and the discontinuous observable events.” (Ibid., p. 
29)  
 Bitbol detects in Schrödinger’s writings five non-metaphysical criteria for 
endowing the wave functions with ontological significance. First, monist and quasi-
realist ontology must be “taken in a restricted (Quinean) sense of choosing an 
appropriate system of references, not in the sense of an act of picking out some set of 
intrinsically defined entities.” (Ibid., p. 99) This contained the above-mentioned move 
of “defining a system of entities in such a way that epistemological considerations 
become redundant with respect to it.” (Ibid., p. 100) Second, the “ability of the wave 
functions to embody the law-like connection between experimental events” was 
considered as an “index of their ‘reality’” (both ibid., p. 100). Partaking in a stable 
relational structure was precisely Mach’s precondition to qualify as a scientific fact. 
Yet Bitbol considers this as a strong neo-Kantian element because it reflects the fact 
that we are not only interested in laws but that they “are necessary for us, if we are to 
objectify a domain of entities beyond the level of the sequences of isolated 
experimental facts.” (Ibid., p. 100) We shall see below that Bitbol wrongly reads Mach 
as someone who could deal only with collections of isolated facts. Third, “to mould an 
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ontology out of a set of instruments of statistical predictions” (Ibid., p. 100) was 
admissible for Schrödinger because he did not think that there existed a crucial 
difference between statistical and sharp predictions. Fourth, “the project of 
ontologization of ψ-waves has further obstacles to overcome, once their objectivity 
has been recognized.” (Ibid., p. 102) While Heisenberg had linked ‘reality’ to the Latin 
res and considered the wave function only as potentia, Schrödinger insisted that 
“virtualities manifest themselves not only through their being actualized in such-and-
such an experimental event exclusive of any other event, but also by modulating as a 
whole the characteristics or distribution of events.” (Ibid., p. 104) Bitbol here points to 
“adiabatic (or ‘protective’) measurements [which] are able to provide direct access to 
… distributional features of the wave function.” (Ibid., p. 106)134 From an 
experimentalist’s standpoint, accordingly, “the most natural extrapolation of the 
macroscopic ontology into the microscopic realm, is not an ontology of bearers of 
sharp values but an ontology of bearers of distributional characteristics.” (Ibid., p. 108) 
And hence we obtain as macroscopic limit of quantum theory the Gaussian 
distributions characteristic of all real-world measurement protocols of classical 
physicists. This at first glance could have been an argument to Exner’s taste. But 
inspired by Wolfgang Köhler’s gestalt theory, Schrödinger (1929b) gave it another 
tack. Thus, fifth, ψ-waves “are individuals by virtue of their having a form, namely a 
wave-length and a … modulation.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 108)  
 
6.2.4 Neutral Monism and Anomalous Parallelism 
 
Bitbol finds Schrödinger’s ontology convincing up to the notorious blind spot of 
quantum mechanics, the measurement problem. Yet “Schrödinger’s dominant attitude 
towards quantum mechanics [was]: push that description of the entities which can be 
construed both objectively and repeatably to its limit; don’t bother about its connection 
with experimental outcomes until the very last stage of the description.” (Ibid., p. 118) 
Schrödinger wavered in the hope whether a definitive solution of the measurement 
problem could ever be found. “But what was really needed was a full acceptance of the 
parallelism between the time-development of the holistic wave-function 
(object+apparatus) and the sequence of macroscopic events, rather than an new blend 
of the old idea of a causal interaction which takes place between objects and 
apparatuses in order to produce the events.” (Ibid., p. 123) Since the early Schrödinger 
did not succeed in construing this parallelism as the emergence of macroscopic 
properties from microscopic ones, his post-modern turn led him to everyday catalogue-
like structural relations between macroscopic facts – as we find them in our life-world 
– and the ψ-model of quantum mechanics.  
 Bitbol calls this position ‘anomalous parallelism’. It “expresses the 
circumstance that the series of experimental facts is not supposed to be linked by a 
strict law to the time development of some overall wave function, but only through 
Born’s probabilistic correspondence rules.” (Ibid., p. 256) Moreover, “anomalous 
parallelism was not only one of the dominant components of Schrödinger’s late 
interpretation of quantum mechanics; it also agreed more closely with the general 
trends of his philosophical outlook than with most alternative conceptions.” (Ibid., p. 
                                                          
134 See (Dickson, 1995) for more on this new developments. 
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261) To Bitbol’s mind, Schrödinger developed anomalous parallelism because he 
abhorred the instrumentalist consequences of a stand like Bohr’s where our position in 
the world remains a crucial point of reference. 
Bitbol claims that anomalous parallelism was the mature end product of a 
continuous development of Schrödinger’s epistemological thoughts. I doubt whether 
his account of Schrödinger’s understanding of the facts of everyday life is historically 
accurate, in particular as far as the role of Mach is concerned. The close relation 
between macroscopic scientific facts and our life-world is not only a creed of 
phenomenology, but also part and parcel of Mach’s philosophy. Adopting a less 
restricted view on Machian ontology would moreover yield certain convergences 
between Bitbol’s parallels.  
 Turning to details, Bitbol distinguishes three different elements of 
Schrödinger’s view about the things-of-our-environment: perspectivism, emphasis on 
form, and holism. First, the “object only shows us its profiles or aspects; its 
presentation to us is perspectival and incomplete.” Form “is what confers individuality 
and permanent identity on entities given to the senses. When form happens to be 
inaccessible at every instant such an object can be identified by relying on the 
continuity of its trajectory.” If no elementary components of matter can be 
individuated, we must rely upon more complex forms. “These organized wholes, or 
their characteristic observable form, must be considered as the only real 
individuatable, and permanent objects.” (all ibid., p. 160) The first feature appeared in 
the continuation of the above-quoted passage from Nature and the Greeks after 
Schrödinger had subscribed to Mach’s neutral elements. 
 
For example,… my mind at this moment is constituted by all I sense around me: my own body, you all 
sitting in front of me and very kindly listening to me …, and, above all, the ideas I wish to explain to 
you, the suitable framing of them into words. But now envisage any one of the material objects around 
us, for example my arm and hand. As a material object it is composed, not only of my own direct 
sensations of it, but also of the imagined sensations I would have in turning it round, moving it, 
looking at it from all different angles; in addition it is composed of the perceptions I imagine you to 
have of it, and also, if you think of it purely scientifically, of all you could verify and would actually 
find, if you took it and dissected it, to convince yourself of its intrinsic nature and composition. And so 
on. There is no end to enumerating all the potential percepts and sensations on my and on your side 
that are included in my speaking of this arm as an objective feature of the ‘real world around us’. 
(Schrödinger, 1954, p. 92f.) 
 
How could neutral monism combine with this conception of ‘everyday thing’? Bitbol 
commences from a very restricted view on Mach’s elements. “Only sensorial 
experience can be ascribed, according to Mach’s positivism, the status of factual 
material; only atomic sensations are truly given. The perceptual or intellectual 
components are only considered as an artificial structure superimposed onto the brute 
data, or as useful fictions which can be modified according to the needs.” (Bitbol, 
1996, p. 164) It is true, “Schrödinger was not so comfortable with sensualistic 
reductionism.” (Ibid., p. 165) But as we have seen in Section 3.1., Machian elements 
neither corresponded to isolated perceptions of red spots on a screen, nor were they 
atomistic in the sense that they were indivisible. Elements were just the elementary 
sensational constituents of a sufficiently stable complex of elements whose further 
divisibility was left open. Elements could be immediate sensations, earlier sensations 
taken from memory, imagined sensations, and all kinds of thoughts. Moreover, all our 
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sensations were already embedded into previous experiences and ultimately into a 
provisional world view. There were more complex kinds of sensations which made it 
possible to intuit at a single glance Stevin’s thought experiment establishing the law of 
the inclined plane or the meaning of a Chinese character (See Mach, 1988, Sect. I.2 & 
IV.4). It was precisely this departure from a tabula rasa conception of sensual 
experiences which at all permitted Mach to account for the historical development of 
science by the combination of fantasy and the principle of economy. (Cf. Haller, 
1986c). Or so he writes right at the beginning of the respective section of the 
Mechanics : “It is the object of all science to replace, or save, experiences, by the 
reproduction and anticipation of facts in thought. Memory is handier than experiences, 
and often answers the same purpose.” (Mach, 1988, p. 494/577) Thus Bitbol is wrong 
in asserting that  
 
in Schrödinger’s conception, the basic constitutive elements do not reduce to bare sensations as in 
Mach, or to sensations plus images of sensations as in Russell. Schrödinger’s ‘events’ already mix up 
sensitive and imaginative components, into a ‘complex’ whose structure is likely to be of an 
intellectual origin. … Thus, in his version of phenomenalism, the constituents of the real objects are 
not just actual and imagined sense-data, but rather perceptual complexes which are so elaborate, so 
‘inextricable’, that they make any further analysis into elementary data quite difficult and probably 
pointless. (Bitbol, 1996, p. 165) 
 
Real objects are “complexes of events, which are themselves inextricable complexes 
of sensorial, imaginative, and intellectual components. … And the complexes 
eventually acquire complete autonomy with respect to their constituents.” (Ibid., p. 
166) But also Machian facts were multi-layered sufficiently stable and approximately 
autonomous complexes that could be intuited in a single act and be economically 
communicated to other humans, from craftsmen to their apprentices, or among fellow 
scientists. Communication was, according to Mach, one of the driving forces for the 
economy of science. Just this was meant, or so I believe, when the late Schrödinger 
described the formation of invariants which we have adopted since childhood. “It 
begins with the sensory complex of the individual, but very soon extends to forming 
mutual invariants, in common to the individuals that are in social contact.” 
(Schrödinger, 1995, p. 146) Bitbol even arrives at an “ideal norm” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 
188) of forming invariances within the constant changes of our environment, a faculty 
that is already acquired by a child who has thus, it seems, learned to apply neo-Kantian 
categories. 
 There is, moreover, no trace of a combination of “both experience and intuition 
of essences” which prompts Bitbol to hold that “Schrödinger’s conception of the real 
object … [was] much closer to Husserl’s phenomenology than to any empiricist or 
positivist doctrine.” (Ibid., p. 166) Mach’s evolutionist epistemology which assumed a 
far-reaching continuity between the first experiences of a child and scientific theories 
makes the following simply a pseudo-problem. “Are the elements then pre-given and 
later connected in order to make complexes, or are the complexes pre-given and later 
disintegrated in order to reveal elements?” (Ibid., p. 168) On Mach’s account, nothing 
was pre-given. The problem of the empirical basis only emerged with Logical 
Empiricists who rigorously set apart empirical observations and formal theory.  
 To be sure, there existed a major difference between Schrödinger and Mach as 
to the status of theoretical elements within such complexes. While for Mach, 
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hypotheses were mere placeholders for experiences still to be made – or a promise of 
future sensations – Schrödinger’s quest for theoretical understanding followed 
Boltzmann’s lead. The goal were universal theoretical entities to which our 
observations could be reduced to. But all this was far from the neo-Kantian perspective 
that there exist invariances in our experience which could, in the limit of the whole 
history of science, replace the old Kantian categories. Bitbol arrives at such a 
classification of Schrödinger by claiming that “[p]erceiving a real object, according to 
Schrödinger, is tantamount to associating unconsciously with it an indefinite number 
of expectations concerning future explorations or experiments.” (Ibid., p. 180) Taking 
the infinite limit of “anticipations, or presumptive synthesis of aspects into material 
objects,” (Ibid., p. 181) one arrives at the ‘horizon’ of Husserlian phenomenology. 
This infinite limit of autonomous complexes makes problems for Schrödinger’s 
complexes which are at bottom only a “finite aggregate of actual and possible 
perceptions.” (Ibid., p. 189) The solution of this problem is, to my mind, simply to 
regard them with Mach as approximately stable but always capable of further 
development. According to Bitbol, however, the problem roots much deeper and its 
solution ultimately requires autonomous parallelism. “Schrödinger wavered between a 
quasi-phenomenological attitude, which is more adapted to the case of familiar 
‘things’, and a constructivist attitude, which fits better with the case of objects of 
science.” (Ibid., p. 189) This yielded problems with the scientific revolution that had 
occurred with quantum mechanics.  
 
It was the kind of radical revision of beliefs which is typical of scientific revolutions and which has no 
manifest equivalent in our way of dealing with the view of the world presupposed by daily actions and 
speech. What Schrödinger insisted upon when he compared the notion of ‘thing’ to a scientific 
construct is … that this very notion of thing should not be sheltered; not any more, at any rate, than the 
most fundamental axioms of a (falsifiable) scientific theory. But is this possible? (Ibid., p. 196)  
 
Bitbol views three possible attitudes. First, “conservative monism aims at preserving at 
any cost the traditional notion of material body, even in the microscopic domain.” This 
class includes Born, with qualifications, and Bohm. Second, loose dualism assumes a 
fluctuating separation between the classical macroscopic world “wherein the 
traditional notion of material body operates, and a domain (the microscopic world) 
wherein it collapses.” (Ibid., p. 197) This was Bohr’s home territory. Third, 
ontological parallelism accepts the existence of two conflicting ontological attitudes 
and devises several strategies to reconcile them, such as Schrödinger’s anomalous 
parallelism.  
 This list is not complete. It does not include Exner’s synthesis of Mach’s 
empiricism and Boltzmann’s theories as pictures. To Exner’s mind (Cf. Sect. 4.4.), 
facts grow continuously while theories might undergo radical changes. This seems to 
me also Schrödinger’s stand in his quest for a radically new quantum ontology. I even 
think that owing to Mach’s principle of continuity Schrödinger would have been rather 
critical of Kuhnian revolutions and incommensurability. 
 Thus far my critical discussion of the present literature. In the subsequent 
chapter I shall try to add a new element to it and treat Schrödinger as member of the 
tradition of Vienna Indeterminism and as a scientist-philosopher who further 
elaborated his teacher Exner’s synthesis of Mach and Boltzmann. To be sure, Exner’s 
name is mentioned by Bitbol (1996), de Regt (2001) and, of course, Hanle (1979), as 
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the ancestor of Schrödinger’s indeterminism. But interpreters hardly go beyond 
Schrödinger’s own acknowledgments. In elaborating this historical perspective I shall 
focus almost exclusively on texts that appeared in Die Naturwissenschaften or whose 
philosophical aspiration is evident. 
 
6.3 Schrödinger on Atomism and Indeterminism 
 
From 1917 to 1935 Schrödinger published ten papers and one review in Die 
Naturwissenschaften. They reflect the full breadth of his scientific interests. In the 
first, the young Vienna Privatdozent reviewed new results on atomic and molecular 
heats (1917). Having become a recognized leading expert in color theory, Schrödinger 
twice wrote on this subject (1924b, 1925a), while at the same time he published his 
endorsement and interpretation of the BKS theory (1924a). After his breakthrough in 
wave mechanics, he gave an explanation of the continuous transition between micro- 
and macromechanics (1926a). Already in Berlin, he eventually had his Zurich 
inaugural address (1922a) published in 1929. In the same volume we find his exchange 
with Planck (1929a), a discussion of the gestalt properties of wave functions (1929b), 
and a review of Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical World (1929c). The Oxford 
émigré still contributed a paper on the inapplicability of geometry at atomic distances 
(1934) and the cat paper (1935) in which he reacted to the EPR-problem. In 
subsequent years Schrödinger would regularly have papers in Nature after which 
Berliner’s journal had originally been modeled, among them a philosophical 
discussion of indeterminism and free will (1936).  
 There is no textual basis to argue as in Section 5.4. because Schrödinger did not 
publish any philosophical text before the year 1929 – although he had already written 
(1922a) and a sketch of his world view (1989a). From 1929 on popular and 
philosophical papers appeared quite regularly and at different places, from the daily 
press to the separately published (1932a).135 What can be said, however, is that 
Schrödinger’s paper on the law of nature (1922a) and in particular the cat paper 
(1935), both published in Die Naturwissenschaften, have been among the most 
influential texts for the discussions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The 
papers (1924, 1926a, 1929b, 1934), on the other hand, must be counted as important 
contributions to the then current foundational discourse in physics.  
 
6.3.1. On Boltzmann’s Atomism 
 
In his early years, Schrödinger had worked in several typically Viennese fields, both 
experimentally and theoretically. What Moore classifies as Schrödinger’s “first 
outstanding paper” (1989, p. 75) harked back to Boltzmann’s mathematical atomism. 
(Sect. 3.5) Yet instead of a constructivist argument involving humans’ finitary 
reasoning powers, Schrödinger was searching for an explicit example where atomism 
and continuum physics lead to diverging scenarios. Citing Boltzmann’s paper on the 
                                                          
135 I have used the bibliography in (Schrödinger, 1984). 
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indispensability of atomism in natural science (1905, pp. 141-157), Schrödinger stated 
the task of the contemporary atomist. 
 
It has often been claimed and is, so to speak, part of the atomist’s creed that all the partial differential 
equations of mathematical physics which connect the spatial and temporal variation of some physical 
variables (temperature, deformation, field strength, etc.) are incorrect in a strictly mathematical sense. 
For, the mathematical symbol of the differential quotient describes the transition to the limit to 
arbitrarily small spatial variations, while we are in fact convinced that in forming such “physical” 
differential quotients we must halt at “physically infinitely small” regions, i.e., at those that still 
always contain very many molecules; if we were to push the limiting process further, the quotients 
concerned, which up to then really were proceeding nearer and nearer toward a definite limit and 
practically seemed to have already reached it, would again begin to oscillate very strongly and only 
much later they would perhaps approach a true limit. For the latter limit, however, and irrespective of 
our inability to ever measure it, those simple laws which are expressed in the partial differential 
equations and hold for the “pseudo limits” of the former type, would not be valid in the least. 
 If we intend to put this conception into effect, we are confronted with a double task. First, all 
those differential equations first derived by consideration of a continuous medium as differential 
equations in the strict sense, now must instead be derived in the above sense as difference equations on 
the basis of a model constructed of molecules. (Schrödinger, 1914, p. 916f.) 
 
The first task is the easier one. But a successful proof only establishes the feasibility of 
the atomistic conception, not its necessity. “And compared with the phenomenologist” 
– that is, for Mach and all those whom Boltzmann called the mathematical 
phenomenologists – “we are always at the disadvantage that he typically reaches his 
goal more quickly by a more simple and plausible ansatz.” (Ibid., p. 917) 
 
Atomistics [accordingly] also calls for a second task, through whose solution it only establishes its 
exclusive right over the phenomenological theory. This consists in searching and predicting such 
conditions under which the differential equation based on a continuum actually leads to an incorrect 
result because of the truly atomistic structure of matter. (Ibid., p. 917) 
 
As a simple model, Schrödinger compared a one-dimensional atomistic model of a 
string in which one elongates a finite number of isolated atoms with the familiar 
d’Alembert differential equation of the vibrating string. Of course, the limit obtains in 
the physically meaningless situation when the distance parameter a between the atoms 
converges to zero. For a constant distance parameter the problem transforms into 
finding those features which the system of initial values xn0 for the distances between 
the atoms or the initial elongations ξ ξn n0 0,&  must possess “to be somewhat similar to a 
continuous elastic medium.” (Ibid., p. 925) The result is that the ξ ξn n0 0,&  must be similar 
to continuous functions that show significant changes only at distances which are large 
compared to a. This condition is met for functions which correspond to averages over 
a sufficiently large number of atoms. If one argues that only such averages correspond 
to the physically observable quantities, then both approaches are equivalent. But this 
argument is inapplicable for phenomena of thermal disturbance [Wärmestörung] 
which are realized in this simple model by randomly elongating the atoms in a finite 
segment that is large compared to a but leaving the chain unaltered elsewhere. Any 
average value is blind for these internal differences of elongation and, accordingly, 
cannot describe the phenomenon of thermal disturbance. 
 We see that the young Schrödinger was advocating Boltzmann’s atomism with 
his already developed sharp mathematical weapons. In the debates about quantum 
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mechanics Schrödinger would defend a continuous theory based on his wave function 
and, much later, a unified field theory. This was his main departure from the 
Boltzmann’s teaching. 
 
 
6.3.2. What is a Law of Nature? 
 
When in 1929 Schrödinger published his 1922 Zurich inaugural address without 
changes, he was well aware that indeterminism was no longer a minority view. He 
added a short preface that was to secure Exner’s priority for it. “The subsequent rise 
and development of quantum mechanics has brought Exner’s sphere of ideas into the 
focus of scientific interest, by the way, without his name ever being mentioned.” 
(Schrödinger, 1922a, p. 9/133) Schrödinger was fully certain about his case. 
 
Within the past four or five decades physical research has clearly and definitely shown that chance is 
the common root of all the strict regularity that has been observed, at least in the overwhelming 
majority of natural processes, the regularity and invariability of which have led to the establishment of 
the postulate of universal causality. (Ibid., p. 9/ 136) 
 
The most surprising aspect in this passage is the enormously long time period as a 
result of which indeterminism has become inevitable. Only the final decade (1913-
1922) was shaped by Bohr’s theory of the atom, and another decade (1900-1912) 
could have been accounted to Planck’s quantum theories of radiation. Schrödinger, 
however, ultimately reached back to the 1870s and 1880s that had, on the one hand, 
witnessed Boltzmann stepwise developing his statistical theory of the second law of 
thermodynamics. On the other hand, the five decades harked back to the year 1872 in 
which Mach’s seminal booklet On the History and the Root of the Theorem of the 
Conservation of Work first appeared, hardly noticed by the German physics 
community. Mach’s main achievement, further elaborated in the Mechanics, was a 
modified conception of causality and a thoroughly historical and evolutionary 
perspective on the principles of physical science. As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, 
Boltzmann largely, however with important qualifications, followed this program from 
the late 1880s on, and Exner set up a synthesis of both approaches as the basis of a 
genuinely indeterministic world view.  
 Also Schrödinger rehearsed the Machian view of the postulate – or principle – 
of causality according to which “every natural process be absolutely determined at 
least through the totality of the circumstances or physical conditions that accompany 
its appearance.” (Schrödinger, 1922a, p. 9/135) Causes, according to this view, are 
constant and regularly occurring conditions of an event. Schrödinger, moreover, 
followed Mach’s evolutionary epistemology in depicting how humans have arrived at 
the postulate of causality by continuous abstraction from the regularities discerned 
both unsystematically in their “daily struggle for life and afterwards … from 
systematically and rationally planned scientific experiments.” (Ibid., p. 9/134) Seeking 
their advantage in the struggle for life, humans ultimately went beyond experience and 
created the idea of a necessary regularity in the course of natural phenomena. As 
Boltzmann, Schrödinger called the belief in causality a habit of thought 
[Denkgewohnheit] which humans have acquired through hundreds and thousands of 
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years. Yet they did so “from observing … precisely those regularities 
[Gesetzmäßigkeiten] in nature which, in the light of our present knowledge, are most 
certainly not causal, or at least not directly causal, but directly statistical regularities.” 
(Ibid., p. 11/144) What we observe on the macroscopic scale, which is of primary 
importance to human beings, already involves such a huge number of individual 
events that the statistical laws appear as strict regularities. Although this guarantees a 
practical value for the principle of causality, the inference to a causal behavior on the 
molecular scale is unwarranted. This becomes particularly clear in gas theory. 
 
In the corresponding calculations and considerations we generally assume the validity of the 
mechanical laws for the single event, the collision. But this is not at all necessary. It would be quite 
sufficient to assume that at each individual collision an increase in mechanical energy and mechanical 
momentum is just equally probable as a decrease, so that taking the average of a great many 
collisions, these quantities remain constant in much the same way as two dice cubes, if thrown a 
million times, will yield the average 7 whereas the result of each single throw is purely a matter of 
chance. (Ibid., p. 10/138f.) 
 
For gas theory, which represented our most immediate daily experience with 
molecular phenomena, Brownian motion was the crucial experiment to establish its 
statistical character. Radioactivity provided another example of a random process. 
 
More than by however many examples, our conviction of the statistical character of physical laws is 
strengthened by the fact that the second law of thermodynamics, or law of entropy, which plays a role 
in positively every real physical process, has clearly proved to be the prototype of statistical law. 
(Ibid., p. 10/140f) 
 
The reason for the universality of the second law is its intimate connection with the 
direction of time and the tendency towards more probable states.  
Thus far Schrödinger closely followed the fourth chapter of Exner’s Lectures 
(1919, 1922) titled – almost as Schrödinger’s paper – “On Laws of Nature”. And he 
commended his teacher for the first philosophically precise enunciation of the idea 
“that the assertion of determinism was certainly possible, yet by no means necessary, 
and when more closely examined not at all very probable.” (Schrödinger, 1922a, p. 
10/142f.) Schrödinger was aware that this conclusion was controversial. In order to 
argue that determinism is unnecessary, he repeated an example of Exner and 
Boltzmann. “Naturally we can explain the theorem of energy conservation on the large 
scale by its already holding true in the small [that is, for the single events]. But I do not 
see that we must do so.” (Ibid., p. 10/143) And even if we postulate energy and 
momentum conservation for the single events, we only obtain four equations and thus 
fall short of the pretended goal of complete determination of microscopic events.  
 As did Exner, Schrödinger considered the problem of causality as empirically 
open. “The possibility [that deterministic causality] may be in reality the case must be 
admitted, but this duplication of natural law so closely resembles the animistic 
duplication of natural objects, that I cannot regard it as at all tenable.” (Ibid., p. 11/ 
145) In virtue of Occam’s razor, “[t]he burden of proof falls on those who champion 
absolute causality, and not on those who question it.” (Ibid., p. 11/ 147) But this was 
not the whole argument. Notice how Schrödinger depicted this duplicity of two realms.  
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On the one hand we would have the intrinsic, genuine, absolute laws of the infinitesimal domain; 
while on the other there would be that observed regularity in the finite domain which in its most 
essential features is not due to the existence of the genuine laws but is determined rather by the 
concept of pure number, the most translucent and simple creation of the human mind. Clear and 
definite intelligibility in the world of outer appearances, and behind this a dark, eternally unintelligible 
imperative, an enigmatic “Must”. (Ibid., p. 11/144f.) 
 
Like in Boltzmann, the concept of pure number was linked to the finitary human 
reasoning powers. And Schrödinger’s idea that all natural happenings in the finite 
domain are based on this concept was echoing Exner’s view that the law of large 
number was the most basic law of science and humanistics. The (possibly infinite) rest 
remained behind Schopenhauer’s veil of the Maya; it was not contradictory as for 
Boltzmann, or downright meaningless as for Logical Empiricists. 
 Schrödinger even defended Exner’s and Boltzmann’s view that the law of 
gravitation was of statistical origin. The number of atoms involved in gravitational 
phenomena is much larger than for any other process in nature, so that deviations from 
the strict macroscopic laws would hardly ever become noticed. Having himself worked 
on general relativity, Schrödinger was aware that “Einstein’s theory strongly suggests 
the absolute validity of the theories of energy and momentum conservation.” (Ibid., p. 
11/146) To avoid a conflict between this finding of the last decade and the tendency of 
the preceding four decades, Schrödinger made a surprising move and considered 
relativity theory as virtually irrelevant for the issue of causality. 
 
Applied to the mass point, these principles actually involve nothing more than a tendency towards 
absolute perseverance – for the whole theory of gravitation can be considered as the reduction of 
gravitation to the law of inertia. That under certain conditions nothing changes is surely the simplest 
law that can be conceived, and hardly falls within the concept of causal determination. It may after all 
be equally reconcilable with a strictly acausal view of nature. (Ibid., p. 11/146) 
 
This was, to be sure, not a Machian argument. Recall the passage about Galileo’s 
intuition of the law of inertial quoted in Sect. 3.1. Still in the Mechanics and after 
discussing how free inertial motion depends on the presence of other bodies in the 
universe, Mach concluded “that precisely the apparently simplest mechanical 
principles are of a very complicated character, that these principle are founded on 
uncompleted experiences, nay on experiences that can never be fully completed.” 
(Mach, 1988, p. 259f./290) Since these principles were experiences, they consisted in 
functional dependences among determining conditions; hence they represented cases 
to which Mach’s concept of causality applied. Schrödinger’s argument is surprisingly 
weak, in particular, if one thinks of the importance of relativity theory within Schlick’s 
(1920) first theory of causality. 
 Moore criticizes that “Schrödinger’s treatment of conservation laws was 
surprisingly superficial” (1989, p. 154) because he neglected their deep roots in the 
fundamental symmetries of space and time. By assenting to Einstein, he moreover 
contradicted his own (premature) dismissal of the conservation laws. The problem of 
Moore’s argument, however, is that he presupposes that Schrödinger assumed space-
time symmetries in the usual sense as prior preconditions of all physical processes. 
Schrödinger still stood in the tradition of Boltzmann who had even advocated an 
atomistic concept of time. Admittedly, this view did not go well along with relativity 
theory. So even between the lines Schrödinger’s inaugural lecture was a confession to 
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the Viennese tradition. He concluded with the belief “that, once we have discarded our 
rooted predilection for absolute causality, we shall succeed in overcoming these 
difficulties, rather than expect atomic theory to substantiate the dogma of causality. 
(Schrödinger, 1922a, p. 11/147) 
 
6.3.3. Indeterminism circa 1924 
 
In 1924 Niels Bohr, Hendrik A. Kramers and John C. Slater proposed a new quantum 
theory in which energy conservation held only on average, but not for the individual 
atomic processes. Schrödinger was enthusiastic and immediately wrote to Bohr 
explicitly citing Exner’s Lectures and his Zurich speech. 
 
I have just read with the greatest interest the interesting change in your ideas in the May issue of the 
Phil. Mag. I am extraordinarily sympathetically touched by this change. As a pupil of the old Franz 
Exner, I have long ago become accustomed to the idea that the basis of our statistics is probably not 
microscopic “regularity”, but perhaps “pure chance” and that perhaps even the laws of energy and 
momentum have only statistical validity. (Letter of 24 May, 1924, in Bohr, 1984, p. 490) 
 
In the fall of 1924, Schrödinger published a survey article in Die Naturwissenschaften 
that emphasized the theory’s philosophical significance and made abundant mention of 
Exner’s name. The conception “that the individual molecular process is not causally 
determined by ‘laws’ in a unique fashion, [here] for the first time attains a tangible 
form.” (Schrödinger, 1924a, p. 720) If this theory were true, the theorem of energy 
conservation would cease to be an exact law of nature and give way to the “Exner-
Bohr conception” (Ibid., p. 724) according to which it is only of statistical validity. 
Schrödinger’s reading of the new theory corresponded to the second of the two tasks 
which he had laid upon the atomist a decade ago. (See Sect. 6.3.1.) A confirmation of 
the BKS-theory would thus put it alongside Brownian motion as a demonstration of 
indeterminism within a certain domain of facts. It took only a year until the crucial 
experiment was realized: Geiger and Bothe showed that energy was conserved in each 
individual process.  
 After two pages of summary in which Schrödinger emphasized that a main goal 
of BKS was to dispense with the light quantum hypothesis, he provided some rough 
estimates to show that the new theory did not contradict present experiences, although 
the changes effected by the BKS on the individual processes were considerable and the 
energy fluctuations were even of the size of the differences of atomic energy levels. 
But the transitions between the levels occurred very rapidly and became 
macroscopically significant only at very high temperatures, so that it would be difficult 
to at all isolate the considered system from its environment.  
 At the end of the paper, Schrödinger argued that a merely statistical validity of 
the theorem of energy conservation would have “much deeper theoretical 
consequences than in the case of the entropy theorem.” (Ibid., p. 724) While in the 
latter case the statistical theory for a closed system approaches the exact 
thermodynamic laws in the limit of infinite observation time, in the BKS theory – or if 
the Exner-Bohr-conception holds true – a closed system exhibits an average behavior 
only for relatively short times.  
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In the limit t→∞ its behavior becomes completely undetermined. … We can reduce the deviation only 
by increasing the size of the system, or by considering it as a subsystem of a more extended system 
(“heat bath”). The exact validity of thermodynamics now could perhaps be maintained at most for a 
system in a heat bath, to wit, for the double limit t→∞ and heat bath→∞. But this double limit poses 
much bigger conceptual difficulties than the single one. 
 One may also say: a certain stability of the happenings of the world sub specie aeternitatis can 
only occur through the connection of each individual system with the rest of the world. The separated 
individual systems would be, from the standpoint of unity, a chaos. It requires the connection as a 
permanent regulator, without which, energetically considered, it would wander about at random. – Is 
it an idle speculation, to find this a similarity to social, ethical and cultural phenomena. (Ibid., p. 724) 
 
More than speculating about another instantiation of Mach’s principle of holistic 
interdependence, the end of Schrödinger’s paper pointed back to Exner’s Inaugural 
Address (1909), which he never quoted in his writings. One may also refer to his 
vedantic views according to which there existed an interconnection between all human 
consciousnesses.  
 Whereas Schrödinger’s article was unanimously positive about the BKS theory, 
his above-quoted letter to Bohr also continued with some criticism. 
 
Your new account to a large extent signifies a return to the classical theory, as far as radiation is 
concerned. I cannot completely go along with you when you keep calling this radiation ‘virtual’ … 
For what is the ‘real’ radiation if it is not that which ‘causes’ transitions, i.e., which creates the 
transition probabilities? Moreover, another sort of radiation is surely not assumed. Indeed, if one 
adopts a purely philosophical standpoint, one might even dare to doubt which electron system has a 
greater reality – the ‘real one’ which describes the stationary trajectories or the ‘virtual one’ that emits 
virtual radiation and scatters impinging virtual radiation. (Letter of 24 May, 1924, from Bohr, 1984, p. 
490)  
 
Interpreting this passage, scholar’s have largely followed Wessels’ view that 
“Schrödinger was enthusiastic about the assumption of irreducibly statistical 
processes, but objected to the authors’ reluctance to give a coherent physical picture 
for the theory.” (Wessels, 1977, p. 313) De Regt even concludes that “[p]recisely 
because his epistemological position amounts to Machian anti-realism, Schrödinger is 
in a position to object to calling some terms in the theory ‘virtual’. If he had adhered to 
a hard-headed correspondence realism [and maintained that there could be any picture 
faithfully describing atomic reality], he would have dismissed the BKS-theory out of 
hand.” (DeRegt, 1997, p. 473)  
It appears to me that there are three intertwined aspects in Schrödinger’s 
criticism. First, there is the difference in the meaning of causality observed by Ben-
Menahem; in Bitbol’s words, “according to Schrödinger the crucial criterion for 
calling a theoretical entity ‘real’ is its being ascribed the capability of ‘causing’ effects 
(be it in a restricted probabilistic sense), and not its being energetically homogeneous 
with the effects it produces.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 36) Second, Mach’s causality as 
functional dependences involved a holistic stance, such that no entities were 
designated in advance as ‘real’ without their standing in causal relations. Darrigol even 
surmises that “Schrödinger would not have dared such a loose speculation in a 
scientific journal [as at the end of the BKS paper] … had not he been very eager to 
connect two of his main favorite themes, holism and acausality, and to do so in 
harmony with his philosophical and political convictions.” (Darrigol, 1992, p. 268) 
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Third, complicated and merely statistical processes in space-time corresponded to 
Schrödinger’s idea about theoretical pictures much better than did the quantum jumps. 
 Earlier in 1924, Schrödinger wrote a long letter to Hans Reichenbach with 
whom he had often met during his Stuttgart semester in 1920/21 (Cf. Moore, 1989, p. 
133). It was a comment on a paper of Reichenbach (1932a) that was only published 
together with Schrödinger’s letter in the third volume of Erkenntnis. As did 
Reichenbach, Schrödinger addressed the relationship of causality and the problem of 
induction.  
 
To be sure, the deep problem of causality seems to me the following: why do we expect the completely 
identical outcome under completely identical circumstances? – and not only after many but already at 
the first repetition. … I call this the riddle of inductive inference. I do not believe that it is solvable for 
us in its proper sense. If one ponders about it for a longer time … some sort of intellectual rotary 
vertigo sets in. (Schrödinger, 1932b, p. 65) 
 
While Reichenbach believed at the time that he had basically solved the problem of 
inductive inference, to Schrödinger’s mind, all such attempts ended up in tautologies, 
and Reichenbach thus had merely buried induction in the problem of probabilistic 
inference. “In actual fact one does not get beyond the fact that we constantly infer 
inductively, that we derive the greatest profit from it, that all our living is based upon 
it.” (Ibid., p. 66) Apparently, Schrödinger was a true heir of Mach’s anti-methodology. 
I cannot enter here into the details of his criticism of Reichenbach because this would 
require a more detailed study of a position which I have excluded from the present 
study because of the close connection between causality and induction; in 
Schrödinger’s case, as we shall see, the riddle of induction remained almost unaffected 
by the causality debate.  
 Schrödinger subsequently addressed, as it were, the inverse problem as before 
and argued that in a chaotic world we would never have arrived at the concept of 
causality. Unlike Schlick (Sect. 7.1.) he defined ‘chaotic’ no other than as the simple 
negation of the principle of causality.  
 
[Accordingly,] this would be the same vicious circle as above. But perhaps this shows that our idea of 
causality has something to do with realism. Only because we consider our environment as something 
real which has a certain persistence, we are able to arrive at attributing to this real the property of 
being causally connected. Of course, behind the idea of some “relatively persistent real” precisely that 
is locked which had been intended originally: why experiences made can say something about 
experiences to be made; to wit, now: just because of this order property of the real which has to be 
thought of as persistent. You may learn from my inaugural address [1922a] which is enclosed that in 
actual fact I do not quite believe in this order property. (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 66f.) 
 
This was anything but a transcendental argument according to which realism and 
causality were a mutual precondition. Rather did it reflect the Machian heritage 
according to which both causality and realism were based on functional dependences. 
On this account, a fact – or something real – consisted in a sufficiently stable – or 
relatively persistent – complex of elements which, on their part, did not represent 
elementary substances independent of such relations.  
 Schrödinger drew an interesting consequence from Reichenbach’s definition of 
causality by the convergence of a certain series, although he believed that most 
interpreters would consider it as useless. It shows that “the experience available today 
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decides with a high probability against causality, probably in all cases. It is most 
valuable to me that by careful and impartial analysis you have been led to this 
conclusion which was certainly not your intention.” (Ibid., p. 69) This was the place 
where Exner’s name had to be dropped. And in the remainder of the letter Schrödinger 
contemplated how an Exnerian picture of nature, “as it will probably be the case in a 
few decades,” (Ibid., p. 69) could look like. Certainly the elements of this world would 
reveal a certain persistence presumably based on the conservation laws. But the riddle 
of inductive inference would not disappear, and the problem of equal outcome under 
equal circumstances would just be shifted to the atomic level. 
 
There one will have to assume – or so I imagine – laws of the kind that sharply defined conditions are 
related to a whole continuum of possible outcomes – or perhaps with certain persistence restrictions, to 
all possible outcomes. The “riddle” will have retreated to [the position] that by repeated preparation of 
sharply defined initial conditions (“circumstances”) the distribution of the outcomes over this 
continuum will be a specific one, e.g., a uniform one. – To be sure, one cannot know whether this idea 
(which is obviously modeled after a game of chance) will turn out to be useful. However, at some 
point an axiom will slip in that is no less enigmatic than causality. For problems do not resolve 
themselves. (Ibid., p. 70) 
 
This was quite a successful prediction about how quantum mechanical results would 
look like just two years later. It is quite surprising that Reichenbach’s concluding 
remarks (1932b) did not appraise the remarkable continuity between what Schrödinger 
wrote in 1924 and the quantum mechanics as of 1932. After all, Reichenbach had read 
Exner’s Lectures. He held, perhaps less surprisingly, that quantum mechanics fully 
confirmed his own conception of causality and emphasized that while quantum 
mechanics in principle blocked the classical extrapolation to strictly causal laws, in the 
kinetic theory of gases it was only practically unfeasible – see the footnote added to 
(Reichenbach, 1932a, p. 63). To be sure, this was said with the benefit of hindsight, 
but Schrödinger’s position in 1924 was precisely that such a difference – even if it had 
been known at the time – was of minor importance for the empiricist’s decision in 
favor of indeterminism. Evidently, it was difficult to get the basic message of Vienna 
Indeterminism across according to which classical causality had essentially terminated 
with the second law of thermodynamics. This does not contradict the fact that after the 
advent of quantum mechanics Schrödinger would himself stress the difference 
between unfeasibility in practice and in principle. 
 
6.3.4. Alleged Counterevidence: The 1926 Letters to Wien 
 
The locus classicus for claims that Schrödinger at least temporarily changed his mind 
in favor of causality, is a letter he sent to Willy Wien on 25 August 1926.136 He 
apparently abrogated the main thrust of his 1922 inaugural address and by stressing the 
problem of the energy of individual processes, he implicitly referred to the BKS-paper.  
 
I have the feeling – to express it quite generally – that we have not yet sufficiently understood the 
identity between energy and frequency in microscopic processes. … What we call the energy of an 
                                                          
136 See (Forman, 1971, p. 104) discussed in Sect. 1.2.3. and (Forman/Raman, 1969, p. 301, fn. 36) discussed in 
Section 6.2.1. I have used the letters and carbon copies in the Nachlaß Schrödinger, Zentralbibliothek für Physik, 
Wien. 
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individual electron is its frequency. The electron does not move with a certain speed for the reason that 
it has received a certain “shove”, but because a dispersion law holds for the waves of which it consists, 
as a consequence of which a wave packet of this frequency has exactly this speed of propagation. 
What we call the energy content of a stream of electrons depends for a given frequency only upon the 
number of electrons and this determines how often those events that are permitted by the frequency 
occur in the electron stream. 
 But today I no longer like to assume with Born that an individual event of this kind is 
“absolutely random”, i.e., completely undetermined. I no longer believe today that there is much to be 
gained from this conception (which I championed so enthusiastically four years ago). From a galley 
print of Born’s last work in the Zeitsch.f.Phys. I know more or less how he thinks about this: the waves 
must be strictly causally determined through field laws, the wavefunctions on the other hand have only 
the meaning of probabilities for the actual motion of light- or material-particles. I believe that Born 
thereby overlooks that – granted that this picture be already worked through completely – it would still 
depend on the taste of the observer which he now wishes to regard as real, the particle or the guiding 
field. There exists really no philosophical criterion for reality [Realität] if one does not want to say: the 
real is only the complex of sense impressions [der sinnenfällige Komplex], all the rest are only 
pictures. 
 Bohr’s standpoint that a spatio-temporal description is impossible I reject in point of principle 
[a limine]. Physics does not only consist of atomic research, science not only of physics, and life not 
only of science. The purpose of atomic research is to integrate our respective experiences into the rest 
of our thinking. And all our other thinking, as far as the external world is concerned, moves in space 
and time. (And above all: The experiments to be explained are entirely embedded into space and 
time.)137 If it cannot be embedded into space and time, then it fails in its whole purpose, and one does 
not know which purpose it serves at all.  
 
At face value, matters seem to stand clear. Schrödinger rejected indeterminism and 
Born’s positivism, and advocated a spatio-temporal description instead. Such a reading 
would signify a complete rupture with Schrödinger’s acceptance of indeterminism as a 
viable option before and also after 1926. Moreover, Bohr’s finality claim was rejected 
by a classical move of Mach against Planck’s exclusive focus on a physical world 
view (Sect. 3.9.); there has to exist a certain continuity with the facts of our 
macroscopic life world. Schrödinger does not charge Born of anti-realist metaphysics, 
because there simply is no other philosophical criterion of reality than Mach’s. 
Nonetheless, Born’s way of return to a pure Machian ontology happened in such a way 
that the theoretical pictures became entirely detached from any possible realities in 
space and time. Or in more historical terms, Born’s positivism on the basis of a still 
classical particle ontology endangered the subtle equilibrium between the teachings of 
Mach and Boltzmann which Schrödinger had imbibed at the Vienna Institute of 
Physics and elaborated into a joint advocacy of continuous pictures and indeterminism. 
 Yemina Ben-Menahem was the first to give an interpretation of this kind by 
restoring continuity with Schrödinger’s (1924a) earlier work. The important point is to 
recognize that “[c]ausality and continuity were independent for him.” (Ben-Menahem, 
1989, p. 321) Schrödinger favored the BKS theory because microprocesses were 
acausal and continuous. This was the content of an earlier letter to Wien written on 18 
June 1926. 
 
I cannot convey to you what extraordinary joy it has given me that personalities such as you and 
Geheimrat Planck share my confidence in the way I took. It appears, to be sure, that at present not all 
parties are convinced that the renunciation of the basic discontinuities, if possible, is to be absolutely 
                                                          
137 This sentence is a handwritten addition to Schrödinger’s own carbon copy. From the translation in Moore, 
1989, p. 226 which is based on the letter in the Wien Archive, Deutsches Museum München, I conclude that it 
was a later addition of Schrödinger’s when he filed the carbon copy. 
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welcomed. But I have always wholeheartedly wished that it would be possible, and would have seized 
the opportunity with both hands – as I did with Bohr-Kramers-Slater – even if chance had not played 
the first tag right into my own hands (or in regard to de Broglie I should better say: the second). 
 
Thus, so Ben-Menahem concludes, “Schrödinger himself regarded his earlier response 
to the Bohr-Kramers-Slater paper as fully consistent with the views he held in 1926 
when working on wave mechanics. It is therefore clear that the allegation that a radical 
change occurred in Schrödinger’s scientific outlook between 1924 and 1926 is at odds 
with Schrödinger’s own understanding of his position.” (Ibid., p. 322) But then what 
was the point of the August letter? “It is the claim that there is ‘not much to be gained’ 
by a probabilistic interpretation that seems odd. But if I am right about Schrödinger’s 
conception, this phrase makes perfect sense. In the BKS paper causality was 
renounced but continuity rescued. In Born’s case, however, there was no such pay-
off.” (Ibid., p. 326) Darrigol’s interpretation is similar: “one theory [wave mechanics] 
offered a fairly detailed space-time picture of radiation processes, despite the quantum 
jumping, while the other [matrix mechanics] explicitly denied the possibility of 
representing quantum processes in space and time. What Schrödinger could not accept 
was the mutual destruction of the claims of causality and visualizability.” (Darrigol, 
1992, p. 268) In one of Schrödinger’s papers of 1926, Bitbol (1996, p. 17) rightly finds 
the same motive of lack of compensation at work against Born’s probabilistic 
interpretation of wave mechanics.  
 
As far as I can see, one can thus never arrive at a uni-directional (irreversible) process without an 
additional hypothesis about the relative probability of the various possible initial distributions of the 
probability amplitudes. I am flinching from this conception [Begriffsbildung], not so much on account 
of its complexity as on account of the fact that a theory which postulates an absolute primary 
probability as a law of nature should at least repay us by freeing us from the old ‘ergodic difficulties’ 
and establishing us to understand the unidirectionality of natural processes without further 
supplementary assumptions. (Schrödinger, 1984, p. 279)  
 
If one adopts a fully probabilistic approach it should at least eliminate the ergodic 
hypothesis which arises from the combination of a deterministic theory of the 
microphenomena and a statistical theory at the macroscopic level. Dispensing with the 
notorious ergodic hypothesis was precisely the reason why Richard von Mises had 
elaborated an entirely probabilistic theory of Brownian motion. As we shall see in 
Sect. 8.2., to him, this success was a case in point for indeterminism. 
 In an even earlier letter to Wien of 19 March, 1926, which accompanied the 
submission of his paper establishing the equivalence of matrix mechanics and wave 
mechanics, Schrödinger emphasized the virtues of his own theory because 
“[p]hysically, … [it] seems considerably more satisfactory and capable of extension. 
There is yet another circumstance a posteriori in favor of the superiority of the 
standpoint of undulatory mechanics and the greater clarity which it promises also in a 
purely mathematical perspective. From this point of view I succeeded in unveiling the 
connection [between both approaches] while Weyl, with whom I cannot compare 
myself in the least as regards mathematical knowledge and capabilities, did not.” This 
indicates that Schrödinger’s Bild-realism involved the pragmatic criteria of simplicity 
and fertility.  
 The intention to reach a positive trade-off between causality and realist pictures 
in space-time can also be seen at the back of Schrödinger’s “simultaneous rejection of 
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hidden variable theories and of the epistemological interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 87) While Born’s renunciation of causality did not lead 
to a coherent ontology, hidden variable theories, to the late Schrödinger’s mind, 
amounted to a “belief in destination.” (Schrödinger, 1995, p. 78) One gained apparent 
causality at the price of ontologically dubious additional entities, such as Bohm’s 
quantum potential. They correspond to completing in thought the observable entities 
by experimentally inaccessible elements. Bitbol emphasizes Schrödinger’s strictures 
for devising a new Bild-ontology. 
 
In so far as the (proper) wave-functions can be constructed from given matrices, just as the matrices 
can be constructed from the (proper) wave functions, one cannot contend any longer that wave 
mechanics is an ad hoc device for creating pictures. This very lucid requirement of reciprocal 
equivalence shows that, unlike the later proponents of hidden variable theories, Schrödinger did not 
consider it satisfactory to an empirically void “clothing” to the structure of quantum mechanics just for 
recovering the classical ontology of for satisfying the desire for pictures. What he wished to 
demonstrate was rather that there exists an adequate picture and an (non-classical) ontology which 
arises quite naturally from unmodified quantum mechanics itself. (Bitbol, 1996, p. 68) 
 
This argument basically rehearses Schrödinger’s positivist reality criterion that had 
motivated his criticism of Bohr’s distinction between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ radiation. 
Schrödinger was a staunch advocate of ontological parsimony, in 1922 when calling 
the quest for determinism an animist duplication of the world, and after 1926 when he 
rejected a combined ontology of waves and particles in favor of a pure wave picture. 
Ontological parsimony also meant that an appropriate picture should not rely upon 
introducing explicit limits of what is knowable or speakable. (Cf. the letter to Bohr of 
May 1928 cited in Section 6.2) Once limits were drawn, completeness could not be 
positivistically rescued. And thus Bitbol rightly diagnoses a “latent complicity 
between Heisenberg’s positivist-like statements and Einstein’s program of replacing 
quantum theory by a complete theory of the behaviour of individual objects.” (Bitbol, 
1996, p. 85) 
 
 
6.3.5. Continuing the Debate with Planck 
 
In 1928, Max Planck published an emphatic review of Schrödinger’s collected papers 
on wave mechanics (1927). The author left no doubt that he preferred wave mechanics 
to matrix mechanics, their formal equivalence notwithstanding. 
 
[Schrödinger’s] discovery consists, shortly speaking, in having established a deep-rooted connection 
of quantum mechanics with classical mechanics, a connection from which follows that both these 
theories are related much closer to one another than one had been inclined to believe after the latest 
developments of research. (Planck, 1928, p. 59) 
 
And Planck even suggested that one arrived at Schrödinger’s equation “by a certain, to 
some degree obvious generalization of the equations of classical mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 
59) But what Planck cherished the most, was of course motivated by his own futile 
attempts to integrate quantum theory in some way or other into classical physics. “It is 
the first time that the quantum of action which hitherto has strongly demurred all 
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attempts to be comprehended from the standpoint of continuum physics, has been 
captured into a differential equation.” (Ibid., p. 60) Indeed, when measured against 
Schrödinger’s (1914) own program to corroborate the atomistic hypothesis by 
investigating conflicting scenarios following from differential equations and difference 
equations, Boltzmann’s mathematical atomism had – quite ironically – failed in its 
proper domain, the physics of atoms. Quantum jumps, the irreducible discontinuity in 
microphysics, could thus be circumvented. Of course, Planck was aware of the 
interpretational problems and he even commended Schrödinger for honestly 
mentioning all the difficulties of his approach.  
 
Summing up, one must say that the new wave mechanics is just at the beginning of its development. In 
particular the physical nature of the wave function is still in great need of clarification. That this 
quantity cannot be intuitive [anschaulich] in the usual sense but only possesses an indirect, symbolic 
meaning is certain if only because matter waves do not occur in physical space but in the so-called 
configuration space. (Planck, 1928, p. 61) 
 
Planck, reasonably, remained skeptical about interpreting the wave function by way of 
the electrical charge density. To be sure, Schrödinger would not have admitted that the 
wave functions were unintuitive just because they were living in configuration space.  
 Schrödinger did not quite accept Planck’s reading according to which he 
brought quantum physics back to the well-entrenched domain of classical physics. 
Rather than emphasizing the continuity with classical mechanics, his 1929 
inauguration as a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences continued the dialogue 
between Exner and Planck. Starting his short speech with the reminiscences of Vienna 
quoted in Section 6.1., Schrödinger asserted that the goal of theoretical physics was to 
subsume the manifold of phenomena under a few simple laws. Classical mechanics, 
which had once ideally fulfilled this goal, now only represented a first approximation.  
 
One of the most burning questions is … whether together with classical mechanics also its method 
must be abandoned, the maxim that fixed laws together with random initial conditions uniquely 
determine the happenings in each individual case. It is the question about the purposivity 
[Zweckmäßigkeit] of the unswerving postulate of causality. It is true, in practice we had had to forgo 
causality already within the classical mechanical explanation of nature. (Schrödinger, 1929a, p. 732) 
 
And Schrödinger recalled the inaugural address of his beloved teacher Hasenöhrl “who 
laid the foundation of my scientific personality.” (Ibid., p. 732) The example was due 
to Boltzmann and we have already (See Sect. 4.4.) encountered it in Exner’s Lectures. 
 
It would not contradict the laws of nature, Hasenöhrl explained to us, if this piece of wood should lift 
itself into the air without any ostensible cause. According to the mechanical explanation of nature such 
a miracle, being a reversion of the opposite process, would not be impossible but only extremely 
improbable. – Yet the probabilistic conception of the laws of nature, which Hasenöhrl had in his mind 
when using these words, by itself does not really contradict the causal postulate. Uncertainty in this 
case arises only from the practical impossibility of determining the initial state of a body composed of 
billions of atoms. Today, however, the doubt as to whether the processes of nature are uniquely 
determined is of quite a different character. The difficulty of ascertaining the initial state is supposed 
to be not one of practice but of principle. (Ibid., p. 732/xvi) 
 
Compare this distinction between “in practice” and “in principle” with Schrödinger’s 
(1922a) insistence that Brownian motion and radioactivity stood on a par as empirical 
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demonstrations of the indeterministic character of a certain domain of phenomena. 
Instead of a few decades it had taken no more than a few years until the “Exnerian 
picture of nature” won favor – though in a way that broke the continuity with 
Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of gases and did no longer depend upon the universality of 
the second law of thermodynamics. 
 
Franz Exner (to whom I am personally indebted for his unusually great encouragement) was the first 
to mention the possibility and the advantages of an acausal conception of nature. … But I do not 
believe that in this form [this fundamental question] will ever be answered. In my opinion this 
question does not involve a decision as to what the real constitution of nature is, but rather as to 
whether the one or the other predisposition of mind be the more purposive and convenient one with 
which to approach nature. Henri Poincaré has illustrated that we are free to apply Euclidean or any 
kind of non-Euclidean geometry we like to real space, without having to fear the contradiction of facts. 
But the physical laws we discover are a function of the geometry which we apply, and it may be that 
the one geometry entails complicated laws, the other much simpler ones. In that case the former 
geometry is inconvenient, the latter is convenient, but the words “right” or “wrong” are unsuitable. 
The same probably applies to the postulate of rigid causality. One can hardly imagine empirical facts 
which ultimately decide on whether the natural phenomena are in reality absolutely determined or 
partially indetermined, but at best on whether the one or the other conception permits a simpler survey 
of what is observed. Even this question will probably take a long time to decide; for the question of 
world geometry has been rendered the more doubtful by Poincaré’s having made us aware of the fact 
that we have the liberty of choice. (p. 732/xvii f.)  
 
Schrödinger’s (1924) optimism that a decision in favor of indeterminism was just a 
matter of decades has faded away although the Exnerian picture of nature had been 
established so rapidly. Admittedly, also Exner had remained open with respect to the 
alternative between determinism and indeterminism although he had preferred the 
former in virtue of manifold supportive evidence and because of its more unified 
character. Methodological purity was, of course, a pragmatic motive that could be 
subsumed under the heading “simplicity” as his application of Occam’s razor in 1922. 
But Schrödinger’s own works, particularly his proof of the equivalence between wave 
mechanics and matrix mechanics, substantially changed the nature of the alternative. 
There was, on the one hand, a beautifully deterministic differential equation the 
application or interpretation of which permitted only statistical predictions. There was, 
on the other hand, an abstract and openly indeterministic theory which nonetheless 
integrated the whole conceptual apparatus of classical mechanics in a quantized form. 
So ultimately, determinism and indeterminism were intermingled. What Schrödinger 
established with his equivalence proof corresponded to the systematic classification of 
all possible geometries achieved at the end of the 19th century which had constituted 
the basis of Poincaré’s conventionalism. In contrast to a Machian view which took all 
theoretical descriptions just a mere economizations, conventionalist choice required a 
precise formal characterization of the alternatives. This might be the reason why 
Schrödinger mentioned the conventionalist thesis only in 1929 although there exists an 
approving passage in notes written in 1918 and titled “Kausalität”. “There he quoted 
Poincaré’s statement about principles: ‘They are neither true nor wrong, they are 
expedient [commodes]’ and he commented: ‘This is certainly entirely true of the 
causality principle.” (Darrigol, 1992, p. 264) It is quite interesting that Schrödinger 
thus arrived at a conventionalist position from considering the issue of causality as of 
an empirical nature. But this did not contradict the fact that on other occasions (See 
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Sect. 6.3.6. and 7.4.) he would stress that indeterminism was more likely or more 
probable. 
 In his response, Planck tried to drag the wavering Schrödinger onto the grounds 
of strict causality. Associating the possible dismissal of causality with “the present 
crisis of theoretical physics”, Planck praised Schrödinger’s “benevolent neutrality” and 
intended “to break a lance for a strictly causal physics even at the risk of appearing as 
a narrow-minded reactionary.” (Planck, 1929, p. 732) Planck admitted that the 
question of causality was ultimately an issue of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit] 
because any physical theory represented just a skeleton [Gerüst] devised in order to 
obtain a picture of nature as faithful as possible. But he was far cry off from 
interpreting purposiveness in a conventionalist fashion. 
 
[T]he skeleton by all means needs a solid foundation if it is not to stand in the air; and if the postulate 
of rigid causality were no longer as before a suitable foundation then first of all the counterquestion 
suggests itself as to what foundation should then be introduced for the “acausal” physics. For no 
physical theory can be developed without any presupposition, unless one wants to pass off the mere 
registration of single observational facts as a theory. (Ibid., p. 733) 
 
This transcendental skeleton was the principle of causality, at least until there was 
“any compelling reason that causal physics does not suffice to do justice to the 
empirical facts.” (Ibid., p. 733) Since the days when he had subscribed to Boltzmann’s 
statistical mechanics, Planck read this theory in a way consistent with the principle of 
causality and a universal determinism at the deepest level of reality. This also 
motivated his interpretation of Hasenöhrl’s example. 
 
From the standpoint of classical physics [this strange behavior] is not only not impossible, but within a 
sufficiently long period it has to be expected with a certain probability, and precisely the quantitative 
confirmation of such fluctuations by experiment, in my view, represents an excellent support in favor 
of the postulate of strict causality by means of which it has after all been derived. (Ibid., p. 733) 
 
Certainly, no Vienna Indeterminist would have denied that this inference from a 
deterministic microdynamics was possible but, as Schrödinger had argued in 1922, it 
was by no means necessary. Thus, Planck’s argument did not represent a confirmation 
of the principle of causality but merely showed that strict microcausality was 
consistent with the statistical macrodynamics. The really decisive evidences for 
Vienna Indeterminism had been the microscopic fluctuations observable in Brownian 
motion and the universal nature of the second law of thermodynamics.  
 It is interesting that by 1929 Planck had not only made his peace with the 
occurrence of strange events, such as Hasenöhrl’s piece of wood, but in a complete 
turnabout accounted them to the principle of causality. Until 1914 he had insisted that 
their extremely low probability be turned into impossibility by the introduction of the 
principle of elementary disorder (Sect. 3.7 & 4.5) This principle represented a lawlike 
condition on the admissible initial states of a system. And again in 1929 Planck 
adopted a similar strategy to rescue the principle of causality in the field of quantum 
mechanics. It consisted in modifying the concept of initial state as inherited from 
classical mechanics. 
 
[T]here is indeed one aspect in physics as hitherto which needs revision, and it is presumably this 
aspect which has caused all doubts about the reliability of the law of causality. We must henceforth 
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drop the presupposition implicitly made to date, that we are able to experimentally realize those 
conditions that causally determine a process to an in principle infinite degree of precision. This 
presupposition is irreconcilable with the laws of quantum mechanics. … Accordingly, also in the 
physics of the future it will be important to keep apart in point of principle the question of the 
conditions which uniquely and causally determine the course of a natural process from the further 
question whether and to what extent these conditions can be experimentally realized. (Planck, 1929, p. 
733) 
 
For the empiricist however this distinction was an artificial one and only motivated by 
an a priori preference for the principle of causality. As long as the empiricist remained 
in principle open to a future causal theory – although he deemed it unlikely – rejecting 
Planck did not require an empiricist criterion of meaning in the strict sense.  
 Planck ended with what he took as the strongest argument in favor of a causal 
quantum theory. It was Schrödinger’s own wave mechanics within which atomic 
processes remained deterministic “yet under the assumption that one considers matter 
waves as their elements instead of motions of mass points.” (Ibid., p. 733) Of course, 
Planck was aware that the physical meaning of these matter waves was still open. The 
shift from mass points to matter waves – even if it did not do the job – was significant 
in a philosophical perspective. When changing the basic ontology to maintain strict 
causality and admitting that at least in principle the law of causality could be falsified, 
Planck implicitly accepted the core tenet of Vienna Indeterminism, the intimate 
relation of causality and ontology.  
 
6.3.6. Indeterminism circa 1930 
 
In 1932, Schrödinger assembled two lectures into a small booklet which was dedicated 
to the memory of Franz Exner. The Viennese heritage was most obvious for the first 
lecture “On Indeterminism in Physics” which had been delivered to the “Society for 
Philosophical Education” on 16 June, 1931. Without entering into a debate with his 
philosophical audience whether physicists’ most recent discussions about causality 
actually corresponded to certain lines of the philosophical tradition, Schrödinger 
considered it as the main question whether “it is possible to precisely predict, at least 
theoretically, the future behavior for any given physical system if one knows its 
constitution and its state at one instant of time?” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 1/53) 
Schrödinger here for the first time provided an explicit philosophical definition of 
causality. Before he had followed the tradition of Exner closely associating causality 
with the determinism peculiar to classical mechanics and electrodynamics. In his 
unpublished letter to Reichenbach, Schrödinger had stated quite generally that we are 
expecting identical outcomes under identical circumstances. As we shall see in Sect. 
7.3., Schrödinger’s definition was identical to Schlick’s (1931) new theory of causality 
published a couple of months before. Schrödinger’s speech was remarkable in a 
second respect. Although he had always made clear his adherence to the Boltzmannian 
tradition of considering theories as pictures, the word “picture” never had occurred so 
frequently in his earlier writings.  
 While 1½ decades ago, so Schrödinger argued, nobody doubted the dogma of 
determinism, now many physicists believed that the repeated failures to understand the 
experimental results of the preceding 3 decades by means of deterministic pictures had 
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lead to a dismissal of determinism in the sense of classical mechanics. To his mind, 
such a repeated failure could not be decisive all by itself. Although the conventionalist 
thesis of the 1929 inaugural address had again disappeared, Schrödinger remained 
open to the possibility of a causal quantum theory. 
 
It will be difficult to ever prove that no determined [bestimmtes] picture can be found which equally 
does justice to the facts. But what makes this modern attempts to abandon determinism nonetheless 
very interesting is that their declarations of a lack of determination are not at all vague and 
undetermined, but entirely precise, quantitative, expressible in cm, g, sec. (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 
3/55) 
 
And he tried to give an intuitive explanation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation 
according to which it is impossible to jointly know the initial position and velocity of a 
mass point more precisely than a certain limit given by a universal constant of nature, 
Planck’s constant. The idea to imagine, at least in principle, that observations could be 
made arbitrarily precise, had to be abandoned. According to Schrödinger, this was the 
most intuitive among all the statements of indeterminacy. “A comprehensive and 
definitive judgment about these matters does not at all exist at the present moment.” 
(Ibid., p. 7/59) Thus Schrödinger just added three “in part loosely connected” (Ibid., p. 
6/59) remarks in which he nonetheless defended quite specific theses.  
 Surprisingly, the first of them harked back to Boltzmann’s mathematical 
atomism. If we understand lack of determinacy as the fact that identical initial 
conditions only lead to an identical outcome statistics, the same holds true already in 
classical mechanics. “If one generally claims the opposite, this rests upon a knack 
[Kunstgriff] which we have got accustomed to for a long time, so that we regard it as 
self-evident.” (Ibid., p. 7/60) As mechanical motions are determined by the 
accelerations, we got used to count the initial velocity among the initial conditions. 
But this is, strictly speaking, not correct because the definition of velocity by means of 
a differential quotient involves two moments in time of which one imagines that they 
can be made coincide in the limit.  
 
[P]erhaps this mathematical limit … is inadmissible. Perhaps the thought machinery [Denkapparat] 
invented by Newton is not sufficiently adapted to nature. The modern claim, that for sharply defined 
position in space the concept of velocity becomes meaningless points strongly in that direction. (Ibid., 
p. 9/62) 
 
Notice that this was said by the single scientist who, as Planck emphasized, had re-
integrated atomic physics into the physics of differential equations. But rather than 
succumbing whole-heartedly to the Göttingen-Copenhagen quantum jumps, 
Schrödinger precisely rehearsed his 1914 concern (and Boltzmann’s teaching) that the 
issue between determinism and indeterminism had to be decided by the more adequate 
mathematical description. Moreover, the “knack” and the “thought machinery” were 
nothing but Boltzmannian “habits of thought” which – as the principle of causality 
itself – had an inherent tendency to be applied also within new domains to which they 
were badly adapted. With all this historical baggage, Schrödinger was too modest 
when calling his first remark merely a benefit from hindsight. In particular because the 
same argument was turned against the Copenhagen extension of classical ontology, as 
we shall see in the third remark below. 
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 Also the second remark pointed back at the days of Boltzmann. For more than 
half a century we know, Schrödinger declared, that a large number of natural laws are 
statistical. Since all those laws which refer to irreversible phenomena are necessarily 
statistical, they represent “the overwhelming majority because the course of nature is 
essentially irreversible, one-sided.” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 11/64) “[S]trictly speaking 
all [laws are statistical] except for gravitation and perhaps (?) also this.” (Ibid., p. 
12/66) 
 
All the “predictions” derived from these laws … only apply with very small deviations or errors that 
can be estimated with complete accuracy. Is this not strikingly similar to what I have talked about at 
the beginning? Why did one make so – relatively – little ado about this? Why did nobody say already 
40 or 50 years ago that modern physics (modern as it was then) was compelled to abandon causality or 
determination, etc., why just 5 or 6 years ago? 
 Well this much is clear. Then the abandonment of determinacy was merely of a practical kind, 
today one assumes that it is theoretical. … Thus one continued to imagine a strictly causally 
determined happening in the realm of the single atoms and molecules, so to speak, as background or 
basis of the statistical mass laws only which, in actual fact, are accessible to experience. (Ibid., p. 
12f./66-68) 
 
This set the stage for the Planck-Exner debate which Schrödinger recapitulated 
without mentioning Exner’s erstwhile combatant. But the opponent depicted in the 
following passage clearly was the Planck of 1914 who had rejected examples such as 
Hasenöhrl’s because they did not occur in “our given nature”. 
 
Most physicists considered a strictly deterministic foundation of the physical world as indispensable. 
They believed that it was impossible to think otherwise … It was said, and sometimes it is said still 
today, that an exact science of nature would be entirely impossible on any other basis, that everything 
would get into flux, that without a strictly deterministic background our picture of nature would 
degenerate into a complete chaos and thus would not fit to our given nature because nature is in fact 
not completely chaotic. This is certainly not correct. (Ibid., p. 14/68) 
 
Without contradicting our experience – so Schrödinger rehearsed the argument of his 
Zurich speech (1922a) – the deterministic laws of impact assumed at the molecular 
level could simply be replaced by an appropriate game of chance determining the 
further path of a molecule as long as the relevant conservation laws, e.g., for linear 
momentum, remained valid on average. The only new element in Schrödinger’s as 
compared to 1922 reasoning was that the theorem of energy conservation was strictly 
valid for the single molecules rather than being treated as the most likely candidate to 
follow the second law of thermodynamics into the domain of merely statistical 
regularities. Energy conservation for the single processes had been established by the 
experiments of Bothe and Geiger, and also the new quantum mechanics assumed it 
strictly. “But these laws of balance [Bilanzgesetze] do not uniquely determine the 
outcome of the impact. Beyond this ‘primary’ chance could rule.” (Schrödinger, 
1932a, p. 14f./69) And Schrödinger returned to the days of Exner. 
 
Back then it was simply a question of taste, or … a question of philosophical prejudice, whether one 
decided in favor of determinism or indeterminism. The age-old habit (or perhaps an ‘a priori’) spoke 
for determinism. In favor of indeterminism one could advance that this habit was evidently based upon 
the factually lawful course of nature which we observe in our surroundings. Once recognized that 
almost all these regularities – and perhaps really all – are of a statistical character, then they no longer 
provide a rational argument for the retention of determinism. (Ibid., p. 15/70)  
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There was enough – but not rigorously compelling – reason to doubt determinism even 
before Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. And Schrödinger recalled that his Zurich 
inaugural address had caused a general shaking of heads – enough reason, so it seems, 
to withhold its publication until 1929. 
 In his third remark, Schrödinger criticized the ontology of the Göttingen-
Copenhagen picture by claiming “that the concepts ‘position’, ‘trajectory’ [Bahn, 
Bahnkurve] are exaggerated when applied to such small [atomic] spatial and temporal 
dimensions” (Ibid., p. 22/77) – they ‘overshoot the mark’, Boltzmann would have said. 
Schrödinger’s starting point was “that the thing about which quantum mechanics 
speaks [in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation] is no longer a ‘material point’ in the 
old sense of the word.” (Ibid., p. 16/71) For such a point is situated at a precise 
position independently of whether this is measured or not. And a trajectory is 
constituted by a material point having a precise position at each time.  
 
To speak of electrons and protons as material points but to deny nevertheless that they have definite 
trajectories seems to be contradictory and rather crazy. Again it should not be denied or passed over in 
tactful silence, as it is done in certain quarters, that in this way [when applying it to atomic 
dimensions] the concept material point undergoes a substantial, yet still poorly understood change. But 
from atomistics one can quite well understand, or at least conjecture, that the concept of trajectory is 
lost at very small dimensions. (Ibid., p 17/72) 
 
At this point Schrödinger turned Boltzmann’s atomism against the Göttingen-
Copenhagen picture according to which material particles are the basis of quantum 
mechanical ontology without having well-defined trajectories. If we depart from how 
we actually observe natural phenomena, it seems to be clear that “[e]very quantitative, 
measuring observation is discontinuous by its very nature” (Ibid., p. 17/72) because it 
ultimately represents nature’s answer to a finite number of yes-no question. We 
complete this finite raw material by interpolation and in this way arrive at a continuous 
trajectory, which in itself is not directly observable. This procedure, however, is 
admissible only if all such measurements could in principle be performed by really 
existing apparatus. To be sure, “we continuously have to complete what is directly 
observed; otherwise there would be no picture of nature but only an inextricable 
patchwork of individual findings [Einzelfeststellungen].” (Ibid., p. 21/76f.) By 
inferring from a finite set of observations to a continuum in this way, we run the risk to 
erroneously complete our factual observations and “mess up our picture of nature” 
(Ibid., p. 21/77) by employing a concept, such as ‘trajectory’, outside its domain of 
validity.  
Already Boltzmann had criticized the concept of a continuous trajectory within 
Newtonian mechanics as a source of contradictions. (See Sect. 3.4.) In this 
perspective, Schrödinger argued that even after having discovered a new suitable 
atomic theory – which could resolve the problem of Vega in the classical limit – the 
inference to the continuum remained problematic in point of principle. Moreover, 
Bitbol cites a letter to Margenau of 12 April, 1955, in which Schrödinger himself 
established the historical link with Boltzmann. “The discontinuity removes the 
univocal identification. Would you believe it, that Boltzmann, in his Principe der 
Mechanik, right in the beginning, underlines this point in what he calls Erstes 
kinematisches Grundgesetz. This was a few years before Planck’s great discovery.” 
 240
(Bitbol, 1996, p. 96) Here is what Boltzmann introduced as the first basic assumption, 
not as a ‘law’ as Schrödinger wrote. 
 
Let us now further develop our picture [of the motion of material bodies] by assuming certain 
fictitious laws for the way these material points change place with time. First assumption: we imagine 
that no two different material points coincide or are infinitely near to each other at any time, but that 
whenever at any time any material point is at any position … then also one and only one material point 
will be at an infinitely near position at any infinitely near time. We say the second material point is the 
same as the first and call this the law of continuity of motion. It alone enables us to recognize the same 
material point at different times. The concept [Inbegriff] of all places at which one and the same 
material point, and the concept of these positions that it traverses in a finite time is called the path 
during this time. We may alternatively formulate the law of continuity as such: to every material point 
which at a given time had certain coordinates, there corresponds at an infinitely near time one and only 
one material point with coordinates differing from the former by infinitely little, and this is called the 
same material point; that is, the coordinates of every material point are continuous functions of time. 
(Boltzmann, 1897, p. 9/230f.) 
 
Bitbol considers completion in thought by virtual elements as a core feature of 
Schrödinger’s ontology (See Sect. 6.2). And indeed Schrödinger did not limit this 
argument to the concept of trajectory, but asserted quite generally that some of the 
unavoidable completions “concern what is in principle unobservable,” (Schrödinger, 
1932a, p. 21/77) for example, the simultaneous existence of both facades of the 
Brandenburg gate. Yet all this could easily be easily reconciled with Mach’s account 
how knowledge of facts is gained and how errors are simultaneously produced by way 
of our mutual completion of different actual and non-actual sensations.  
 Most part of the third remark of 1931 can already be found in a lecture on “The 
Change of the Physical Concept of the World” which Schrödinger had delivered at 
Munich in May 1930, but which remained unpublished until 1962. Interestingly, 
Schrödinger then spoke of “a series of single statements [Konstatierungen]” 
(Schrödinger, 1930, p. 602) instead of “findings” [Feststellungen]. This had been 
Schlick’s terminology, e.g., in (Schlick, 1920, p. 464).  
 He continued the remark about our acquired habit of interpolation and the origin 
of continuous trajectories with a criticism of the Göttingen-Copenhagen quantum 
jumps. 
 
Many interpret the failure of the deterministic picture of nature in such a way that in the course of 
nature there is in actual fact something discontinuous, jumpy, that instead of the old sentence: natura 
non facit saltum the direct opposite were true: natura facit nil nisi saltus … – But one should really be 
very careful with this interpretation. (Ibid., p. 606) 
 
The reason for such caution was, of course, the discontinuous nature of our 
observations. But Schrödinger gave his argument a twist that would be absent in the 
following year. It led back to Boltzmann’s constructivist atomism.  
 
Due to a certain finite, limited constitution of our mind [Geist], we are totally incapable to pose nature 
a question which admits a continuous sequence of answers. The observations, the single measurement 
results, are nature’s answer to our discontinuous questions. Thus they concern perhaps in a most 
essential way not the object alone, but rather the interrelation between subject and object. For the 
philosopher this is a truism, but perhaps it now attains again an increased significance. (Ibid., p. 607) 
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More specifically, both electromagnetic waves and matter waves do not represent an 
objective description of reality, the do not describe “nature in itself, but the knowledge 
we possess of her through our observations actually performed.” (Ibid., p. 607) As 
these observations disturb one another in virtue of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation, 
we can only reach statistical predictions about future observations. We have to 
renounce the goal of an objective description of nature, even as an asymptotic ideal in 
the sense of Planck. To many, Schrödinger admitted, this seems to be “a painful 
reduction of their claims to truth and clarity. … But is this relation [between subject 
and object] not at bottom the only true reality which we know of? Does it not suffice 
when it finds a fixed, clear and completely unambiguous expression, for which indeed 
there is all hope!” (Ibid., p. 608) 
 In these passages, Schrödinger considered the picture of nature as provided by 
quantum mechanics as more coherent than ever before. In all other papers investigated 
so far, he avoided the Copenhagen talk about subject and object. Large part of what he 
said in the city of Sommerfeld, the teacher of Heisenberg and Pauli, might thus be read 
as a conversion. But it need not. Taking the relationship of subject and object as the 
ontological basis of science could also be seen as an instantiation of Mach’s neutral 
monism, though with some terminological concessions to his Copenhagen-oriented 
audience; a staunch Machian would have avoided the metaphysical terms ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ altogether. Schrödinger in particular did not defend Heisenberg’s anti-
Machian version of positivism that involved a conscious subject endowed with 
spontaneity and a prior restriction to observable entities.  
 According to Bitbol, the Munich speech documented that “in the process of 
ontological deconstruction … [Schrödinger] had landed on the surface of the bare 
subject-object relatedness.” (Bitbol, 1996, p. 80) This surface was the dwelling of the 
Machian elements. But what about the Boltzmannian pictures? “The pictures have not 
been lost as such, according to Schrödinger, but our conception of what they represent, 
has changed.” (Ibid., p. 79) The wave functions only describe our knowledge and 
“permit us to predict the results of future observations … with precisely that degree of 
uncertainty and mere probability prejudged by the observations actually performed at 
the respective object.” (Ibid., p. 607f.) And Schrödinger even assented to Heisenberg’s 
idea of disturbance. Yet where is this knowledge dwelling? Not in the subject itself – 
there was no mind to reduce wave packets – but only in the interrelation between 
subject and object. This was as close as Schrödinger could get from Mach to 
Copenhagen. But accepting the Copenhagen reading of his wave function became 
primarily an incitement to search for a better Bild-ontology, in particular, since the 
criticism against the very concept of trajectory figuring in the Copenhagen 
interpretation was another centerpiece of the same paper.  
 In an earlier talk, “Conceptual Models in Physics and Their Philosophical 
Value”, delivered in December 1928, we can diagnose already a sort of therapeutic 
assent to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. 
 
This idea, which originated with Heisenberg, is satisfactory in a way, since it consoles us for the failed 
attempts we had made to attribute the predicate of real existence [Wirklichkeitswert] to our specific 
pictures by means of virtual (if not actual) observations. … On the other hand, however, Heisenberg’s 
idea is profoundly disconcerting. It makes it exceedingly difficult to use all the terms and concepts we 
have employed hitherto. … The position and velocity of a particle cannot both be accurately indicated 
simultaneously. Thus, since the particle now becomes a thing which does not describe a definite path, 
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the question as to which path it describes becomes illusory in the usual sense. … The new idea 
obviously prohibits the formation of pictures or models which unambiguously and continuously fill 
the continuum of space-time in all details and without gaps. Maybe the world that can be observed … 
is no continuum at all. Of course, when faced with the question of how to represent it otherwise, we 
are still confronted by an insoluble conundrum. I do believe that we cannot be satisfied in the long run 
with the answer I once received from the young genius Dirac. Beware of forming models or pictures at 
all! (Schrödinger, 1929e, p. 292/159f.) 
 
For a while this passage reads like a complete surrender on Schrödinger’s part. But the 
quest for pictures survived Schrödinger’s partial assent to the semantic aspects of the 
Copenhagen interpretation. And further down in the text we see him turning the tables. 
He accepted his opponents’ conviction that one has to find a suitable meaning 
criterion, but tried to frame it in another way. This is an example in favor of Beller’s 
view that certain tools from the positivist’s tool kit proved extremely versatile. 
 
One may either believe (1) that matter has really a wave structure. Then the uncertainty principle is an 
immediate consequence. Or (2) one may think that the uncertainty principle is fundamental. The wave 
picture then is simply an auxiliary idea [Denkbehelf] for the convenience of grasping and representing 
the principle. (Ibid., p. 293/161f.) 
 
No doubt, Schrödinger opted for (1). Yet he firmly believed that the elimination of 
those principal gaps in our physical world picture which resulted from Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty relations “ought to be possible without leading to the consequence, that no 
visualizable [anschaulich] scheme of the physical universe whatever will prove 
feasible. …[To this end] it will be necessary to acquire a definite sense of what is 
irrelevant in our new models and schemes, before we can trust to their guidance with 
more equanimity and confidence.” (Ibid., p. 294/165)  
 Thus in contrast to a metaphysical realist, Schrödinger was at bottom 
advocating a rigorous mathematical introduction of the basic concepts of quantum 
theory in order to suit intuitive clarity. There was little difference between him and 
von Neumann, who laid the mathematical foundations of matrix quantum mechanics, 
that axiomatization involved explicit limits for the meaning of the basic concepts. Yet 
any finality claim about a theory so construed is precisely as strong as the conceptual 
framework itself. And here Schrödinger still believed that physicists had not reached a 
satisfactory framework. To be sure, I do not intend to drag Schrödinger on the grounds 
of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks. He accepted neither of Logical Empiricists’ 
dogmas. Yet in contrast to the Göttingen-Copenhagen group who had a prior 
commitment to particle concepts as an alleged bridge to macroscopic physical reality, 
Schrödinger could more freely adopt any kind of ontology, any conceptual framework, 
as long as it was empirically adequate and corresponded to his quest for pictures. No 
wonder that he reminded his audience: “We must not forget that ultimately pictures 
and models serve no other purpose than to hang all observations on them which are 
possible in principle.” (Ibid., p. 294/164)  
 Pictures and models are thus nothing but a scaffolding for observations actually 
made and virtual observations. In this Machian context it is no surprise that 
Schrödinger’s criticism of matrix mechanics dressed up in a historico-critical fashion. 
To discuss the real existence of electron orbits had little sense because quantum 
physicists were  
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convinced that the effect through which the orbiting electron would manifest itself, in case it existed, 
is certainly not observed. Despite the immeasurable progress which we owe to Bohr’s [older quantum] 
theory, I consider it very regrettable that the long and successful handling of its models has blunted 
our epistemological delicacy concerning such questions. We must not hesitate to sharpen it again, lest 
we may be too rash to content ourselves with the new theories which today have supplanted Bohr’s, 
and believe that have reached the goal which indeed is still far away. (Ibid., p. 290/155) 
 
 
6.3.7 Science and the Milieu 
 
The second paper in Schrödinger’s 1932 booklet bears the title “Is Science Determined 
by the Milieu?”. It appears to aim right at the heart of the Forman thesis, and indeed 
Forman (1971, p. 57) read it as an assent to the Spenglerian idea of an intimate relation 
of science and Lebensgefühl. But as we shall see in the present section, the intellectual 
roots of Schrödinger’s speech did not point to post-war Weimar but to pre-war Vienna.  
 It is true, Schrödinger openly declared that “we are all members of our cultural 
milieu.” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 38) Yet he did not doubt the truth of experimentally 
corroborated scientific facts. Rather was there, on his account, a subjective element in 
scientists’ selection of topics and in the attention they devote to certain findings. 
 
Once for some thing the direction of our interest matters at all, then the milieu, the cultural sphere, the 
zeitgeist, or however one wants to call it, must exert its influence. On all fields of culture one will find 
common traits in world view, and even more frequently, common stylistic traits in politics, arts, 
science. If one succeeds in exhibiting them also in exact science, then one has produced a kind of 
circumstantial evidence for subjectivity and milieu dependence [Milieubedingtheit]. (Ibid., p. 38)138 
 
Such was the program of Schrödinger’s paper that expanded an address held in front of 
the Prussian Academy of Science. In more than one respect Schrödinger returned to 
Exner’s conception of a general theory of culture in which a culture was associated 
with the ideas it contributed to the evolution of mankind. Science, on that account, was 
part and parcel of cultural evolution, but because of the objectivity of its results as 
compared to the subjectivity of what we choose to investigate, Spengler’s radical 
cyclism and the incommensurability of different cultures could not thrive. Some 
passages of Schrödinger’s text sounded close to cultural morphology – as did a larger 
part of Exner’s From Chaos to the Present.  
 As did Exner’s Inaugural Address, Schrödinger began with the relation of 
Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften. No doubt, “[r]egardless of all 
scientific faithfulness and allegiance to truth, there exists a notable artistic and 
accordingly subjective touch” in the humanities. Within the exact sciences one 
everywhere hears, in contrast, the maxim to “do away with all kinds of 
‘anthropomorphisms’.” (both ibid., p. 26) This was, of course, what Planck considered 
as the pivot of modern physical science. But Schrödinger expressed his misgivings 
about Planck’s quest for the absolute. “This claim to and this longing for absoluteness 
are partly justified, but partly they go too far.” Of course, “perfect reproducibility of 
experiment is the primary condition that we call something a scientific result.” (both 
                                                          
138 The English translation was “freely rendered by Dr. James Murphy” (p. 81), even more freely than in other 
cases. For this reason I have translated this paper myself and omitted references to Science, Theory and Man. 
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ibid., p. 26) And there is no source of scientific knowledge other than experiment. But 
the number of experiments actually made is negligibly small compared to all possible 
experiments. Thus at each stage of scientific research “it is necessary anew to select 
those experiments which we consider as interesting, important, informative.” (Ibid., p. 
27) Of course, our choice will be motivated by earlier experiments; yet, firstly, not by 
them alone,  
 
but mainly by the thoughts we have formed about them. Secondly, the selection of the preceding 
experiments was in turn determined by the results of even earlier ones and the thoughts linked to them. 
And thus forth, until this pedigree of planned experimentation arrives at the first conscious 
observations of nature by primitive man, which were not yet brought about by any specific 
organization, but determined by the biological situation, by the construction of the soma and its 
interaction with environment. (Ibid., p. 28) 
 
One can hardly imagine a more faithful brief of Mach’s epistemology. Not only that 
modern science ultimately rooted in the primeval experiences of mankind, Schrödinger 
also depicted the development of science as an interaction of (experimental) facts and 
thoughts – as did Mach in his famous slogan. Schrödinger rejected an objectivist, or 
determinist, reduction of our subjective interests to the “force of the facts” (Ibid., p. 
28), an idea which was advocated, for instance, by Duhem (1908, Ch. 11). “The entire 
history of science speaks against this. Often a single thought all of a sudden stirs up 
the interest for investigations which seemed uninteresting and irrelevant before.” 
(Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 28f.) It was Nernst’s heat theorem which created the interest in 
heat capacities. On the other hand, Grimaldi’s important discoveries were neglected 
because Newton’s emission theory drove out Huygens’ undulatory theory. Mach’s 
study about the history of optics showed “how little the development of science 
corresponds to a logical and systematic course.” (Ibid., p. 32 citing Mach, 1921, p. 
204) Thus, Mach’s psychology of knowledge must supplement the descriptivist maxim 
of Kirchhoff. Not the facts by themselves count, but the thoughts we form about these 
facts. Science accordingly does not deal with something objectively given. Yet even if 
we assumed that there exists a definite object for scientific research, such that the 
subjective order of investigation were irrelevant, investigators could err systematically 
as if one just picked the even numbers out of all natural numbers. By this re-turn to 
Mach, Schrödinger’s thesis about the difference between corroborated facts and 
interest-influenced thoughts became more basic than the distinction between facts and 
theories by means of which Exner had criticized Spengler (See Sect. 4.4.). 
 After these general arguments, Schrödinger provided three historical examples 
of how the general milieu of a certain epoch looked like. The first was Greek antiquity.  
 
The clear, transparent, and rigid edifice of Euclidean geometry corresponds to the plain, simple and 
limited forms of the Greek temple. The whole temple is small, near at hand, completely surveyable … 
So, too, Greek science could not really access the infinite. … Greek drama, especially that of earlier 
epochs, is absolutely static. … So also in Greek physics there exists no dynamics [in the sense of 
Newton]. (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 39) 
 
The second example could be seen as an Exnerian elaboration of Boltzmann’s 
conviction that the 19th century was “the century of Darwin” (Boltzmann, 1905, p. 
28/15) rather than the steam engine. “There has hardly ever been a single idea which 
exerted a more dominant influence on all fields of life and the sciences than evolution, 
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in its general form as well as in the special form given to it by Charles Darwin.” 
(Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 40) “Ernst Mach has applied it to the scientific process itself. 
… In astrophysics we have learned to consider the various types of stars merely as 
different stages in one and the same stellar evolution.” (Ibid., p. 41) 
 Thirdly, within contemporary physics Schrödinger spots five not mutually 
distinct trends caused by the milieu: Reine Sachlichkeit; the desire for revolution 
[Umsturz] and a preference for freedom and lawlessness; the ideas of relativity and 
invariance; the methods of mass control; statistics. Let me go through them in more 
detail. 
 First, within our present material culture “houses, furniture and all our domestic 
accessories are produced exclusively with regard to their designated use, their 
purposiveness [Zweckdienlichkeit];” (Ibid., p. 43) ornamentation and useless 
decoration are banished. The same tendency prevails within our physical world view. 
Scientists focus on the observed facts and exclude all arbitrary hypotheses, in 
particular everything that cannot be observed in principle. For example, in the kinetic 
theory of gases the specifications made for the single molecules have been constantly 
reduced in the course of time: from microscopic billiard balls to systems only obeying 
the laws of classical mechanics, and finally to the even more modest assumption of the 
conservation of energy and momentum as statistical average laws. In a footnote 
Schrödinger explicitly distinguished these statistical laws from “the tendency of 
modern quantum mechanics to deny exact regularity altogether.” (Ibid., p. 45 fn. 1) 
Schrödinger’s second example concerned the problem of quantum jumps which 
emerged in the older quantum theory. And he rehearsed the standard Copenhagen 
argument that the precise energy of an electron at a certain instant of time made sense 
only when it is measured, which however disturbs the system. Accordingly, “certain 
concepts are simply removed and their places left empty in contrast to the desire of 
completion that once prevailed.” (Ibid., p. 48) Have Reine (or Neue) Sachlichkeit and 
positivist meaning criteria jointly overcome the horror vacui? Certainly, there was an 
alliance between the modernist movements in the arts and in science, for instance, 
between the Bauhaus and the Vienna Circle. The interesting point of Schrödinger’s 
testimony is that, in stark contrast to Forman (1971), he did not present this modernist 
tendencies as a fringe phenomenon but as the outcome of a history that reached back 
to the days of Mach and Boltzmann. 
 Second, everywhere the authority of history is called into doubt. “One demands 
the right of independent examination. Everything, every institution, if it wants to 
persist, must legitimate itself by its rationality or by something other than its historical 
emergence.” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 48f.) The desire for revolution has become a 
characteristic trait of modern science. The doubts of Gauß that physical geometry need 
not be Euclidean culminated in Poincaré’s conventionalism according to which we are 
free to choose any geometry we consider convenient. “The revolutionary tendency of 
modern physics has most strikingly taken form in relativity theory and in quantum 
theory. The latter even casts doubts on the dogma of causality.” (Ibid., p. 50) And 
referring to the first paper in his booklet he added an observation familiar from his 
dialogue with Planck (See Sect. 6.3.5), to wit, that the issues of causality and geometry 
were one of a kind.  
 
It can never be decided experimentally whether causality in nature is ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’. The relation 
of cause and effect, as already Hume has pointed out, is not something that we find in nature but 
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concerns the form of our thinking about nature. We are completely free to maintain this form or to 
alter it according to convenience, that is, in which way the whole description of nature becomes 
simpler. (Ibid., p. 50f.)  
 
Schrödinger’s desire for revolution thus falls by far short of the alleged desire of the 
Weimar milieu “to sink the law of causality by hook or by crook;” (Forman, 1971, p. 
84) in particular if one takes into account the rigorous mathematical form of this 
freedom as continued in the next point.  
 Third, “stated very generally, the kernel of the idea of relativity is this: even … 
to a question that apparently admits of only ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ as an answer, one has to 
answer sometimes: As the case may be! That depends! … What really matters now is 
to actually construe the ‘that depends’ in such a way that the conflicting experiences or 
thoughts which have led to the dilemma are reconciled.” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 52) 
Special relativity, for instance, reconciliated the aberration of the light coming from 
the fixed stars and the result of Michelson’s experiment by defining motion relative to 
a reference system. In this way, one also obtained an elimination of superfluous 
entities in the sense of the first observation. But are there questions which can be 
unambiguously answered at any time?  
 
The complementary antithesis to the concept of relativity is invariance. … Once formed, the concept 
[of invariant] proves so comprehensive that it appears as if all human concept formation is subject to 
it. … Also the thesis of the objectivity of scientific knowledge is a claim of invariance. The question is 
whether the propositions of natural science are invariant with respect to the cultural milieu or whether 
they need the latter as a reference system and, in the case of a radical change of the cultural milieu, 
become not false in all details but substantially change their true meaning and their interest. (Ibid., p. 
54f.)  
 
It is crucial not to misread Schrödinger’s statement as an assent to Spenglerian 
relativism. The statement of relativity, if more than just evading the question, must be 
made sufficiently precise, so that we know how to transform a question from one 
reference system into another. Invariant questions are of particular interest, but being 
scientifically meaningful does not require absolute invariance. As Schlick (1920) 
emphasized, physical laws must not depend explicitly upon the position in the 
Universe, but whether events can causally influence each other depended upon their 
relation in space-time. Hence what Schrödinger discussed under relativity 
corresponded to the search for a coordinate system that was appropriate to the problem 
at hand and eliminated spurious degrees of freedom. Moreover, it appears to me that 
also Schrödinger’s quest for suitable pictures in quantum mechanics was a quest for 
invariances in this sense. They need not be absolute invariances, in the form of 
Kantian categories or neo-Kantian limits, but they had to be subject to well-defined 
transformation rules between reference systems; the notorious collapse of the wave 
packet did not live up to these requirements. In an analogous way we can also partly 
transform the views of other cultures to our present one. As Exner had stressed, 
scientific facts prove to be invariants under this transformation because of their 
objectivity. But within certain limits we can also assess sunken cultures or their traces 
in present culture and compare them to our. For instance, Schrödinger added a 
footnote that the idea of relativity “has been familiar to the Indian thought from time 
immemorial.” (Ibid., p. 51 fn.1) 
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 Fourth, mass control means “a highly-developed technique of managing 
populations [Gesamtheiten] large in number whose members nonetheless require 
individual handling, … [such as] inhabitants, voters, taxpayers, clients, … . The means 
to manage them are registration, cartography, catalogues, … Also the making of laws 
and jurisprudence belong here.” (Ibid., p. 55) Moreover, the increased demand of 
goods is met most economically by factory production. However, the “most perfect 
instance of mass control by excellent organization and, at the same time, economy of 
labor by making an expenditure once and for all, we find in the methods of 
mathematical analysis.” (Ibid., p. 56) Differential equations permit the physicist to 
describe the motions of an arbitrary number of mechanical particles. The familiar 
tensors of general relativity represent a systematically arranged register for calculating 
any desired gravitational phenomenon. The art of the theoretical physicist thus consists 
in formulating a problem in such a way that it can be approached in an economical, 
factory-like fashion. “Simplifying economy is the true essence of mathematical 
progress, whereby a constantly growing territory becomes accessible to our 
quantitative thought.” (Ibid., p. 58) This came quite close to Mach’s understanding of 
mathematics. 
 
Mathematics is the method of replacing in the most comprehensive and economical manner possible, 
new numerical operations by old ones already made, so that there is no need to repeat them. It may 
happen in this procedure that the results of operations are employed which were originally performed 
centuries ago. (Mach, 1988, p. 499/583) 
 
To be sure, assenting to Mach’s thesis about the economy of mathematical practices 
did not require to accept, as Boltzmann had actually done, Mach’s empiricist 
foundation of mathematics as “economy of counting”.  
 Fifth, statistics introduced a new idea into mass control, the “prudent 
renouncement of detailed knowledge.” (Schrödinger, 1932a, p. 59) We have to redirect 
our interest in such a way as to phrase new questions that let emerge new regularities. 
The restriction to statistical knowledge, accordingly, does not amount to a resignation. 
But it is not a trivial task and as “the statistical method is a dominant feature of our 
times” (Ibid., p. 61) there is a lot of misuse and uncritical application. In the end, 
Schrödinger turned to the application of statistics in economy and sociology. As in 
physics, there one tries “to forecast the laws according to which the statistics will alter 
if the external conditions are arbitrarily changed.” (Ibid., p. 61f.) And he reminded his 
readers of the first lecture in which he showed that the physicist can reach precise 
average laws without knowing of or being able to act upon the single molecules.  
 
Might one not perhaps see here common traits with a characteristic of our epoch that is not yet reached 
but nonetheless aimed at? For it appears to be the aim of a higher culture to reach the necessary order 
and lawfulness in the human community without an overly detailed interference into the living of the 
individual; rather [it aims to intervene] in such a way that one studies the average nature of man and 
its statistical range of variation and subsequently posits suitable motives and offers such goals to the 
feelings of desire that a bearable community is secured at least on average in the large. (Ibid., p. 62) 
 
Schrödinger’s booklet thus ended with a plea for social engineering that was 
diametrically opposed to the end of Exner’s 1908 Inaugural Address. There Exner 
considered the statistical distribution of human faculties and commodities as 
unchangeable by any kind of political intervention, however, without restricting the 
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behavior of the individual members of society. Culture defined itself through the 
emergence of this unchangeable state, at least until it degenerated into civilization. 
Schrödinger, in contrast, not only assumed that the overall distribution in society can 
be changed once we have learned the most effective mechanisms to do so. He also 
considered it as the aim of higher culture to improve the conditions of the community. 
Despite all dedication and adherence to Exner, Schrödinger thus did not follow 
Exner’s mandarin world view. And Schrödinger’s criticism against the uncritical 
application of statistical methods could also be turned against his beloved teacher. 
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7. Moritz Schlick at the Causal Turn 
 
As early as during the first decade of the 20th century Vienna Indeterminists seriously 
contemplated the idea that the basic laws of nature were irreducibly indeterministic. 
Thus Heisenberg’s (1927) pronouncement of the invalidity of the principle of causality 
in quantum mechanics did not find them unprepared. In contrast, Moritz Schlick 
frankly admitted that quantum mechanics had taken him by surprise. 
 
The turn that recent physics has taken on the subject of causality could equally [as in the case of 
relativity theory] not have been foreseen. For all the philosophizing that has gone on about 
determinism and indeterminism, about the content, validity and testing of the causal principle – 
nobody has lighted on precisely that possibility which quantum mechanics offers us, as the key which 
is to yield understanding of the type of causal order that actually prevails in reality. (Schlick, 1931, p. 
145/176f.) 
 
In the present section I shall show why Schlick had to substantially change his mind 
about the principle of causality after the advent of quantum mechanics. To this end, I 
compare his two influential papers on the subject that appeared in Die 
Naturwissenschaften in 1920 and 1931. While his “Philosophical Reflections on the 
Principle of Causality” were basically after a precise formulation of the principle of 
causality within the framework of relativistic physics and contained just a few lines on 
the problems of statistical physics, the 1931 article “Causality in Contemporary 
Physics” explicitly revoked the earlier project and, citing the lessons of quantum 
mechanics, considered causality as basically coextensive with successful prophecy.  
 In 1920 Schlick was about to become the leading philosopher of relativity 
theory and constantly engaged in skirmishes with those neo-Kantians who insisted on 
the synthetic a priori character of space and time. There exist detailed analyses of how 
Schlick employed certain versions of conventionalism to that end and on what grounds 
he rejected any relativized a priori.139 As we shall see, the departure from Kantian 
territory took considerably longer for the category of causality than it did for space and 
time, case in which it was fully completed with the second edition of the 
Erkenntnislehre in 1925. 
 Schlick’s drastic turn in causal matters corresponded to a change of 
philosophical influences. While his 1920 theory (Section 7.1.) was still strongly 
indebted to the Kantian conception of causality as advocated by his former teacher 
Planck, the 1931 theory made prominent – though not decisive – use of the 
Wittgensteinian distinction between an assertion and a prescription for the making of 
assertions (Section 7.3.). In-between there exist a few documents of transition in which 
a simple rehearsal of the earlier stand meshed with serious doubts about the validity of 
the principle of causality prompted by the developments in quantum mechanics 
(Section 7.2.). Although his modified theory of causality brought Schlick significantly 
closer to his Vienna Circle colleagues, there is clear evidence that Schlick’s position 
remained by far more accessible to other German physicist-philosophers than Vienna 
Indeterminism. (Section 7.4.) But all of them had problems with his adherence to a 
Kriesian theory of probability. It would take another five years until the growing 
                                                          
139 E.g., (Friedman, 1994) and (Howard, 1994).  
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‘linguistic turn’ on both sides of the aisle brought the Machian and the post-Kantian 
strands of the Vienna Circle, or more precisely: Frank and Schlick, to a far-reaching 
agreement (See Sect. 8.7.). 
 
7.1 Schlick 1: Causality Modeled after General Relativity 
 
Schlick’s 1920 paper opened as such. “The causal principle is not itself a law of 
nature, but rather a general expression of the fact that everything which happens in 
nature is subject without exception to valid laws.” (Schlick, 1920, p. 461/295) Any 
particular law of nature is subordinate to this principle taken in the sense of Kant’s 
original formulation “Everything that happens …, presupposes something upon which 
it follows to a rule.”140 As the rules determining the sequence of natural events are the 
laws of nature, the principle of causality is “identical with a claim to thoroughgoing 
subsistence of natural laws.” (Ibid., p. 461/295) Rather than expressing these laws by 
way of relations of cause and effect, their strictest form is achieved in the 
mathematical equations governing physical processes. There can be differential 
equations involving infinitesimals, as in classical mechanics or electrodynamics, or 
difference equations owing to the discontinuous constitution of matter on the atomic 
scale suggested by quantum theory. Restricting attention to the first case, the principle 
of causality in physics can be given a “by now unobjectionable and empirically 
testable form … on the [empirical] assumption that forces acting at a distance do not 
exist,” so that we can isolate the events in a certain region of space-time. Accordingly, 
“given the ‘initial conditions’ and ‘boundary conditions’, everything that occurs in the 
area under consideration is univocally determined and calculable by means of the 
differential equations of physics.” (Both ibid., p. 462/297) 
 As the infinitely small is unobservable in principle, those differential micro-
laws cannot be observed, but are inferred from the integral macro-laws accessible to 
measurement or observation over a finite space-time interval. 
 
The differential laws prevailing in nature can … be conjectured only from the integral laws, and these 
inferences are never, strictly speaking, univocal, since one can always account for the observed macro-
laws by various hypotheses about the underlying micro-laws. Among the various possibilities we 
naturally choose that marked by the greatest simplicity. It is the final aim of exact science to reduce all 
events to the fewest and simplest possible differential laws. (Ibid., p. 462/297)  
 
This micro-macro distinction neatly corresponded to the set-up of Exner’s (1909, 
1922) argument in favor of indeterminism by virtue of greater nomological coherence. 
Determinists like Schlick’s teacher Planck (1914) had argued, to the contrary, that 
even probabilistic macro-laws required strictly causal micro-laws, whereas Vienna 
Indeterminists saw no cogent reason to do so. Against this backdrop it is quite startling 
that Schlick did not altogether interpret the difference between macro-laws and micro-
laws in the sense of statistical mechanics, but remained exclusively in the realms of 
deterministic physics and simply rehearsed Planck’s (1915a) description of the goal of 
theoretical research.141 To be sure, by that time simplicity had already become a major 
                                                          
140 (Kant, [1781] 1990, A 189) cited in (Schlick, 1920, p. 461/295). 
141 See Sect. 4.5. for the debate between Exner and Planck, and Sect. 3.8 for the pivotal role of the Principle of 
Least Action within Planck’s philosophy of physics. 
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philosophical motive within Schlick’s assessment of relativity theory by means of 
which he counterbalanced the conventionality of space-time (See Friedman, 1994, p. 
26-29), a move which testified his parting company with the neo-Kantians. But within 
his theory of causality, the criterion of simplicity led Schlick straight to Planck’s 
preferred candidate for a simple universal principle, the “Principle of Least Action” or 
“minimal principles” in general. Yet in contrast to Planck, Schlick’s conventionalism 
blocked attributing any ontological surplus to the integral principles. That one can 
describe a motion between two moments in time by specifying the initial state and the 
final state indicates, rather, that  
 
there is a great arbitrariness of view here, and each [of these descriptions] is legitimate, really, so long 
as it only leaves untouched the thoroughgoing perfect determinacy of the whole. This should be borne 
in mind, above all, when examining the difference, and the legitimacy, of causal and finalistic or 
teleological viewpoints; many erroneous questions in this area have arisen from lack of clarity in 
regard to the simple relationships we have discussed. (Schlick, 1920, p. 462/298) 
 
Already by this move Schlick implicitly rejected Mach’s rephrasing causality as 
functional dependences, for when considering “the thoroughgoing interconnection of 
processes, which finds expression in the invariable determinacy of all happenings [in 
nature], as a causal one” (Ibid., p. 462f./298) he added the following footnote: “In 
contrast to functional relation, which signifies not a real relation, but a purely 
conceptual and analytic one, such as exists, for example, between the number x and 
log x.” (Ibid., p. 463/320)142 The contrast to Mach’s account was completed by 
Schlick’s pronunciation that “we think the laws independently of whether man, in 
particular, knows about them or not: he does not make, but merely discovers them.” 
(Ibid., p. 465/302) Mach and Exner, to the contrary, had held that natural laws are 
formulated by man.  
 Although Schlick’s conception of causality as an atemporal and real 
relationship of lawfulness remained consistent with Kant’s conception, he rejected the 
transcendental argument that only the special form of our knowledge about natural 
laws was rooted in the special nature of our cognitive organization so that the general 
principle of causality was valid in any cognizable world even if humans were unable to 
formulate a single universal law. Uniformity of nature is thus not only a precondition 
for our understanding of nature, but of her being at all causal.  
 In Schlick’s rather intricate argument we discern both his explicit abandonment 
of neo-Kantianism in favor of an empirical notion of causality143 and an early use of 
the verificationist criterion of meaning. This is not to say that Schlick whole-heartedly 
subscribed to empiricism. At the beginning, he rejected Mach’s argument against the 
notions of cause and effect that was condensed in the pithy phrase that “nature has but 
an individual existence.” (Mach, 1988, p. 496/580) While Mach held that like cases 
exist only in abstraction, Schlick emphasized that already a far-reaching resemblance 
sufficed for a direct experience of similarity because small differences remained below 
the threshold of consciousness. Although our factual knowledge of causality thus 
                                                          
142 I assume that the expressions “Zusammenhang”, “Abhängigkeit”, and “Beziehung” are used interchangeably 
here. 
143 A footnote on p. 465/320 takes back his position from the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918, p. 322) and 
rejects similar ideas of Hugo Bergmann and Johannes von Kries. 
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depended, contingently, on uniformity, could there be, nonetheless, laws of nature in 
an universe without any uniformity? Schlick rephrased this question as such.  
 
Must every law of nature be universal, that is apply to a number of real cases separated only by space 
and time – or can there also be individual laws, such that every process in the world follows its own 
special rule … ? … Nothing seems easier! We need only suppose that space and time enter explicitly 
into the mathematical expression of natural laws, and do so as arguments of non-periodic functions. 
(Schlick, 1920, p. 464/301) 
 
In such a chaotic world, space and time would attain an absolute meaning. “A change 
in the frame of reference would necessitate a quite different formulation of the laws of 
nature: so spatial and temporal determinations would not be relative” (Ibid., p. 
464/302) – which is clearly at odds with relativity theory. Before drawing 
philosophical consequences from this fact, Schlick addressed the more fundamental 
question whether such a thought experiment could at all be empirically verified. 
Having abandoned the categorical validity of the principle of causality, Schlick could 
consistently imagine that there exist  
 
two exactly similar worlds, such that in one of them the very same processes occur by chance as go on 
in the other through causality. Given any seemingly lawless sequence of world-states whatsoever, we 
can also view it, if we please, as the obedience to law. For let the piece played upon the world-stage be 
as chaotic and confused as can be: … for the maddest irregularities a sufficient explanation may 
always be found … in the particular values of the space and time coordinates of the process in 
question. (Ibid., p. 465/303)  
 
Hence the existence of a mathematical formula cannot ground the necessity of the 
causal link between two states.144  
 Schlick now refuted a restricted version of the prophecy approach which would 
become his starting point in 1931. One could, first, argue that for random events the 
individual laws are established subsequently while in causal processes the course of 
events can be predicted. “But this attempt at a distinction fails of its purpose. For in 
the first place, every law, every objective rule, as a purely conceptual structure, is 
atemporal.” (Ibid., p. 466/304) Concepts exist whenever they are consistent. One 
could, secondly, invoke the moment in time when the law was actually formulated. 
Without the presupposition of a recurrence of similar events, however, “the 
observational discovery of the true laws of events would be wholly impossible to us. 
But in the absence of observation, the correct formula could only be guessed. But 
guesswork, of course, is equally possible in a totally lawless universe.” (Ibid., p. 
466/304) Third, Schlick ruled out the possibility that the distinction in question be 
found in psychological experience. This would lead into a dangerous 
anthropomorphism by confusing causal necessity [Notwendigkeit] with compulsion 
[Zwang]. “The contrary opposite of necessity is contingency, while that of compulsion 
is freedom”. (Ibid., p. 467/306) If this difference is properly respected any conflict 
between causality and free will simply disappears. 
 As, accordingly, no difference can be asserted “between a universe confounded 
by chance and one thrown into confusion by causality,” (Ibid., p. 465/303) uniformity 
of nature, and hence the universality of natural laws, were necessary conditions for a 
meaningful notion of causality, not only for their actual discovery. While practical 
                                                          
144 On a similar basis Frank (1907) argued that the law of causality was merely a convention; see Sect. 8.1. 
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uniformity as a regulative principle would, to my mind, correspond to Mach’s 
principle of economy, Schlick’s requirement of uniformity – albeit based on a 
verificationist instead of a transcendental argument – came close to a Kantian 
‘condition of the possibility’. 
 
It is not enough that we should be able to think at all a formula whereby the course of nature can be 
presented – this is possible without exception; the formula also has to be of a specific kind. Any 
number of cases of its application must, in fact, be possible. A law of nature is such, therefore, only if 
it is general: the concept of individual causality has led us into contradiction. (Ibid., p. 467/307) 
 
This position prompted Schlick to reject “under all circumstances” the idea that the 
laws of nature could change, even if this change occurs slowly, “since such a 
possibility could never fall within the scope of scientific experience.” (Both ibid., p. 
467/307) The idea of natural laws changing on the cosmological scale was advocated 
by Fechner and granted by all Vienna Indeterminists; it was an unavoidable 
consequence of their radical empiricist stance. 
 Schlick’s restriction on the form of causal laws involved the concepts of space 
and time. Here again, he took a rather Kantian tack.  
 
[I]f like cases are to be able to exist in the course of nature, some principle of separation must be 
presupposed, which sees to it that occurrences can be alike without being identical. … This 
separatedness in nature is realized in two ways, … namely in spatial coexistence and temporal 
succession. … These principles of separateness, which constitute the presupposition of the concept of 
lawfulness and causality, have rightly been called forms, following Kant’s terminology, precisely 
because the concrete [contentual] determinations [inhaltlichen Bestimmungen] of things do not depend 
on them. That space and time are these forms is a fact that we have to accept. We can imagine no 
others even if they are thinkable. Space and time could not fulfill their function as forms if they 
entered explicitly into the differential laws of the natural process, for in that case they would indeed 
have a concrete significance. (Ibid., p. 467f./307f.) 
 
Schlick attributed this insight to Maxwell. 
 
Space and time are hereby credited with a homogeneity which is in fact indispensable to them, if they 
are really forms, as causality requires. This homogeneity is of the most general kind (and thus 
consistent with spatio-temporal inhomogeneities conditioned, according to gravitational theory, by 
matter) … By now thanks to the new advances in our physical views, the relativity of space and time 
has been laid down in a far broader and deeper sense. It has to be asked whether this most 
thoroughgoing relativization likewise forms an inescapable presupposition for the possibility of 
causality, or whether there is no such close connection here as with that particular relativity, of which 
we found that without it there can be no meaningful talk of a universal lawfulness of nature. (Ibid., p. 
468/308) 
  
Schlick’s argument commenced from Einstein’s famous thought-experiment about two 
isolated fluid bodies of different shape rotating relative to one another. Ascribing the 
flattened shape of one of them to centrifugal forces in absolute space, Newtonian 
mechanics only appeared to provide a causal explanation. But there is no contradiction 
to the requirements of the principle of causality; “it is merely that the bounds of its 
applicability are more narrowly drawn there than in the general theory of relativity.” 
(Ibid., p. 469/309) For, Newtonian mechanics did not consider shape as a causa vera 
but restricted the principle of causality to processes. Here also Schlick found that the 
specific formulation of causality used within a particular theory is linked to the latter’s 
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ontology.145 But Schlick considered only one ontology as suitable to the principle of 
causality, to wit, processes in space-time. And his main point was that general 
relativity permits the reduction of further substantial properties and states to processes. 
 General relativity thus represents “not merely a logical simplification but an 
actual advance in causal explanation; it opens up to the concept of cause a new area 
beyond the boundary that had hitherto seemed to limit its sway.” (Ibid., p. 470/312) It 
did so by the experience that the system of fixed stars possesses a privileged status as a 
system of reference. What Mach had merely postulated, Einstein turned into a 
differential equation by introducing the concept of a gravitational field and interpreting 
its states as processes, to wit, as motions of matter.  
 
From the epistemological point of view it is remarkable that the gravitational field does not represent 
anything perceptible in the same sense as the motions of visible bodies to one another. But if we stop 
short at considering the latter, we get no further than the mere postulate of the relativity of all motions 
… Mach who established the postulate, notoriously arrived only at … quite useless formulae. … The 
situation seems to me not without relevance to an assessment of Mach’s theory of knowledge. (Ibid., 
p. 471/313) 
 
As had his teacher Planck (1908a), Schlick charged Mach of infertility.  
 Schlick, strikingly, not only argued that by turning seemingly irreducible 
properties into causal processes, general relativity extended the realm of causal 
explanation of nature, but he also contemplated an inversion. 
 
If it were absolutely established that these properties of bodies have to be interpreted in this way [i.e., 
as processes], … then in fact the demand of causality would be satisfiable only by the general 
principle of relativity… [A] non-relativist view would then actually contradict the causal principle … 
There is no seeing, indeed, how … a rigorous proof is to be adduced for the necessity of viewing the 
property in question as a process. … But despite possible want of proof, the scientist – and this cannot 
be sufficiently stressed – has in general no firmer conviction than that of the process-character of the 
perceivable properties of matter. … It tells very strongly, in my view, in favor of general relativity, 
that the presupposing of principles so fundamental and well-established is enough to make it appear as 
a mere inference from the principle of causality. (Schlick, 1920, p. 471/314) 
 
Recall that, to Schlick’s mind, the principle of causality was empirical because the 
non-existence of action-at-a-distance represented an empirical fact, in virtue of which 
the principle’s mathematical form had to be of a particular kind. Moreover, it is a 
contingent “fact that there is any such thing as natural law and causality.” (Ibid., p. 
473/317) 
 Schlick followed Kant in intimately linking the principle of causality to one 
particular theory of space and time. Einstein’s general theory of relativity grossly 
extended the sway of the principle of causality by reducing properties to processes. 
Yet, are there “properties which we cannot understand as processes, which 
consequently defy causal explanation, and in which our physical knowledge therefore 
encounters an insuperable barrier and natural limit?” (Ibid., p. 472/315) All laws of 
nature contain initial and boundary conditions which cannot be reduced to the laws 
themselves. They “fill the empty form of natural laws with content, in that they 
determine the integration-constants therein.” (Ibid., p. 473/316) Their values are as 
contingent as the form of the primeval nebula. Adopting a terminology of von Kries, 
                                                          
145 Von Mises (1922a) considered relativity theory as more restrictive than Newtonian mechanics, which 
following his notion of causality corresponded to a diagnosis similar to Schlick’s (See Sect. 8.2.). 
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Schlick contrasted nomological and ontological determinations of reality, that is, 
dynamical processes and initial or boundary conditions.  
Although general relativity does not permit any longer to separate off a unique 
time coordinate, one could still split space-time into a three-dimensional hypersurface 
– Schlick called this the basis of a deformed cylinder – and a fourth dimension – the 
height of the cylinder – that played the role of time and carried the nomological 
dynamics. 
 
[T]he only [thing] that matters to us here: a three-dimensional region has to be given, which is at least 
extended by an infinitesimal amount into the fourth dimension as well; by this, then, the immediately 
adjacent world-slice is also co-determined through ‘causal dependency’. Everything real is four-
dimensional; three-dimensional bodies are mere abstractions, exactly as lines or planes are. The 
causal determinacy of the world extends only in one dimension, and this we call the direction of time. 
Once it is chosen, what lies in the other three dimensions has to be seen as simply contingent. With 
this an insuperable barrier to the causal mode of consideration has undoubtedly been designated. The 
causal principle finds application only to extension in the time-direction. (Ibid., p. 474/319)  
 
Despite this categorical wording, Schlick had qualified his claim already on the day 
before his article appeared in print. In a letter to Einstein written on 10 June, 1920, he 
admitted that he “must not object to considering the lawfulness [Gesetzlichkeit] within 
a time slice as causal. My reasons were only: 1) The fact that in the reality of 
consciousness time seems to play a distinctive role, and 2) that those regularities 
[Gesetzlichkeiten]146 must have a different character than those in temporal direction. 
But these are only subjective reasons which perhaps are dispelled upon closer 
consideration.” On 7 June, 1920, Einstein had sent Schlick some critical comments on 
the galley version. He contemplated that “more complete laws of nature might leave a 
considerably restricted arbitrariness in the choice of initial conditions”.147 From the 
standpoint of statistical mechanics, this was a natural objection to raise; it could be 
seen as the call for conditions more convincing than elementary disorder.  
 Could ontological determinations be lawful in a non-causal sense? Or put 
differently, could they resist reduction to more fundamental laws? Schlick believed 
that if all properties are reduced to processes some factual conditions or fundamental 
constants in the laws would remain. This had also been Planck’s position for whom the 
irreducible constants of nature represented something absolute (See Sect. 3.8). But 
Schlick’s position was less committed to convergent realism. Although laws among 
these conditions cannot be causal, they must not attribute an absolute meaning to space 
and time coordinates. Schlick contemplated two possible types. First, one could 
consider the identity of all electrons in the world as a law. As a matter of fact, modern 
physics knows of two different types of indistinguishability, which separates the 
quantum world into bosons and fermions. Second, 
 
                                                          
146 The translation of “Gesetzlichkeit” and “Gesetzmäßigkeit” poses some problems because they denote both 
certain regularities, weaker than laws of nature, and the fact that a certain domain is governed by law. In 
Schlick’s second theory the problem is aggravated by the fact that he denied the status of “Gesetz” to statistical 
“Gesetzmäßigkeiten”. I thus translate depending on the context as “regularity” or “lawfulness” and add the 
German word where necessary. 
147 Both letters from the Schlick-Nachlaß; I take the almost identical letter of 9 June simply as a draft of the letter 
of 10 June. I refrain from entering into Einstein’s other criticisms in the letter of 7 June, in particular, because 
they would lead into detailed considerations of relativity theory and because in a letter of 31 June, 1920, Einstein 
makes a partial withdrawal. 
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if it were certain that everywhere in finite portions of the universe only such processes occur as are 
bound up with an increase of entropy (transitions, that is from states of lower to states of higher 
‘probability’), this would presuppose an initial state of specific lawfulness (the hypothesis of 
molecular disorder), which would likewise be of the type in question.  
 The problem of whether there actually are such laws … is of greatest importance for the 
shaping of our picture of the world. Only when it is solved, perhaps, will a satisfactory logical theory 
of ‘inductive’ cognition be possible. For logical induction can be regarded as the procedure by means 
of which we ascertain causal connections of a merely ‘contingent’ kind. (Schlick, 1920, p. 474/320) 
 
It is quite interesting that at the end of his paper, Schlick considered the problem of 
causality as more basic than the problem of induction. This was in stark contrast to the 
views Reichenbach would develop during the 1920s.  
 Similarly as Planck, Schlick strictly separated dynamical causality and 
statistical regularity, or (causal) nomological and (contingent) ontological 
determinations. Statistical regularity was a specific type of ontological determination 
that supervened on what was nomologically possible. Although Schlick used 
ontological determinations in a somewhat more general sense, this neatly 
corresponded to von Kries’s (1886, 1927) Spielraumtheorie. Von Kries had 
supplemented the a priori category of causality by the equally unempirical principle of 
range (Prinzip der Spielräume) (Kries, 1886, p. 170) in order to make space for 
objective probability in a deterministic world. The range (Spielraum) of all 
nomologically possible events was determined by the laws of nature. Ontological 
determinations concerned circumstances for which we do not have any cogent reason 
to demand further explanation but simply have to “consider as something factually 
realized.” (Kries, 1919, p. 5) In physics they were typically described as initial 
conditions. In contrast to Planck’s (1914) intention to eliminate the highly improbable 
events, von Kries’s theory could accommodate the highly improbable events and even 
justify a version of the ergodic hypothesis. (Cf. Kries, 1919, pp. 19-21) Although 
Schlick explicitly departed from von Kries by admitting an empirical notion of 
causality, he did not abandon the distinction between both kind of regularities and, 
consequently, the Kriesian conception of probability.148 But he remained surprisingly 
vague and cautious about molecular disorder, and largely argued by conditional clause. 
Four years later, Schlick would become even more hesitant about Planck’s 
insistence on strict dynamical causality. In a review of Planck’s first collection of 
philosophical papers Physical Panoramas (1922), Schlick endorsed the criticism of 
Mach’s positivism as of inferior fertility and emphasized the value of Planck’s quest 
for synthesis and final principles. Yet at two points the reviewer called for 
philosophical caution. First, when Planck believes that the distinction between 
reversible and irreversible processes is of so fundamental a character as to persist in 
any future physical world view, one has to remember “that reversible processes – as 
Planck himself clearly emphasizes – are only ideal limit cases; thus all real processes 
would be strictly speaking irreversible, and the distinction in question rests upon an 
                                                          
148 I have excluded a separate discussion of von Kries’s theory although it was outlined on the pages of Die 
Naturwissenschaften and von Kries commented upon an earlier paper of von Smoluchowski (1918). But von 
Kries was not only a contemporary of the 1920s. His theory of probability had been written at about the same 
time as Fechner’s, and he never made significant modifications to it. For a succinct account of von Kries’s 
theory and the influence of von Kries on Waismann, and thus on (Schlick, 1931), see (Heidelberger, 2001). A 
broader discussion is found in (Neumann, 2002), but, as far as Schlick is concerned, the author exclusively 
focuses on logical probability only and erroneously charges the Vienna Circle of misunderstanding von Kries’s 
account of probability in physics. (See Section 7.3.) 
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artificial abstraction.” (Schlick, 1924, p. 819) Thus far Schlick was in accordance with 
Exner’s criticism of Planck’s rectorial address (See 4.4.). But while Exner had 
accentuated the primary character of irreversibility, Schlick interpreted the kinetic 
theory as a proof that all irreversible macroprocesses reduce to reversible 
microprocesses. Ultimately the distinction between reversible and irreversible 
processes becomes simply a consequence of “the opposition between the statistical 
regularities of the constellations in nature and the strictly causal lawfulness of all 
processes.” (Ibid., p. 820) At bottom, this interpretation was closer to Schlick’s own 
theory of causality than to Planck’s original views because a substantial part of the 
difference in principle between reversible and irreversible physics was linked to the 
difference between that part of physics that could be subsumed under a Principle of 
Least Action and that part that could not. Next, Schlick endorsed Planck’s (1914) 
criticism of Exner’s belief that all laws of nature are of statistical kind.  
 
Certainly, this careful attitude [of Planck’s], which wants to sacrifice the principle of causality under 
no circumstances, has to be approved from the philosophical point of view. But even though the 
reviewer sympathizes with this, he must nevertheless emphasize that on purely logical grounds one 
has to admit the possibility that the final laws of nature might be of statistical, and not of causal 
character. (Ibid., p. 820) 
 
Yet it is remarkable, so Schlick continued, that the stubborn defense of the principle of 
causality stemmed from the creator of quantum theory. Referring, finally, to Planck’s 
diagnosis of the “gigantic breach in the present system of natural science” (Ibid., p. 
822) that opens between quantum theory and relativity theory, Schlick praised his 
teacher’s quest for a unified theory at a deeper level of reality. 
 
7.2 Documents of Transition  
 
At about the same time, Schlick completed his entry “Naturphilosophie” for Max 
Dessoir’s Lehrbuch der Philosophie. Although Schlick basically rehearsed his 1920 
theory of causality, he now seriously contemplated the possibility that the basic laws 
of nature could be statistical. We can find even a mention of the “newest findings 
which raise serious doubts as to the absolutely strict validity of the energy principle as 
such: it seems hardly possible to dismiss the idea that energy remains constant only on 
average.” (Schlick, 1925a, p. 420/23) This obvious allusion to the BKS-theory149 
appeared in the context of Schlick’s historical outline of the dissolution of the concepts 
of substance and identity of substance into mechanical motions and – after the 
mechanical world view had proven insufficient – into law-governed processes and 
constants of nature. This historical development, so Schlick contended in full 
accordance with Planck, was mainly driven by the motives of objectivation, 
abstraction and unification. Measured against these criteria, energeticism clearly 
signified a step backward to a set of distinct energetic substances. This was precisely 
the point where Boltzmann had rightly turned Mach against Ostwald. (See Sect. 3.4.) 
 “Once the theory of relativity is admitted … it is not just unnecessary … to 
found things on the idea of substance as the concept of the identically permanent; it 
                                                          
149 This testifies that Schlick was among the latecomers mentioned in Dessoir’s preface. 
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has become impossible. Only with this is the physics of substance genuinely 
destroyed.” (Ibid., p. 425/28) Modern physics is the physics of fields, although in the 
realm of quantum theory it is unclear,  
 
whether it will be possible to sustain the conception of continuity that underlies it. … But the mode 
and manner in which this theory describes nature contains features so universal, that we may well 
believe that any future physical world-picture will have to appropriate these same features: 
explanation, that is, of all events in nature by pure state-quantities, and abandonment of the notion of 
substance in favour of that of law. (Ibid., p. 426/28f.)  
 
Such an asymptotic extrapolation to the final theory was the basis of Planck’s 
convergent realism. Schlick also resounded Planck’s (1925) interpretation of relativity 
theory. “In every case there exists, for the theory, an objective world, equally real for 
all observers and common to all of them, which can thus even justly be called 
‘absolute’.” (Ibid., p. 441/43) And apart from the emphasis on invariants in relativity 
theory, we find the core of Planck’s structural realism, the Principle of Least Action – 
though the praise stood under a strong conventionalist proviso. 
 
In all the advances of physics it has turned out that, in contrast to many another law, the action 
principle preserves its validity unshaken; all newly discovered laws of nature, including those of 
relativity theory, can be regarded as consequences of a principle of least action, which thereby appears 
to assume the highest rank of formal generality. It is obviously capable of this, because its formulation 
involves the fewest assumptions about the particular type of reciprocal dependency among natural 
processes. In regard to these dependencies there is actually a considerable arbitrariness in our choice 
of views: the one is as legitimate as the other, so long as it does but conform to the idea of a 
thoroughgoing perfect determinacy of the whole. (Ibid., p. 433f./35) 
 
At quite a few places of the text, Schlick leveled explicit and implicit criticism against 
Mach or, rather, what he took to be the Machian position; apparently Schlick was still 
mainly influenced by Planck’s reading of Mach and he typically took his teacher’s side 
when mentioning the Mach-Planck controversy. The ideal of describing the physical 
world without hypotheses, as defended by Mach and energeticism, failed miserably; 
physicists must form more and more abstract hypotheses “under the inescapable 
compulsion of the need for unity in our knowledge.” (Ibid., p. 446/47) The loss of 
Anschaulichkeit, however, does not have ontological drawbacks. “Physical reality is 
not in fact made up of directly experienceable, observable data, but is merely linked to 
them, and the physicist has only to take care that this linkage with experience is 
maintained at any time for all observation.” (Ibid., p. 446/47) Interestingly, Schlick 
relegated the final answer to the problem of external reality to epistemology; 
philosophy of nature can just show that there is no difference between the existence of 
electrons and the objects of our daily life. 
 
Any scientific view of reality – like all the rest of our practical dealing in the world – rests upon the 
assumption that all events in nature take place according to law. The claim that this assumption is 
satisfied constitutes the content of the principle of causality. … Investigation of whether this principle 
is really universal or necessarily valid is a matter for the general theory of knowledge. The latter 
establishes that a science of reality is possible, at all events, only insofar as the principle of causality 
holds. … The validity of causality is thus a presupposition, not an object, of the natural sciences. … 
But philosophy of nature must certainly get clear as to the content of the causal principle. (Ibid., p. 
429/31) 
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Largely recapitulating his 1920 stand, Schlick identified causality with the lawfulness 
of nature. Causality is empirical because experience alone teaches that there exists no 
action-at-a-distance. The differential laws of nature are inferred from the observable 
macro-laws, an act which often yields an ambiguous outcome. Mach’s reinterpretation 
of causality was overtly rejected. 
 
Ernst Mach … has described the mystical notion, whereby the effect is ejected from the cause as if by 
some effort of will, as a relic of ‘fetishism’, and has thereupon repudiated the concept of cause 
altogether. Following the usage of mathematics, he wished to speak of a ‘functional’ dependency 
instead. But this is ultimately a mere change of name; there is no seeing why the real dependencies in 
nature, as opposed to the purely logico-conceptual dependencies of mathematics, should not be called 
‘causal’, and it should have become clear from our discussion that the concepts of cause and effect can 
be defined in a manner free from fetishism. (Ibid., p. 434/36) 
 
As in his 1920 paper, Schlick moved on to argue that “uniformity [Gleichartigkeit] of 
nature is a necessary condition for the concept of law.” (Ibid., p. 435/36) His primary 
example relativity theory was now amended by some considerations about the spatial 
boundedness and temporal infinity of the cosmos. While considering most steps in the 
life of the single stars as well-confirmed, Schlick remained skeptical whether stellar 
and “cosmic evolution can really be thought of as a cyclical process eternally repeated 
in similar fashion.” (Ibid., p. 452/52) Against this stands the second law of 
thermodynamics, which is “of an entirely new type.” (Ibid., p. 452/52) Its merely 
statistical character also rules out the notorious heat death of the Universe which had 
prompted Nernst (See Sect. 5.5.2.) to invent an explicit nuclear mechanism to close the 
cycle of cosmic evolution. Nernst had not accepted the highly improbable strange 
events admitted by the second law. As Schlick had dropped Planck’s stricture of 
molecular disorder, he could make virtue of necessity on the cosmological scale. 
However small the probability of such events may be, 
 
since the universe has any amount of time at its disposal, there will, in principle, be no state of the 
world that could not recur, none that could not be carried out in reverse. So should anything like a 
heat-death have one day come about in the universe, then, albeit after immeasurable ages, a new 
differentiation of the universally undifferentiated state will at length have to recur of itself (by 
‘chance’) …; the processes of nature would then have to unfold in a reverse sequence or direction to 
that which we are used to in the present state of the cosmos. (Ibid., p. 454/54) 
 
And Schlick also cited Boltzmann’s intuition that “if ever in the world, or some part of 
it, events run counter the entropy principle, past and future have there exchanged their 
roles.” (Ibid., p. 454/54f.) 
 Apparently Schlick had already arrived at Vienna, yet without ever subscribing 
to all elements of Vienna Indeterminism. While the latter tradition considered the 
second law as the primary and most basic law of nature, for Schlick, it remained 
foreign to reversible physics. And he also followed Planck’s reading of Boltzmann 
according to which irreversibility was not grounded in the laws of nature but in the 
initial conditions. Since we can directly observe the violations of the second law at the 
example of Brownian motion, Schlick felt the need to give some lawlike justification 
to such statistical regularities. Returning to the distinction adopted at the end of his 
1920 paper, Schlick concluded that they are a special kind of ontological regularity. 
“Causality [nomological regularity] prevails only in the temporal direction, not in 
those of space. There we have laws, but here, initially, only facts. The entropy theorem 
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indicates that even in the realm of facts there are general hypotheses, that in this area, 
too, it is possible to conceive of general knowledge” (Ibid., p. 458/58) by relating the 
facts in a particular temporal slice of the world.  
 To a Machian, Schlick’s distinction between laws and facts sounded artificial. 
To Schlick, it represented an even deeper justification of the fundamental difference 
between dynamical and statistical laws; although he assumed other ontological 
regularities, such as the identity of all electrons in the world, that were not of a 
statistical kind. Interestingly, Schlick did not openly advocate the thesis that 
probabilities are meaningful only once the nomological determinations are fixed, or 
Planck’s contention that any statistical regularity needed a determinist foundation.  
 After Schlick discussed the dim prospects to illuminate the area of ontological 
regularities, “which seems to lie wholly in the twilight of contingency, by means of the 
concept of law” (Schlick, 1925a, p. 459/59), the thrust of the paper changed, and in the 
subtext we can discern the author’s sudden doubts as to the limitations of the theory 
just outlined. Notice the terminological shift from statistical regularity to probabilistic 
law. 
 
Today there is already serious consideration that even the causal laws are by no means so far-reaching 
as is generally assumed, and as the reader must suppose after our previous discussion. For when once 
the statistical approach had been introduced into physics, the idea could arise, that perhaps the ultimate 
regularity of nature is itself statistical in character, that the true micro-laws are themselves laws of 
probability. … [In statistical mechanics] probability related only to the contingent frequency of the 
initial states; but if we suppose the ultimate micro-laws to have a probability character of their own, 
the events themselves then become a contingent matter, they would be removed from causality and 
cease to be exhaustively knowable. … [In quantum theory] we have to reckon with the fact that this 
behaviour [of emitting and absorbing atoms] can no longer be understood, say, in an ontological 
fashion. (Ibid., p. 459/59) 
 
In this way, of course, a Kriesian account of quantum probabilities was blocked. 
Planck’s quantum theory, so Schlick continued, had extended the discontinuities, long 
familiar already within the ontological realm, into the domain of natural processes. 
Future physics would have to achieve a reconciliation or decision between continuous 
field physics and discontinuous quantum physics. This had also been Planck’s agenda 
since the Leiden lecture.  
 The most recent development in atomic physics of the years 1924/25 propelled 
Schlick, or so it appears to me, to amend his “Naturphilosophie” with some timely 
deliberations which in tendency run counter to the overall thrust of the text. They 
reveal that the ‘gigantic breach’ as of 1920 had turned into a foundational crisis. If the 
newest results of quantum mechanics were true, so Schlick contended, Laplace’s old 
dream would be finally over. “The world, in the last resort, would be handed over to 
chance.” (Ibid., p. 460/60) He did not greet this development. 
 
It is clear … that only in the utmost case of emergency will the scientist or philosopher decide to 
postulate purely statistical micro-laws, since the scope of such an assumption would be enormous: The 
principle of causality would be abandoned, only an approximate validity would still be retained for 
macro-processes, while events on the smallest scale would be subject to chance, and hence the 
possibility of exhaustive knowledge would have to be renounced. The adoption of such a position 
would not, indeed, be impossible, for a thinker schooled by the empirical sciences will hold neither the 
causal axiom nor the demand for nature’s exhaustive comprehensibility to be absolutely necessary and 
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irrefragable – but still, he will drop these otherwise so well-confirmed presuppositions of all inquiry 
only if the pressure of facts becomes unavoidable. (Ibid., p. 461/61) 
 
In a paper written a few months later, but published only in 1929 in Scientia, Schlick 
went one step further on his way to Vienna. “Epistemology and Modern Physics” 
criticized three synthetic a priori assumptions of Kantian and neo-Kantian 
epistemology: the Euclidean nature of space and time – referring to Weyl (1924), 
Schlick even contemplated that space-time might have a complicated topology –, the 
continuity of nature that has been dismissed after Planck’s quantum theory, and finally 
the principle of causality. And Schlick rejected any modified or relativized apriorism, 
as advanced by Cassirer and other neo-Kantians: “the logical a priori is inseparable 
from the psychological, if it is to characterize a particular epistemological position, 
namely the Kantian notion that our understanding prescribes laws to nature.” (Schlick, 
1929, p. 313/95) We can find a similar identification in Schlick’s letters of 1920 in 
which he had convinced Reichenbach to abandon the distinction between two 
meanings of the Kantian a priori, to wit, ‘being necessarily and unrevisably true’ and 
‘being constitutive of the concept of the object of knowledge’. Reichenbach’s 
relativized a priori upheld the second meaning but admitted that the first was untenable 
after relativity theory. (See Friedman, 1994, p. 23-26, and Howard, 1994) Apparently, 
it took Schlick five years to apply the same strategy to the category of causality; and 
yet he still was reluctant to sacrifice the idea that causality is constitutive for physical 
science. But while his textbook entry had talked about emergency measures, Schlick 
now grudgingly called it a great progress that science itself defines the domain of its 
validity. 
 
Even if – like the author – one fails to perceive in the facts available any sufficient basis for this 
conclusion, it could still become perfectly legitimate if further facts were to hand, and so this case has 
the following lesson to teach: Although physics is well aware that the causal principle … is a 
presupposition for its own existence, it still by no means assumes this presupposition to be satisfied a 
priori everywhere, or even in a particular area; it ascertains for itself, rather, using its own methods 
(and with the exactitude of these methods), whether and to what extent this is the case. It establishes 
for itself, that is, the boundaries of its own kingdom. (Schlick, 1929, p. 313/96) 
 
Of course, it would always be possible in principle to sustain the causal law by suitable 
ad hoc hypotheses. But doing so repeatedly and against growing evidence, science 
would violate the scientific method as such. Despite the unenthusiastic concessions in 
causal matters, Schlick’s paper ended highly optimistic and much closer to a coherent 
empiricist position than the “Naturphilosophie”. 
 
The relation outlined between modern physics and philosophy could occasion regret that epistemology 
should cast the anchor of its criterion of truth into empirical science, and thereby partake of its 
uncertainty and mutability. But if the hope of grounding philosophy on a firmer soil than that of 
experience and logic must be abandoned (and it has never been more than a hope anyway), this would 
have to be set off in the bargain against the advantage of having obtained any objective criterion at all. 
… [T]he empiricist unable to join in the lament … that physics is constantly changing … He knows, 
rather, that no law till now, in the sense and with the exactitude whereby it has once been confirmed, 
has ever again had to be abandoned. The changeable elements in physics are not the relations of 
dependency [Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen], which once established, continue to find repeated 
confirmation, but rather the intuitive ideas which serve for interpretation and interpolation. (Ibid., p. 
315/97) 
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The task of empiricist philosophy, so Schlick continued, is to purify the logical and 
empirical content of science from the ever changing pictures. For the first time, 
Schlick spoke friendly about ‘functional dependences’ without considering them 
inferior to ‘real causal relationships’. Still, Schlick had no theory of causality that 
could express his final turn to empiricism. And for another five years he would not 
present one; the very few publications written between 1925 and 1930 do not give us 
any clue about his changing views. His positive opinion about Herbert Feigl’s Ph.D. 
dissertation150 rather suggests that Schlick was still clinging to the view that causality 
was a distinguished kind of lawful relationship.  
 
7.3. Schlick’s New Theory of Causality 
 
In 1931, Schlick explicitly withdrew his earlier theory of causality and published a 
long paper in Die Naturwissenschaften that was oriented at quantum mechanics as 
closely as his earlier one had followed relativity theory. Initially he distinguished the 
concept of causality – or natural law – from the validity of the principle of causality. 
“The content of the principle of causality obviously consists in the claim that 
everything in the world takes place according to law; it is all one, whether we maintain 
the validity of the principle of causality, or uphold the truth of determinism.” (Schlick, 
1931, p. 145/177)  
 Referring to his earlier theory of causality, Schlick sustained that the concept of 
causality still required comparability of different world regions and a certain ordering 
of events. This order could either be spatial, in which case the events simply coexist, 
or temporal, that is, nomological. Although Schlick dropped the Kriesian wording 
‘ontological regularities’, he maintained the rigid distinction between spatial and 
temporal order and a Kriesian notion of probability. But now he renounced all his 
former attempts to list specific criteria for laws to qualify as causal and plainly 
declared that “every ordering of events in the temporal direction, of whatever kind it 
may be, is to be viewed as a causal relation. Only complete chaos, an utter 
lawlessness, could be described as non-causal occurrence, as pure chance; every trace 
of order would already signify dependence, and hence causality.” (Ibid., p. 146/179) 
But how to draw the border line between order and chaos? It does not suffice to 
demand that an order be expressed by a mathematical function because any arbitrary 
distribution of quantities could be expressed in this way with arbitrary exactness. Upon 
such a wide definition of causality, the principle of causality would become a 
tautology.  
 The most natural restriction is to require that causal laws of nature be universal. 
Schlick (1920) had thus posed the condition that space and time coordinates must not 
explicitly appear in them.  
 
The concept of law undoubtedly figures in physics only in such a way that this requirement is always 
satisfied; … but would it be a necessary condition? … So far as I can see, it would be imaginable, for 
example, that regular measurements of the elementary quantum of electricity (electron charge) would 
yield values for this quantity that fluctuated up and down quite uniformly by 5%, in say 7 hours, and 
then another 7 hours, and then 10 hours, without our being able to find even the slightest ‘cause’ for 
                                                          
150 The dissertation has recently been published in (Haller/Binder, 1999) and the opinion can be found in the 
university archive at the University of Vienna. 
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this; and perhaps there would be another fluctuation on top of this, for which an absolute change of the 
earth’s position in space would be held responsible. The Maxwellian condition would then no longer 
be satisfied, yet we would certainly not find the world disordered, but could formulate its laws 
[Gesetzmäßigkeit] and make predictions by means of them. (Schlick, 1931, p. 147f./181f.) 
 
While this example sounded quite Fechnerian in spirit, Schlick subsequently pointed to 
the purely random or ‘uncaused’ quantum jumps in Bohr’s atomic theory. “As soon as 
the slightest simple claim could be established about these jumps, if the temporal 
intervals, for example, were to become larger, then it would straightaway appear to us 
as a regularity, even though time explicitly entered into the formula.” (Ibid., p. 
148/182) As the criterion of simplicity, accordingly, remains applicable in cases where 
the Maxwellian condition is violated, it appears to be a better candidate to single out 
the causal laws among all orderings of events. “But simplicity is a concept half 
pragmatic and half aesthetic.” (Ibid., p. 148/182) In particular, simplicity is 
conventional, admits degrees, and a less simple individual law might lead to a more 
simple system of all natural laws (or vice versa).  
At this point, Schlick called for a fresh start that departed from the 
verificationist criterion of meaning in its full-fledged form. 
 
Our mistake hitherto has been not to adhere with sufficient exactness to the actual procedure whereby 
we actually test, in science, whether processes are dependent on one another or not, whether a law, a 
causal process, is or is not given. So far we have merely investigated the way in which a law is 
established; but in order to ascertain its true meaning, we must see how it is tested. It is quite generally 
the case that the meaning of a proposition is always revealed to us only through the manner of its 
verification. (Ibid., p. 149/185) 
 
If we have found, in whatever way, a formula describing our observations, we 
investigate “whether the formula obtained now also presents correctly those 
observations which we have not yet used in obtaining it. … In other words, the true 
criterion of lawfulness [Gesetzmäßigkeit], the essential mark of causality, is the 
fulfilment of predictions.” (Ibid., p. 149f./185) Although, trivially, the act of 
verification comes after the establishment of the law, “past and future data have 
entirely equal rights …; the criterion of causality is not that it holds in the future, but 
that it holds at all.” (Ibid., p. 150/185)  
 Schlick considered his new criterion as necessary and sufficient. “The 
confirmation of predictions is thus the sole criterion of causality; only by means of it 
does reality speak to us; the establishing of laws and formulae is purely the work of 
man.” (Ibid., p. 150/186f.) Schlick (1920) had, in contrast, maintained that laws of 
nature were not made by man, but that man only discovered them. His respective shift 
in favor of the view endorsed by all Vienna Indeterminists was not mainly a product of 
radical empiricism but of his move to pragmatics by virtue of which causal laws 
drastically changed their status. And here the influence of Wittgenstein came into play.  
 However often a law of nature successfully passes an empirical test, 
“confirmation of a prediction never ultimately proves the presence of causality, but 
always makes it probable, merely. … From this we gather that a causal claim 
[Kausalbehauptung] by no means has the logical character of an assertion [Aussage], 
for a genuine assertion must ultimately allow of verification.” (Schlick, 1931, p. 
150/187) And Schlick credits Wittgenstein for the idea “that at bottom a law of nature 
does not even have the logical status of an ‘assertion’, but represents, rather, a 
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‘prescription for the making of assertions’.”(Ibid., p. 151/188) Thus causality cannot 
be defined in such a way that it applies to any given course of events. “Only by 
reference to the single case, the single verification, can we say: it behaves as causality 
requires.” (Ibid., p. 151/188) 
 
Verification as such, the fulfilment of a prediction, confirmation in experience, is therefore the 
criterion of causality per se, and this is the practical sense in which alone it is possible to speak of the 
testing of a law. But in this sense, the question concerning the existence of causality can be tested. It 
can hardly be sufficiently emphasized that confirmation by experience, the fulfilment of a prophecy, is 
an ultimate, incapable of further analysis. It is utterly unstateable, in principles of any kind, just when 
it must occur; we simply have to wait and see whether it occurs or not. (Ibid., p. 151/188) 
 
The crucial empirical test for causality in these days was quantum mechanics, or more 
precisely, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. And Schlick attempted to give common 
interpretative wisdom – which was oriented at rejecting the Laplacian ideal – a new 
twist. 
 
The fact that position and velocity of an electron cannot both be measured with complete accuracy is 
commonly expressed by saying that it is impossible to detail the state of the system completely at a 
particular point in time, and hence that the principle of causality becomes inapplicable. For since the 
said principle claims that the future states of the system are determined by its initial state, and 
assumes, therefore, that the initial state can in principle be stated exactly, the principle of causality 
thereupon collapses, since this assumption is simply not fulfilled. I would not wish to declare this 
formulation as false, but yet it seems to me inappropriate [unzweckmäßig], since it does not clearly 
express the most essential point. What matters is to realize that the indeterminacy referred to in the 
Heisenberg relation is in fact an indeterminacy of prediction. (Schlick, 1931, p. 152/190) 
 
As Bohr and Heisenberg, and contrary to Schrödinger, Schlick openly assumed that 
the concepts of macroscopic physics remain applicable in the atomic domain, yet 
without giving much of a justification. 
 
Even in present-day physics, it is certainly permissible, with restrictions [set by the Heisenberg 
relations] …, to say, as a façon de parler, that every physical system is to be viewed as a system of 
protons and electrons, and that its state is perfectly determined by the fact that at every moment the 
position and momentum of all the particles is known. (Ibid., p. 151f./189) 
 
What Schlick more clearly associated with the Copenhagen interpretation was his 
belief that Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation introduced a limit of principle to quantum 
mechanical explanation. 
 
The new contribution made by present physics to the causality problem does not consist in contesting 
the validity of the principle of causality as such, nor in describing, say, the microstructure of nature by 
statistical rather than causal relationships, nor in the recognition of a purely probabilistic validity of 
natural laws having replaced belief in their absolute validity. All these ideas have already been 
expounded earlier, some of them a long time ago. The novelty, rather, consists in the discovery, never 
previously anticipated, that a limit of principle is set to the exactness of prediction by the laws of 
nature themselves. … In earlier times, it was always bound to seem as though the question of 
determinism would have, in principle, to remain undecided. (Ibid., p. 153/191) 
 
To Schlick’s mind, it represented “a great achievement of modern physics to have 
shown that a theory of such a structure [i.e., a theory that contains its own limits] is at 
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all possible in the description of nature.” (Ibid., p. 153/191) As the decision against 
determinism has been reached by a particular law of nature, it entirely depends upon 
the validity of the latter. This conditional refutation seems to suggest that the principle 
of causality is false – as Heisenberg (1927) had explicitly enounced, to Schlick’s mind. 
But in actual fact, laws of nature and the principle of causality do not represent 
assertions but prescriptions for the making of assertions.151 So the principle of 
causality can be neither empirically true nor false. It is not tautological either because 
physicists constantly discuss its empirical validity. It rather “represents a demand or 
prescription to seek regularity [Regelmäßigkeit] and to describe events by means of 
laws. Such a directive is not true or false, but good or bad, useful or idle.” (Schlick, 
1931, p. 155/196) Quantum mechanics teaches us that the principle of causality is bad 
within the boundaries set by Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. And as this theory 
itself is only judged as good or bad according to its current predictive score, “there 
always remains the hope that with future progress in knowledge the principle of 
causality may be able to triumph again.” (Ibid., p. 156/197) Thus, ultimately, Schlick’s 
farewell to causality was considerably less rigid than the Göttingen-Copenhagen 
finality creed. 
 The empirical foundation of the principle of causality also shows that this 
prescription “is not a postulate, in the sense in which this concept figures among 
earlier philosophers, for there it means a rule to which we must adhere under all 
circumstances.” (Ibid., p. 155/196) Schlick here rejected the neo-Kantian strategy to 
consider the principle of causality as a regulative principle. And he contended that “the 
so-called problem of ‘induction’ is also rendered vacuous.” (Ibid., p. 156/197) General 
propositions cannot be justified because they are simply not genuine propositions.  
 As radical as Schlick’s departure from his 1920 theory of causality appeared on 
the epistemological level, several core features of his analysis of statistical laws 
persisted with qualifications owing to the changed framework. While Schlick’s 
verificationist theory of causality in itself, at least to my mind, would have been 
reconcilable with Vienna Indeterminism, the remaining elements of a Kriesian theory 
of probability and the strong emphasis on the criterion of simplicity prompted Schlick 
– or so I shall argue in the remainder of this section – to reject the idea of statistical 
laws and to stick to his Planckian heritage. 
 Although simplicity was unsuitable for the definition of the concept of 
causality, Schlick considered it probable that a formula fulfilling the Maxwellian 
condition and the more general criterion of simplicity  
 
really expresses a law, an order that actually exists, and hence that it will be confirmed. If it is 
confirmed, we again think it probable that it will also be further confirmed (meaning by this, without 
the introduction of new hypotheses). … The term ‘probability’, that we use here, means something 
quite different … from the concept that is dealt with in the probability calculus and occurs in statistical 
physics. (Schlick, 1931, p. 151/187f.)  
 
This distinction between logical and physical probability was, to be sure, in stark 
contrast to Reichenbach’s advocating a unified notion of probability by means of 
which – or so he claimed to the displeasure of his Vienna colleagues – the problem of 
induction was solved rather than, as Schlick held, dissolved. 
                                                          
151 Cf. (Schlick, 1931, p. 155/195); where “Aussage” is now translated as statement. 
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 Due to the intimate connection of simplicity and (logical) probability of 
confirmation,  
 
[simplicity] de facto coincides with the true criterion [of causality], that of confirmation. It obviously 
represents, in fact, the special prescription, effective in our world, whereby the general directive of the 
principle of causality, to seek regularity, is supplemented. … 
 Once the purely practical character of the principle of simplicity is recognized …, we are also 
in the position to understand why ‘simplicity’ cannot be strictly defined and yet that the vagueness 
here does no harm at all. If we were to try to draw the simplest curve through the points whereby, in 
some experiments, the data of quantum processes (electron jumps in the atom, for example) are 
represented, this would be of no use at all in making any predictions. And since we also know no other 
rule by which we could achieve this purpose, we just say that the processes follow no law, but are 
random. So de facto there is actually a clear agreement between simplicity and lawfulness, between 
chance and complexity. (Ibid., p. 156/197f.) 
 
This distinction, in effect, led back to the Kriesian distinction between nomological 
and ontological regularity that figured so prominently in Schlick’s 1920 paper. There 
are many cases in science where our predictions are constantly confirmed in, say, 99% 
of all cases while, despite the best means available, we cannot give any cause for the 
deviant 1%. Such a world, it seems, it nicely ordered and provides a simple way of 
obtaining predictions that are much more reliable than those of medicine and 
meteorology. Since natural laws are nothing but prescriptions for the formation of 
predictions, Schlick cannot deny these statistical regularities the status of ‘law’. Still, 
they represent a “causality of an imperfect kind [unvollkommene Kausalität].” (Ibid., 
p. 157/198) 
 
It is important to note that such a [statistical] law, wherever we encounter it in science, is regarded, so 
to speak, as the resultant of two components, in that the imperfect or statistical causality is dissected 
into a strict regularity [Gesetzmäßigkeit] and an element of pure chance, which overlap. … In the 
kinetic theory of gases, the laws whereby each individual particle moves are assumed to be totally 
rigorous; but the distribution of individual particles and their states is presumed at any given moment 
to be entirely ‘lawless’. Combination of the two assumptions yields both the macroscopic gas laws (for 
example, the Van der Waals equation of state) and the imperfect regularity [Regelmäßigkeit] of the 
Brownian motion. … 
 There is another example obviously to hand in Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics (as 
interpreted by Born). There, too, the description of processes is likewise split into two parts: into the 
lawful propagation of ψ-waves, and into the occurrence of a particle or quantum, which is absolutely 
random, within the limits of the ‘probability’ determined by the ψ-value at the point in question. (That 
is, the value of ψ tells us, for example, that at a particular point, on average, 1000 quanta per second 
are arriving. But in themselves, these 1000 display a wholly irregular distribution.) (Ibid., p. 
157/198f.) 
 
Schlick, it becomes clear, was far from granting Brownian motion the status of a 
genuine lawlike process and, accordingly, he had to deny that it served as decisive 
evidence in favor of indeterminism – as Vienna Indeterminists did. Moreover, Schlick 
strictly separated deterministic micro-laws and thermodynamic laws of state, on the 
one hand, from the lawless initial conditions and fluctuations, on the other hand. No 
wonder that he also denied a primary character to the second law of thermodynamics 
and the phenomenon of irreversibility. It is true, the concept of entropy served to 
“distinguish the direction past-future from its opposite; but that the actual course of 
events proceeds in the first direction, and not in the opposite one, is in no way 
 267
assertible and no law of nature can express it.” (Ibid., p. 160/205) Thus he could still 
maintain Boltzmann’s intuition that the direction of time could differ in distinct 
regions of the universe. Reichenbach, accordingly, was wrong to assume an irreducible 
temporal asymmetry of the causal relation; this is just “feigned by circumstances 
connected with the entropy theorem.” (Ibid., p. 160/205) This was not the only 
criticism against Reichenbach.152 I cannot enter here into further analysis because it 
would lead deeply into Reichenbach’s own theory of causality, the problems of error 
and induction.  
More relevant to the present context is Schlick’s attack against von Mises’s 
frequentist interpretation of probability. To Schlick’s mind, “the so-called probability 
distribution is simply the definition of total disorder, of pure chance.” (Ibid., p. 
157/200) But this definition would be correct only for an infinitely large number of 
observations.  
 
Since this is impossible, of course, in reality, it remains strictly speaking undecidable in principle 
whether ultimate disorder is present in any given case or not. … We here have the same difficulty of 
principle which makes it impossible to define the probability of any events in nature through the 
relative frequency of their occurrence; for in order to arrive at correct statements [Ansätze], such as are 
presupposed for the mathematical treatment (the calculus of probability), it would everywhere be 
necessary to proceed to the limit for infinitely many cases – which for the empirical world is naturally 
a senseless requirement. This is often insufficiently attended to [here Schlick cites (Mises, 1928)]. The 
only usable method for defining probabilities is, in fact, that which utilizes logical ranges (Bolzano, 
von Kries, Wittgenstein, Waismann). (Ibid., p. 158/200f.)153 
 
We shall in Section 8.2. that this was quite a standard criticism which von Mises 
typically rebutted by radical empiricism, that is, by considering probability calculus as 
an axiom system on a par with Newtonian mechanics the point particles of which 
cannot be found in nature either. This answer was unacceptable for someone, such as 
Reichenbach, defending a single objective notion of probability that embraced 
statistical physics and human judgment (probabilistic induction). Schlick, on his part, 
explicitly separated probability of judgment from physical probability and considered, 
as did von Mises, the application problem (Anwendungsproblem) as meaningless. 
Why then did he reject von Mises’s frequentism so bluntly? 
 That the frequentist definition of probability invoked an infinite sequence 
events was not only a foundational problem but also a very concrete obstacle for a 
theory of causality and randomness that was based on the single act of verification. It 
was not a primitive but part of a larger mathematical structure. Von Kries’s theory, on 
the other hand, attributed a range of nomologically possible behavior to the single 
events, e.g., the individual molecules in a gas. But how could a new version of the 
distinction between nomological and ontological determinations be reached? Recall 
Schlick’s above-quoted reading of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. It demonstrated, 
as an empirically corroborated law of nature, that there were “circumstances which in 
point of principle could never be observed.” (Kries, 1919, p. 6) But this was precisely 
the situation in games of chance where we could only use probabilities to assess what 
                                                          
152 Schlick also rejected Reichenbach’s approach to problems (as the one above) in which a high percentage of 
our predictions is confirmed. In those cases, Reichenbach invoked a ‘principle of probable distribution’ [Prinzip 
der wahrscheinlichkeitsgemäßen Verteilung] alongside the principle of causality. 
153 Heidelberger (2001, p. 184) rightly cites this passage as circumstantial evidence for the close relationship 
between the theories of von Kries and Wittgenstein. 
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was equally possible under the laws of nature.154On this basis, Schlick simply rejected 
the idea that there exist laws of chance. Laws of probability do not represent ‘laws’ but 
merely a definition of ‘chance’, that is, “we are not content with a statistical law …, 
but frame it as a mixture of strict regularity and total lawlessness.” (Ibid., p. 157/199) 
With respect to natural laws, it seems to me, this distinction is more basic and more 
rigid than the former distinction between ontological and nomological regularities. 
While Schlick (1920, 1925a) had granted the possibility of lawlike ontological 
regularities, such as the identity of all electrons, Schlick (1931) opposed nomological 
causal regularity to a lawless kind of ontological coexistence, chance. Notice that 
although Schlick’s (1931) concept of causality was much wider in a theoretical 
respect, all the restricting conditions of Schlick (1920), simplicity foremost, remained 
untouched as practical maxims. Thus Schlick’s empiricist turn in epistemology, in 
effect, did not bring his philosophy of nature any closer to Vienna Indeterminism. In 
particular, Exner’s contention that exact laws are the ideal limit of probabilistic laws 
simply changed from being treated as a violation of the most basic presupposition of 
scientific research – in terms of (Schlick, 1920) – to an outright category mistake.  
 It is true, Schlick new theory could easily count all predictive successes of 
quantum mechanics on a par with other instances of lawfulness – within the limits set 
by Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. But the idea of strict lawfulness as opposed to 
pure chance remained as unassailable as Planck had taught. In Schlick’s above-quoted 
description of Born’s interpretation the determinist evolution of the wave function is 
simply contrasted with its non-deterministic interpretation. Within Schlick’s 
conception, the scientist could content himself with this situation as long as successful 
predictions were possible and once the separation into causal laws and pure 
randomness had been achieved. Schlick’s whole theory thus, at bottom, crucially 
depended upon the verificationist criterion of meaning. Discussing Heisenberg’s 
disturbance argument (the Heisenberg microscope), Schlick accordingly continued as 
such. 
 
But I should prefer to put it more strongly, in complete agreement with what I take to be the 
incontestable basic viewpoint of Bohr and Heisenberg themselves. If a statement about an electron’s 
position is not verifiable within atomic dimensions, we can attach no meaning to it; it becomes 
impossible to speak of the ‘path’ of a particle between two points at which it has been observed. … 
This can be regarded as a sharpened form of a principle of the general theory of relativity: just as no 
physical meaning can there be attached to those transformations which leave all point-coincidences – 
or intersection-points of world-lines – unchanged, so here we may say that it has no meaning whatever 
to attribute physical reality to the world-line segments between the points of intersection. (Ibid., p. 
159/203) 
 
It is true, Schlick applies the verificationist criterion of meaning on an empiricist basis 
while Heisenberg (See Sect. 2.2.2.) did so on the basis of quite a few presuppositions 
that would have appeared metaphysical to Logical Empiricists.  
 If we try to locate Schlick within the dispute on quantum mechanical ontology, 
we see an interesting division. While Göttingen-Copenhagen insisted on the use of 
                                                          
154 Neumann, in the same vein, argues that “the development of quantum mechanics up to Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty relation of 1927 could be seen as a paradigm example of the theory of ranges.” (2002, p. 328) 
Unfortunately he wrongly believes that Schlick considered “statistical laws as something final” (p. 376) and thus 
fails to see that Schlick had basically done, though in a different wording, what a Kriesian turned empiricist, to 
Neumann’s mind, should have done. 
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classical concepts, Schrödinger called for an entirely new and consistent quantum 
ontology. In this, Schrödinger not only followed Boltzmann’s picture realism but also 
availed himself of the large freedom in the choice of ontology characteristic of Vienna 
Indeterminism; it resulted from the close connection between causality and ontology 
within the context of a given scientific theory. Thus empiricists could accommodate 
physical ontology to a new law of nature. Schlick’s verificationist account of causality, 
on the other hand, provided a strategy to circumvent such changes in ontology. To 
search for a universally applicable ontology was less important once natural laws 
ceased to be assertions. Verificationism provided the means to live quite well with a 
theory that explicitly described the limits of its own validity – a prospect unacceptable 
to Schrödinger. This limit permitted Schlick to maintain a distinction in principle 
between causal laws and randomness; apparent statistical laws resulted from their 
combination. Moreover, Schlick could easily accept the Copenhagen contention that 
the ontology of classical physics was indispensable as a basis for quantum mechanical 
ontology – it was just a façon de parler that was admissible if it provided successful 
prediction. Thus although close allies on the general level, verificationism and radical 
empiricism pulled into different directions if applied to quantum mechanics. But this 
division was not the only aspect that made Schlick’s position difficult reading for his 
contemporaries. In the next section we shall see that many physicists were wondering 
about his treatment of statistical law.  
 
7.4. Reactions and Dialogues 
 
Schlick entertained close connections to many leading physicists of the day. This was 
not just a consequence that he had obtained his Ph.D. under Planck and was on close 
terms with Einstein. It also expressed the prominent role the German physics 
community of the 1920s and 1930s attributed to the philosophical foundations of their 
field. For those participating in the discourse among the scientist-philosophers, Schlick 
was an eminent frontman within academic philosophy. In a letter written to Schlick on 
11 June, 1919, in which he expressed his fascination about the Allgemeine 
Erkenntnislehre, Max Born went so far as to write: “We [the new generation of 
physicists] are now forming a community [Gemeinde] which has found its prophet – I 
hope that you will accept this honorable position. After all, it entails no burdens other 
than those which your philosophical profession anyhow shifts onto you, to wit, to 
continue the research into the purification and clarification of knowledge.” As outlined 
in Section 5.2, Schlick had become the main philosophical defender of relativity 
theory in the critical years between 1917-1922. When Schlick published a new theory 
of causality in Die Naturwissenschaften in 1931, this, accordingly, represented an 
authoritative voice. 
 In the present section, I shall discuss the reactions to Schlick’s new theory by 
six physicist-philosophers involved in the interpretation of quantum mechanics: 
Einstein, Heisenberg, Pauli, Born, Sommerfeld, and Schrödinger. The first three had 
received a carbon copy of the manuscript. At surface value one should expect that 
assent and criticism to a paper defending – at least at surface value – the Göttingen-
Copenhagen position, would divide according to the already established interpretative 
front lines. Looking through the correspondence one sees that, to a certain extent, this 
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is indeed the case. While Born, Heisenberg, and Pauli – for his standards at least – 
reacted positively to Schlick, Einstein, Sommerfeld, and Schrödinger expressed their 
doubts. But this is not the only line of division. We will also find many remnants of 
the causality debate between Vienna and Berlin which reveal that Schlick was indeed 
considered as being much closer to the German philosophical context than his Vienna 
Circle colleague Frank. Most explicit was Schrödinger who, defending Exner’s 
priority, wondered why Schlick had identified such a radical change in matters of 
determinism. In one respect, however, Schlick unanimously received negative 
responses, to wit, that he had not fully accepted statistical laws and the relative 
frequency interpretation. 
 On 28 November, 1930, Einstein wrote to Schlick:155 
 
I have immediately read your paper and found it essentially correct. Roughly speaking I may put it as 
such: 
Science searches for universal relational assertions [allgemeine Relationsaussagen], which connect 
possible sense experiences [Sinneserlebnisse] in such a way that these assertions can turn out correct 
or incorrect, or respectively, are suitable for correct prediction in empiry. 
I essentially disagree with you on the following points. 
1. Even quantum theory knows such relational assertions which are not of a statistical nature, but 
applied to a single instance yield something entirely definite (e.g., energy-momentum theorem 
applied to an elementary process). 
2. I do not believe that ‘statistical law’ is a contradictory concept. It is, to be sure, a limiting assertion 
which refers to frequent repetition of a set-up which is defined in a very particular way. Whether 
one wants to call such laws as deterministic or not, is a question of nomenclature. It is common to 
call them non-deterministic. 
3. Temporal assertions, to the extent that they can be conceived of as relational assertions, which 
directly refer to sense experiences are not to play a special role superior to relational assertions. (I 
agree to the criticism against Reichenbach with respect to the non-invertibility of temporal 
direction.) 
From a general perspective, your presentation does not agree with my point of view, inasmuch as I 
consider your whole conception, as it were, too positivistic. Physics, to be sure, supplies relations 
between sense experiences, but only indirectly. For me its essence is by no means exhaustively 
characterized by this statement. I frankly tell you: Physics is an attempt at conceptual construction of a 
model of the real world and its nomic structure. However, it must represent exactly the empirical 
relations among those sense experiences accessible to us; but only thus it is chained to the latter. 
 I also admire the achievements of quantum mechanics as coined by Schrödinger-Heisenberg-
Dirac, but I firmly believe that one will not want and will not be able to make do with this mode of 
consideration. For this theory does not furnish a model of the real world. (The elements functionally 
connected in it do not represent the real world, but only probabilities which refer to experiences 
[Erlebnisse].)156 In brief, I suffer from the unclear separation between experiential reality 
[Erlebnisrealität] and ontic reality [Seinsrealität]. Moreover, I am firmly convinced that one fine day 
the statistical law as a basis of the physical expression of law will be overcome. As already said, I do 
not share your opinion that the ‘statist. law’ is no law at all. 
 You will be astonished about the ‘metaphysician’ Einstein, but every four-legged and two-
legged animal is de facto a metaphysician in this sense. 
 
It is remarkable to what extent Einstein was able to enter into Schlick’s philosophical 
train of thought; this was certainly a product of their intense intellectual exchange at 
                                                          
155 All letters can be found in the Schlick-Nachlaß; my translation. 
156 “Erlebnis” in another term difficult to translate. I translate it here as “experience” to set it apart from 
“sensations” which would give it a Machian bias and “observation” which would lead to some confusions in the 
context of quantum mechanics. This admittedly wipes out to difference between elemental “Erlebnis” and 
“Erfahrung” in general which is less important for the objective of the present study. 
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the beginning of the 1920s. Don Howard has studied in great detail how Schlick’s (and 
also Reichenbach’s) “development of a new form of empiricism that would force the 
issue with the neo-Kantians, … chiefly to save relativity … from the clutches of the 
neo-Kantians” (Howard, 1994, p. 74) led to a parting of philosophical ways with 
Einstein in the late 1920s. Einstein’s general criticism of positivism and his ironical 
self-description as a metaphysician have been rightly seen as a case in point (Cf. ibid., 
p. 94). Howard’s main evidence for Schlick’s change is a detailed comparison of both 
editions of the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918, 1925b). Yet the drastic changes 
necessitated by quantum mechanics came after the second edition, and the Schlick of 
the years 1924-1925 was still wavering – and even published an account (Schlick, 
1925a) that came close to a hybrid of two positions – without having a satisfactory 
theory of causality.  
In this perspective, Schlick’s (1931) turn must have appeared to Einstein as 
once again radicalizing a ‘positivist’ trend without compelling new reasons, or rather, 
for reasons which Einstein openly rejected because, to him, the present state of 
quantum mechanics was transitory only. Yet if we take his well-known quest for a 
realist and not merely statistical theory of quantum mechanics, it becomes even more 
striking that Einstein, twice, rejected Schlick’s contention that statistical laws are not 
laws at all. Here, so I take it, one of the former core players in statistical mechanics 
charges Schlick not only of overshooting the mark in the defense of Göttingen-
Copenhagen, but also – compare point 2. – of an inadequate notion of physical 
probability; as most physicists in those days Einstein was quite happy with statistical 
law referring to the limit of relative frequencies. 
 Also Heisenberg had received a carbon copy of Schlick’s manuscript. In a letter 
of 27 December, 1930, he emphasized that “he extraordinarily liked its tendency,” in 
particular the distinction between the three possible meanings of causality, that is, 
whether it is a tautology, an empirical assertion, or just a practical prescription. The 
first of Heisenberg’s critical remarks indicates that Schlick’s understanding of 
statistical law was strange for Heisenberg, too. “The distinction between order, 
lawfulness [Gesetzmäßigkeit], and ‘statistical regularity’ [statistische 
Gesetzmäßigkeit] has not become totally clear to me.” 
 
But what means absolutely random within the limits of ‘probability’? I cannot see any difference 
between your ‘statistical regularities’ and those which we know of in atomic theory. Neither do I see 
how anything could be still possible in-between ‘complete’ causality and disorder plus probability 
‘laws’. What Einstein wants, is, e.g., complete causality in the strictest sense, that is, Einstein hopes 
that some day it will be possible to predict the moment in time of a ‘transition’ in the atom on the basis 
of previous experiments. 
 I am also a bit unhappy to be always quoted for the phrase of the ‘invalidity of the causal 
principle’ [Kausalsatz], as if I would be in opposition to the views of Born. I have given much thought 
to the word ‘invalidity’ and wanted to express by it two things: First, that the principle of causality no 
longer has a domain of validity in physics (in the sense as, say, the stamps of 1912 are no longer 
‘valid’) – which is not the same as the claim ‘it is false’; second, that a principle that has no domain of 
validity also cannot be at all interesting. The word ‘invalid’ seemed to me just to stand in the right 
middle between ‘false’ and ‘inapplicable’, but unfortunately is has always been identified with false. 
To be sure, for the then common unclear form of the causal principle the word ‘false’ is not entirely 
justified. In the meantime, however, Planck has asserted a form of the causal principle which is surely 
‘false’. Planck thinks157 that Schrödinger’s ψ-function determines a process or a system; it can indeed 
                                                          
157 For instance in (Planck, 1929b), his response to Schrödinger’s inaugural address. 
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be taken with arbitrary precision from experiment and its future follows from a differential equation. 
But Planck here completely overlooks that the physical behavior of the system does not uniquely 
follow from precisely this ψ-function (or at least not in general). Thus he claims: ‘If one knows all 
determining instances [Bestimmungsstücke] of the system at a certain moment in time, then one can 
calculate the future.’ The antecedent can now be satisfied. The consequent is false if one intends the 
physical future; it is only correct if one speaks about the ψ-function. 
 I completely agree to your rejection of Bergmann’s [1929] writing and, more generally, of the 
possibility, believed in by physicists time and again, of synthetic a priori judgments. Planck, von Laue, 
Kellner, and others still cling to the authority of the good old Königsbergian who would have 
understood the whole situation long before had be been accustomed with non-Euclidean geometry. 
This much is correct of these judgments a priori, that it remains possible to make postulates, and, at 
bottom, Kant has in part thought of these postulates (your ‘case III’). But, it is true, these postulates 
often prove inappropriate [unzweckmäßig] if applied to new domains. … 
 
Here Heisenberg clearly misread Schlick’s concept of postulate that was explicitly 
intended not to represent a Kantian regulative principle. Reinterpreting the disreputed 
categories as regulative principles was a widespread neo-Kantian defense strategy. Yet 
it was rather the influence of Wittgenstein’s concept of rule that loomed in causality as 
prescription, not as postulate. 
 As had Einstein, Heisenberg considered the laws of quantum mechanics simply 
as probabilistic laws and opposed Einstein’s belief in a future deterministic theory. 
Unlike Einstein, however, he did not see that Schlick in effect was denying matrix 
mechanics the status of law altogether. And his interpretation of Planck’s futile return 
to determinism took just the form of the standard argument about Laplacian 
determinism that Schlick had considered as missing the essential point of prediction 
(Cf. Schlick, 1931, p. 152/190). To Heisenberg, the lesson of Planck’s obtaining a 
false consequent from a true antecedent was that the antecedent had to be denied. 
 Heisenberg openly expressed his embarrassment about Schlick’s procedure of 
separating complete causality and disorder. In his response of 2 January, 1931, Schlick 
admitted that the expression “random within the limits of ‘probability’” was unclear 
and pointed to a parenthesis added in the printed version (Cf. ibid., p. 157/198f.). 
However, the parenthesis just rehearsed Born’s interpretation of the wave function.  
 
I was believing that also in all other cases arising in physics such a division of the description into 
strict lawfulness and pure chance is carried out or is at least aimed at. … Perhaps I may express my 
view that has been badly formulated in the paper as such: If it is observed as a final, not further 
reducible, fact that under certain circumstances an event occurs in a given percentage of cases more 
frequently that the other observed events, then a ‘statistical law’ is present. Upper limit: this 
percentage is 100 (complete causality). Lower limit: this percentage is the same for all possible 
sequences of events, none of them is distinguished (complete disorder, lawlessness, probability 
distribution). In the latter case I would consider it misleading to speak of probability ‘laws’.  
 
Though perhaps more pointedly, Schlick simply recapitulated his original position and 
insisted on the division into complete lawfulness and complete lawlessness. Schlick 
did not hold that strict causality (100%) was the limit of statistical laws; it resulted 
from the strict lawfulness meshed with randomness once the latter had been tamed or 
reduced, e.g., when cosmic radiation is screened off in an experiment. Schlick’s 
distinction did not perform well as regards the distinction between atomic processes 
and macroscopic physics that entered only by way of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation 
because he in effect understood it solely as a limit of the applicability of concepts. 
Thus, Schlick had not much to say about the issue that was plaguing quantum 
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physicists, whether the basic laws of nature were deterministic or not. His theory of 
causality went equally well with Planck’s and with Heisenberg’s ideas; quantum 
mechanics could not provide final laws because it did not provide laws at all – here 
even Planck could agree –, but this was no hobble against its validity because 
ultimately it were the predictions which counted. 
 On 5 February, 1931, Wolfgang Pauli wrote a long letter to Schlick which 
expressed similar misgivings.  
 
I may interpret everything what you say in such a way that I can agree to it. Yet one might also 
interpret much in such a way that I would have to protest; in short, I think, that you have expressed 
yourself not precisely and clearly enough on all issues. First of all, I believe, one has to keep apart two 
problems more clearly as has been done in your manuscript. 
A) How does one establish a causal connection between observational data and in which sense does 
such a connection exist according to the conception of quantum theory? 
B) How does one test a definite theory by experiment? 
 
The main difference between the cases A) and B), according to Pauli, was that a causal 
connection in the sense of A) might be established without knowing the definite form 
of the law of nature in the sense required for B). Thus Schlick’s main criterion for 
successful prediction, to wit, that the law of nature was applied to predict new data, 
already required B) instead of just A). Pauli insisted on distinguishing two types of 
prediction. “‘Whenever A, then the same B’ is something else than a special functional 
form ‘B=f(A)’. The ‘test of a law’ is something else than the question whether there 
exist at all unique connections between certain experimental results.” Pauli’s criticism 
made it clear that his notion of causality was very different from that of his godfather 
Ernst Mach. Nine years ago, the 22-year old Pauli had written to Schlick in a different 
spirit. “I have thoroughly reconsidered your objections against [Mach’s] positivism 
and I am no longer able to accept them as valid. I now consider positivism as an 
entirely perfect and coherent world view. Of course, it is not the only possible one.” 
(quoted from Meyenn, 1994, p. 41) 
 Pauli fully accepted the coherence of statistical law. He moreover emphasized 
that such laws directly emerged from the mutual exclusiveness of certain experimental 
set-ups and because each measurement introduced disturbances part of which remains 
undetermined in point of principle. This was nothing but the standard Copenhagen 
argument. 
 
As regards the characteristics of ‘statistical law’, I would also want to say that, to me, the partition of 
such a ‘law’ into strict lawfulness and complete lawlessness appears neither feasible in general nor 
advisable [zweckmäßig]. Moreover, for the physicist there cannot exist any definition of probability 
other than through the number of favorable cases divided by the number of possible cases, despite its 
inherent ambiguity in principle due to the transition to the limit of an infinite number of cases. 
 
Apart from Planck, by 1930 practically every physicist-philosopher had made his 
peace with the frequency interpretation, setting foundational problems aside. And 
Pauli even expressed a more fundamental dissatisfaction with Schlick’s whole 
approach of logical analysis. 
 
The difference between ‘useless prescription’ and ‘incorrect assertion’ has remained unclear to me. I 
cannot reconcile myself with the whole direction Wittgenstein (transfer of the logical methods of 
Hilbert and others from mathematics to the natural sciences); I cannot see the fertility of this method. 
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This passage, it is true, was not a model of careful and clear distinction.158 
 A transfer of mathematical methods to physics was, of course, no annoyance for 
Born who had studied with Hilbert at Göttingen. Moreover, the axiomatic method 
represented the main philosophical instrument of the Hilbert school. On 8 March, 
1931, Born wrote to Schlick. 
 
I would like to say to you that your article on causality has given much pleasure to me. Also Hilbert 
with whom I have spoken yesterday was very satisfied with your paper. He and I are in general 
appalled by what the philosophers of today are saying and writing – each time when incidentally a 
philosophical writing comes into our hands, we have the feeling to look into an alien world, farther 
than the farthermost fixed star. The more we are pleased that you are close and comprehensible to us, 
even more that you are capable of formulating so crystal-clear those thoughts which in us act more 
unconsciously underneath the surface of our creative production. Your way of philosophizing is a 
supplement, yes the crowning of the special research and a guide for life – With other members of the 
Viennese school of philosophy I do not agree so completely. Let alone the presumptuous tone of some 
writings, I have many objections in substance, e.g., against that form of positivism which Philipp 
Frank [1929] has recently advocated in the Naturwissenschaften. 
 
Beyond the narrower context of Hilbert’s foundational program, Born’s short letter 
clearly demonstrates that German scientist-philosophers felt much closer to Schlick’s 
conceptual framework and to the tendency of his philosophizing than to the Viennese 
tradition rooted in Mach. Pace Wittgenstein, this shows to what extent the Mach-
Planck controversy, or the opposition between radical empiricism and post-Kantian 
criticism, was still shaping the protagonist’s philosophical identities.  
 In the above-mentioned (Sect. 2.1.2.2.) short correspondence with Schlick, 
Sommerfeld had charged positivism of infertility in science and pointed to Frank. In 
the same letter of 17 October, 1932, we can also find his criticism of Mach’s 
empiricist conception of causality. 
 
I am not a dogmatist in a religious sense, but I am a dogmatist on the issue of natural laws. I cannot 
tolerate Mach’s ‘principle of sloppy laws of nature’ (Prinzip der schlampigen Naturgesetze) despite 
the uncertainty relation. 
 
Schlick responded with some delay on 18 December 1932. 
 
Personally also I do not want to have anything to do at all with the ‘principle of sloppy laws of nature’, 
moreover I firmly believe in the objective lawfulness of nature, and presumably the uncertainty 
relation in principle does not require any change in this respect even though the laws are then of a 
different kind. In this point there seems to be complete agreement [between us]. 
 
While Mach’s principle of sloppy laws of nature was, when supplemented with the 
frequentist interpretation of probability, fully consistent with the notion of 
probabilistic law, Schlick in his 1931 theory had reserved the term ‘law’ to strict 
regularities. And in his rejection of ‘sloppy laws’, that is when pure chance had not yet 
been separated off, he was in full agreement with Planck and Sommerfeld who, 
however, remained skeptical that quantum mechanics was the final word. 
                                                          
158 Schlick was not to only one who had to stand Pauli’s bitter criticism of Hilbert’s axiomatic method. Born 
reports that Pauli called his interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation as matrix multiplication “useless 
mathematics” (Born, 1975, p. 300) that was about to destroy Heisenberg’s physical ideas. 
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 Schrödinger shared this skepticism, but for different reasons. As we have seen 
in Sect. 6.3., they concerned ontology rather than the statistical character of natural 
law. In a letter to Schlick of 25 February, 1931, Schrödinger defended the tradition of 
Vienna Indeterminism against Schlick’s negligence. 
 
I hope you won’t get me wrong if I write to you about a little thing, that is certainly not the most 
important in your article, but that has made me a bit sad. … The turn that recent physics has taken on 
the subject of causality has been foreseen. To be more precise, in Franz Exner’s Lectures published in 
1919 at Deuticke. Franz Exner has not gone by the cross-roads [of the old and new ideas] without 
noticing it. He was not at all in possession of those quantum theoretical conceptions which have been 
created in 1925/26 by Heisenberg-Born, on the one side, and by de Broglie and myself, on the other 
side, and which we have got used to within the last five years. 
 With respect to causality, he nevertheless made already precisely that conjecture which today 
is advocated by the quantum theoreticians and which – perhaps – will be confirmed. It is true, a 
quantitative version, say, of the kind of the uncertainty relation cannot be found in him. But instead an 
extraordinarily more profound investigation of the question of acausality from a purely philosophical 
standpoint. 
 Whether the new conception of natural law [Naturgesetzlichkeit] can be made probable by 
very general arguments (as Exner had done) or whether it becomes imperative only by the discoveries 
of quantum mechanics, to my mind, is a question of far greater importance than all petty priority 
disputes. … 
 
And Schrödinger emphasized that he would not mind if Schlick frankly admitted not 
to have read Exner’s book or regarded his own inaugural address (Schrödinger, 1922a) 
as mere “popular prattle”. He nonetheless attached an offprint of it marking off the 
initial popular prattle from the core of Exner’s thought by a red line. 
 
Personally, the general philosophical reasons for acausality, which were first advanced by Exner and 
which I have merely repeated in that paper, are almost closer to my heart than the particular ones from 
quantum theory. For the former are almost infinitely portative [tragfähig] while the latter are not. I 
even can tell you why not. They rest upon what today is called the ‘interpretation’ of quantum 
mechanics. And this interpretation suffers from the disastrous defect that it is hardly reconcilable with 
the special theory of relativity. I thus expect that it will undergo quite a radical modification some day 
or another.  
 
We see again how deep-seated Schrödinger’s adherence to Vienna Indeterminism was. 
Even a modified quantum mechanics that would conform to his quest for new 
universal concepts and coherent pictures, could not lead to a simple return of 
determinism.  
 Schlick answered only a fey days later159 that he had indeed never read Exner’s 
book because he felt fully informed about it through Schrödinger’s paper. 
 
It is true, I should perhaps have mentioned Exner, of course particularly since I entirely admire the 
boldness of his thesis – yet the reasons why I did not do so, come out in my paper with full clarity. … 
It simply appeared to me – rightly or not – as most characteristic of the present situation that assuming 
the correctness of the relevant statements of quantum theory “a limit of principle is set to the exactness 
of prediction by the laws of nature themselves.” Only this idea I had in mind when asserting that the 
present turn has not been foreseen by anyone. As far as I know, this idea is not found in Exner. 
 That modern physics takes acausality into consideration and is inclined to believe into the 
statistical character of the ultimate microlaws, did not appear to me, frankly speaking, so surprising 
                                                          
159 The carbon copy bears no date, and I have not found the letter in the Schrödinger-Nachlaß. But Schrödinger 
already responded to Schlick on 13 March, 1931. 
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and exceptional. For even though determinism has long been regarded, as it were, as a dogma in 
physics, nevertheless, the likes of us are well accustomed to doubts against causality from the history 
of philosophy.  
 
And Schlick mentioned Epicurus’ oft-quoted indeterminist atomism. Since Hume, it 
had become “one of the most familiar insights of empiricism that acausality is not 
unthinkable at all”. After emphasizing again that Exner’s “philosophical candor 
commands respect”, Schlick filed a logician’s caveat against the thesis that the primary 
laws of nature could be of a statistical character; six years before, he had expressed in 
a similar wording his doubts about Planck’s uncompromising insistence on 
determinism, when reviewing Planck’s rebuttal of Exner (See the end of Sect. 7.1.). 
 
As a careful logician I am unable to make his [Exner’s] reasons for this view [of genuine 
indeterminism] my own. – Although we know that precisely the natural [natürlichen] laws of 
macroscopic events which served as a model of causality, in actual fact are of a directly statistical 
character, it nonetheless does not seem to me legitimate to say that it is really improbable that the 
microlaws carry a different, namely, a strictly causal character, and that it is much more probable that 
there do not exist two kinds of laws (for finite size and for the infinitely small). To me it seems that 
from the structure of the macrolaws one can initially draw no conclusion about the structure of the 
mircolaws to be assumed; and success alone can show how one has to imagine the latter. It seems that 
one can equally well assent to Poincaré who states at some point (albeit in a different context) that it is 
an unjustified prejudice to assume that the microproperties must be somehow similar to the 
macroproperties. If one looks closer at how statistics emerges in the gas laws, one finds, I think, that 
there is no reason to assume that it is more probable that strictly causal laws do not exist at all. 
Einstein, as is well-known, considers complete causality still as ‘more probable’ even under the 
present circumstances. I only want to say that general philosophical deliberations neither speak for nor 
against the statistical character of the microlaws, that accordingly only factual confirmation can decide 
here. 
 These remarks should only justify why I cannot settle for your position, namely, to attribute 
almost a higher dignity to the general philosophical reasons than to the empirical ones. 
 
Schrödinger responded promptly on 13 March, 1931. “I have just read your kind letter 
and reread the last paragraph of § 8, which you indicated to me. And from both 
together I recognize a much deeper divergence of our opinions than I have assumed.” 
Admitting that a quantitative result is of course more valuable than a merely 
qualitative one, Schrödinger affirmed that Exner’s result was in fact no less 
empirically testable than Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. And indeed (Cf. 3.4., 4.4., 
6.3.2., 8.1., 8.2.), Schrödinger and the Vienna Indeterminists took Brownian motion 
and radioactive decay precisely as empirical corroborations of their core indeterminacy 
thesis. Schlick’s suspicion that Schrödinger put philosophy above empirical science 
was hence unjustified. 
 Schrödinger brushed aside Schlick’s reference to Epicurus by pointing to the 
many absurd theses advanced by the philosophers of that epoch and that Epicurus’ 
ideas were considered as entirely absurd for a long time.  
 
Well, Hume’s deed is in fact generally acknowledged. But after Hume came Kant and his tremendous 
influence on all philosophy and natural science. Even if you tell me that for a certain group of 
philosophers since Hume it has remained one of the most familiar insights that acausality was not 
unthinkable, this insight nevertheless remained without the slightest influence on anyone’s conviction 
that physics was doing right to follow the words of the superior pope [Oberpapstes] on this issue and 
to reject indeterminism. I do not believe than any among those philosophers has seriously opposed 
Laplace’s claim that from a precise knowledge of the initial state of the physical world it would be 
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possible to calculate in advance the state at every later instant in time. I am not even entirely 
convinced that Hume himself would have doubted this. 
 
Exner defended a correct thesis that stood against the general opinion of the 
philosophers of the day. Ending thus the question of priority, Schrödinger expressed 
his embarrassment about Schlick’s rejection of his proof for the probability of Exner’s 
indeterminist thesis as presented in the inaugural lecture (Schrödinger, 1922a). 
 
You are committing the petitio principii that I would be talking about two things: 1) the macrolaws, 2) 
the microlaws. (‘Law’ here is intended in the most general sense; perhaps ‘state of affairs’ 
[Sachverhalt], ‘form of the events’, or something like that would be better.) Moreover, you impute to 
me the following absurd conclusion: macroscopically we find regularity [Regelmäßigkeit], but 
recognize its merely statistical character. Hence it is probable that the same state of affairs prevails 
microscopically too.  
 The same state of affairs would mean: likewise regularity, likewise in actual fact statistically 
conditioned, for instance, by a huge number of collisions of extremely small ultra-atoms, say, of the 
ether. 
 This is diametrically opposed to the views of Exner and myself. It would instead be the view 
of some person who, although he has encountered a certain variability [Schwankungsbreite] of 
determinacy in the microscopic realm, nevertheless à tout prix would stick to determinacy and to this 
end invent a strictly causal ultra-mechanism which would account for this variability in a way similar 
to the molecular mechanism of Boltzmann have accounted for the thermodynamic fluctuations. 
 But instead we [Exner and Schrödinger] actually claim, precisely in accordance with 
Poincaré’s statement, which I know very well, that is it highly improbable that upon sufficiently 
precise observation in the microscopic realm one would find the same again as in the macroscopic, to 
wit, regularity. More precisely, not statistical regularity justified by ultramechanics because this would 
be too naive following Poincaré’s aperçu. Not ‘true’ determinacy either because it would be equally 
naive to hope that nature had done us the kindness to run a theater play within a domain into which we 
have not entered so far, a play to which a certain instrument of thought by chance happens to fit just 
well which he have made up – notoriously wrong – in an entirely different domain. Only not to be 
forced to put into the corner as useless our cozy little causality [unser liebes herziges Kausalitätchen] 
and say that nothing came out of it, only that we continue to have some use for it, nature should have 
done us this favor. But that is really totally obvious. It is almost as naive as if an explorer having 
initially drawn an extremely inaccurate map of a newly discovered island, tried to find his way around 
the next island he discovers by means of this map. This has been my train of thoughts when 
considering the ‘duplicity’ of natural laws as extremely improbable. 
 
As Boltzmann and Exner, Schrödinger rejected the primary character of distinction 
between macrolaws and microlaws because its only emerged – as a contingent fact 
about nature – from the large number of particles present in our every-day 
environment which makes the statistical laws become exact causal laws in the limit. 
Thus Schrödinger basically rehearsed the classical Viennese criticism of causality as a 
habit of thought that was used beyond the domain of its validity; in Boltzmann’s 
words, causality thus overshot the mark (See Sect. 3.3.). And he accused Schlick of 
simply defending the Planckian position – leveled against Exner in 1914 (Sec. 4.4.) – 
according to which any statistical law required a deterministic foundation, e.g., by 
atomic collisions or even more microscopic ultramechanism. Schrödinger concluded 
with some remarks about the relation of entropy and the predictions about a systems 
future and past behavior that are closely related to his paper on the inversion of natural 
laws (Schrödinger, 1931). 
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 Schlick responded promptly on 19 March, 1931, being sorry about the many 
misunderstandings. In particular he never assumed that Schrödinger committed the 
above-mentioned absurd conclusion. 
 
I was rather thinking of an analogy in the form of the laws, which in both cases are based on a different 
state of affairs. In actual fact, e.g., the macroscopic gas laws are statistically explained by the 
assumption of lawlessness in spatial direction (hypothesis of molecular disorder), while maintaining 
causality in the temporal direction; however the quantum laws cannot be reduced any longer, in them 
causality is dropped. Perhaps one might say that one gets from the state of affairs prevailing in gas 
theory to the one in quantum theory by transferring the idea of disorder from the spatial to the 
temporal direction. Excuse my still defective way of expression. 
 Now as before I do however not believe that on the basis of general considerations one could 
meaningfully conclude that strict causality is ‘rather improbable’ and that one can instead only say: 
from the outset we do not know anything at all about the microscopic regularity. 
 What about if, e.g., the certainly possible case occurs (which Einstein, Planck and others 
indeed hope to be real) that by new discoveries modern quantum theory together with the uncertainty 
relation would be overcome by a strictly causal field physics that successfully describes all 
observations with arbitrary exactness? As your argument for the improbability of finally arriving at 
strict causality is to be valid with complete generality, you would have to consequently say also in this 
case: this field theory, however beautiful its differential equations may appear, is definitively not the 
last word and we must continue research until we arrive at acausality because it is far too improbable 
that this should not be the case! To me this position would appear unjustified and to the physicists, I 
am sure, entirely infertile. In brief: we must not be surprised about causality or acausality. Your 
comparison with newly discovered islands appears to me inappropriate because in this case it would 
well be meaningful, so I believe, to speak about a probability of whether the islands are similar or not. 
 
Schlick apparently did not realize how radical Schrödinger’s indeterminism in effect 
was; exact laws just emerge from chaos. Notice that in the correspondence with 
Schlick, Schrödinger defended the original Exnerian stand without referring to the 
conventionalist argument ending his Berlin inaugural address (Schrödinger, 1929a).  
 Schlick argued that Schrödinger did not possess any basis for a meaningful 
probability judgment. Hence the question as to the characteristics of the true 
microlevel had to be left open. It is true, such probability could not be put on a 
frequentist basis – let alone on a Kriesian –, and Schlick was right to question 
Schrödinger’s conclusion. Yet paradoxically it was Schlick himself who had insisted 
on the intimate connection between simplicity and logical probability. Although it was 
irrelevant for the justification of the concept of causality – albeit crucial for each 
application of causal laws –, Schlick could have understood that Schrödinger was not 
only speaking about an ill-defined range of possible islands for explorers but that in 
effect he was also making a claim about ontological simplicity when rejecting the 
duplicity of natural laws.  
Schrödinger had, of course, to grant that a successful deterministic theory of 
atomic physics was provisional with respect to the issue of causality; and indeed all 
Vienna Indeterminists were empiricist enough to do so. Strangely, Schlick even 
imputed to Schrödinger an a priori preference for acausality; this was an open 
misunderstanding. 
 Schrödinger was wrong to assume that Schlick was simply defending Planck’s 
criticism of Exner. Yet something remained of Planck’s contention that probabilistic 
laws required a determinist foundation. This was the Kriesian approach to probability, 
or rather the more fundamental distinction between ontological and nomological 
determinations which yielded the rigid distinction between disorder in temporal and 
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spatial dimension by way of which Schlick set apart what all Vienna Indeterminists 
saw as the very same philosophical problem, namely, Boltzmann’s statistical 
mechanics and quantum theory. This was not to say that quantum theory did not 
introduce a novel feature: now there was a principal limit on determinism emerging 
from within the theory itself. In this respect, Schrödinger could well agree with 
Schlick and accordingly he did not contest the respective clarification in Schlick’s first 
letter. Unlike later interpreters Schlick was careful enough not to wrongly associate 
Schrödinger’s ideas about a better quantum theory simply with the position of 
Einstein.  
 After responding to Schrödinger’s remarks about the concept of entropy by 
quoting the respective passages from his “Naturphilosophie”, Schlick concluded their 
correspondence as such. 
 
At present I do have the time so say and ask more; perhaps at some point there will be an occasion to 
speak about a few things. When this occasion comes I hope to learn also whether you agree at least to 
basic conception of causality as advocated in my article and thus assent to those eminent physicists 
who have already expressed to me, in part with great warmth, that this conception completely 
coincides with their own. Of course, it would be of great importance for me to know also your opinion 
about this. 
 
This passage not only shows Schlick’s frustration about the negative reaction on 
Schrödinger’s part, but also to what extent Schlick was still better fitting into the 
German conceptual coordinate system than into the local Viennese tradition in the 
philosophy of physics. As we shall see in the next chapter, communication with his 
Vienna Circle colleagues was much easier despite basic differences as regards the 
issue of causality and indeterminism. The reason, or so I shall argue, was the linguistic 
turn or rather that the lesson of quantum mechanics was one about the limits of 
meaningful statements. This was a move Schrödinger would never make. 
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8. Frank and von Mises: Frequentism and Statistical 
Coordination 
 
Let me finally come to the second strand of the second phase of Vienna 
Indeterminism. I shall discuss the positions of Frank and von Mises together because 
of their common intellectual origin and the many affirmative cross-references in their 
relevant writings. This intimate connection justifies enrolling the Berlin professor of 
applied mathematics von Mises – at least for the scope of the present book – in the 
Vienna Circle. This is not to say that both did not advocate rather diverging ideas 
about culture and politics: von Mises was politically rather a conservative while Frank 
was a socialist. 
 While Erwin Schrödinger entered the University of Vienna in the semester after 
Boltzmann’s tragic death, Frank had still started his Ph.D. thesis under Boltzmann. Yet 
the opinion for Frank’s thesis had to be written by Exner and co-signed by the other 
experimentalist of the University, Viktor von Lang. Frank’s dissertation focused on a 
purely mathematical topic concerning the Principle of Least Action that was – as he 
repeatedly stressed – typically absent from the standard treatises of mechanics 
including Boltzmann’s (1897, 1904): sufficient conditions for a minimum of the action 
integral or the theory of the second variation. Yet both were research fields of Gustav 
von Escherich and the young Privatdozent Hans Hahn who would become his 
philosophical ally in the years to come. Frank broadened his mathematical knowledge 
in Göttingen during the summer semester of 1906 where he studied among others with 
Hilbert, Klein and Zermelo.160  
The first pages of Frank’s thesis already reveal the direction his philosophical 
convictions were going to take. Discussing Jacobi’s (1866) work on variational 
calculus, he turned to the notorious issue of the philosophical interpretation of the 
Principle of Least Action. 
 
After Jakobi [sic!] has stated the principle in a form more precise than ever done before him, he says: 
 “It is difficult to find a metaphysical cause for the Principle of Least Action, if it is expressed 
in this true form, as is necessary. There exist minima of an entirely different type, from which one can 
also derive the differential equations of motion, which in this respect are much more appealing.” 
 One can give the theorem an even more ametaphysical form than Jakobi’s by saying: A 
material point moves according to the Lagrange equations appertaining to the variational problem 
dsVhJ
b
a∫ −= . This casts off the last remnant of minimum-romance. (Frank, 1906, p. 2) 
 
This was an early statement of Frank’s anti-metaphysical attitude. It followed Machian 
footsteps not only as to the general philosophical outlook, but also by casting Mach’s 
reluctance to admit any philosophical surplus of the Principle of Least Action in a 
more precise mathematical form. As a student of Boltzmann and working on the topic 
of sufficient conditions, Frank knew of course very well that Mach’s identification of 
this principle and the conservation of energy was untenable (See Sect. 3.2.). Thus 
Frank had already found his stand within the coming controversy between Mach and 
                                                          
160 See his Curriculum Vitae in the Habilitationsakt at the Archive of the University of Vienna. More on Frank’s 
early work in (Stöltzner, 2003b). 
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Planck. As we shall see in Section 8.1., Frank was at pains to strengthen Mach’s case 
by openly admitting the inadequacy of Mach’s anti-atomism.  
Frank’s first paper on causality, however, was written from a truly 
conventionalist point of view. Inverting a neo-Kantian analysis of Hans Driesch, Frank 
(1907) considered the general law of causality as a mere convention. This position was 
clearly at odds with Mach’s radical empiricism and, as he later admitted under the 
influence of von Mises, not in line with a genuinely probabilistic conception. After 
some publications on variational calculus and two philosophical papers, Frank turned 
to the special theory of relativity. In 1912, this early work earned him a professorship 
at the University of Prague as Einstein’s successor. The conceptual progress in 
statistical mechanics led Frank to partly change his view in 1919 and attribute an 
empirical meaning to the law of causality. Yet he still remained neutral as to whether a 
deterministic explanation of phenomena such as Brownian motion could still be 
obtained. 
 Richard von Mises studied mechanical engineering at the Technical University 
of Vienna until 1906, obtained his habilitation at Brno in 1908, and became 
extraordinary professor at the University of Strasbourg in 1909. His early research 
concerned various areas of mechanics and hydrodynamics, in particular water wheels 
and the theory of flight. Already at the Technical University of Vienna, von Mises 
became accustomed with questions of probability calculus through Emanuel Czuber.161 
His first contribution to the field (Mises, 1912) consisted in an elegant reformulation 
of Fechner’s theory of collectives. Right after the war he published his seminal theory 
of probability (Mises, 1919b) where he defined the concept of collective simply by 
two conditions and rigorously developed the relative frequency interpretation. Later he 
gave a broader outline and philosophical defense of his interpretation in the booklet 
Probability, Statistics, and Truth (Mises, 1928a, 1936). In later years, von Mises’s 
interpretation was superseded by the axiomatic theory of Andrej N. Kol’mogorov 
(1933) which took probability as an implicitly defined basic concept instead of 
reducing it to the concept of collective. Yet as regards the application of probability 
calculus to “real events” in the empirical world, Kol’mogorov “to a high degree” 
(1933, p. 3 fn. 1) endorsed von Mises’s position.162  
From 1920 until his forced emigration to Turkey in 1933, von Mises held the 
chair of applied mathematics at the University of Berlin. His most important Berlin 
contribution to the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism was the 1922 paper “On the 
Present Crisis of Mechanics” (Section 8.2.). The crisis was not pessimistically gazed at 
as a symptom of coming decline, as Forman reads this article. Rather did Mises 
propose a statistical approach in order to obtain solutions where classical mechanics 
failed miserably. Moreover, he explicitly criticized Boltzmann’s formulation of the 
second law as a blend of microdeterminism and macroprobabilism and advocated a 
purely probabilistic approach instead. In this respect, von Mises’s version of Vienna 
Indeterminism was more radical than Exner’s openness in principle or the 
conventionality of determinism that Schrödinger advocated at places. Exner’s and 
Schrödinger’s argument that indeterminism was more probable than determinism was 
unacceptable for von Mises because he regarded such talk about probability as simply 
                                                          
161 On the conceptual development from Fechner to Mises in general, see (Heidelberger, 1993, pp. 370-389). 
162 On the development of Kol’mogorov’s concept of probability from the context of Hilbert’s axiomatic method, 
see (Hochkirchen, 1999). 
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meaningless. As we have seen in Section 7.4, Schlick shared von Mises’s criticism but 
he admitted a logical probability of judgments based on simplicity.  
On von Mises’s account, dynamical and statistical laws did not compete with 
one another; they simply concerned different observational facts. Moreover, the law of 
causality obtained empirical content only once it had been specified by means of 
certain axioms, the differential equations of Newtonian mechanics, the force functions, 
and the appropriate boundary conditions. Just as the Newtonian dynamical laws 
govern the motions of point particles, statistical laws deal with mass phenomena which 
are represented by statistical collectives. 
 In September 1929 the German physicists and mathematicians gathered for their 
biennial meeting at the University of Prague. Being president of the organizing 
committee, Frank had not only arranged that the first public meeting of the Vienna 
Circle was affiliated to the congress but also that two of three plenary lectures in the 
opening session were dedicated to the new scientific philosophy. Section 8.3. discusses 
Frank’s (1929) and Mises’s (1930a) speeches which later appeared in Die 
Naturwissenschaften. It is completed by von Mises’s 1930 rectorial address at the 
University of Berlin. The three papers show to what extent Frank and von Mises 
considered the shift to statistical regularity as the most important lesson of the physics 
of the day. 
 In the year before the Prague meeting, Frank had taken a stand against the 
uncritical demand for Anschaulichkeit, which, to his mind, rooted in nothing but the 
adherence to a school philosophy that, in turn, rested upon the outdated mechanistic 
world view. In both relativity theory and atomic physics physicists had only seen more 
clearly than ever before that the method of measurement was a relevant problem and 
that the realistic interpretation of auxiliary concepts involved certain dangers. (Section 
8.4.)  
 In his 1932 book The Law of Causality and its Limits, Frank largely revoked his 
1907 position as one-sided. (Section 8.5.) He emphasized that his change of mind was 
caused by quantum theory and by von Mises’s conception of statistical laws. Frank 
investigated in great detail the conditions under which the general law of causality 
could attain an empirical content, but he came up with a negative result. Yet 
causality’s close vicinity to tautology stood in stark contrast to our continuous and 
successful application of specific forms of the causal principle. This apparent 
antinomy, however, dissolved as long as one did not assume the existence of a true 
world behind the phenomena. Frank’s view thus approached Schlick’s (1931) new 
understanding of causality as successful predictions. But there were important 
differences. Most importantly, Frank remained committed to a single type of 
lawfulness and thus considered statistical laws as genuine laws. Taking collectives as a 
possible ontology and holding that all concepts in physical theories are coordinated to 
specific observations or measurements, Frank could simply argue that the only new 
feature of quantum mechanics, as compared to Boltzmann’s kinetic theory, was the 
statistical character of this coordination.  
 The final two sections of the book are dedicated to the rapprochement between 
both strands of the causality debate. Large part of this development, so I shall argue, 
was the sharpening Viennese focus on linguistic analysis of scientific theory. 
Schrödinger who remained committed to Boltzmann’s conception of theories as 
pictures thus, in one of the final dialogues in Berliner’s Naturwissenschaften, found 
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himself aligned with von Laue and against von Mises (Section 8.6.). On the 1936 
Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science, Bohr’s concept of complementarity 
provided the basis for a far-reaching rapprochement between Frank and Schlick 
(Section 8.7.). The reason was not only that Frank had meanwhile adopted the 
physicalist ideas of his Vienna Circle colleagues, but also that quantum mechanics had 
to be defended against a flood of metaphysical misinterpretations. (Section 8.8.) 
 
8.1. Frank’s Early Views on Causality and Statistics 
 
One of the first philosophical papers of a later member of the Vienna Circle was 
Frank’s “On the Law of Causality and Experience”. He argued that “the law of 
causality, the foundation of every theoretical science, can neither be confirmed nor 
disproved by experience; not, however, because it is an a priori true necessity of 
thought, but because it is a purely conventional definition.” (Frank, 1907, p. 444/63) In 
order to prove this pointed thesis, Frank adapted an argument which the biologist-
philosopher Hans Driesch had devised to establish the a priori character of the law of 
energy conservation. This already suggests that Frank to a certain extent discussed the 
issue of causality within a Kantian frame of thinking in which the a priori category, 
however, had been replaced by a convention. And, indeed, Frank contended that  
 
the latest philosophy of nature revives in a striking way the basic idea of critical idealism, that 
experience only serves to fill a framework which man brings along with him as a part of his nature. 
The difference is that the old philosophers considered this framework a necessary outgrowth of human 
organization, whereas we see in it a free creation of human arbitrariness. (Ibid., p. 447f./66)  
 
Mach and Boltzmann, who are not mentioned in Frank’s paper, had been considerably 
more empiricist. Frank’s conventionalism replaced their naturalist epistemology 
according to which our common habits of thought were simply a product of man’s 
successful adaptation to nature. As had Kant’s, Frank’s theory of causality remained 
on the conceptual level. The tacit dismissal of any Darwinist or Lamarckian 
justification of epistemology would remain one of those tenets by which Logical 
Empiricists severed the ties with the local Viennese tradition. 
 Frank discussed the law of causality in the following form: “If, in the course of 
time, a state of the universe A is once followed by the state B, then whenever A occurs 
B will follow it.” (Ibid., p. 444/63) In this form, strictly speaking, it was applicable 
only to the Universe as a whole. “In finite systems, the law of causality is the more 
nearly valid the larger the system. In the application of the law to a finite system, the 
answer to the question whether the system is large enough depends on the degree of 
accuracy required for the occurrence of the predicted effect.” (Ibid., p. 444f./63) 
Interestingly, Frank held that “the so-called inductive method has been developed” 
(Ibid., p. 445/64) to reach a fallible and provisional decision as to whether a substitute 
of the general law of causality can be applied. But even for systems, e.g., in 
astronomy, where it can be applied, a more basic problem arises. The crucial point in 
each form of the law of causality is the arbitrariness in the definition of ‘state’. “If the 
law of causality is not valid according to one definition of the state, we redefine the 
state simply in such a way that the law is valid. If that is the case, however, the law, 
which appeared to be stating a fact, is transformed into a mere definition of the word 
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‘state’.” (Ibid., p. 446f./65) Hence the general law of causality can always be fulfilled 
and becomes a mere convention. 
 
If I wish, I can provide all bodies with state variables that are all qualitatively different, in order to 
fulfill the law of causality. I can regard heat, electricity, magnetism, as properties of bodies, essentially 
different from one another, just as is done in modern energetics, and as Driesch does. On the other 
hand, if I wish, I can get along with less qualitatively different properties. For example, I can introduce 
only the motion of masses; but then, in order to obtain the necessary diversity, I must take refuge in 
uncontrollable hidden motions. This leads to the purely mechanical world view, which Democritus 
dimly conceived as an ideal, and which occurs mostly in the form of atomism. (Ibid., p. 448/66f.) 
 
Arguments similar to Frank’s correspond to adding so-called hidden variables in order 
to retain a completely determined – though unpredictable or even chaotic – behavior of 
the quantum particles at the price of adding in-principle unmeasurable quantities. 
Frank, on the contrary, was at pains to avoid any ontological commitment – either to 
Boltzmann’s property ascription to universal theoretical entities or to Mach’s universe 
of relatively stable facts. Although he remarked that some world view would be more 
simple than another, he opted neither for Boltzmann’s ontological simplicity nor for 
Mach’s principle of economy.  
 The important role of Mach within Frank’s early thinking only emerged in later 
publications. In 1910, he reviewed Planck’s (1908a) Leiden lecture for the 
Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik163. Frank held that Planck’s attack essentially 
arose from various misunderstandings. In particular, one could well maintain 
simultaneously that our world view is an arbitrary creation and that this, nonetheless, 
reflects natural processes independent from us. The real conflict, according to Frank, 
was that Planck – in contrast to Mach – assumed that our present physical world view 
possesses some lasting traits, which are counted as real. Frank also rejected 
introducing metaphysical realism as a guiding postulate; “it is even less admissible to 
repeat now what had happened with God, freedom, and immortality in favor of atoms 
and electrons.” (Frank, 1910, p. 47) And he held that even Mach would have 
considered energy conservation as real, once the quantities of all the single energies 
had been specified. As a general law, however, it was merely a convention whereas 
Planck considered it as the most important guiding principle of scientific research.  
 In a review of the third edition of Planck’s historical and systematic study on 
The Principle of Energy Conservation (Planck, 1908b), Frank was even more direct. 
To an argument of Planck in favor of the empirical character of the general law he 
retorted: “There is still a breach through which the skillfully expelled 
‘conventionalism’ can intrude into this [general] form of the energy law and this lies in 
the concept of ‘the same state’.” (Frank, 1916, p. 18) This was precisely the point by 
which Frank (1907) had justified the conventionality of the law of causality. In the 
interview with Kuhn, he recalled the story as such: 
 
Yes I knew Planck a little. Concerning science, the most I ever had to do with him related to this book 
which he wrote about the first law of thermodynamics. [Planck, 1908b] … His main point was to 
refute Poincaré and similar authors who had held that the first law was tautological. He formulated it 
in such a way that it was not, and I rejected this. His main argument was, and this is often repeated, 
                                                          
163 The Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik was the house organ of the Institute of Mathematics of the 
University of Vienna. So it is quite natural that Frank and Hahn published there several “Literaturberichte” 
(reviews), but apparently Uebel (2000) was the first to notice this.  
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that the first law has to be formulated in such a way that if you have a cyclic process, then by a cyclic 
process no weight can be lifted. And I said this is not sufficient, because what is a cyclic process? It is 
one which will restore the same state. And what is the same state? Something remains the same if no 
weight has been lifted. And this is also a kind of tautology. (from Blackmore, 2001, p. 65) 
 
Frank was, of course, wrong to believe that Planck’s target was Poincaré’s 
conventionalist interpretation. The first edition of Planck’s book had appeared in 1887 
and thus more than a decade before Poincaré started his philosophical works. To be 
sure, Planck’s principle-oriented view at the laws of thermodynamics was in 
contradiction to the views of Poincaré as it was to those of Mach. (See Sect. 3.6.) 
Frank’s conventionalist interpretation of the law of energy conservation was fully in 
line with his interpretation of the more fundamental law of causality. But it was at 
odds with the views of both Mach and Boltzmann. After a short correspondence in 
October 1893, both had agreed that the law of energy conservation “has no other 
evidence than an empirical law.” (Höflechner, 1994, p. II 204; see Sect. 3.3)  
 Both reviews of Planck formed the basis of Frank’s commemorative article on 
“The Importance for Our Times of Ernst Mach’s Philosophy of Science” which he 
viewed in Mach’s having adapted the great project of Enlightenment to the present. As 
a main tenet of Enlightenment philosophy Frank considered “the protest against the 
misuse of merely auxiliary concepts” (Frank, 1917, p. 70/80) as an absolute foundation 
of physics and philosophy, because this bore the danger of conceiving any change in 
the foundations of physical theory as a bankruptcy of the scientific world conception 
as a whole. Of course, each epoch creates its own auxiliary concepts which may in 
turn transcend their own domain of definition. “The work of Mach is therefore not 
essentially destructive, … but on the contrary it is an attempt to create an unassailable 
position for physics” (Ibid., p. 68/75) despite the constant change of theories. Not 
entire parts of theories, as Planck held, will become lasting truths, but only the 
functional dependences between the phenomena will remain.  
 
The known connections among phenomena form a network; the theory seeks to pass a continuous 
surface through the knots and threads of the net. Naturally, the smaller the meshes, the more closely is 
the surface fixed by the net. Hence, as our experience progresses the surface is permitted less and less 
play, without ever being unequivocally determined by the net. (Ibid., p. 66/72) 
 
To this network of interconnections are the point at which the later Vienna Circle 
would apply their logical analysis of scientific theory. A theory corresponded to a 
network of logical relations the knots of which were coordinated to possible 
observations.  
 Frank did not posit any analog of Mach’s principle of uniqueness in order to 
guarantee the integrity of the facts constituted by this network. Instead, he affirmed 
that all our theories were empirically underdetermined and contained an irreducible 
conventional element. Frank also took a stand on atomism. Emphasizing that Mach, 
above all, strove after concepts that were applicable in all sciences, he concluded as 
such. 
 
I will not deny that Mach allowed himself to be misled by this argument into attacking the use of 
atomistics in physics more sharply than can be justified. After all, the usefulness of the atomic theories 
in this limited realm is certainly indisputable. His followers, as is generally the case, often saw in this 
weakness of the master his greatest strength. … I believe that one can completely free the nucleus of 
 286
Mach’s teachings from this historically and individually conditioned aversion to atomistics. (Ibid., p. 
68f./77f.) 
 
Frank’s paper was not the official obituary for Mach published by Die 
Naturwissenschaften. One may rather assume that it represented a Viennese attempt to 
correct the picture that had been drawn in the year before by the Jena physicist Felix 
Auerbach. “Ernst Mach’s Lifework” mainly criticized Mach’s anti-metaphysics as an 
unfulfillable promise. Mach’s “fear of metaphysics” (Auerbach, 1916, p. 181) 
prevented an appropriate reception of his metaphysical thinking that was superior to 
other types of metaphysics. According to Auerbach, Mach’s philosophical “system” 
rested upon two pillars: the principle of economy and that ‘the given’ consisted of 
elementary sensations. As the motivation of the principle of economy, Auerbach 
apparently regarded the Principle of Least Action – which he called “principle of the 
least quantity of force”. This showed, to his mind, that great care was required when 
applying the concept of economy, even more when extending it to intellectual 
processes. Summarily, he assented to Wundt’s classification of Mach as an “inverse 
Kant” (Ibid., p. 181). 
 
While Kant however at least attempted to deduce the categories from general functions of thought, in 
Mach the principle comes like a shot, almost as a teleological maxim; and similarly as Kant … Mach 
comes from the a priori given to experience. And this is surely metaphysics, even though critical 
metaphysics. (Ibid., p. 179) 
 
Planck, too, had charged the principle of economy of being metaphysical in kind (See 
Sect. 3.7.). Although Auerbach, in contrast, properly appraised Mach’s neutral 
monism, using a Kantian perspective as comparison rendered Mach, at bottom, a 
sensualist according to whom sensations were the “final elements” (Ibid., p. 181). This 
interpretation missed the flexibility present in Mach’s notion of element and the subtle 
interrelation between facts, or stable complexes, and the elements they consist of (See 
Sect. 3.1.). Hence in effect Auerbach came rather close to Planck’s criticism. But 
concerning the classical polemics between Planck and Mach he took an intermediate 
position and rejected Planck’s convergent realism in favor of the idea of theories as 
pictures. Auerbach wondered whether Planck was not aware himself 
 
that his electrodynamical-thermodynamical theory including its quantum consequence … is, on the 
one hand, too special and, on the other hand, too complicated to count as an ultimately satisfactory 
system. … Doesn’t he, who has grown up under the wings of Helmholtz and Kirchhoff, and who has 
acted aside Heinrich Hertz know best himself that all that are just pictures which we make of the world 
… in order to arrive at coherent knowledge? (Ibid., p. 181) 
 
And Auerbach continued to wonder how Planck could have condemned wholesale 
Mach’s Theory of Heat, “a book from which so many mature scholars and thousands 
of maturing younger scholars have learnt infinitely much.” (Ibid., p. 181) On the field 
of historico-critical-epistemological investigations Mach was “the qualified if not the 
only existing guide”. (Ibid., p. 182)  
 Frank’s 1919 paper on “The statistical approach in physics” published in Die 
Naturwissenschaften marked a first change of his view on causality owing to the new 
statistical setting. He commenced from the same definition of the principle of causality 
as in 1907 and again approached the problem by an analysis of the notion of state.  
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The present state of a closed system of bodies uniquely determines its future state, that is, whenever 
the system reaches the state A, a particular state B follows. … If one understands by state the sum of 
all physically measurable properties of the system, the law of causality has no validity. In the sense of 
molecular theory one must rather add to the description of the state also the positions and velocities of 
all molecules, by means of which the law of causality is saved, but its actual application becomes 
impossible. (Frank, 1919, p. 727) 
 
Frank’s main justification for the factual invalidity of the law of causality, revoking 
thus his earlier radical conventionalist thesis, came from Brownian motion. In the 
theory of gases the number of molecules is typically so large that highly improbable 
events, such as a spontaneous departure from equilibrium, practically never occur. 
While for gases the invalidity of the law of causality is only inferred theoretically, in 
Brownian motion we observe these spontaneous density fluctuations. Thus, “in the 
realm of the empirical-physical, the experimentally measurable quantities, … there 
exists no causality.” (Ibid., p. 728) It remains, however, possible to establish an 
average law, Smoluchowski’s law of diffusion for the Brownian particle. Brownian 
motion had been also Boltzmann’s and Exner’s case in point for a genuinely 
indeterministic physical world picture. But like von Smoluchowski (1918), Frank did 
not fully subscribe to indeterminism yet; although empirically irrelevant, it remained 
possible to formulate the notion of state in “a molecular-deterministic fashion,” 
(Frank, 1919, p. 728) so that the law of causality was upheld. The same was true in 
history where a similar macro-micro distinction presents itself. 
 
The law of causality [in history] does not require at all the existence of historical laws. It might well be 
that the properties by which the historian describes groups of nations do not suffice in principle to 
fulfill the law of causality, and that there exists no historical, but only an individual psychological 
causality. (Ibid., p. 728) 
 
Summing up, Frank’s outline of the “statistical conception of nature” (Ibid., p. 701) 
shared the core tenet of Vienna Indeterminism, the separation of causality and 
ontology. Moreover, Brownian motion is understood as empirical evidence that the 
reduction of statistical laws to dynamical laws is impossible. This had been precisely 
Exner’s empiricist rationale against Planck. (Sect. 4.5.) Exner had, more generally, 
considered the very fact that all natural processes are directed as the starting point of 
our understanding of nature and thus the second law of thermodynamics as the basic 
law of nature. Right at the beginning of his paper, Frank characterized “the tendency 
of assimilating all distinctions” as the most characteristic trait of natural processes and 
as a “brazen law” (Ibid., p. 701) that originates in a game of chance. For this result he 
credited Boltzmann and von Smoluchowski. Despite his far-reaching assent to Vienna 
Indeterminism, Frank did not subscribe to so radical a probabilism as Exner. And 
although he applied the frequency interpretation when explaining the concept of 
probability, he did not yet derive clear-cut ontological consequences from it. He would 
do so only under the influence of von Mises (see Sect. 8.2.).  
 How does Frank’s early thinking about causality relate to Schlick’s? First of all, 
Frank discussed statistical mechanics while Schlick’s (1920) theory was exclusively 
oriented at relativity theory. And in contrast to Frank, Schlick remained committed to 
the idea that only dynamic laws were genuine laws. Second, Frank did not address the 
question as to which conditions a law must fulfill to count as causal and he based his 
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considerations solely on the concept of prediction. Thus, Frank’s (1907) starting point 
was the same as that of Schlick’s (1931) second theory. Frank (1932) would broadly 
study the conditions under which the law of causality became empirically meaningful. 
 
 
8.2. Von Mises on Probability and the Crisis of Mechanics  
 
Von Mises’s 1922 article “On the Present Crises of Mechanics” set out by 
distinguishing two strands of mechanics that differed in content, not just in method. 
‘Bound mechanics’ contains all mechanical problems in the classical physical sense 
that can be subsumed under a single variational principle. ‘Free mechanics’ denotes all 
theories that are consistent with the wider framework of Newton’s axioms and that are 
specified by arbitrary force functions. Also general relativity, von Mises continued, 
seems to be expressible as a part of free mechanics, but the force functions admitted 
are of a highly restricted type.  
 
It seems to us that the mechanics of relativity is much more absolute or ‘absolutistic’ than the usual 
one, ‘more bound’ in our words. … Perhaps here one finds part of the reasons which have induced 
Ernst Mach in his posthumous ‘Optics’ to reject relativity theory so firmly from the standpoint of 
experience (Mises, 1922a, p. 26). 
 
Here von Mises touched upon the absolute character of the metric which for Planck 
signified the main virtue of relativity theory. (Sect. 3.7.) Taking ‘bound mechanics’ as 
the paradigm of causal explanation, von Mises’s diagnosis that general relativity was 
more ‘bound’, corresponds to Schlick’s view that Einstein’s theory extended to 
domain of causality (Sect. 7.1) Although von Mises associated ‘bound’ mechanics 
with a variational principle, or rather with forces for which such a principle could be 
formulated, his distinction did not agree with Planck’s more global distinction between 
reversible physics based upon a variational principle and irreversible physics. To the 
Viennese von Mises, this distinction was not of a fundamental kind and thus ‘free’ 
mechanics was embracing both reversible and irreversible phenomena. 
 Granting Planck that general relativity was also more ‘absolute’ but remaining 
simultaneously committed to Mach’s epistemology, von Mises had to find a way to 
deal with the notorious preface of Mach’s Optics (1921) that had appeared just in the 
year before. Apparently, he did not possess a better argument than to call for 
mitigating circumstances. Other than Frank (1917) who had openly admitted the 
failure of Mach’s anti-atomism and tried to detach Mach’s epistemology from it, von 
Mises’s wording revealed surprisingly persistent misgivings against atoms. “I want to 
clearly emphasize that I do not think of hypothetical molecules, electrons, α-particles 
and the like, but that I have in mind only phenomena of motion and equilibrium at 
sensorily perceptible masses.” (Mises, 1922a, p. 28) Indeed, von Mises studied the 
main question of his article, to wit, whether the framework of ‘free mechanics’ 
suffices to explain all observable phenomena of motion and equilibrium, by purely 
classical examples. Both turbulence phenomena in liquid media and Brownian motion 
taught us that no satisfactory result was obtained unless one resorted to statistical 
methods which, in the first case, yield a phenomenological theory whose degenerate 
system of equations “provides the welcome opportunity to adapt the theory to 
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observations.” (Ibid., p. 27) While in this case von Mises argued almost like an 
engineer, in the case of Brownian motion he took the position of a methodological 
purist and charged the theories of Einstein and Smoluchowski of  
 
the intolerable contradiction that the course of events at one time was considered as uniquely 
determined by physical or mechanical laws, while one subsequently believed to be able to reach 
results about this course from a completely different angle. This contradiction particularly comes to 
light in Boltzmann’s version of the kinetic theory of gases (which, however, deals with the 
hypothetical molecules and not with observable masses, so that it can serve only as an analogy here) 
where one calculates first the velocity changes according to the laws of elastic scattering and then 
thwarts these calculations by purely statistical considerations. (Ibid., p. 29) 
 
In kinetic gas theory this connection between the deterministic microlevel and the 
probabilistic macrolevel was established by “the notorious ergodic hypothesis.” (Ibid., 
p. 29) It is instead more coherent to pursue a thoroughly probabilistic approach. As in 
Exner’s case, the frequentist account of probability permitted von Mises to furnish the 
probabilistic laws with a suitable ontology, to wit, mass phenomena which become an 
independent object of physical theorizing in the same vein as Newtonian point 
particles. “Probability calculus is part of theoretical physics in the same way as 
classical mechanics or optics, it is an entirely self-contained theory of certain 
phenomena, the so-called mass phenomena, irrespective of whether they are of 
mechanical, electric or other nature.” (Ibid., p. 28) This calculus maps initial 
probabilities, which play the combined role of the force functions and initial values of 
‘free mechanics’, into other probabilities without ever yielding deterministic results 
about single processes. The burden of finding and verifying these probability 
distributions remains with the empirical sciences. Thus, statistical physics “never 
directly competes with a result of mechanics or of the rest of deterministic 
physics.”(Ibid., p. 28)  
 By attributing to probability calculus its own domain of facts, mass phenomena, 
von Mises could maintain the strict separation between deterministic physics and 
statistical physics. This avoided Exner’s radical outlook that, most likely, all 
deterministic laws were, in actual fact, indeterministic. This compartimentalization of 
physical ontology according to the type of law seemed to be the price paid for von 
Mises’s staunch rejection of atomism and his continuous criticism of Boltzmann’s 
reductionism. Thus, von Mises read Boltzmann rather in the Berlin fashion as an 
opponent of Mach. This made him overlook many Machian traits in Boltzmann’s and 
Exner’s radical probabilism; and it was, perhaps, a consequence of not being a student 
of the Vienna Institute of Physics.  
 Nevertheless, von Mises endorsed core tenets pertinent to Vienna 
Indeterminism: firm empiricism and the rejection of any a priori category of causality 
foremost. And he considered Brownian motion as a decisive case in point for 
indeterminism. 
 
It is entirely irrelevant whether we stick to the assumption that the orbits [of gas particles] would be 
determined if we knew the exact initial conditions and all influences; since we have no prospect of 
ever achieving this knowledge, this is an assumption of which it can never be decided whether it is 
true or not, hence an unscientific one. (Ibid., p. 29) 
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Mises quite generally believed that such unanswerable questions could be excluded in 
the course of scientific progress. 
 A major driving force of both Exner and von Mises was their unequivocal 
endorsement of the relative frequency interpretation. Besides this, von Mises arrived at 
the core convictions of Vienna Indeterminists on a slightly different route. Without 
referring to Exner’s synthesis, he directly went back to Mach’s radical empiricism 
turning it, as Exner, into an argument in favor of genuine indeterminism. Yet he 
phrased the problem of equipping statistical laws with a suitable ontology in an 
entirely different way. Exner and Schrödinger had believed that indeterminism became 
preferable – or more probable –, in virtue of the theoretical universality of atomism – 
taken as a Boltzmannian picture – and the macro-micro distinction – understood as a 
distinctive characteristic of physical phenomena. Yet the Machian von Mises was 
reluctant to count on an unobservable microworld even if this chaotic world was not 
bound by physical law. In his inaugural address, Schrödinger (1922a) argued against 
ontological duplicity and for conceptual purity. If one understood this as an argument 
for ontological parsimony, von Mises could well agree, and in later years he would 
explicitly stress this point (Mises, 1930b; see Sect. 8.3.).  
Other than Boltzmann, Exner, and Schrödinger, von Mises was not after 
universal pictures but rather a satisfactory mathematical framework that could be 
coordinated to observation. And thus he followed the core step of Logical Empiricism: 
rigidly distinguishing mathematical theory and empirical observations. In this way, he 
could hope to avoid the usual ontological quibbles altogether. This was an important 
move that introduced a new dimension into the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism. It 
was not decisive in itself because, for instance, Schlick’s advocacy of it did not propel 
him to accept genuine indeterminism; rather did he use the strict separation between 
two languages to simultaneously accept the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics and cling to the idea that only deterministic laws were genuine laws.  
A comparison of “The Crisis of Mechanics” with his first paper about the 
philosophical consequences of his relative frequency interpretation of probability 
teaches us. This shows that a substantial part of the motivation for indeterminism 
consisted in his successful formulation of a genuinely indeterminist theory of 
Brownian motion (Mises, 1920b).164 In the year before, von Mises (1919a) had still 
been more reluctant to take a stand on the issue of indeterminism in physics. The aim 
of his first paper in Die Naturwissenschaften was to refute the philosopher Karl 
Marbe’s claim that probabilistically distributed events harbored an inherent tendency 
of equilibration. He commenced by distinguishing concept formation in philosophy, 
which starts out from everyday language, and in the sciences, which rest upon exact 
but arbitrary definitions within a partially or fully axiomatized theory. Thus 
‘probability’ in everyday parlance, our subjective degree of certainty, is sharply 
distinct from its mathematical homonym.  
 Von Mises’ definition of probability as the limit of the relative frequency of a 
property within an infinite series presupposed that this series forms a collective. There 
are two conditions for a collective: (i) The relative frequencies of the occurrence of the 
property converge to a limit. (ii) “If out of the whole series of elements one forms a 
subseries without using the differences between the properties in the subseries to be 
selected, then within this subseries the relative frequencies for the occurrence of the 
                                                          
164 For a detailed analysis of von Mises’s theory of Brownian motion, see (Hochkirchen, 1999). 
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properties possess the same limits as for the whole series.” (Mises, 1919a, p. 171; 
italics dropped) This second condition is called ‘irregularity of coordination’ or 
‘impossibility of a gambling system’.  
 According to von Mises, the first condition is based on our manifold experience 
that in lotteries, birth rates, etc. the relative frequencies become more and more stable 
as the observed series gets longer. In those days empirical investigations into such 
simple phenomena were still very common; Frank (1919, p. 704f.), for instance, 
reported in detail a statistical investigation of the number of pedestrians occupying a 
small strip of the sidewalk. Since Poisson, the empirical fact of the convergence of 
relative frequencies was often called the law of large numbers. But, as von Mises 
demonstrated in a later paper that is largely identical with a part in Probability, 
Statistics and Truth165, this terminology was ambiguous because Poisson also used it 
for a particular mathematical theorem that generalized a result of Jacob Bernoulli. It 
states that the probability p for an experiment repeated n times to lie within [pn-εn, 
pn+εn] (ε a small positive number) converges to 1 as n→∞. Von Mises showed that if 
one stays within the realm of classical a priori probabilities, this theorem is of purely 
algebraical nature and does not permit any conclusion about actual experiments. 
Adopting the frequency interpretation, however, it yields a valuable statement about 
“the order of the experimental results” (Mises, 1927a, p. 501) or “about the course of 
the phenomena” (Ibid., p. 502) that transcends the empirical law of large numbers 
which had only concerned the existence of the limit. In order to derive Poisson’s 
theorem, one has to assume the irregularity condition. While in his 1919 paper he had 
argued that his second condition was hardly accessible to direct empirical observations 
– but derives its empirical support mainly from the manifold experimental 
corroborations of the multiplication rule of probability which can be derived from it – 
he now provided an analogy from physics. “As modern physics has deduced from the 
failed attempts to construe for centuries a perpetuum mobile the valuable energy law 
or the principle of the excluded perpetuum mobile, so we have to avail ourselves of the 
experiences of the system players in the casinos.” (Mises, 1927a, p. 501)166 The 
analogy presupposed a Machian reading of the principle of energy conservation and 
contradicted Frank’s 1907 conventionalist account. And combined with von Mises’s 
mathematical results, it provided a justification for a core theme of Exner’s inaugural 
address, to wit, that the law of large numbers was the empirical meta-law basic to all 
science. Condition (i) alone did not suffice. 
 While in the “Crises of Mechanics” von Mises (1922a) considered probability 
theory on a par with mechanics and attributed to it its own domain of facts, in 1919 he 
was still holding that in the application to theoretical physics “the connection between 
probability theory and reality is not so immediate [as in games of chance or population 
statistics] because theories of physical nature lie between them.” (Mises, 1919a, p. 
173) Instead he compared probability calculus to geometry because probabilities are 
calculated from given probabilities; but “the determination of the initial collectives of 
the calculation does not belong to the tasks of probability calculus in the narrow 
sense.” (Ibid., p. 175) Similarly the procedures of determining the base length and the 
angles of the triangles do not belong to geodesy itself. Pure geometry, he continued, 
corresponds to the games of chance.  
                                                          
165 To wit, the first half of the fourth lecture in the German original (Mises, 1936, pp. 129-143). 
166 This analogy also appears in (Mises, 1930a, p. 148). 
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 Von Mises’s second analogy was less far-fetched and could count on an 
important voice. Hilbert’s sixth problem (1900, p. 272f.) had declared geometry as the 
pattern of the axiomatization of empirical theory. Hilbert’s agenda contained the 
axiomatization of probability theory in order to reach a rigorous formulation of the 
theory of gases. As for both Mach and Hilbert geometry was undoubtedly an empirical 
science, it was only a short step for von Mises to subsequently consider mass 
phenomena as the ontology suitable not only for societal, but also for physical 
probabilities. His 1919 paper still envisaged probability theory predominantly from the 
mathematical side and left the specification of the probability distributions and 
statistical collectives to the empirical sciences. But in 1922 he found that this question 
was decisive for the scientific import of probability calculus and for an ontology 
suitable to statistical physics – even more after quantum mechanics had won favor by 
the end of the decade.  
 Von Mises’s analogy between geometry and probability was repeatedly 
criticized by other Logical Empiricists. On the first meeting on “Epistemology of the 
Exact Sciences” co-organized by the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Society for 
Scientific Philosophy in 1929, there was an entire section and a broad discussion about 
probability that was later documented in the first number of Erkenntnis. During the 
discussion, Reichenbach argued that  
 
in the coordination of a physical body to a mathematical theory the notion of approximation occurs 
which contains the concept of probability…: within certain limits these physical objects correspond 
with high probability to the mathematical axioms. Thus, the problem of coordination itself contains the 
concept of probability. It is true, in geometry one is allowed to separate the coordination problem from 
the mathematical theory because the coordination problem does not contain any geometrical concept; 
in probability theory however the concept constituted by this theory enters itself into the coordination 
problem: this is the logical particularity of the problem of probability. (Erkenntnis 1, p. 275)  
 
Von Mises, to the contrary, considered the statistical collective no longer as an 
empirical but as an ideal concept. Asked about this shift by Zilsel (Ibid., p. 271), he 
emphasized that the question “whether an empirically given series represents a 
collective … [accordingly] does not constitute a problem within probability calculus.” 
(Ibid., p. 272) He insisted “that approximation and statistics are not to be confused 
with one another.” (Ibid., p. 280) Strictly in line with Hilbert’s axiomatic method, he 
even contemplated that by “modifying the axiom of irregularity … one can obtain 
another probability calculus in the same sense as there is an Euclidean and a non-
Euclidean geometry.” (Ibid., p. 280) As a matter of fact, von Mises’s relation to 
Hilbert’s program was a complex one, and von Mises’s axiomatization of probability 
was not Hilbertian insofar as probability was not a primitive and implicitly defined 
concept but rested upon the more basic concept of collective.167  
The disagreement between von Mises and Reichenbach rooted in his firm 
empiricism owing to which there could not be any difference between the observed 
                                                          
167 Interestingly, von Mises (1939) was very critical about Hilbert’s axiomatic method. In a recent paper (2002a) 
I have argued that Hahn and Frank identified Hilbert’s axiomatization program as professing the faith of a 
Leibnizian pre-established harmony between mathematics and the empirical sciences, a bridge which 
contradicted their rigid separation between analytical and empirical statements. To my mind, a similar case can 
be made with respect to von Mises. Recent work on Hilbert (Corry 1997, Majer 2002) shows that such an 
account misrepresents Hilbert’s intentions. On the axiomatic formulation of probability theory, see 
(Hochkirchen, 1999). 
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and the existing that would require a probabilistic theory of approximate 
correspondence. On the ontological side, Mach, Boltzmann, and Exner’s insistence 
upon the individual existence of the world and, accordingly, the rejection of possible-
world arguments blocked – or at least made very unattractive to frequentists such as 
Frank and von Mises – Reichenbach’s probabilistic reasoning concerning coordination 
in the framework of classical physics. 
 It is beyond the scope of the present investigation to study all concepts of 
probability advocated within Logical Empiricism. As the 1929 discussion showed, 
there was a large spectrum of opinions which is not exhausted by von Mises’s 
frequentism, the Kriesian theory of Waismann and Schlick, and Reichenbach’s 
extended use of the concept of probability. Suffice it to say, that von Mises’s position 
corresponded to that shared by most physicists and that, on the 1929 meeting, his 
friend Frank had taken measures that it was most prominently placed. 
 
8.3. The Prague Meeting 
 
In September, 1929, the biennial meeting of German physicists and mathematicians 
took place at the German University of Prague. Frank seized the opportunity to 
publicize the new scientific world conception, not only by attaching the above-
mentioned meeting to the congress and the distribution of the famous manifesto 
(Hahn, Neurath & Carnap, 1929)In these days it was not uncommon for a meeting of 
the German Physical Society to accept philosophically-oriented papers,168 but an entire 
opening plenary session with two philosophical talks, was indeed a novelty. After 
Frank (1929) and Mises (1930a), the session was completed by Arnold Sommerfeld’s 
“Some principal remarks concerning wave mechanics”. Frank later recalled the event 
as such. 
 
I had prepared an elaborate paper that was intended to give the scientists a kind of preview of our ideas 
and to prove that the new line in philosophy is the necessary result of the new trends in physics, 
particularly the theory of relativity and the quantum theory. … 
 Some friends cautioned me not to speak too bluntly. The audience, which consisted mostly of 
German scientists, knew little about philosophy, except that they had some sentimental ties to 
Kantianism. … My wife said to me after the lecture: ‘It was weird to listen. It seemed to me as if the 
words fell into the audience like drops into a well so deep that one cannot hear the drops striking 
bottom. Everything seemed to vanish without a trace.’ 
 There is no doubt that quite a few people in the audience were shocked by my blunt statements 
that modern science is incompatible with the traditional systems of philosophy. Probably, most of the 
scientists had not been accustomed to thinking of philosophy and science as a coherent system of 
thought. … 
 After the meeting, however, our committee received a great many letters from scientists who 
expressed their great satisfaction that an attempt has been made toward a coherent world conception 
without contradictions between science and philosophy. (Frank, 1961, p. 49f.) 
 
 While Frank and von Mises interacted perfectly in their plea for a new epistemology, 
Sommerfeld “strongly dissented in the appraisal of the philosophical background” 
(1929, p. 866) of the recent achievements of theoretical physics. He spoke out against 
Mach, monism, conventionalism, pragmatism, and praised the harmony of natural laws 
                                                          
168 See (Stöltzner, 1995). 
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independent of man. This was Planck’s program which Sommerfeld amended by 
interpreting Bohr’s concept of duality, or complementarity, as corresponding to the 
metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and body. 
 In contrast to Sommerfeld, many physicists of the younger generation by 1929 
were convinced that quantum mechanics required a final farewell to well-entrenched 
methodological convictions. To them Frank wanted to offer an entirely new 
perspective. His paper “What do the present physical theories imply for general theory 
of knowledge?” thus contrasted the emerging scientific world conception as continued 
application of scientific methods in the philosophical analysis of science with the 
outdated, paradox-laden school philosophy which scientists naively adhered to when 
going beyond their narrow domain of expertise.169 School philosophy falsely pretended 
the existence of a separate domain of philosophical truths investigated by genuinely 
philosophical methods. Constant philosophical reflection, so Frank contended, could 
only come from the sciences themselves. But it was indispensable for scientific 
progress. Insisting on a ‘purely physical point of view’ was the best guarantee of 
tacitly rehearsing “a philosophy that contains a fossilization of the earlier physical 
theories.” (Frank, 1929, p. 991/119) 
 
Experience has taught that those physicists who declared, for instance, that the relativity theory was 
nonsense often spoke in the name of ‘pure, empirical science, free from speculation’, but chiefly took 
their arguments from the school philosophy, not from empiricism [Empirie]. It need not be supposed 
that one has to make any philosophical studies to be acquainted with this world conception. In all 
knowledge that has come to us from the elementary school, in all metaphors of our language, it is 
implicitly contained. … Hence it is no wonder that it is just the physicist opposed to speculation who 
is easily inclined to the ignorabimus of Du Bois-Reymond, with his surrender of the scientific 
conception of nature. (Ibid., p. 974/102) 
 
For a whole generation, du Bois Reymond’s categorical pessimism to ever reach an 
understanding about the true essence of matter and force was the most famous 
quotation from an academic speech. Many developed strategies to get around it. 
Hilbert’s (1900) battle cry was that in mathematics there was no ignorabimus because 
all correctly formulated problems were solvable. Others emphasized that the 
Ignorabimus was indissolubly linked to the exalted optimism of mechanical reduction 
embodied by Laplace’s demon. Frank, finally, charged a naive correspondence theory 
of truth, in particular, the idea that there exist truths independently of any possible 
experience of them, such as the ‘real length’ of a body or ‘real rest’.  
 
One who considers it obvious that an electron must have at every instant a definite position and 
velocity – though the measurement of them may be impossible – … is forced to interpret the quantum-
mechanical calculations, which he uses nevertheless, in such a way that these definite positions and 
velocities of the electron do not determine the future. Since, on the other hand, the doctrines of the 
school philosophy in the field of mechanical phenomena require strict determinism, one is forced to 
assume for the motion of the electron some mystical vital causes, similar to organic life. (Ibid., p. 
973/102) 
 
                                                          
169 In (Frank, 1961) the paper is translated as “Physical Theories if the Twentieth Century and School 
Philosophy”. 
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The only solution is to abandon the idea of a correspondence between our thoughts and 
the real world altogether. “The edifice of science must be built up out of our 
experiences and out of them only.” (Ibid., p. 104/974)  
Of course, Frank cited the local Prague hero of this program in which the 
ignorabimus loses its justification. After a short description of Mach’s fundamental 
insights he concluded not without a critical distance. 
 
Neither Mach himself nor his immediate students have systematically carried further his point of view. 
… On the contrary, Mach’s teaching, through many presentations, has been washed out into 
something indefinite rather than built up to a consistent scientific conception of the world. It has even 
been interpreted again in line with the school philosophy. (Ibid., p. 975/105) 
 
And similarly as the Vienna Circle Manifesto, Frank sketched the ancestry of the 
scientific world conception: the conventionalism of Duhem and Poincaré, the 
pragmatism of William James, the logical works of Schröder, Frege, Hilbert, Russell, 
and Wittgenstein. Among their positive results most relevant to the appraisal of 
scientific progress was Schlick’s dissolution of the correspondence theory of truth into 
the uniqueness of coordination [Zuordnung]. “Every verification of a physical theory 
consists in the test of whether the symbols coordinated170 to the theory are unique.” 
(Ibid., p. 987/111) And thus he summarized the new optimistic program. 
 
The task of physics is only to find symbols among which there exist rigorously valid relations, and 
which can be coordinated uniquely to our experiences. This coordination between experiences and 
symbols may be more or less detailed. If the symbols conform to the experiences in a very detailed 
manner we speak of causal laws; if the coordination is of a broader sort we call the laws statistical. I 
do not believe that a more exact analysis will establish a definite distinction here. We know today that 
with the help of positions and velocities we cannot set up any causal laws for single electrons. This 
does not exclude the possibility, however, that we shall perhaps some day find a set of quantities with 
the help of which it will be possible to describe the behavior of these particles in greater detail than by 
means of the wave function, the frequencies.171 (Ibid., p. 992f./123) 
 
Let me elaborate on five aspects of Frank’s stand. First, what conclusion can we draw 
from the fact that the values of Planck’s constant h observed in black-body radiation 
and in atomic spectra agree? To Planck’s mind (See Section 3.8.), such agreement was 
a trustworthy sign that we had successfully moved up one step in the ladder, from the 
relative to the absolute, because, after we had given up simultaneously precise 
positions and momenta, we gained a new absolute constant. On Frank’s account, 
agreement of various determinations of h did not warrant the inference to its real 
existence, as pretended by school philosophy. Notice that Frank did not criticize 
Planck by name, but example and interpretation were clue enough to spot the 
addressee. “The theory in which h plays a role then asserts that all the various groups 
of experiences, which are qualitatively so different from one another, nevertheless 
should give the same numerical value of h. It is therefore only a question of comparing 
experiences [Erlebnisse] with one another.” (Ibid., p. 976/107) And as the true 
                                                          
170 To restore terminological continuity with other Logical Empiricists of the day, here and in the subsequent 
passages I have changed Frank’s own English translation. Frank wrote “assigned” and “correspondence” for 
“zugeordnet” and “Zuordnung”. In view of Frank’s post-war writings, I suspect that this was done deliberately to 
distance himself from a position he now longer advocated.  
171 In the English translation, Frank used the word “probability” instead. To a frequentist this was of course the 
same, at least in the present context. 
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existence of a physical quantity is only uniquely defined through the agreement of all 
experiences involving it, “the concept of a really existing quantum of action is only an 
abbreviation for the group of experiences which yield one and the same numerical 
value for h.” (Ibid., p. 989/114)  
 Second, correspondence between a measuring rod and a measured body is the 
core of measurement. In formulating the law of causality according to Laplace’s 
demon, classical physics contained the idea that exact knowledge of the initial state of 
a system was effectively attainable by a precision of measurement that could be 
increased at will. But if we stay on the level of possible experiences, each 
measurement of length ultimately reaches into atomic dimensions and becomes a 
coincidence of electrons measured by light. Arbitrary precision in such a measurement 
requires radiation of arbitrarily small wavelength, hence arbitrarily high frequency and 
energy. This is not only unrealistic, but also disturbs the measured object by Compton 
scattering. And Frank compared Heisenberg’s disturbance argument with 
electrodynamics in which we cannot effectively use of test bodies with infinitely small 
charge either. 
 Third, that Frank approached quantum mechanics from this point of view might 
suggest that he simply adhered to the Copenhagen creed. To a certain extent, this was 
indeed the case. But Frank’s reading of Born’s interpretation of the wave function and 
the dismissal of causality was embedded into a different context. Moreover, Frank 
remained open to future deterministic modifications of quantum mechanics and thus, 
as a positivist, he rejected the notorious finality thesis But as the deliberations about 
measurement had shown, so he held, setting up causal mechanical equations did not 
amount to actual experiences. Experiments of electron diffraction at a lattice, to 
Frank’s mind, demonstrated that the law of causality was invalid for our experiences 
of the positions and velocities of electrons. 
 
It is often concluded that electrons follow absolute chance in their choice of direction. … This follows, 
however, only if one starts from the picture given by school philosophy, according to which every 
electron has a definite position and velocity, which nevertheless do not determine its future.  
 From the standpoint of a purely scientific conception, on the other hand, one will say that there 
are no individual experiences involving positions and velocities of electrons from which the future of 
the latter can be predicted univocally. Instead it appears that the probability that an electron will be 
deflected in a definite direction can be predicted from the experience of the initial experimental 
arrangement. For these frequencies (the squares of the absolute values of the wave functions) 
Schrödinger in his wave mechanics, sets up rigorous causal laws. To the frequencies that occur in 
these laws and define the state of the system one can therefore coordinate definite experiences. This 
theory is called statistical. The statistical element here consist in the manner of coordination of 
experiences to symbols. Thus to certain symbols, the squares of the absolute values of the wave 
functions, there are coordinated, not individual experiences, but numbers which are obtained by 
averaging from a great many individual experiences. (Frank 1929, p. 992/122) 
 
Frank thus, fourth, rejected the notion of absolute chance not because it is impossible 
to prove that given events are absolutely random, but because it was a metaphysical 
concept. And thus he implicitly criticized Exner’s exalted declarations that chance was 
the root of all natural processes. Yet Exner and Schrödinger constantly maintained the 
empiricist’s openness on the issue of determinism and indeterminism. Moreover, in the 
above-quoted passage on the task of physics Frank took Exner’s stand against Planck 
and Schlick by asserting that the distinction between deterministic and statistical laws 
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was at best a gradual one. The reason why Frank arrived close to Copenhagen and far 
from Schrödinger’s Vienna, to my mind, is found in the strict division between theory 
and experiences which by then had become the core tenet of Logical Empiricism. 
 Roughly their account of experience and theory can be pictured like a 
commuting diagram in geometry between symbols at t0 and t1 and the respective 
experiences e0 and e1 (figure 6). This suggests that statistical features enter in two 
places that are, it is true, strongly correlated: in coordination (or assignment) and in the 
law. Pointing to the existence of a causal equation for the frequencies or probabilities, 
Frank could simply relegate the probabilistic element into the correspondence, such 
that the ei were replaced by statistical collectives Ei.  
S(t0) S(t1)
e1e0
 
Fig. 6: The coordination of experiences to theoretical symbols 
 
Advocating a form of Boltzmann’s Bild-realism, Schrödinger rejected to leave such a 
prominent part to coordination only. To him, laws could well be of a statistical 
character, but theory should as much as possible minimize the arbitrariness of 
coordination. Schlick, instead, demanded a separation of strict causality and pure 
randomness already on the level of theory. As randomness was ascertained by the 
complete impossibility of prediction, to my mind, it cannot be interpreted as a definite 
experience in Frank’s sense. Also their interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relation diverged. To Schlick’s mind they represented an internal limitation of 
quantum theory, to Frank they restricted coordination or better: measurement. Yet on 
the level of experiences or predictions, Schlick and Frank were in complete agreement.  
 Fifth, when it comes to ontology, Frank followed Mises lead and considered 
statistical collectives as entities that could figure in strict laws. They were ideal 
objects, but within Frank’s conception all theoretical concepts represented abstract 
entities that were coordinated to experiences by certain definitions or correspondence 
rules. When contemplating possible further specifications of the quantum mechanical 
states, he continued (the above passage). 
 
When we determine a number through a so-called single observation, we really observe even in this 
case only a mean value; ‘point experiences’ are never recorded. The coordination of symbols to 
experiences always contains then, strictly speaking, a statistical or, if we like, a collective element. 
Thus it is always a matter of making the coordination so as to go into detail to a greater or lesser 
degree. (Ibid., p. 993/123) 
 
Thus collectives (or, more precisely, objects derived from them) can be coordinated to 
single observations and, accordingly, represent a possible ontology for physical laws 
that map probabilities into probabilities. And thus he reformulated the problem of 
causality as such: “What is the character of the coordination between our experiences 
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and the quantities describing the state of the system, which are subject to rigorous 
laws?” (Ibid., p. 993/123) If this coordination involves individual events, then 
causality holds. 
 Following Frank’s opening, von Mises (1930a) explained to the Prague 
congress that the recent changes towards a statistical viewpoint were rooted in a 
modified attitude to causality. By postulating hidden causes, it is rather easy to 
rephrase any statistical law in such a manner that it conforms to both of Kant’s very 
general definitions of causality. In this way, of course, the principle completely loses 
its value for science. In the limit, one would arrive at Schlick’s (1920) example of a 
completely chaotic world with specific laws for each space-time point. Yet von 
Mises’s intention was not to search criteria to protect the principle of causality from 
emptiness. 
 As it can always be trivially fulfilled, so he held, the principle of causality is not 
a necessity of thought, “but changeable, and it will subordinate itself to the demands 
of physics.” (Mises, 1930a, p. 146) For this reason causality does not provide an 
adequate basis to assess the more relevant distinction between determinism and 
indeterminism, or between the description of nature by means of differential equations 
and by means of probability distributions. But as had Frank, von Mises remained 
reluctant to a final decision because absolute chance did not make sense to a Vienna 
Indeterminist. “The systematic theory, as I have pursued it for more than a decade, has 
never known of any failure of deterministic physics other than that it becomes idle in 
certain cases.” (Ibid., p. 152) In this respect, quantum mechanics did not represent a 
fundamental breach in modern physics, and with minor qualifications von Mises could 
return to the hydrodynamic examples from “The Crisis of Mechanics” and stress the 
continuity between quantum mechanics and pre-quantum indeterminism.  
 “Laplace’s demon, the executive officer of determinism” (Ibid., p. 146) can 
fulfill his duty only as long as the force laws are not too complex. “Newtonian 
mechanics only provides a useful means of causal explanation of nature as long as 
relatively simple force laws entail more complex motions. … Explanation just means 
reducing to something more simple.” (Ibid., p. 146) Otherwise, Mach’s principle of 
economy would be violated. 
 
The deterministic approaches of classical physics can be maintained formally, or better: ideally, in the 
entire realm of directly observable phenomena, but in many cases … they become idle, they lose the 
character of a causal explanation, they do not contribute to our knowledge, to describing or predicting 
the course of phenomena. … Who views ponderomotoric forces, densities, and dielectric constants as 
things enjoying an existence independently of the task of describing nature, will consider determinism 
as in principle preserved but practically excluded. For those who comprehend these concepts 
[occurring in physical theories] only as means introduced in the approaches based on differential 
equations in order to jointly enable an orientation in the phenomenal world, the limits of applicability 
and the limits of determinism itself coincide. (Ibid., p. 147)  
 
Once again we find Mach’s empiricism at the roots of preferring an indeterministic 
approach. More precisely than in his earlier papers, von Mises studied the difference 
between the macro and the micro level. Hydrodynamics, Brownian motion and 
Boltzmann’s various attempts to provide a mechanical foundation of the kinetic theory 
all show that “[t]he transition between the physics of the single elementary body, 
atom, proton, electron, etc., to the macroscopic phenomena is simply obtained only by 
statistics.” (Ibid., p. 148) If one consequently adopts a purely statistical approach the 
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notorious ergodic hypothesis becomes a solvable mathematical problem. Although the 
time evolutions of Brownian particles themselves do not form a collective, and, 
accordingly, the original concept of probability cannot be carried over to them, the law 
of large numbers (in the general sense) can be applied to the time evolutions.  
 Giving a succinct presentation of the frequentist approach, von Mises stressed 
that the statistical collective represented an ideal object similar to a sphere in geometry 
and that the irregularity condition corresponded to what physicists commonly 
described as ‘molecular disorder’. As probability calculus merely was a theory 
mapping probabilities into probabilities, von Mises could tacitly relegate the problem 
of the status of this assumption to his physicist colleagues. This in effect turned 
Planck’s (1914) use of molecular disorder upside down: from a supplementary 
condition rescuing determinist causality despite the use of probability in the second 
law of thermodynamics into a justification of an indeterminist theory. 
 Von Mises followed Schlick’s (1920) contention that the verification of the law 
of causality required a suitable notion of when identical conditions recur. As a 
Machian, he had to stress the uniqueness of the course of physical events. Yet, the 
statistical approach – as any scientific investigation, to the empiricist’s mind – tried “to 
find out observable processes which are limited in space and time and which reoccur 
to a reasonable approximation. Only approximately repeatable processes are the 
object of physical considerations.” (Mises, 1930a, p. 151) Any observation or 
measurement yields only a decimal number with finitely many digits. While 
Schrödinger (1932) had emphasized that the determinist insisting on differential 
equations in actual fact assumed the feasibility of a continuous interpolation between 
the measured values, von Mises held that those who equate the idea of causality to 
naive determinism, are extrapolating their results beyond possible experiences by 
assuming that the precision of measurements could be increased beyond any limit. But 
this, so von Mises contended, contradicts the atomistic hypothesis. So ultimately he 
had made peace with atomism. And citing the idea of disturbance, he concluded that 
the efficiency of determinism is limited to sufficiently coarse measurements. The 
statistical point of view was thus superior to determinism. But von Mises did not 
conceive of any “contradiction between a series of observations and classical theory, 
we are never forced to say that a law of classical physics is violated in any single 
process.” (Ibid., p. 152) Only the BKS-theory was based on this assumption, but it was 
quickly abandoned.  
 Quantum mechanics blocked the possibility to support determinism by 
reduction to atomic processes. “One has recognized that the elementary processes 
themselves do not admit a causal description. This was an immediate consequence of 
the requirement that a theory must be considered only together with the experiments 
serving its verification.” (Ibid., p. 153) And now von Mises repeated the standard 
Copenhagen arguments up to Heisenberg’s microscope. But there was a difference of 
philosophical interpretation. In von Mises’s treatment of Born’s interpretation of 
Schrödinger’s wave function there was little evidence of a quantum revolution. Just 
“the same interpretation we have to give to any result of the physics of differential 
equations in the macroscopic realm if we restrict ourselves to assertions about what is 
actually observable.” (Ibid., p. 153) According to Heisenberg’s theory of 
measurement, “also in microphysics the concrete measurement process does not 
represent an elementary process, but a statistical event.” (Ibid., p. 153) But already 
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when testing a deterministic theory, we have to presuppose the notions ‘collective’, 
‘distribution’, ‘expectation value of a distribution’ because there is no other way to 
speak of the true value of a measurement other than defining it as the expectation 
value of the collective belonging to it. 
 During the academic year 1929/30 von Mises was Rector of the University of 
Berlin. On 27 July, 1930, he delivered the annual address commemorating the founder 
of the University, King Friedrich Wilhelm III. As Planck had done 16 years before, 
von Mises began with some words about the historical moment, the “fortunate 
settlement of one of the most unfortunate consequences of the lost war,” (Mises, 
1930b, p. 885) the liberation of the Rhineland. “We conceive in the stage now reached 
a first indispensable precondition for the recovery and restrengthening of the nation 
which can come only from within; which can only grow from the three pillars of our 
own strength, work, character, and insight.” (Ibid., p. 885) Planck could not have 
better described the duties of the university as the Berlin academic elite understood 
them. 
 As regards philosophical content, “On the scientific world picture of the 
present” initially targeted the same opponent as Frank’s (1929) opening address: du 
Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus. Von Mises’s main theme was to compare the physical 
world picture of the 1870s with the present one. Of du Bois-Reymond’s in principle 
completed mechanical world practically nothing had remained. The convulsion began 
at the apparently safest place, in Euclidean geometry. It continued with the principle of 
causality in atomic physics and the principle of the excluded middle in mathematics. 
All these developments contradicted the intuitive idea of a reduction to elementary 
motions of atoms, which represented “wishful thinking reaching back to antiquity and 
closely linked to primitive habits of thought.” (Ibid., p. 887) Atomism gave birth to 
Laplace’s demon, but the first consistent implementation of this reductionist program 
by Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of gases unearthed the concept of probability foreign to 
the determinism of the mechanical world view. Ultimately, quantum mechanics dashed 
all hopes for a future return of determinism and demonstrated the “essentially 
statistical character of all physical assertions.” (Ibid., p. 890) But already before 
determinism or the physics of differential equations hit many obstacles, the 
impossibility to find simple and universal force laws for many phenomena of our 
immediate life-world and the fluctuations present in all physical measurements that 
ultimately reach atomic dimensions. In the second half of the speech, von Mises put 
these arguments familiar from his earlier writings into a general philosophical context 
and approached his colleagues from the humanities.  
 Many new developments of physics, so von Mises continued, blatantly 
contradicted our common intuitions. But we have to view them in the same vein as the 
people of the 16th or 17th century wondered about the rapidly moving earth. 
 
In actual fact this is nothing but a process of habituation, an adaptation of our faculties of thought and 
imagination to certain claims which, in actual fact, are completely unintuitive and definitely contradict 
the naive conception and all doctrines handed down to us before. In every epoch of truly creative 
progress in natural science, there has to occur such an essentially voluntary process of assimilation of 
thought. (Ibid., p. 890) 
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Von Mises’s conclusion closely followed Mach’s lead except for the voluntary 
character of the adaptive process. Mach had instead assumed also an instinctive 
process. This shift again documents Logical Empiricists’ demise of biologism. 
 What forced the physicist “to develop theories which make such high demands 
to our faculty of intuition?” (Ibid., p. 891) The outcome of an experiment alone does 
not suffice. Although there can be crucial experiments within a well-defined setting, in 
the large experiments can be accommodated into many different theories. Although 
von Mises thus accepted Duhemian underdetermination, he rejected Poincaré’s view 
that physical theories represent mere conventions agreed upon to suit a given purpose. 
“This conventionalism which seems to be a counterpart to the contrat social and 
similar extreme views in other domains, no doubt, contains a perfectly true core, but it 
envisages only one side of the matter. Already the far-reaching unanimity of physicists 
in rejecting and accepting theories speaks against the existence of free conventions.” 
(Ibid., p. 891)  
Although von Mises, accordingly, admitted that theories change while 
experimental results essentially remain correct within their observational limits, he 
clearly distanced himself from the far-reaching conventionalism still prevailing among 
Logical Empiricists. Nevertheless, the actual decisions scientists make about any given 
theory followed the usual pragmatic criteria of theory choice: “the simplicity, 
plausibility, decency [das Unanstößige] of a theory” (Ibid., p. 891). And von Mises 
cited a whole history of such criteria ranging from Occam’s razor “until the lucid yet 
not always properly understood principle of ‘economy of thought’ which we owe to 
Ernst Mach [all of which express] the guiding principle of scientific theory formation: 
Among all assumptions consistent with our present stock of experimental knowledge, 
we choose the one which in the smoothest way and with the least resistance adapts to 
our previous ideas, the one which imposes the least constraints to our previous habits 
of thought.” (Ibid., p. 891) Coming back to the comparison of the world picture of du 
Bois-Reymond’s epoch and the present one, von Mises emphasized than above and 
beyond the extraordinary increase in scientific knowledge, “also our epistemological 
attitude has become more comprehensive, more profound, and richer in insight. 
Between those days … and our present lies above all the great clarificatory work 
[Aufklärungsarbeit] of the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach which – after a short 
period of misunderstanding – now begins to have the widest consequences.” (Ibid., p. 
892) And apart from relativity theory, von Mises even praised the value of Mach’s 
ideas for the restriction of quantum mechanical concepts to what is actually 
observable. It is quite interesting to note that while on this basis von Mises largely 
assented to the Copenhagen interpretation, Schrödinger turned the same criticism of 
the overestimation of auxiliary concepts against Copenhagen’s particle trajectory 
(Sect. 6.3.6.). 
 In the end, von Mises returned to du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus and its 
persistent effect on the autonomy claims of the Geisteswissenschaften.  
 
Still today for many representatives of the Geisteswissenschaften the program of a naive atomistic 
explanation of nature represents the basis of their attitude towards the natural sciences. Extensive 
theories about the ‘limits of concept formation in the natural sciences’ or the ‘geisteswissenschaftliche 
method’ and the like are erected thereupon and try to elaborate the alleged contrast between two types 
of viewing world in a programmatic fashion. But who looks at present-day natural science as it really 
is, must understand that it does not close its eyes to any method suitable to impart knowledge 
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[Erkenntnis] and that it does not possess any limits other than those altogether set to human cognition 
[Wissen], that is, communicable knowledge [Erkennen]. (Ibid., p. 892) 
 
Emphasizing the communicative basis of science was indeed a truly Machian 
perspective (See Sect. 3.1.). Yet von Mises was not after the continuity between 
craftsmanship and the experimental method. Almost verbally quoting Mach he instead 
praised it as “the highest philosophy of the scientific investigator is to tolerate an 
incomplete world view” (Ibid., p. 892)172 and thus emphasized the openness in 
principle and the universality of the empirical method. “As to aim, content, and 
method, there exists only a single science, the imitation of the world by concepts; the 
bipartition in Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften has only a practical and provisional 
significance, it is not systematically necessary or final.” (Ibid., p. 892) This was a 
creed, Vienna Indeterminists defended from Mach and Exner until Logical 
Empiricists’ unified science. But more than the latter von Mises admitted that while 
the Naturwissenschaften set out from simple problems, the Geisteswissenschaften 
addressed the “more lifelike and vital and, above all, the more complicated problems.” 
(Ibid., p. 892) This implied a difference of perspective on conceptual changes in both 
realms.  
 
While in the latter one attributes high significance to a new discovery, to a new basic idea only if it 
actually permeates large part of the problem in question, if it quantitatively affects a wide field, the 
most important physical theories often exert only little influence at a remote place, at least at the 
beginning of their development. (Ibid., p. 890f.) 
 
And von Mises rightly held that missing this difference and the difference between 
constant facts and ever changing theories was the basis of many misunderstandings of 
modern physics among people with a geisteswissenschaftlichen background. The 
failure to recognize these differences, so one might add, nourished a substantial part of 
the sentiments of a hopeless foundational crisis of science widespread in the general 
cultural milieu. Moreover, this distinction gives some clue that when assenting to 
Spengler in the early 1920s, von Mises was talking about a different type of crises. 
(Cf. Sect. 1.1.2.2.) As Exner but with a markedly different orientation towards modern 
art, von Mises thus simultaneously lived the life of a scientific modernist and a 
Bildungsbürger. This was an important difference to his friend Frank. 
 
8.4. Logical Empiricists’ Anschaulichkeit  
 
Perhaps the most ideology-laden paper of Frank, still more outspoken than the Prague 
opening speech, was his 1928 criticism of the debates about Anschaulichkeit. It 
amounted to a radical criticism of the milieu’s demands characterized by Forman and 
tried to track down their metaphysical roots. In “On the ‘Anschaulichkeit’ of physical 
theories”, Frank initially assented to Heisenberg’s redefinition of the term. A theory 
was anschaulich if it was possible to think all experimental consequences in a 
consistent qualitative fashion. This, however, “is a demand made on every physical 
theory.” (Frank, 1928, p. 121) Since the demand for Anschaulichkeit that was typically 
                                                          
172 This famous quotation appeared in the Mechanics (Mach, 1988, p. 479; 559). See also Sect. 1.1.2.1. 
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made went further and was much more specific, Frank set out to investigate its precise 
meaning. 
 
[At bottom, one only finds] a certain desire for convenience [or simplicity] and an unconscious 
adherence to some traditional philosophical systems. One might perhaps immediately object that that 
the latter claim is untenable because precisely those physicists have the desire for Anschaulichkeit who 
think in the most concrete fashion and are averse to any speculation. Against this one can only say that 
who is averse to any speculation simply takes over at face value the speculations of earlier generations. 
(Ibid., p. 121) 
 
This inescapability to critically discuss anew the foundational questions of every 
scientific theory is a figure that returns over an over again in Frank’s writing. (See 
Sect. 8.3. & 8.5.) Otherwise scientists typically relapse into school philosophy 
(Schulphilosophie). The Vienna Circle reserved this tag for those classical 
philosophies which considered themselves prior to empirical sciences and strove for 
scholastic coherence. In the case of Anschaulichkeit, the philosophical convictions 
taken over uncritically consisted in two characteristic metaphysical creeds.  
 
First, the materialistic world conception according to which all events can eventually be reduced to the 
motion of absolutely inelastic little particles in vacuum. … Second, idealistic philosophy with the 
special status of the enigmatic triad of space, time, causality (or space, time, matter), where by means 
of the, or so it seems to me, absurd concept of “pure” intuition a daring bridge is thrown that leads 
from mystical intuition to a real optical experience of viewing. (Ibid., p. 124) 
 
The unnamed party guilty of absurdity and the enigmatic triad was Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy. For the Logical Empiricists, general relativity required a 
radical departure from the a priori categories of space and time that Kant had grounded 
in pure intuition. And indeed one of the goals of Kant’s transcendental philosophy was 
to embody the core concepts of Newtonian physics in a systematic fashion.  
 Frank extended this model of the dismissal of the synthetic a priori and a return 
to pure empiricism to the issue of causality by implicitly identifying materialism and 
deterministic causality. This is also the reason why he believed, but did not really 
prove, that both metaphysical positions “presuppose one another.” (Ibid., p. 124) Yet 
one may well ask whether this identification is necessary for a Kantian standpoint, in 
particular if one takes Kant’s original formula for causality: “Everything that happens, 
that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows to a rule.” (Kant, 
[1781] 1990, A 189) As a matter of fact, there were neo-Kantians who treated the 
issues of space-time and causality on different grounds. And Ernst Cassirer (1910) 
even viewed the joint development of modern science and modern philosophy as the 
transition from the concept of substance to the concept of function.  
 There were, it is true, less sophisticated minds. In Lenard’s attacks against 
Einstein, Frank rightly detected a materialist origin, in particular the conviction that all 
inanimate processes in nature are “merely translocations of a substance [Stoff] given 
once and for all.” (according to Frank, 1928, p. 126) Apart from these metaphysical 
dispositions, the preferred status of the Newtonian world view of particles mutually 
interacting through forces was just a contingent fact of the history of physics which 
people simply imbibed and got used to as centuries went by. But those who “establish 
a vague connection between the lack of Anschaulichkeit in Einstein’s theory and the 
lack of a causal explanation” (Ibid., p. 121) simply forgot that at the time of Newton, 
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forces at a distance were totally unintuitive and – so one might add – Newton had to 
admit that his mechanics could not explain the almost circular nature of the planetary 
orbits. Similarly, the electrons orbiting around the nucleus in Bohr’s early atomic 
theory were intuitive only because they reminded us of the solar system. But this 
intuition proved illusionary once we try to actually look at [anschauen] these atoms. 
‘Looking at’ means, according to the empiricist, “observing and experiencing a 
reaction of this body to light waves.” (Ibid., p. 123) Frank’s argument thus developed 
into Heisenberg’s famous thought experiment about the determination of momentum 
and position of a quantum particle under the microscope.  
 
If as a result one believes that nothing is said about the positions and velocities of the electrons 
themselves, but only about the possibilities of their precise measurement, the proper response is that 
one has to distinguish between the position coordinates as mathematical concepts and the position 
coordinates as physical experiences. As the latter, the electrons are experienced in the properties of 
dispersed light; as regards the former, quantum mechanics shows that coordinate triples of points are 
inadequate quantities to represent radiation phenomena. But there is nothing “intuitive” in these 
material or electrical points. (Ibid., p. 124) 
 
This strict division between the mathematical and the empirical level of science was 
another core tenet of Logical Empiricism that had been developed by interpreting the 
relativity theories. This division represented their most important departure from 
Mach’s empiricism and was a precondition, or so they held, to avail themselves of 
modern logic in the analysis of science. Any idealistic metaphysics, Kant’s synthetic a 
priori foremost, amounted to a border violation that was meaningless, at least under a 
strict reading of the verificationist doctrine. The relation between the analytic and the 
synthetic realm was established by suitably chosen coordinative definitions. In physics 
they corresponded, at bottom, to a theory of measurement. This two-tired ontology 
permitted Frank and his colleagues to reject Planck’s (1908a) allegations that 
positivism led to a return of anthropomorphic and subjective elements into science.  
The new theories of physics, so Frank continued, did not “introduce the 
observer as a causally determinative factor” (Frank, 1928, p. 123) let alone a 
subjectivity of sense perception because any observer could be replaced by a 
measuring device. “One may express the basic idea of relativity theory nearly as such: 
the registering devices and the processes of their construction and calibration belong as 
essential parts to the system whose regularities we want to describe.” (Ibid., p. 124) 
The same holds true in quantum mechanics, as the Heisenberg microscope argument 
demonstrated. 
 Frank at this point continued the Mach-Planck debate. While relativity theory at 
first look favors positivism, the successes of atomistics suggest that physical theory 
could reveal “the innermost nature of matter.” (Ibid., p. 125). But there existed 
Planck’s realist interpretation of general relativity according to which the metric was 
“moving the absolute more backward…[by] welding space and time by means of the 
velocity of light into a uniform continuum.” (Planck, 1925, p. 154) In contrast, Frank 
believed that quantum mechanics – both in Schrödinger’s and Heisenberg’s versions – 
continued the epistemological changes of relativity theory and corroborated a major 
insight of Mach, namely, the criticism of a realistic interpretation of auxiliary 
concepts. 
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The concept of position, the precisely defined locality in space turns out not to be applicable for all 
phenomena. The final fixed point is seen in the immediately experiencable reaction of an atom to light 
rays. Wholly in line with Mach’s conception of physics … the auxiliary concepts “position of the 
electron”, etc., turn out not to be applicable in general, adhering to them even hampers the 
understanding of radiation phenomena. (Ibid., p. 125) 
 
In these lines, Frank appears closer to a staunch Machian position than he would do in 
later writings having taken a linguistic turn. (See Section 8.7.) The auxiliary concept 
Mach was most reluctant to accept were Boltzmann’s atoms. Frank, as it were, made 
virtue of necessity and praised Mach’s early insight that “one need not imagine the 
chemical elements to exist in a space of three dimensions”, (Mach, 1909, p. 55, quoted 
by Frank, 1928, p. 126f.) of course without suggesting that Mach presaged 
configuration space. Still, this sounded apologetic. Referring to his obituary (1917), 
Frank conceded that Mach was wrong to expect that “the most important 
advancements would be stimulated by sense physiology,” (1928, p. 125) but he 
remained committed to a strict reading of the empiricist criterion of meaning. General 
relativity and quantum mechanics teach us not only that the measuring devices are part 
of the system, but also “that all physical statements can be reduced to statements about 
the relations of the readings of measuring devices,” (Ibid., p. 125) readings which 
replace the enigmatic triad of space, time, and matter. And these readings were 
construed in parallel to the classical Machian elements. To give a simple example first, 
Frank argued that neither the heliocentric nor the geocentric picture of the planetary 
system had any similarity with the experience of twinkling points; “the only similarity 
is that the pictures can be generated by a unique rule from the phenomenon and vice 
versa.” (Ibid., p. 122) The same occurred in Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics.  
 
[I]n the positivist conception of nature we have gained [here] a fixed point. On this account, every 
theory is justified and indicates an understanding of natural phenomena which uniquely connects the 
sense impressions. In the fate of the materialistic world view we clearly see the consequences of an 
idolization of auxiliary concepts. (Ibid., p. 125). 
 
But this uniqueness did not at all imply that there is only one true theory because there 
can and typically will be different rules that are preferred or rejected according to 
pragmatic criteria among them simplicity and fertility. Mach’s positivism was thus 
highly anti-reductionist. 
 In the final pages of his paper, Frank rejected Vladimir I. Lenin’s criticism of 
Mach by observing that the basic idea of the old materialism consisted in the 
“mathematical description of all natural events” (Ibid., p. 127) which was not tied to a 
primitive mechanicism. In the emphasis of mechanicism, the materialist of Lenin’s 
brand and the vitalist meet though with directly opposing aspirations in the description 
of animate nature. Some pages before, Frank had leveled the same criticism against 
that type of physics which Lenard had found so intuitively appealing. Hence one might 
conclude by transitivity that, to Frank’s mind, there was a certain agreement between 
Lenin and Lenard. They shared the will to return to the classical physics from which 
their metaphysical world view had once emerged. 
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8.5. The Law of Causality and Its Limits 
 
In the Introduction to his 1932 book, Frank recalled that his earlier views (See Sect. 
8.1.) had been shaped by his failed attempt to posit causality as an axiom of physics in 
the style of Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry. As I have argued elsewhere (Stöltzner, 
2002a), Hilbert’s Viennese students Frank and Hahn conceived the axiomatic method 
through the glasses of conventionalism, thus rejecting Hilbert’s repeated talk about a 
non-Leibnizian pre-established harmony between mathematics and physics.  
 Two developments of recent physics prompted Frank to return to the causality 
theme. “On the one hand it was the conception of statistical laws [Gesetzmäßigkeit] 
and their relation to dynamic laws which has been developed in several publications 
by Richard von Mises; on the other hand the new formulation of the law of causality in 
quantum mechanics.” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 24/12) In contrast to Schlick (1931), 
quantum mechanics accordingly did not strike Frank as a bolt from the blue because 
substantial modifications of the concept of causality familiar from classical physics 
were already called for by the statistical physics of the 1910s. Frank explicitly cited 
(Mises, 1922a) and acknowledged useful suggestions from Einstein, von Mises, and 
Schrödinger.173  
 We can find many affirmative references to the tradition of Vienna 
Indeterminism. First of all Frank acknowledged Exner’s priority. 
 
Franz Exner has already drawn attention to the possibility that elementary processes do not follow the 
pattern of celestial mechanics with their Laplacian causality but that perhaps for an individual event, 
for example the collision of two molecules, no causal law can be established at all, and that 
nevertheless, with the formation of averages, laws can be derived by which some causal determination 
is expressed. (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 90/70f.) 
 
And citing the Lectures (Exner, 1919) in the notes, Frank continued that the 
“significance of Exner’s thoughts for our time is very correctly characterised by Erwin 
Schrödinger [1922a].” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 338/284) Hence Frank was well aware 
of the philosophical tradition of the old Vienna Institute even though he had not 
explicitly defended these views when he was working there before 1912.  
Frank cited his 1919 paper, that represented a transitory position, only in the 
notes as a presentation of gas theory. Although he now called his juvenile work 
(Frank, 1907) one-sided, what remained in 1932 was the insight that very general 
theorems, among them energy conservation and the law of causality, constantly were 
close to meaningless tautologies. This insight motivated the strategy of Frank’s book, 
to search for conditions under which the law of causality had a well-defined empirical 
meaning, that is, was a statement about the real world [Wirklichkeitssatz]. In the end, 
Frank arrived at a negative conclusion. 
 
From our experiences [Erlebnissen] no proof can be derived for or against the validity, or even 
probability, of the law of causality in nature, nor can we conclude anything about observable events 
from the validity of the law of causality.  
 On the other hand, our whole science, even our whole practical life is apparently based on the 
continual application of the law of causality. Our whole life is built upon confidence in this law; each 
                                                          
173 (Cf. Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 28/15). 
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manipulation is accompanied by the expectation of definite results, an expectation that we can draw 
only from the belief that equal initial conditions will always be followed by the same. 
 Both conceptions are correct and therefore cannot be in real opposition. The appearance of 
such a contradiction comes about because we often have an unclear notion of the connection of the 
‘real’ world with the world of our experiences, that an old tradition has taught us to look for a sharply 
designed world of ‘real’ things behind the living, but vague, world of our experiences, a notion that 
seems to us as obvious as in fact it is misleading and obstructive to understanding the more delicate 
features of science. (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 286f./238f.) 
 
Frank treated this apparent contradiction between the theoretical and the practical 
content of the law of causality almost like a Kantian antinomy. The contradiction 
dissolved once untenable metaphysical presuppositions were dropped. Indeed, there 
was hardly a better Kantian example for a transcendent concept – at least in the 
phenomenal realm – than the ‘real’ world. No wonder that at the end of Chapter X, 
Frank praised neo-Kantianism as the most progressive direction within “the process of 
decomposition [Zersetzungsprozeß] of school philosophy.” (Ibid., p. 320/268) 
 Frank’s philosophical conclusion was more radical and more specific than just 
rejecting metaphysical realism. Manifold historical investigations demonstrated that 
“obviously the general law of causality was not a great discovery. Only special causal 
laws were, for example the discovery by Galileo and Newton that all motions can be 
predicted from the positions and velocities at a moment in time.” (Ibid., p. 328/274f.) 
Just the form of these special laws underwent drastic changes. More precisely than in 
1929, Frank elucidated his commuting diagram between theoretical symbols and 
empirical observations (or possible experiences). Ultimately, this distinction permitted 
Frank to overcome – and partially maintain – his 1907 position; recall that the 
definition of state had been crucial for establishing the conventionality of causality. 
 
Full precision is, in principle, not possible at all in the world of sense experience, because equality of 
states is not defined in it; it is only defined in the mathematical scheme with which theoretical physics 
represents our experiences. 
 The scheme itself always connects the present values of certain magnitudes with their future 
values in an unambiguous way, and is therefore, seen as a formal scheme, always purely causal. 
Depending on the manner in which the mathematical magnitudes are connected with the observational 
sense experiences, the systematic summary of a scheme and rules of coordination [Zuordnungsregeln] 
can form a causal or a noncausal theory. The latter is true when the mathematical magnitudes are 
coordinated not to individual experiences, but, as happens in modern wave mechanics, to a whole 
group of experiences, which results from a series of experiments made under certain conditions. … 
 This [new development] however makes a change only in the physical theory, that is in the 
totality of scheme and coordination, compared to classical physics. The subdivision is different now; 
the summary [pauschal] nature of the prediction of experiences [Erlebnisse] is already inherent in the 
rules of coordination, whereas formerly we retained the unambiguous nature of the relation between 
mathematical magnitudes and experience, and took the summary nature of the observed connection 
between future and present experiences into account by regarding the scheme used as altogether too 
simple for a faithful representation of the experiences.  
 This difference is therefore not a difference in the statements about experiences, for in any 
case there are only summary predictions here; but the deviation exists only in the theory of how these 
summary predictions can be made. … What the new physics teaches us is an advance in the analysis 
of uncertainty, since the theory now also predicts this spread [Streuung]174, whereas formerly the 
spread, the uncertainty, was simply thrown into the residue which could not be understood 
theoretically. (Ibid., p. 333f./279f.) 
 
                                                          
174 The English translation here reads “scatter”. But I found a term from statistics closer to Frank’s intentions. 
 308
At bottom, Frank took it as the main lesson of quantum mechanics that coordination of 
theoretical symbols and experiences was no longer one-to-one but statistical. This 
move simply integrated the errors present in every real-world measurement into the 
theory itself. It is quite interesting that in this passage at the end of the book Frank 
made reference only to Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and remained silent about what 
Schlick (1931) had taken to be the pivotal lesson of quantum physics, to wit, that 
quantum theory contained an absolute limit of language.  
 Frank, however, openly approved Schlick’s emphasis on prediction. Discussing 
the identification of the law of causality with predetermination by a world formula, 
Frank concluded “that predetermination of the future has scientific meaning only if we 
connect it with the question of scientific prediction. Schlick [1931] is justified in 
regarding this as the proper scientific meaning of the law of causality.” (Frank, [1932] 
1988, p. 51/37) And when explaining that before coordination to certain experiences 
all mathematical formulas of theoretical physics are neither true nor false, Frank added 
the note that “Schlick, M., following Wittgenstein, says that the laws of nature 
themselves are not assertions about the real world, but only directions for the 
formation of such assertions.” (Ibid., p. 335/281) To Frank’s mind, rules of 
coordination were not only appropriately chosen conventions but “the reason why in 
exact science, however exact it may seem, there are remnants of uncertainty.” (Ibid., 
31/19) Quantum mechanics only integrated this uncertainty into the theory itself.  
 But there is another important difference here above and beyond the strong 
emphasis on limits of the speakable that resulted from Schlick’s adherence to a rigid 
verificationist criterion of meaning. In Sect. 7.3. we have seen that he used the 
pragmatic Wittgensteinian twist to maintain a difference between strict dynamical laws 
and statistical regularities which still had to be divided into laws and pure chance. 
Frank instead remained committed to the Viennese tradition and used only a single 
type of lawfulness [Gesetzmäßigkeit] thus treating statistical and dynamical laws on a 
par. In this perspective it is very instructive to follow Frank’s attempts to assign 
empirical meaning to the general law of causality – albeit unsatisfactory at the end of 
the day – because he provided a variety of very general yet still specific versions of the 
law of causality, some of which were historically influential enough that philosophers 
equated them to the general law of causality itself. As demonstrated in Section 7.1., 
Schlick (1920) coined his theory of causality after the general theory of relativity 
while quantum mechanics would prompt the complete dismissal of this conception in 
1931.  
 Frank’s historico-critical investigation commenced from Laplace’s demon, 
“probably the most incisive and definite [formulation the law of causality] has ever 
received.” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 60/44) That there exists a unique determination of 
the whole course of the world from a given state, however, does not suffice to escape 
tautology because this demand “has nothing to do with causality.” (Ibid., p. 66/50) 
While Mach had taken unique determination as a very weak ontological principle and 
thus criticized the notion of independent (and repeatable) causes and effects (See Sect. 
3.2.), Frank considered this kind of uniqueness as a plain tautology, probably because 
by way of the concept of coordination, Mach’s criticism was already incorporated into 
epistemology; the mathematical symbols were just the abstractions Mach had called 
for. Symbolism and coordination had to reflect this uniqueness in the sense that they 
must not lead to an ambiguous relation between experiences, but there could well exist 
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different symbolic representations – this was Duhemian underdetermination – and the 
coordinations could be statistical. 
 
It is clear that for the world there is only one course of events that really happens. If there is an all-
embracing intelligence that knows this course in advance it can also predict it. Every other being also 
knows that there can be only one course of events for the world; only he does not know in detail what 
it will be like. If the proposition ‘everything is predetermined’ is meant to say that in reality there is 
only one course of events, it is a tautology; for ‘to be predetermined’ is then only another expression 
for ‘to exist’. … Our statement about the predetermination is no tautology only insofar as it claims the 
existence of an all-embracing intelligence; by this it states something about the real world if what this 
intelligence knows of the future also becomes noticeable in our experiences. (Ibid., p. 49f./35) 
 
More specifically, Laplace’s superhuman intelligence that is able to calculate the 
future of the world from its present state, again runs the risk of tautology because 
anything can be expressed through an arbitrarily complicated world formula. This 
corresponded to Schlick’s (1920) insight that a world governed by arbitrarily complex 
laws was empirically indistinguishable from a chaotic world. Interestingly, Frank left 
open the theological alternative that such a superhuman world formula became 
meaningful by the assuming the empirical existence of a superhuman intelligence 
cognizant of it. “If however we want to avoid both the introduction of this spirit and 
also the decline into the tautological, we have to introduce the assumption that the 
world formula is of a special kind, for example given through Einstein’s differential 
equations of the general field theory, or a similar system of equations.” (Frank [1932] 
1988, p. 50/36) 
 The paradigmatic example were Newton’s laws of the mechanical motions of 
mass points, that is, second order differential equations of the form )()( tXtxm =&& , 
where X denotes the relevant force function.  
 
Laplace’s spirit must have three achievements, helped by his superhuman capabilities: he must know 
all initial positions of all mass-points of the world; he must know the forms of all functions X,Y,Z for 
all masses, and finally he must be able, from knowledge of the initial conditions and of the functions 
X,Y,Z, to calculate the positions at any time whatsoever, that is he must be able to integrate Newton’s 
equations of motion for any initial conditions and any ‘law of force’. (Ibid., p. 64/48) 
 
It is empirically meaningful to assert the existence of a superhuman spirit so construed. 
“In order to make Laplace’s demand meaningful for a human mind, the arbitrariness of 
the functions X,Y,Z has to be reduced,” (Ibid., p. 66/50) they must be simple enough to 
make possible successful predictions. “The significance of Newton’s discovery is 
precisely this: that the laws of force can be expressed by simpler functions than those 
that would be needed to describe the processes of motion if we wanted to specify the 
shape of the trajectories directly.” (Ibid., p. 67/50) And Frank explicitly endorsed von 
Mises (1930a) contention that the limits of applicability of mechanical concepts and 
the limits of mechanical determinism itself coincide. (See Sect. 8.3.)  
 Frank accordingly drew the limits of mechanics just in the same way as his 
friend had done in the “Crisis” paper (Mises, 1922a). Celestial mechanics represented 
the ideal and yet the only case where the Laplacian program could actually be carried 
out. “The suggestive power exerted by the celestial mechanics of Newton and Laplace 
was so strong that for a long time the law of causality could be understood in no other 
way.” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 68/51) In actual fact, however, already bodies of finite 
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dimension did not fit into this scheme because not all their properties could be reduced 
to properties of elementary mass points. Treating solid bodies as continuous media 
instead – thus as part of ‘free mechanics’, in von Mises’s terminology – already 
transcended the Laplacian framework. The equations of hydrodynamics or elasticity 
theory “in no way allow us to calculate the future states of particles from their initial 
positions and velocities. For the state of the system is described by magnitudes that 
result from forming averages of positions and velocities, for example density or the 
shape of the surface.” (Ibid., p. 70/53) Accordingly, von Mises (1922a) advocated a 
genuinely statistical approach to hydrodynamics which Frank approvingly discussed at 
length in Section 7 of the third chapter “Currents of Thought Hostile to Causality”.  
Other than von Mises, Frank did not argue by methodological purity in the first 
place but interpreted the whole of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics as an “Attempt to 
Rescue Mechanical Causality with Statistical Ideas.”175 But the validity of Newtonian 
mechanics for atomic mass points alone was insufficient to obtain phenomenological 
thermodynamics. 
 
Rather, certain additional assumptions about average behavior had to be made which have been called 
the ‘assumption of disorder’, assumption of a number of collisions’ [Stoßzahlansatz], ‘the ergodic 
hypothesis’, etc. It is in no way sufficient to make such an assumption just for the initial state; the 
assumptions are rather for the whole course of the movements, in addition to the Newtonian laws, and 
we cannot even show that these assumptions are compatible with the equations of motion. (Frank, 
[1932] 1988, p. 89/70) 
 
Other than Planck (1914), Frank did not treat these assumptions as supplementary 
laws. And he precisely invoked Exner’s reasoning against the inescapability of a 
deterministic microstructure. (See Sect. 4.4.) “[I]f the Newtonian laws of motion were 
not sufficient to derive laws for averages, … perhaps it did not matter at all that the 
individual laws from which the averages were formed were in fact Newtonian laws 
with their dynamic palpable causality in the Laplacian spirit.” (Ibid., p. 90/70) 
Moreover, he read Exner’s reasoning – too conventionalistic, to my mind – as pointing 
to the tautological character of “the proposition that mechanical causality exists for 
each particle of arbitrarily small size.” (Ibid., p. 92/72) This reading, to be sure, 
corresponded to Schrödinger’s (1929a) reference to Poincaré at the end of his Berlin 
Inaugural Address; but in the Zurich speech and in the correspondence with Schlick, 
Schrödinger basically rehearsed Exner’s original argument that indeterminism had 
become more probable than determinism. (See Sections 6.3.2., 6.3.5., 7.4.) From the 
above-quoted negative conclusion of Frank’s we can see that he considered, in contrast 
to Schlick and von Mises, talk about probability as legitimate in this case but 
nevertheless as inconclusive, now in full agreement with them.  
 Frank also criticized another mediator between the mircrolevel and the 
macrolevel, Maxwell’s demon. The fact that once again one “has to take recourse to 
the kingdom of spirits [Geisterreich] at the very point where the law of causality has to 
be pronounced concretely, in full generality, for a system of mass points” indicated 
more than was commonly acknowledged “an essential difficulty in the formulation of 
the general concept of mechanical causality.” (Ibid., p. 72/92) 
 
                                                          
175 So reads the title of the respective section III. 4. of (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 89/69). 
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All these sceptical views about the general applicability of the law of causality in physics were 
however only a weak prelude to the conception that is often argued in quantum mechanics today. 
(Ibid., p. 94/74) … 
 [C]lassical mechanics was convinced that it might well be possible, in the end with sufficient 
refinement of technical tools, to define the state of the individual mass-points so precisely that, some 
time, the future of the gas could be exactly predicted from the observations of the present moment. 
The introduction of more or less superhuman intelligences by Laplace and Maxwell, however, 
demonstrated that very vague hopes for improvement of human capacities are hidden in this opinion. 
The new quantum mechanics however is convinced from the outset that there is no possibility in 
principle of ascertaining the initial values of the wave function with precision. This anticausal 
standpoint has sharpened our eyes to look back at the whole difficulty of formulating the law of 
causality, even in classical physics. (Ibid., p. 95f./75) 
 
Consequently, in 1926 there occurred no quantum revolution but rather a great 
advancement in the continuous process of clarifying the concept of causality. In this 
vein, Frank discussed the emergence of the field concept within electrodynamics and 
the various attempts to uphold the Laplacian conception in field theory although 
determination of the future state of a system required the knowledge of the state of the 
whole space. Among them were the ether, which at bottom was defined only through 
its electrodynamic effects, and the introduction of differential equations of higher 
order, which pushed the law of causality closer to the tautological statement that all 
observations can be described by analytic functions.  
 
The significance of the reduction of all natural phenomena to motions was so great that it was later 
practically identified with the understandability of natural phenomena. … As a consequence there was 
strong resistance to acknowledging that not everything can be reduced to motion. The abstract 
conception of a physical field seemed to be a relapse to the half mystical assumption of occult 
qualities [residing in empty space]. (Ibid., p. 78/59f.) 
 
The main problem was to give an appropriate definition of field densities with their 
characteristic fluctuations from point to point resulting from the atomic constitution of 
matter. 
 
If we want to give a meaning to the law of causality that does not sink into the tautological, we have to 
say: By the introduction of a limited, manageable number of state variables alone, if their initial 
distribution is not over-complicated, we can bring it about that after the return of the same state, also 
the whole sequence which followed it the first time will always return. We see also that this 
formulation has to make use of the not very precise concepts, ‘limited’, ‘complicated’, and the like. 
(Ibid., p. 82/63) 
 
Field theory, accordingly, deprived the law of causality of the simple and intuitively 
clear meaning it had enjoyed within the Laplacian world view.  
 Could there be manifest gaps in the laws of nature? Since within Frank’s 
conception statistical laws represented genuine laws for collectives, no such gap 
existed in statistical theories. It did so for chaotic systems – in today’s terminology – 
which exhibit a ‘sensitive dependence from initial conditions’: minute changes of the 
initial conditions entail a drastically different future behavior. “In this sense we can 
say that the world of mechanical laws, if we want to pursue it into its finest detains, 
has ‘gaps like a sieve’.” (Ibid., p. 103/81)  
 At the classical problem of miracles as purported gaps in the lawfulness of 
nature, Frank devised an argumentative strategy that he also applied against 
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independent teleological explanations and vitalism. Diagnosing a miracle is a non-
tautological statement about the real world only if it is turned into a positive statement 
about the plan of a superior intelligence. Then, “mechanical laws are replaced by a 
different kind of law which has to do with psychological states of a higher intelligence 
instead of with mass-points. If causality is understood to be only the permanent links 
between events, the belief in miracles is as compatible with this as the belief in the 
general validity of the strictest laws of mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 105/82)  
 Thus we find Mach’s liberal notion of causality as functional dependence at the 
bottom of the alternative which Frank posed to the critics of causality. Claims about 
miracles, vitalistic factors of goal-directedness in nature are non-tautological only if 
they are positively expressed either in terms of psychological laws about superior 
intelligences or in terms of empirical laws that are of no other kind than those 
governing physical phenomena. The Machian conception of lawfulness – so Frank 
believed in accordance with the Viennese tradition – was wide enough to incorporate 
all positive claims of the life sciences and the so-called Geisteswissenschaften. It was, 
one might add, so wide not to provide a satisfactory criterion to exclude natural 
theology at least if theologians set themselves the, probably insurmountable, task to 
list in gruesome detail the purposes of a highest being.  
 Unity and openness of the scientific method was also Frank’s main gear to 
reject the vitalist claim that the phenomenon of life was inexplicable from the laws of 
physics. Such a negative statement was defective because it crucially, and in effect 
exclusively, depended upon the present imperfect state of physical science. As to the 
positive claims of vitalism, Frank took them seriously enough to devote an entire 
chapter to their criticism. Most prominently and respectfully he treated the biologist-
philosopher Hans Driesch who had introduced entelechy as a quantity that measured 
goal-directedness and was irreducible to basic physical quantities. It could be seen in 
analogy with material constants in physics. But, so Frank concluded, the more the 
formal analogy with physics was sought in order to produce a scientific theory 
alongside with and independent of physics, the more the autonomy of vitalistic 
quantities disappeared. What remained was a proto-scientific theory in the spirit of 
animism. “The more scientific vitalism wants to be, the more it retreats from true 
science.” (Ibid., p. 120/94)  
 Also Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s attempts “to formulate vitalism positivistically” 
by distinguishing causality and finality according to the temporal order of the 
functional dependences faced the same dilemma. For “in physics each dependence 
between two events can equally well be formulated as a dependence of the later event 
on the preceding one or vice versa, and that therefore nothing is stated about the events 
themselves and even less on what is characteristic for biological processes. By 
positivist purification, the concept of finality loses absolutely everything that 
constitutes its attraction.” (Ibid., p. 148/118) Even the concept of system – which 
would become the core notion of Bertalanffy’s later thinking – was no peculiar 
characteristic of living organisms. “We cannot solve the most primitive mechanical 
problem, the path of a particle on which no forces have an effect, without knowing its 
velocity with reference to the whole galaxy.” (Ibid., p. 150/120)176 This was nothing 
else but Mach’s principle of the relativity of motion. 
                                                          
176 For a detailed assessment of Frank‘s criticism, see (Hofer, 1996). 
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 Those seeking organismic traits in the indeterminism characteristic of atomic 
physics, in those days, could point to Sommerfeld’s (1929) Prague address which 
elaborated the idea that teleology played a certain role in atomic physics because the 
transition between two energy levels in the atom depended both on the initial and the 
final state. Warning against the dangers of physicists’ relapse into school philosophy, 
Frank tried to eliminate the problem through a consistently statistical approach based 
on collectives as the basic theoretical entity. 
 
If initially the electron circulates on the orbit with energy E3 the quantum theory allows us only to 
predict what will happen on the average if we examine a very great number of atoms with the same 
initial state. Thus in this theory the proportion of the number of jumps to the orbit with energy E2 to 
the number of jumps to the orbit with energy E1 is unambiguously determined. … But if, in the case of 
an individual experiment, the initial and the final state are known, then the frequency can be predicted 
also for each individual atomic experiment. (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 166/134) 
 
Yet this situation was no different from already knowing the outcome of a throw of 
dice which followed purely mechanical laws. The new feature of quantum mechanics 
was thus not the intrusion of teleological elements into physics but “that from the 
initial state only statistical statements can be made about the final states.” (Ibid., p. 
167/134) 
 Rather in passing, Frank also turned to the teleological connotations of the 
Principle of Least Action. Repeating an example from his dissertation where the 
minimality of the action integral did not correspond to the physical solution, he 
concluded that  
 
[i]t is not at all characteristic for the orbit a point-mass follows that along that orbit any magnitude 
assumes its smallest value. If the orbital curves satisfied another law … there would always be a 
magnitude that depends on the velocity (or acceleration) and which is smaller for the orbital curves 
than for any other curve. Just this magnitude would then be regarded as a measure of the action of 
nature. We should therefore be able to prove why a definite magnitude signifies the action of nature. 
… This would mean a return to pure anthropomorphism, to the animistic world-conception of the pre-
scientific age. (Ibid., p. 115/91f.) 
 
Similar as Mach, Frank held that “[o]nly a certain mathematical simplification is 
hidden in the minimal principles of mechanics. With its help the laws of the orbital 
curves can be expressed in fewer variables.” (Ibid. p. 116/92) 
It was not so much the specter of metaphysical realism implicit in Planck’s 
veneration of the Principle of Least Action, which prevented Frank to assign any 
greater significance to it. Rather was he at pains to seal any door trough which 
anthropomorphic design arguments could intrude into physics. In the criticism of this 
“widely spread manner of treating natural phenomena by analogy to human emotional 
life.” (Ibid., p. 114/90), Frank’s book strengthened the tendency of de-
anthropomorphization revealed by Mach’s historico-critical studies. By recognizing 
additionally those abstract theories, such as atomic physics, which Mach had 
downgraded to mere economizations, as theoretical structures of their own right, Frank 
in effect pushed this tendency of objectivation equally far as Planck, albeit without any 
realist aspirations. Moreover, he implicitly shared Planck’s dislike of the strongly 
Darwinist and Lamarckian elements in Mach’s epistemology. Yet instead of 
advocating convergent realism, Frank replaced the biological corroboration of 
scientific knowledge by its social corroboration. Already in the Introduction, Frank 
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formulated his mature stand with respect to the classical Mach-Planck controversy. In 
his Leiden speech, Planck (1908a) had compared  
 
the positivist and the metaphysical conceptions of science. He characterized them perfectly correctly in 
this way: according to the metaphysical conception, the aim of science is the discovery of an existing 
‘true’ world, while according to the positivist, however, it is the construction of a system of statements 
with the help of which we can find our way in the world of our experiences. Planck finds fault with the 
latter conception: the passion and readiness for sacrifice with which men like Galileo have fought for 
their convictions could not be understood if the matter had been merely purposeful [zweckmäßige] 
constructions and not the discovery of truth. 
 However these passions and this fighting spirit are facts that are as empirical as those of 
physics. … Planck may be right insofar as the establishment of theories by the positivist wing has 
often been made all too much in empty space, without regarding its connections with the total activity 
of mankind. … The events around Galileo make it clear that the passionate conflicts connected with a 
physical theory have nothing to do with its suitability to represent natural processes but much more 
with their relationships to the political and social events of the time. Therefore there is no need to 
amplify the positivist conception of science by a metaphysical concept of truth but only by a more 
comprehensive study of the connections that exist between the activity of the invention of theories and 
the other normal human activities. (Frank [1932] 1988, p. 26f./14) 
 
Consequently Frank’s criticism of vitalism and wholeness made ample reference to the 
political and societal motivations of these conceptions. 
 Let me turn to the general problem of randomness and the frequentist 
interpretation of probability. To Frank’s mind, any event could be called accidental or 
random only with reference to a definite set of causal laws that had hitherto failed to 
predict it. In virtue of the openness of scientific progress, such a negative definition of 
randomness never yielded a positive statement about experiences. Consequently, 
absolute randomness in the emphatic style of Exner (1909) was not a meaningful 
concept. The goal to formulate positive empiricist conditions of randomness directly 
led Frank to the frequentist conception of probability. “If we have conditions of 
experiment such that from them only the frequency [Häufigkeit] can be predicted with 
which each possible individual result appears among a large series of experiments, the 
result of an individual experiment is called ‘random’.” (Ibid., p. 194/158) This 
definition is not a negative one but “states positively that there is a lawful dependence 
of the collective experiment upon the conditions of the experiment. Random events are 
those that are not identified by a definite causal law, but yet are members of a 
collective experiment whose average results can be considered as given by a causal 
dependence upon initial conditions.” (Ibid., p. 194/159) 
 How strongly Frank was now indebted to von Mises’s frequentism and the 
Viennese tradition can be seen in the eighth chapter titled “Causality, chance or plan in 
the development of the world?” After a criticism of the concept of equiprobability and 
a detailed discussion of the kinetic theory of gases, Frank concluded that  
 
statements that discuss the probability of a definite state of the world have a meaning only if the world 
is conceived as a mechanical system that passes through the same states again and again with a certain 
frequency. And only under this assumption does the concept of entropy of a state as derived from its 
probability have a concrete meaning. … If on the other hand we did not conceive the world as a 
system that passes through all states again and again with a certain frequency, the concept of 
probability of state would lose its sense altogether, and so would the relation between entropy and 
probability. Also the proposition that the world tends toward its most probable state, would thereby 
become meaningless. (Ibid., p. 253f./210)  
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This assumption was nothing but the ergodic hypothesis. In contrast to von Mises, 
Frank did not dismiss it in virtue of the apparent difficulties of obtaining a 
mathematically rigorous and physically satisfactory formulation. What prevented him 
to advocate a unified statistical approach was, to my mind, that Frank wanted to retain 
the micro-macro distinction as a framework to discuss the issue of historical laws. And 
indeed while chapter VII had ended with rejecting the then increasingly popular 
associations of quantum mechanics and free will, chapter VIII set out with the question 
as to whether there are “strictly causal historical or sociological regularities 
[Gesetzmäßigkeiten].” (Ibid., p. 239/198) Yet even if the microlaws provided by 
individual psychology were strict, one would not obtain the existence of strict 
sociological laws because all measurable sociological quantities referred to 
macroscopic quantities for which only the average behavior could be predicted. 
 
The various theories of historical and sociological laws are therefore distinguished, essentially, by 
using different macroscopic state variables. The materialist conception of history, for instance, 
assumes that knowledge of the present economic conditions is sufficient to predict the future 
sociological development in its essentials. (Ibid., p. 240/198) 
 
And Frank held that by using more and more state variables the macroscopic level and 
the psychology of the individuals could be decoupled such that the notorious polemics 
surrounding materialist historiography, whether great men or the social conditions 
determine the course of the world, became a metaphysical pseudo-problem.  
 If we confront Exner’s physicalist theory of culture (See Sect. 4.6.) with 
Frank’s criteria of meaning, it becomes clear that it contained empirically meaningless 
elements even though by postulating a certain repetition of cultural phenomena it met 
Frank’s standards to meaningfully claim a transition to more probable states. No 
surprise because Exner’s theory had emerged from a frequentist approach and 
abundantly utilized the micro-macro distinction. Supporting his friend Neurath’s views 
about social engineering, Frank had to reject the end of Exner’s (1909) Inaugural 
Address that the distribution of wealth and commodities was given by nature.  
The main problem of Exner’s application of probability was to find the right state 
variables and the measure of order. Frank addressed the interest dependence of order at 
a classical example of natural teleology and its modern probabilistic version. “If in a 
desert, we were to come across an accumulation of sand that has the form of a regular 
pentagon, we will hardly believe that this accumulation is the result of the action of the 
wind and the mutual impacts of sand particles.” (Frank, [1932] 1988, p. 254/210) At 
least since Vitruvius, such example counted as strong evidence for human or divine 
design. However, the regular pentagon appears so extremely improbable to us “only by 
allowing no difference between the individual irregular figures. … The whole 
improbability of the regular figure consists in the fact that we direct our special interest 
specifically to it individually, whereas the deviations of the irregular figures from each 
other do not interest us.” (Ibid., p. 255/211) Still probability is not well-defined here. 
The frequentist can assign a probability to the regular pentagon only after all possible 
shapes of sand heaps have actually formed and each shape has occurred sufficiently 
often.  
 
If we think this to be possible, we have to divide the time during which the regular pentagon exists 
without being destroyed by the wind by the whole time past. Our result is the probability for the 
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formation of a regular pentagon by chance. For such a probability to have any meaning at all, the 
possibility of the formation of the pentagon must already be presupposed, indeed its frequent 
formation. (Ibid., p. 258/213f.) 
 
While this presupposition poses no problem for sand heaps in the desert, frequent 
formation in the time available proves problematic in other cases, in particular for the 
emergence of the universe or the origin of life. Within his frequentist conception Frank 
had simply to deny a well-defined empirical meaning to the idea of 
 
tracing the origin of organisms back not to macroscopic physical laws but to deviations from these 
laws, which come about because many microstate correspond to one macrostate. The organisms are 
formed – according to this conception – by extremely rare microstates during ordinary macrostates. 
 The question whether the probability of such formations is big or small can be answered only 
under the assumption that this formation took place within a closed system, in which it was repeated 
again and again, though after very long intervals. Since however there is no question of such a closed 
system, as we do not know anything about a closed cycle of events in the known or hypothetically 
assumed universe, there is not the slightest chance of making an estimate of the probability for the 
formation of an organic substance. (Ibid., p. 259/214f.) 
 
Frank was of course right to criticize the unwarranted probabilistic arguments for 
divine design or the presence of teleological factors. But also his frequentist strictures 
were too narrow. Given that our present theories of evolutionary biology and the origin 
of the universe admit far too less time for all possibilities to be tried out repeatedly in 
the actual world, one wonders whether given such a reasonable corroborated basis 
theory, talk about probabilities should be excluded beforehand. The theory of von 
Kries, on the other hand, permitted one to speak meaningfully about the probability of 
a single event. Quantum mechanics has since revealed other problems of a purely 
frequentist account. Let these few remarks from the present perspective suffice to 
show how strong Frank was committed to the frequentist interpretation of probability. 
 Let me close this section with some remarks about Frank’s specific treatment of 
causality and quantum mechanics. It is the hypothesis of (Laplacian) determinism that 
by the “progress in our technical capacities we can in time get closer and closer to the 
goal where empirically equal conditions of experiment bring equal results.” (Ibid., p. 
196/160) The claim that such refinement is possible represents an empirical statement 
about the results of future physical experiments. The opposite hypothesis – which 
Frank did not call ‘indeterminism’ – is only meaningful if the limit of future 
refinement can be “expressed numerically; the numbers occurring would have to be 
so-called ‘universal constants’, that is they would have to be founded within the 
empirical structure of the real world, as for example the velocity of light, the 
elementary unit of electric charge, or Planck’s quantum of action.” (Ibid., p. 196/160) 
It was the last of these universal constants which set a definite limit to quantum 
mechanical predictions from a given initial state.  
 
We can describe this fact, the scattering of the final states, if the initial state is given, in two different 
ways.  
First: there are exact causal laws. A definite final state corresponds to every initial state. But very 
different real states are hidden behind each measured state. The scattering of the final states originates 
in the uncertainty of the measurement of the initial states. 
Second: No exact causal laws exist, but we can state that from a definite initial state a definite final 
state follows with a certain relative frequency, so that with a given initial state and many experiments, 
a scattering of the final states becomes noticeable. 
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… [T]hese two propositions are only different formulations of the same factual situation; they are not 
two hypotheses, one of which maintains the strict validity, the other the non-validity of the causal law, 
if we understand this law to be a proposition about actual experiences. (Ibid., p. 200/164)  
 
Restriction to the actual experiences thus, so Frank believed, effectively eliminated the 
core problem of the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics. Either the 
uncertainty was already in the coordination of the initial state to experiences, i.e., 
measurement results, or the statistical law only emerged after a sufficiently large 
number of trials. While the first alternative corresponded to Heisenberg’s claim that in 
quantum mechanics precisely the antecedent of the determinist argument fails, the 
second alternative could be considered as an early version of the statistical 
interpretation. The only difference was that Heisenberg had held that the law of 
causality was invalid in any case.  
 Not only in this respect, Frank remained more open-minded to future 
modifications of quantum theory than most Göttingen-Copenhagen protagonists. 
Regarding the fact that quantum theory makes predictions about ‘collective 
experiments’ only, he remarked:  
 
Here, in a certain sense, there is really a gap. It could be filled only if we might find laws that 
determine the fate of the individual particle. Claims like: the future of the individual particle is perhaps 
not determined by the laws of physics, but is still somehow determined, are either tautological … or 
theological. (Ibid., p. 234/193).  
 
This alternative neatly corresponded to his above-discussed analysis of gaps in the 
nomological structure of the world. Frank was also rather careful about the problem of 
duality between the wave and the particle picture.  
 
This ‘dualism’ is in no way mystical, but only characteristic of present theoretical physics, perhaps an 
imperfection which will one day disappear, or perhaps a permanent disagreeable quality. There has 
been a similar dualism in [classical] field theory. Already Lorentz‘s theory of electrons consists of the 
equations for the electromagnetic field in the ‘ether’ on the one hand, and on the other, equations of 
motion of the electrons. … The same dualism was preserved at first in all field theories, as for example 
in the general relativity theory of Einstein where field equations of gravity and the equations of motion 
of mass-points (geodetic lines) confronted each other. (Ibid., p. 232/192) 
 
Although Frank could report substantial progress on the understanding of this duality, 
in a certain sense the duality between field and particles is still with present-day 
general relativists. Thus once again, Frank applied his usual strategy of integrating an 
astonishing feature of modern physics into the continuous historical development. The 
predecessors of quantum mechanical duality emerged only more sharply if analyzed 
against the backdrop of the new atomic physics. Such a Machian approach to the 
history of physics was at odds with Copenhagen‘s absolutistic finality claims and 
Heisenberg‘s notion of a closed theory. Of course, Frank held that the mathematical 
symbolism of quantum theory contained an absolute limit of the speakable. “Since 
scientific statements deal only with symbols, the question what happens if one always 
gives the particles the same initial position and velocity, cannot be formulated in wave 
mechanics” (Ibid., p. 223/184) because it cannot be coordinated to any concrete 
experience. The main lesson of quantum mechanics consisted in the statistical 
character of coordination.  
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 That Frank called the duality a temporary imperfection or a permanent 
disagreeable quality shows, to my mind, that Boltzmann‘s teaching was still alive. 
Admittedly he did not go nearly as far as Schrödinger who took Boltzmann‘s Bild-
realism as a requirement for a consistent physical theory. But also for Frank the 
universality of basic concepts remained a desirable goal. This was, to my mind, one 
reason why he still avoided any talk about Bohr‘s complementarity, a concept which, 
in effect, represented and an enormous extension of this disagreeable duality.  
Reviewing his friend Frank’s book on causality (1932) for Die 
Naturwissenschaften, von Mises (1932b) praised the general criticism of school 
philosophy but considered less harsh a tone to be more fruitful. He also assented to 
Frank’s strategy not to start with a simple general definition of the concept of causality 
but to start from a detailed analysis of its various applications. This was indeed a major 
achievement of the book. 
 
8.6. Von Mises Versus Laue and Schrödinger  
 
In 1934 a continuation of the debate between Vienna and Berlin took place between 
three former Berlin colleagues. It was documented in Die Naturwissenschaften still 
under Berliner’s directorship. Schrödinger supported von Laue’s criticism against 
Copenhagen’s finality claims and in principle limits of causal description, while von 
Mises charged von Laue of disrespect for statistical laws. The short debate shows that 
front lines had changed because strategic alliance were now established predominantly 
for motives other than indeterminism. From the perspective of whether quantum 
mechanics in its Göttingen-Copenhagen form was a satisfactory theory, Logical 
Empiricist’s logic-oriented view at physical theory seemed to conform to 
Copenhagen’s finality claims while Schrödinger’s Bild-realism and his (apparently 
deterministic) equation associated him with those who were searching for a 
deterministic theory.  
 In his contribution to the Festschrift for Berliner (See Sect. 5.1.1.), von Laue 
basically defended the Planckian standpoint by warning against a precipitous dismissal 
of the principle of causality. 
 
Certain purely physical concepts, which were based upon experience, have failed in the face of newer 
experiences; for the time being better concepts are missing. This situation is not uncommon in the 
natural sciences and predates every larger progress. But these difficulties cannot force anyone to 
change his epistemological point of view however it may be; although they indicate – as every deep 
physical question – the importance of epistemological considerations. (Laue, 1932, p. 916, italics of 
the original removed) 
 
While Planck’s response to Schrödinger’s inaugural address (Sect. 6.3.5.) had still 
placed his ontological stakes on the wave function itself, von Laue considered the 
problem as to the nature of material bodies, the quantum enigma, as fundamentally 
open, even regarding the direction in which progress could be made. To von Laue, 
Bohr’s duality between wave and particle picture was rather a wish for synthesis than a 
solution. Moreover, he shared Planck’s and Schrödinger’s criticism of the concept of 
mass point. In a footnote he approved Schrödinger’s (1932a) claim that the uncertainty 
relations contain an internal contradiction. “According to its definition, a mass point is 
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a mechanical object defined by the specification of its position, velocity, and mass. 
Denying the specifiability of position and velocity (momentum) nullifies the concept.” 
(Laue, 1932, p. 916) Thus there is no need to rescue the mass point by renouncing the 
description of individual events – thus sacrificing the principle of causality – and 
restricting oneself to statistical regularities. “We do not want to criticize this 
procedure; at present it is probably the best way out.” (Ibid., p. 916)  
 Von Laue assumed a far-reaching neutrality of the mathematical formalism. It 
was legitimate to proceed on the path of statistics as long as one advanced on it. On the 
other hand, “often mathematical methods outlive the ideas on which they are based.” 
(Ibid., p. 916) All this does not justify an epistemological sacrifice and a prohibition 
against the investigation of single processes. “Who wants to presage that never 
anything comes of it.” (Ibid., p. 916) 
 Von Laue’s criticism of Bohr’s complementarity – though avoiding, as 
Schrödinger, the term itself –, his rejection of the particle concept, and his assent to 
Schrödinger’s criticism clearly mark him, in the light of Beller’s (1999) criteria, as a 
critic of the Copenhagen interpretation. In contrast to Schrödinger, concerning 
causality itself he followed Planck by putting general epistemology above the physics 
accepted at a certain time. Thus it is surprising that to make his case von Laue availed 
himself of positivist arguments that were closer to the original Machian stand than 
Heisenberg’s alleged positivism. 
 The unique determination of position and momentum was lying at the very 
heart of Newtonian mechanics. It was shattered by quantum mechanics more radically 
than by relativity theory. 
 
Upon all this [astonishment about Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation] one had typically forgotten that 
[Newtonian mechanics] is nothing but a physical theory, that as any such theory it contains 
hypothetical elements which transcend the experience it is based upon, and that accordingly – as any 
physical theory – in contains the germ of death in it from the very beginning. One of the few who 
remained conscious of this was Ernst Mach; but his historico-critical presentation of mechanics never 
received due attention. In point of fact, mechanics enjoyed a special status in the physicists’ 
consciousness which was psychologically understandable as a consequence of the great experience 
which everyone has when entering through it as the entrance portal of physics. De facto mechanics 
held this special status, but not de jure. (Ibid., p. 915) 
 
Von Laue’s argument precisely echoed Mach’s distinction between direct and indirect 
descriptions. In contrast to Heisenberg, he argued that there is no need to a priori 
restrict physical theory to observable entities only. And indeed Mach allowed 
scientists to temporarily introduce hypotheses because the restriction to direct 
descriptions was not of a metaphysical kind. Nor did the positivist Mach consider 
methodological and epistemological strictures as absolutely compelling. 
 
Already before physics has ignored an epistemological postulate and it did so for a long time; and 
nonetheless today we consider this postulate to be almost as important as the principle of causality 
with which it is, incidentally, intimately linked. We are speaking about the principle of local action 
and Newton’s law of attraction which, as is well known, expressed an action at a distance. Newton 
himself sharply expressed his dissatisfaction with this deficiency; nevertheless theoretical astronomy 
emerged from his law. As today general relativity has finally instated the principle [of local action] in 
its right, we know, firstly, that Newton’s law will remain an excellent and for all times indispensable 
approximation and, secondly, that progress beyond it was impossible in Newton’s days. (Ibid., p. 916) 
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Von Laue thus pondered that the principle of causality could well be suspended for 
decades before a new theory, as deep as relativity theory, would reinstate it. All this 
did not justify abandoning the principle of causality which set the distant goal at the 
horizon of the history of physics.  
 Interestingly, von Laue’s strategy to point to the continuity with historical 
predecessors had been used over and over again by Frank and von Mises. Frank was 
convinced that the essential characteristics of physical science had not changed since 
Newton’s axioms; quantum physics required no revolution in epistemology. 
 
The laws of physics consist of mathematical relations between quantities, as well as of directions on 
how these quantities can be related to actual observations, and in this respect nothing has changed 
even in the twentieth century. The equations have changed, the quantities are different, and the 
directions, too, are therefore no longer the same; but the general scheme according to which a physical 
theory is constructed still has the same fundamental character today as it had in Newton’s time. 
(Frank, 1935, p. 198/128f.) 
 
In 1934, von Laue restated his view about the inapplicability of mechanical concepts 
in the atomic domain and amended it by a criticism of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s 
disturbance argument. Although he accepted their claim that the feedback of a test 
body on the measured object put a bound on the precision of measurements in the 
atomic domain, he objected to considering this as an in principle insurmountable limit. 
“For such a conclusion is based on the tacit assumption: ‘Opening up new possibilities 
of measurement necessarily requires new experimental means.’ Only by this 
assumption can one conclude: ‘Since now we have arrived at the finest means, the 
atoms themselves, we can never get any further.” (1934, p. 439) But, so von Laue 
continued, neither Hertz nor Nernst invented any new means prior to their discoveries, 
but their progress resulted “from a genial experimental train of thoughts” (Ibid., p. 
440) using the already available experimental means in a new way.  
 Hence it would be premature to draw far-reaching epistemological conclusions 
from the present state of atomic physics and “to arrive at an ‘Ignorabimus’ in principle 
because present atomic physics and its splendid formalism renounce to answer certain 
questions.” (Ibid., p 441) As von Mises, von Laue attributed the ‘Ignorabimus’ to the 
failed optimism about import and range of mechanical explanation. That atomic 
physics had established the naiveté of mechanicism did not justify that one, instead, 
relapsed into an equally uncritical pessimism and considered the task of physics as 
irresolvable. “Despite all physical pseudo-reasons put forward for it, that pessimism is 
only the physical consequence of the widespread and deep-seated cultural pessimism 
which represents a general tone of our times. To deal with this, is no longer the 
province of the natural scientist; his science stands above all human temperament.” 
(Ibid., p. 441) This distinction between science and temperament entirely 
corresponded to Planck’s Kantian separation between the realms of necessity and 
freedom.  
Von Laue’s resistance against pessimism, at first glance, supports Forman’s 
later thesis on the continued abandonment of causality after 1927 under the pressure of 
the milieu (Sect. 1.3.). Von Laue also contradicted the milieu’s demand for 
Anschaulichkeit. “There is, it seems to me, and entirely objective measure of progress 
[in atomic theory] …; this lies in its often criticized unintuitiveness 
[Unanschaulichkeit]. What one considers as intuitive it a matter of the time.” (Ibid., p. 
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440) This diagnosis was fully in line with Frank’s (Sect. 8.4.) And von Laue criticized 
that in atomic physics the traditional intuitive idea that matter is filling space badly 
coexisted with the existence of smallest particles. Instead of limits to knowability as 
such, “[t]he uncertainty relations [Ungenauigkeitsrelationen] – this is my view – pose 
a limit to any corpuscular mechanics but not to any physical knowledge.” (Ibid., p. 
441, original in italics) This precisely amounted to Schrödinger’s interpretation of 
them. Continuing this passage, von Laue charged the Göttingen-Copenhagen 
physicists of shifting the burden of proof in causal matters. “In fact when should 
causality be counted as ‘empirically proven’? Perhaps when the last riddle of natural 
science has been completely resolved? This stage will probably never be reached.” 
(Ibid., p. 441) This rhetorical question, of course, served to suggest that causality 
represented a necessary presupposition of natural science that could be temporarily 
suspended but never abandoned. In correspondence (Sect. 7.4.) Heisenberg had agreed 
with Schlick that ‘invalid’ was not tantamount to ‘empirically false’. Thus, at bottom, 
von Laue’s argument rather targeted Exner’s move against Planck (Sect. 4.4.) that the 
burden of proof rested with the determinist, because his claims were stronger than 
those of the indeterminist. Exner nonetheless believed that the question was 
empirically open. Schrödinger largely followed the Viennese tradition although he 
viewed the prospects for a decision to be as dim as von Laue did. But, at those places, 
Schrödinger stressed the conventional character of determinism while von Laue turned 
to a relativized and temporarily suspendible a priori. Accordingly, this part of the front 
line between Vienna and Berlin was still intact. Schrödinger’s reaction on von Laue’s 
paper, however, shows that the emphasis of the causality debate had shifted to the 
issue of finality claims. 
 Only five weeks later, Schrödinger published a short paper in Die 
Naturwissenschaften in which he agreed to von Laue’s (1932, 1934) papers “from the 
bottom of his heart. The aim [of the paper] is to sing the same song, so that it sounded 
louder and in multiple voices.” (Schrödinger, 1934, p. 518) He assented to von Laue’s 
analysis of the disturbance or feedback argument and contemplated that a measuring 
apparatus shows certain results even without an interaction, for instance, when a target 
is not hit.177 Yet Schrödinger’s main point was to intensify his earlier criticism that the 
concepts of classical point mechanics were still applied albeit with absolute limits of 
precision. (Cf. Sect. 6.3.6.) “The concepts must be abandoned, not their sharp 
definitiveness. One tries to get around the monstrosity of unsharply defined concepts 
by hundred thought experiments.” (Schrödinger, 1934, p. 519) “Among the concepts 
to be abandoned is also position. But this means: geometry.” (Ibid., p. 519) The reason 
was that geometry was based on congruence the empirical realization of which 
presupposed the existence of rigid bodies. According to Schrödinger, the application 
of geometry to real objects represented a gedanken experiment which had to be 
consistent with the laws of nature. The classical solution to approximate rigid 
connections by potentials was impossible due to the finite distance between energy 
levels. Thus there could be only approximately rigid bodies. Schrödinger concluded 
that “the spatial structure derived from the group of translations fit to nature only 
approximately – and not merely that there do not exist sufficiently precise material 
measuring rods to measure it. The true geometry of physics is … the four-dimensional 
                                                          
177 As a matter of fact, ‘interaction-free measurement’ is today among the most-discussed topics in the 
foundations of quantum mechanics. 
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one of relativity theory. … The difficulty to adapt to the requirement of relativity is a 
well-known crux of quantum mechanics.” (Ibid., p. 520) In short, geometry was 
inapplicable to small distances. And as he held at least since 1931 (See the letter to 
Schlick in Sect. 7.4.), quantum mechanics was at odds with relativity theory. 
 Von Laue’s paper (and consequently also Schrödinger’s second voice to it) was 
criticized by von Mises in a letter to the editor. Initially, von Mises assented to von 
Laue’s criticism of the feedback argument.  
 
But von Laue advocates … the view that one could remain loyal to the determinist conception of 
physics in spite of the indeterminacy relations. … On this I would just like to remark that, to my mind, 
one can at all assert Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations only as a proposition of statistical physics, 
which within the framework of causal physics does not find a place and is not possible. (Mises, 1934a, 
p. 822) 
 
Within von Mises’s purely probabilistic approach, “it can be left entirely open whether 
in the cases intended by the uncertainty relations such a ‘true’ value exists or not.” 
(Ibid., p. 822) And he repeated his argument that speaking of a ‘true’ value already 
presupposed the concept of collective. (Cf. Sect. 8.3.) 
 
If one abandons the point of view that the measurements form a collective, then there exist no 
distribution, no divergence, and thus no uncertainty relation. I agree with pleasure to von Laue’s 
rejection of the ‘Ignorabimus’. But I believe that one has to get used to the fact that the assumption of 
statistical instead of causal explanations does not signify a renunciation of knowledge but only another 
and perhaps more advanced form of knowledge. (Ibid., p. 822) 
 
Although von Mises’s plea for granting equal rights to statistical explanations 
represented an important lesson of the whole historical development from Boltzmann 
to quantum mechanics, within his frequentism it required ontological commitments 
neither the determinist von Laue not the indeterminist Schrödinger was willing to 
accept. On the statistical level the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics 
dissolved trivially. If any ontology was fine that permitted successful predictions, the 
philosophical problems dissolved as well. But almost every quantum physicist-
philosopher wanted more than this minimalistic ontology of mass phenomena. Von 
Laue wanted concepts that allowed for causal explanation, Schrödinger wanted 
consistent Boltzmannian pictures, Copenhagen wanted classical concepts to connect 
quantum mechanics with the macroscopic world, and even his friend Frank wanted a 
certain linguistic continuity between quantum concepts and the concepts of everyday 
life. Or so he expressed himself at the 1936 Copenhagen Congress. Already in 1928, 
von Mises had stressed that his did not heed such aims. His review of the second 
edition of von Kries’s book, which was just a photomechanic reprint with a new 
introduction concluded as such. 
 
Only in one respect von Kries’s introduction [to the new edition] aptly characterizes the mutual 
relation of our views. The assumption of a “regularity directly related to and expressed in mass 
phenomena” indeed appears to me to serve our intellectual need to the same extent as the assumption 
of a “general lawfulness of nature”. I cannot blame anybody for his intellectual needs reaching deeper 
or wider, but I believe that the whole development of our knowledge about nature points into a 
direction that requires from us the indicated modesty. (Mises, 1928b, p. 1030) 
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8.7. Reconciliation and Strategic Alliances: Copenhagen 1936 
 
From 21-26 June 1936, the Second International Congress for the Unity of Science 
took place in Copenhagen. Its main topic was the problem of causality with special 
regard to physics and biology. The congress was opened in Bohr’s house, and Bohr 
delivered a lecture on “Causality and Complementarity” that was followed by Frank’s 
“Philosophic Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Quantum Theory” and Schlick’s 
“Quantum Theory and the Knowability of Nature”. Schlick did not participate in the 
meeting because – as he wrote to Neurath on 2 June, 1936 – due to new university 
regulations it was impossible to obtain leave of absence during the exam week at the 
end of the summer term. Thus he suggested that, if desired, someone else read his 
paper to the congress. On 17 June, 1936, Frank sent a postcard to Schlick. 
 
Thank you very much for sending me your manuscript. I will arrange everything according to your 
wishes. With its content I agree completely. In its tendency it perfectly coincides with the paper that I 
have prepared for Copenhagen. I believe that they go together very well and exactly complement one 
another. I am departing tomorrow.  
 
On the second day of the congress, on 22 June, 1936, Schlick was killed by a former 
student on the stairs of the University. (See Stadler, 2001) Frank delivered a short 
obituary still during the congress.  
 In this section I analyze the contributions of Bohr, Frank, and Schlick and argue 
that Bohr’s notion of complementarity provided the background of a far-reaching 
agreement between Frank and Schlick because it permitted them to treat the problem 
of quantum mechanical causality as a problem of theoretical language and 
experimental arrangements. Within the more general context of complementarity, their 
original differences – that had, to be sure, never been pronounced explicitly – lost their 
importance in comparison to the common goal of combating the then sprouting 
metaphysical and spiritualistic misinterpretations of quantum theory. This was yet 
another example of how Bohr succeeded in providing common philosophical ground 
(Cf. Section 2.2.). Against the background of how the interpretative debates in 
quantum mechanics had developed since 1926, it is clear that Frank’s open 
endorsement of the concept of complementarity – which had still been absent from his 
book (Frank, 1932) – signified his parting company with Schrödinger to whom the 
term had become the shibboleth of the Copenhagen interpretation. Thus a main 
question of the present section will be what motivated Frank and Schlick to adopt the 
concept of complementarity. 
 Bohr’s talk essentially contained a summary of his earlier papers in Die 
Naturwissenschaften and his rejoinder to the EPR-paper178 which consisted in a refined 
and broadened version of the concept of complementarity. The impossibility to sharply 
distinguish between the autonomous behavior of an atomic object and its interaction 
with the measuring device, so Bohr set out, “forces us to replace the ideal of causality 
by a more general viewpoint usually termed ‘complementarity’. The apparently 
incompatible sorts of information about the behavior of the object under examination 
which we get by experimental arrangements can clearly not be brought into connection 
with each other in the usual way, but may … be regarded as complementary.” (Bohr, 
                                                          
178 (Bohr, 1928, 1929, 1930) and (Bohr, 1935) answering (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen, 1935). 
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1937, p. 295/291) Thus the quantum of action introduced a certain individualization of 
the single atomic processes.  
Bohr, interestingly, compared the principle of equivalence in relativity theory 
with the idea that “results obtained by different measuring arrangements apparently 
contradictory because of the finite size of the quantum of action, are logically 
compatible.” (Ibid., p. 295/291) This was, to his mind, the deeper logical significance 
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. Quantum mechanical objects no longer 
possessed autonomous and inherent attributes as the particles of classical mechanics. 
Of course, the abstract logical connections of the new theory required a farewell to the 
usual quest for Anschaulichkeit; one of the motivations of an artificial term like 
complementarity was to avoid any intuitive associations. 
 
We thus see that the impossibility of carrying through a causal representation of quantum phenomena 
is directly connected with the assumptions underlying the use of the most elementary concepts which 
come into consideration for the description of experience [position and momentum]. In this connection 
the view has been expressed from various sides that some future more radical departure in our mode of 
description from the concepts adapted to our daily experience would perhaps make it possible to 
preserve the ideal of causality also in the field of atomic physics. Such an opinion would, however, 
seem to be due to a misapprehension of the situation. For the requirement of communicability of the 
circumstances and results of experiments implies that we can speak of well defined experiences only 
within the framework of ordinary concepts. In particular it should not be forgotten that the concept of 
causality underlies the very interpretation of each result of experiment, and that even in the 
coordination of experience one can never, in the nature of things, have to do with well-defined breaks 
in the causal chain. (Ibid., p. 297f./ 293) 
 
Bohr’s criticism targeted primarily Einstein’s program of a causal completion of 
quantum mechanics. Schrödinger, instead, combined his call to expel the traditional 
concepts of classical physics from the atomic domain with a solid indeterminism in the 
Viennese tradition. (See Sect. 6.3.). In contrast to Einstein, he never looked for “some 
causal mechanism underlying the atomic phenomena and hitherto inaccessible to 
observation.” (Ibid., p. 298/294)  
 Bohr’s argument for the indispensability of classical concepts took, at first, a 
Machian tack: all scientific results must be communicated or, at bottom, all science 
was communicable knowledge. But while von Mises (1930b) (1930b) had used 
precisely this move to justify the universality and adaptability of the scientific method, 
Bohr advocated a rather limited notion of communicability. Only the physical concepts 
corresponding to our classical life-world qualified for communicating experimental 
results. Against this von Mises could have reasonably argued that results about mass 
phenomena that are no further analyzable into individual events, can be communicated 
perfectly well; and in many cases of hydrodynamics they were everything 
communicable. Moreover, von Mises and Frank repeatedly emphasized that the 
concepts of Newtonian mechanics had become the basis of daily talk only because this 
theory, rather than Aristotelian physics, was part of the school curricula. Bohr’s final 
argument came close to Frank’s (1932 [1988]) insight that causality – or rather 
specific causal laws – still represented as pragmatic presupposition of our daily life. 
We could not act properly if there were gaps in the causal chain; the good news of 
Frank’s book had been that finding a gap represented a merely negative result that was 
provisional or even idle until, positively, definite limits of knowledge were empirically 
established. 
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 Present quantum mechanics, so Bohr held, was just the first step from classical 
causality to complementarity. Thus it could not provide any solution to philosophical 
questions such as ‘mechanism or vitalism’, ‘free will and causal necessity’. 
 
Just the fact that the paradoxes of atomic physics could be solved not by a one sided attitude towards 
the old problem of ‘determinism or indeterminism’, but only by examining the possibilities of 
observation and definition, should rather stimulate us to a renewed examination of the position in this 
respect in the biological and psychological problems at issue. (Bohr, 1937, p. 299/295) 
 
And in the remainder of his paper, Bohr provided some sketches of how 
complementarity could help to avoid futile metaphysical controversies about living 
organisms. In particular, “every experimental arrangement suitable for following the 
behavior of the atoms constituting an organism … would be incompatible with the 
maintaining of the life of the organism.” (Ibid., p. 300/296) The phenomenon of life 
and Planck’s constant shared the property of being elementary facts about nature. 
“Thus the existence of life itself would have to be regarded in biology, both as regards 
the possibilities of observation and of definition, as no more subject to analysis than 
the existence of the quantum of action in atomic physics.” (Ibid., p. 301/296) Although 
Bohr rejected “every compromise with any anti-rationalistic vitalism” (Ibid., p. 
301/296) as well as the mechanist world-view, such a categorical limit of further 
analysis was not without problems for Frank who had rejected vitalism not the least by 
emphasizing the openness of science (See Sect. 8.5.).  
Bohr was confident that complementarity would also clarify the relation 
between the activities of life and the second law of thermodynamics. As Frank had 
done, Bohr objected to any association between quantum physics and spiritualism, but 
he nonetheless believed that complementarity “would rather seem suited to put the old 
problem of psycho-physical parallelism in a new light.” (Ibid., p. 302/297) Moreover, 
he hoped “that the epistemological attitude which had led to the clarification of the 
much simpler physical problems could prove itself also helpful in the discussion of 
psychological questions. … Above all, just the impossibility in introspection of 
sharply distinguishing between subject and object as is essential to the idea of 
causality would seem to provide the natural play for the feeling of free will.” (Ibid., p. 
302f./297) Although he thus pronounced one of the most forbidden words of Logical 
Empiricists, Bohr concluded his speech with the hope to have “to some extent 
succeeded in giving you the impression that my attitude is in no way in conflict with 
our common endeavors to arrive at as great a unification of knowledge as possible by 
the combating of prejudices in every field of research.” (Ibid., p. 303/298) 
 A principal goal of the papers of Frank and Schlick was to put Bohr’s approach 
into an empiricist perspective. As Schlick put it, their task was “one of interpretation, 
not of correction.” (Ibid., p. 318/483) Yet although they, accordingly, readily adopted 
Bohr’s notion of complementarity, both were at pains to pinpoint its precise empirical 
content where possible and to properly distinguish it from metaphysical readings given 
to it by other scientists and philosophers. It is another matter whether their 
interpretation really was the most adequate one. 
 To Frank, metaphysical misinterpretations were endemic to scientific progress. 
“As soon as any new physical theory appears, it is used to contribute something 
toward settling the controversial questions of philosophy, the questions on which 
philosophers have been working for centuries without coming a single step closer to 
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their solution.” (Frank, 1937, p. 303/158) Their favorite controversy between 
materialism and spiritualism Frank had studied at length in his book (See Sect. 8.5.). It 
manifested itself in the persistent resurgence of animistic conceptions that laymen and 
scientists had imbibed through the general world view. “Every crisis [Wendung] in the 
history of physical theories is associated with a certain lack of clarity in their 
formulations, and this unfulfilled longing [for a return of the anthropomorphic 
conception of nature] bursts forth with great strength from the unconscious.” (Ibid., p. 
304/169) As outlined in Section 8.5., Frank was well aware of the influence of the 
social embedding of science. Yet in his Copenhagen address, Frank took a more 
linguistic tack which made possible, so I shall argue, a rapprochement with Schlick. 
“[E]ven the slightest similarity in the wording is enough to induce the physicist 
to offer a proposition of his science as support for the idealistic philosophy.” (Ibid., p. 
305/160) These misinterpretations ran in two steps. “First, physical propositions that 
are really statements about observable processes are regarded as statements about a 
real, metaphysical world” that are, of course, scientifically meaningless. Second, such 
“proposition, by means of a rather small change in wording, goes over into a 
proposition which again has a meaning, but is no longer in the realm of physics; it now 
expresses a wish that people should behave in a certain way.” (Both ibid., p. 306/160) 
Misinterpretations were thus produced by mismatches between the empirically 
meaningful realms of scientific propositions and ethical imperatives that resulted from 
the transition through the meaningless real, metaphysical world. Frank called for a 
“direct short circuit between the physical principle and the moral principle. This can be 
done, for example, through the consistent use of the ‘physicalist language’, which 
Carnap and Neurath have suggested as the universal language of science.” (Ibid., p. 
306f./161)  
 The Vienna Circle’s physicalist program, the outcome of the so-called protocol 
sentence debate, motivated Frank’s analysis of the concept of complementarity and it 
provided a new context for Bohr’s thesis of the indispensability of classical concepts, a 
thesis which Schrödinger had criticized so heavily. There are clear indications that 
Frank followed Neurath’s brand of physicalist language that was oriented at everyday 
expressions about events in space and time rather than Carnap’s that took the 
statements of physical science as the basic statements. Compare Frank’s concluding 
judgment. 
 
The great importance of Bohr’s complementarity theory for all branches of science, especially for the 
logic of science, seems to me that it starts out with a language that is generally understood and 
accepted, the language used to describe the gross mechanical [grobmechanischen] processes of 
motion. Its significance lies in the fact that in its use all men are in harmony. In physics this language 
is used in such expressions as ‘position of a particle’, in the sense of gross mechanics. Atomic 
processes, however, cannot be described in this language, as the new physics has shown. Bohr has 
demonstrated in a careful analysis of modern physics that certain parts of the language of everyday life 
can nevertheless be retained for certain experimental arrangements in the field of atomic phenomena, 
although different parts are required for different experimental arrangements. The language of daily 
life thus possesses complementary constituents which can be employed in the description of 
complementary experimental arrangements. (Ibid., p. 316/170) 
 
And Frank contemplated an application of Bohr’s complementarity, now reinterpreted 
in the Vienna Circle setting, to problems of psychology. One might always start with 
everyday language and amend it, if limits of applicability arise, by the protocol 
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language of Carnap and Neurath, the symbol language of psychoanalysis, and the 
phenomenal language of Carnap’s Aufbau, each of which could be seen “as a 
constituent of a general language in the sense of Bohr‘s conception.” (Ibid., p. 
317/170) This pluralist conception of language came rather close to Neurath’s intuition 
that physicalistically purified everyday language should be the embedding of and 
connection between the languages of the single sciences, the special languages. The 
end product of this train of thought was what Neurath later came to call the ‘universal 
jargon’; it was substantially different from Carnap’s conception most pointedly 
expressed, still later, in his linguistic frameworks.179 
 This background elucidates why Frank counted it as an advantage that everyday 
gross mechanical language remained applicable within certain limits and preferred this 
view to Schrödinger’s search for a better, consistent and unambiguous, conceptual 
framework for quantum theory. However this search came out, its product ultimately 
would have to be related to the language – not to the ‘things’ (See Sect. 6.2.) – of 
everyday life. As for a Machian any scientific theory was provisional, this was 
motivation enough for Frank to side with Bohr’s complementarity against ideals of 
completeness. But Frank’s linguistic approach to classical concepts substantially 
differed from the much stronger status which Bohr and Heisenberg ascribed to 
classical physics as such in the theory of measurement. Physicalism had more 
conceptual leeway than a theory crucially dependent on measurement apparatus. 
 In this vein, Frank proposed the following formulation of Bohr’s notion of 
complementarity which did not contain any metaphysical enunciations about 
constituents and cognizability or even the indefiniteness of the ‘real’ world.  
 
The language in which occur statements like ‘The particle is at this place and has this velocity’ is 
suited to experiences involving gross mechanical processes and cannot be employed satisfactorily for 
the description of atomic processes. However, one can give a group of experimental arrangements for 
the atomic domain in the description of which the expression ‘position of a particle’ can be used. In 
the description of these experiments – and in this consists the idea of Bohr – the expression ‘velocity 
of a particle’ can not be used. In the atomic domain, therefore, certain parts of the language of gross 
mechanics can be used. The experimental arrangements, however, in the description of which these 
parts can be used, exclude each other. (Ibid., p. 310/164) 
 
This formulation, so Frank held, blocked three widespread misinterpretations. Here is 
the first one. “‘It is impossible to measure the position and the velocity of a particle 
simultaneously.’ The world, therefore, just as it is according to classical mechanics, is 
filled with particles having definite positions and velocities; unfortunately we can 
never attain a knowledge of them.” (Ibid., p. 307/162) This view produced the same 
pseudoproblems as Kant’s thing-in-itself because it introduced in principle 
unknowable objects. The second misinterpretation came close to Schrödinger’s 
criticism of the particle concept and Frank remained open to redefinitions.  
 
[P]articles ‘in general do not possess definite positions and velocities simultaneously.’ … [But] the 
combination of words ‘particle with an indefinite position of velocity’ transgresses the syntactic rules 
according to which the words ‘particle’, ‘position’, and ‘indefinite’ are ordinarily used in physics and 
everyday life. Of course, there would be no objection if a new syntax were introduced for these words 
                                                          
179 Admittedly, I am too brief here, but placing Frank in this context would be a topic of its own; in particular 
because the context itself is still under discussion. See (Uebel, 1992) for a broader discussion of the protocol 
sentence debate and physicalism. 
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for the purposes of quantum mechanics. In that case, expressions like ‘particle with an indefinite 
position’ could be employed inside of physics without any danger. And there exist many correct works 
on the quantum theory in which this is the case. (Ibid., p. 308/162) 
 
A case in point, one might surmise, was quantum logic. Yet the problem of such a 
special language was, to Frank’s mind, that the connection to other domains of 
knowledge would typically be established through metaphysical talk about particles as 
constituents of the ‘real’ world. 
 A third temptation to metaphysics was the complementarity between space-time 
and causal descriptions. Frank was well aware that Bohr‘s notion of causality was a 
very particular one.180 
  
In this way the fact is often hidden that this again only means the complementarity of position and 
momentum or time and energy. By ‘causal description’ we understand here only the description by 
means of the principles of conservation of energy and of momentum, which does not quite agree with 
what is usually understood by causality. (Frank, 1937, p. 309/163) 
 
At the end of his paper, Frank discussed the misuse of complementarity as an 
argument for vitalism and free will. This was certainly the point where the consistent 
empiricism of the Viennese – Bohr’s declared rejection of vitalism and spiritualism 
notwithstanding – had qualms with Bohr himself, not only with his philosophical 
interpreters. Thus Frank filed his “objection to the use of the words ‘free will’ for the 
description of certain situations, corresponding to the experimental arrangements in 
physics.” (Ibid., p. 312/166) The problem of Bohr’s analogy was that in contrast to 
‘position of a particle’, the term ‘free will’ was of a metaphysical origin and had no 
meaning in the language of everyday life, where ‘freedom’ merely denoted the 
absence of certain external coercions.  
 Concerning the complementarity between observation in atomic detail and 
persistence of a living organism, Frank emphasized the distinct experimental 
arrangements used to investigate an organism as a physical system and in its vital 
functions. Yet although Frank judged Bohr’s way of putting the matter as tenable, he 
raised doubts as to its usefulness. At bottom, Bohr had established an analogy between 
the transition from classical to quantum physics and the transition from quantum 
physics to the science of animate bodies. But the difference was that in the first case 
complementarity emerged from a positive law of nature, Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relations, while in the second case it was just based on a negative assertion about 
contemporary physics. Thus the analogy was strictly valid only if empirical evidence 
was presented  
 
that the exact physical observation of the atoms of a living body is incompatible with the known 
empirical laws for the behavior of living bodies and with the physical hypothesis about their atomistic 
structure. As long as this evidence has not been submitted, it follows only from Bohr’s train of thought 
that in biology, in the present state of our knowledge, the complementarity mode of expression is 
possible and perhaps even desirable. In contrast, for the transition from classical physics to quantum 
mechanics one can conclude that in atomic physics the complementarity mode of expression is 
necessary. (Ibid., p. 315/169) 
 
                                                          
180 Cf. the distinction drawn by (Ben-Menahem, 1989) and discussed in Section 6.2. 
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Schlick, in the paper read by Frank, was even more critical about this application of 
complementarity. What Frank had called an analogy, Schlick took as the psychological 
stimulus [Anregung] “that the situation which led to the establishment of the quantum 
theory might possibly (or as Bohr even thinks, probably) repeat itself elsewhere.” 
(Schlick, 1937, p. 325/488) Quantum concepts could well fail in biology as classical 
concepts did in atomic physics. Accordingly, “organic regularities 
[Gesetzmäßigkeiten] … will perhaps have to be formulated in specific concepts, 
differing from the known physical concepts in the same way as quantum concepts 
differ from the classical.” (Ibid., p. 325/489) But some enunciations of Bohr could “be 
expounded as though we were bound to believe that in knowledge of the organic we 
are confronted with a problem essentially insoluble.” (Ibid., p. 325/489) This rocked 
the foundations of Logical Empiricist’s creeds: unity of science and epistemological 
optimism – or the rejection of the Ignorabimus that already Frank (1929) and von 
Mises (1930b) had taken as the core of the modern scientific world view. 
 
The method of knowledge in biology cannot be different in principle from that of physics. All 
observations that can be made of organisms can likewise be described in classical terms, and the task 
of science consists in finding a formalism that permits us, from the observed behaviour of an 
organism, to predict its future behaviour as exactly as possible (the latter in turn being naturally 
described in classical terms only). Either such a formalism exists – in which case it is discoverable 
after the fashion of all empirical inquiry, namely by inductive conjecture; or it does not exist – and this 
would mean that no law is present. (Schlick, 1937, p. 326/489) 
 
Schlick’s conception of causality was still liberal enough to be optimistic about 
obtaining biological regularities in a suitable scientific language. And by way of the 
conception of coordinative definitions, Schlick’s insistence on classical concepts as the 
basic language of all scientific results, that is, in terms of “observation-protocols [that] 
ultimately describe events in the ordinary space and time of everyday life” (Ibid., p. 
320/484f.), was less of an ontological commitment to classical physics than was 
Bohr’s theory of quantum mechanical measurement. On the other hand, all this liberal 
epistemological and nomological structure was set up to draw all the more rigid 
another border line against metaphysics and absolutely unsolvable problems. This was 
Schlick’s final conclusion. 
 
The whole question furnishes a fine example of an important principle of consistent empiricism, as 
upheld, for instance, by the Vienna School; the principle that nothing in the world is intrinsically 
unknowable. There are many questions, to be sure, which for practical or technical reasons will never 
be answered, but a question is intrinsically insoluble only in the one case where it is no question at all, 
and we are dealing, therefore, with a problem wrongly put. The limit of knowability lies only at the 
point where there is nothing further to which knowledge could address itself. Where the quantum 
theory sets a limit to causal knowledge [Kausalerkenntnis], where it tells us to abandon the search for 
further causes, this does not mean that the additional laws [Gesetzmäßigkeiten] still at work must 
remain unknown to us; it means, rather, that additional laws do not exist and cannot be propounded, 
since the question about them would make no sense. (Ibid., p. 326/489f.) 
 
Echoing this ‘important principle’ Schlick’s paper opened with a succinct description 
of his views about quantum mechanics. Since “to know nature is to establish natural 
laws”, where “by natural law we mean a formula which permits us to predict events”, 
the limit drawn by quantum mechanics reached deeper than possible differences on 
causal matters.  
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[H]owever we may chose to formulate the conclusions which quantum mechanics yields for the causal 
principle, it is nonetheless certain that this theory restricts in quite specific fashion the possibility of 
predicting physical processes. … It therefore sets an insuperable limit to the knowability of nature. It 
is in fact a limit to the possibility of prior causal determination. (All ibid., p. 317/482) 
 
While Frank had been more careful and mentioned possible imperfections, Schlick 
was clearly willing to accept Copenhagen’s finality claim. Everybody admitted that 
quantum mechanics, trivially and like any scientific theory, could turn out to be false 
at the end. In contrast to Frank, Schlick did not advocate a pluralistic conception of 
different languages embedded into and mediated by the physicalist language of 
everyday life. The limit of language was the limit of knowability; quantum mechanics 
was the pivotal example of an empirically corroborated theory that explicitly stated its 
limits.  
Notice that Schlick’s motivation to subscribe to the finality claim was neither 
Bohr’s authority – repeatedly stressed by Beller (See Sect. 2.2.) – nor any ontological 
predilections. Rather did he repeat a move made already in the early 1920s to block 
neo-Kantian interpretations of general relativity by a strict reading of the 
verificationist criterion of meaning and by taking physical theory as a rigid system of 
axioms. Rather than the synthetic a priori, the metaphysical idea to be excluded this 
time were the Kantian ‘things-in-themselves’ and the belief that the question as to their 
nature represented “a meaningful problem, whose solution, indeed, could in principle 
be found by beings organized different from ourselves” (Ibid., p. 318/483) and 
endowed with intellectual intuition. Equipped with this philosophical background, so 
Schlick held in full accordance with Frank, many “authors have welcomed the gaps in 
causality disclosed by recent physics” as a “scope for certain pet metaphysical ideas.” 
(Ibid., p. 317/482) This shows that as regards the opponent, Schlick’s criticism of Kant 
was quite in line with his Viennese colleagues. The main difference, however, was that 
Frank’s radical empiricism was more flexible to possible modifications of quantum 
theory than Schlick’s verificationism.  
 In his last paper, Schlick had not changed his mind on matters of causality as 
compared to 1931. And as regards probability, he remained on Kriesian grounds. In 
quantum mechanics, so he wrote, 
 
it is not possible to make this connection [between experimental conditions and experimental results] 
in a wholly unambiguous way, and this is just what we refer to in speaking of an abandonment of strict 
causality. The uncertainty relations establish for the experimental results, and thus for the values of the 
measured quantities, a quite specific range [Spielraum], having objective significance; they do not 
refer to any subjective ignorance on our part. (Schlick, 1937, p. 320/485) 
 
Accordingly, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations affected the range of possible 
outcomes on which quantum probabilities were defined. Or put differently, 
coordination between symbols and experiences yielded objective possibilities. This 
marked a substantial difference to Frank’s relative frequency approach within which 
the basic object of quantum mechanics was given directly by statistical collectives 
because coordination itself was of a statistical nature. From the standpoint of Schick’s 
(1931) theory of causality, such an approach suffered from an imperfect separation 
between law and disorder. 
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No wonder that Schlick emphasized the historical cleft between the kinetic 
theory of gases and quantum theory which for Vienna Indeterminists just represented 
an important step within a rather continuous scientific development. 
 
[T]he concept of probability plays an altogether different role in modern physics from that assigned to 
it, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases. In the latter, the description of nature with the help of 
statistical mean values is introduced faute de mieux, as it were, because we are not in a position to 
track down the elementary processes in detail …; we therefore renounce insight into the minuter 
molecular processes, though without of course doubting their existence. In quantum theory, by 
contrast, the probability viewpoint is not introduced in consequence of any such renunciation, for here 
it is the appropriate mode of description. Apart from it there are no further independent laws of 
elementary processes, which have remained hidden from us. The quantum laws lay claim to being a 
complete and exhaustive description of nature. (Ibid., p. 319/484) 
 
Setting aside their markedly different accounts of the history of probability in physics, 
the notion of complementarity provided a territory for compromise. Recall that Bohr 
had introduced complementarity as a generalization of causality – not only of his own 
rather narrow concept of causality. It was mainly Frank who changed his position, as it 
were, by a linguistic turn and adopted the physicalist language of Neurath and Carnap. 
Thus both could approach complementarity as a problem about the validity of 
concepts. 
Still, there were important divergences of opinion. While to Frank different 
experimental arrangements corresponded to different statistical collectives, to Schlick 
they corresponded to different ranges. And Schlick remained critical about 
indeterminism because, as in 1931, he still accepted only a negative concept of 
disorder, or randomness, relative to certain laws, while Frank (See Sect. 8.5.) 
considered statistical laws as a positive description of randomness. As the causality 
debate had, ultimately, been absorbed by the notion of complementarity, Schlick’s 
dislike of the adjective ‘undetermined’ found another object: quantum logic.  
 
There are philosophers who maintain that it is possible to speak of an indeterminacy of reality, in the 
sense that a meaningful proposition about it has to be answered, not with ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but at most 
with a statement of probability. This would mean that there were meaningful propositions about reality 
which are neither true nor false: such a view would thus contradict the principle of excluded middle, 
and it is to be rejected as utterly absurd. To declare a real situation to be in a certain respect objectively 
‘undetermined’, can in fact only mean that certain propositions about it are neither true nor false, but 
meaningless. (Ibid., p. 322/486) 
 
One of these philosophers was Reichenbach. But we have seen above that also Frank 
thought it a viable possibility to give a scientific meaning for the assertion ‘the particle 
has an indefinite position’. He rejected it because of the greater advantages of using a 
language that was close to everyday physicalist language. Schlick’s open rejection of 
quantum logic reached again back to the ‘important principle of consistent 
empiricism’: there cannot exist something in principle unknowable; theoretical 
description is complete. While Schlick’s principle pushed him very close to the finality 
thesis, it estranged him, on the other hand, from a research program launched from 
within the Göttingen-Copenhagen group by von Neumann’s Mathematical 
Foundations (1932).181  
                                                          
181 To be sure, the definitive formulation of quantum logic came a few years later.  
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 Moreover, Schlick also discarded Heisenberg’s and von Neumann’s allegedly 
positivist talk about quantum mechanical measurement. He was convinced “that the 
question of the psycho-physical relation has been wrongly dragged into the debate, and 
in any case has nothing to do with the relation of observer and observed, in the sense 
that matters in quantum theory.” (Schlick, 1937, p. 318/483) And discussing the 
second misreading of quantum mechanics mentioned by Frank, Schlick discarded the 
widespread answer 
 
that in itself the electron has neither a quite specific position nor a definite velocity, but that by the act 
of measurement – e.g., by means of very short-wave light – a specific position is nonetheless given to 
it; or more generally, that by means of a particular experimental arrangement it is compelled, as it 
were, to confess to a specific state. Yet even this mode of expression seems to me inadequate. (Ibid. p. 
321/485f.) 
 
The interpretation of a blackened spot on a photographic plate to denote that the 
electron was located at a specific position is already based on a theory of measurement 
that comes afterwards. Thus Schlick also rejected certain Copenhagen-style 
formulations according to which the measurement result emerged or even was created 
by the interaction. Despite ambiguous wording at places, such views were not really 
defended by the leading physicists of the day, but they played a major role for the 
return of spiritualism, idealism, vitalism, and the like, against which the papers of 
Frank and Schlick intended to fortify a united front.  
 
8.8. The Debate Ends 
 
In the end, there were three reasons why about 1936 we can, on the one hand, witness 
a rapprochement between Frank and von Mises, the Vienna Indeterminists turned 
Logical Empiricists, and Schlick, who came to this movement from neo-Kantianism 
and the philosophical thoughts of Planck and von Kries, while, on the other hand, the 
apparent distance between the former and Schrödinger increased. First, the 
Copenhagen interpretation increasingly won the community’s acceptance over the 
factual competitors. Logical Empiricists primarily analyzed given scientific theories. 
When an empirically corroborated scientific theory contradicted some methodological 
or philosophical principles, the latter had to go. For really existing scientific theories, 
conceptual gaps and historical contingencies abounded, so that an improvement or 
completion of a scientific theory in the far future was beyond their scope of analysis. 
As a physicist-philosopher, Schrödinger had also other goals than scientific 
philosophy.  
Second, the Vienna Circle continuously developed the instruments of logical 
and linguistic analysis of science. After his book had appeared in 1932, Frank adopted 
Neurath’s and Carnap’s physicalism. This made possible that Bohr’s notion of 
complementarity provided a domain of compromise, other differences 
notwithstanding. Frank’s linguistic turn estranged him from Schrödinger’s unchanged 
commitment to Boltzmann’s Bild-realism. The common Machian basis lost its 
importance as an identifying factor in the causality debate because the Copenhagen 
interpretation declared itself a positivist tradition. The doubts which Schrödinger 
partly shared came from the declared anti-positivists. Thus, in a certain sense, 
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Schrödinger had become homeless and the common heritage of the Viennese reading 
of Boltzmann had ceased to be a cohesive factor. 
Third, after 1933 the political situation and the intellectual milieu of the 
German speaking countries underwent drastic changes. In Germany and Austria fascist 
governments were in helm, socialists and Jews were forced to emigrate. The general 
intellectual milieu again favored – more powerful than in the turmoil after 1918 and 
with organized oppression – irrationalism, Anschaulichkeit, and individuality in the 
sense of genius and leadership. Nobody among Logical Empiricists’ contemplated 
adaptation. Nor did Schrödinger, even though he was far from associating the 
scientific world conception with politics as most Vienna Circle members did. Frank 
and Schlick had been actively involved in the defense of relativity theory during the 
early 1920. And in particular Frank drew intimate connections between relativity 
theory and quantum mechanics as far as their philosophical import was concerned. In 
the changed political context of the mid 1930s, the newly emerging misinterpretations 
of quantum mechanics appeared to them as a dangerous déjà vu that required forceful 
opposition. Schlick’s and Frank’s goals to render the principles of modern physics 
unassailable by its critics thus suggested a strategic alliance with Copenhagen’s efforts 
at an interpretative fortification. As we have seen, this was not a finality claim about 
quantum mechanics. 
Two years after the Copenhagen congress, all living protagonists of the present 
story but Planck had emigrated and left the Continent. Thus the tradition of Vienna 
Indeterminism ended together with the European phase of Logical Empiricism. The 
causality debate investigated in this book was no longer alive because its protagonists 
did no longer communicate on this subject matter. Moreover, the interpretative debates 
about quantum mechanics largely faded away. Apart from isolated events they would 
not resume until Bohm’s (1952) papers.  
In emigration, Logical Empiricists did little to get the history of their movement 
straight. The devastating effects of the so-called received view on debates about 
positivism are today well-known. While Logical Empiricists’ papers from the 
European days were little read, their intellectual ancestry, Mach, Boltzmann, Planck, 
Exner, was not read at all. What remained for the context of quantum philosophy was 
their endorsement of complementarity and the vague association of their positivism 
with Heisenberg’s. It neatly combined with interpreting the staunch Machian 
Schrödinger as a realist. 
But apart from getting the historical record straight, I have promised a second 
lesson. In the causality debate analyzed here, scientist-philosophers and scientific 
philosophers interacted in various dialogues which involved certain types of 
philosophical arguments and were indebted to traditions centering around them. 
Pragmatic criteria of theory choice and well-entrenched philosophical principles 
competed in the interpretation of empirical results and theoretical foundations. Such an 
interaction was probably a unique feature of the German speaking physics community 
of the day, but it provided that continuous encounter between science and philosophy 
which modern philosophy of science aspires at. This interesting object, I believe, 
should not be minimized by stockpicking in order to maximize the score of a beloved 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
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